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65. See note 28 supra. In view of the fact that the 1949 Geneva Conventions clearly indicate that the
activities of the Protecting Power and of the ICRC are complementary and not alternative (see Levie, note
53 supra, at 394-96), it is difficult to understand why the resolution was phrased in the disjunctive.
66. ICRC, Reaffirmation, at 7, where the following appears:
".
. . Thus the wars of Italy with Abyssinia in 1935, ofJapan with China in 1937, of Germany with Poland
in 1939, ofRussia with Finland in the same year, and ofjapan with the United States in 1941, opened without
a formal declaration of war."
To the same effect see ibid., 87-88.
67. Common Article 9/9/9/10 is the basic provision of the four 1949 Geneva Conventions relating to
the activities of the ICRC. Paragraph 3 of common Article 10/10/10/11, concerning replacements and
substitutes for Protecting Powers, permits the ICRC to offer its services to perform the humanitarian functions
of the Protecting Power when there is no Protecting Power. This is probably the basis upon which the ICRC
has acted in the post- 1949 Geneva Conventions era. One of its more successful recent efforts was in connection
with the Honduras-Salvador conflict. 9 Int'l Rev. Red Cross 493-96 (1969), 10 ibid., 95-105 (1970).
68. A/1120, para. 226. Italy suggested considering the possibility of "delegating authority to the
International Red Cross, so that that body may, in the case ofarmed conflict, ensure that its own representatives
are continually present in the belligerent countries throughout the duration of the conflict." Ibid., at 79 of the
original United Nations document. A somewhat similar suggestion was made by the group ofexperts convened
by the ICRC. ICRC, Reaffirmation 107.
69. Le Comite International de la Croix-Rouge et le Conflit de Coree: Recueil des Documents, passim
(2 vols., 1952); British Ministry of Defence, Treatment of British Prisoners ofWar in Korea 33-34 (1955).
70. "The International Committee and the Vietnam Conflict," 6 Int'l Rev. Red Cross 399, 402-03
(1966); St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Feb. 5, 1970, p. 2B, col. 1.
71 . Strangely enough, it has apparently been permitted to function with virtually no restrictions in Israel
for the protection ofboth prisoners of war and of civilians in the occupied territory. See, for example, 8 Int'l
Rev. Red Cross 18-19 (1968); 9 ibid., 173-76, 417-19, 488, and 640. On the other hand, the United Nations
has encountered some difficulty in making an investigation ofthe treatment ofcivilians in the occupied territory
because of the Israeli position that the resolution calling for it was biased and one-sided. However, even the
International Conference of the Red Cross found it necessary to express concern about the plight of these
people. 9 Int'l Rev. Red Cross 613 (1969).
72. The Report also makes a suggestion to this latter effect. A/7720, para. 217. It is entirely possible,
however, that some States, notably Switzerland and Sweden, which did yeoman work as Protecting Powers
during both World Wars, would not wish to shoulder these additional, and potentially controversial, problems.
This would make the solution herein suggested all the more necessary. It might be appropriate to cover this
eventuality by providing for a possible division of functions, where desired, the Protecting Power, if there be
one, performing the traditional functions with respect to wounded and sick, prisoners of war, and civilians,
and the substitute performing the function with respect to the conduct of hostilities.
73. In ICRC, Reaffirmation 89-90, this is ascribed to the fact that many of the conflicts since 1949 have
been of an internal nature; but what of Korea, the Yemen, Vietnam, the Middle East, etc.? In none of these
conflicts has there been a Protecting Power.
74. In A/7720, para. 216, it is suggested that a new organ be created which could "offer its services in
case the Parties do not exercise their choice." For the reasons already advanced, it is not belived that any system
other than one which operates automatically will constitute a solution to the problem.
75. This calls for selection by one State, acceptance by the State so selected, and approval by the State
on whose territory the Protecting Power is to operate. See Levie, note 53 supra, at 383.
76. The Report {A/1120, para. 218) makes two suggestions with respect to the legal effect of the
designation of a Protecting Power or of an international organ as a substitute therefor: (1) that the Protecting
Power, or the substitute, should be considered as an agent of the international community and not merely of
one belligerent State; and (2) that the designation, being solely humanitarian in purpose, should have no legal
consequences. The first comment is already true under the 1949 Geneva Conventions, although the term
"Parties to the Convention" is deemed appropriate rather than "international community" (sec Levie, note
53 supra, at 382-83); and the second comment might well be accomplished by the use of a provision such as
that appearing in the last paragraph of common Article 3 of the 1949 Conventions: "The application of the
preceding provisions shall not affect the legal status of the Parties to the conflict." This provision was eventually
applied during the French-Algerian conflict of the late 1950s and early 1960s.
77. The ICRC experts were also of this opinion. ICRC, Reaffirmation 89 and 91. Had such an
international body heretofore existed with such powers and duties, there could have been immediate
investigations of allegations of such charges as the use of gas in the Yemen by the United Arab Republic, of
bacteriological agents in Korea by the United Nations Command, etc. In this regard, see Joyce, Red Cross
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International 201 (1959). In fact, it is probably safe to say that under these circumstances many such allegations
would never be made in the first place!
78. The subject is there discussed at length. A/7720, paras. 216-225. Despite the cautious defense of the
use of a political organization as a Protecting Power, made in the last paragraph cited, it would appear that,
for the reasons heretofore stated (see text in connection with note 46 supra), the creation ofa new, non-political
body is basically the position taken by the Report.
79. See note 57 supra. The reservations were justified. The article, in effect, authorizes the Detaining
Power to unilaterally select a substitute for the Protecting Power. The reservations would merely require
agreement on the part of the Power of Origin, as in the case of the selection of the Protecting Power itself.
See note 75 supra. Of course, were it a Party to the new convention which we are discussing, it would have
agreed in advance to the filling of the void by the ICEHRAC.
80. I Final Record 201. Concerning this resolution, see the text in connection with note 45 supra.
81. Once again, of course, the ICEHRAC would need a fairly large operational staff, including many
specialists, to serve as its eyes and ears to collect and sift evidence. But this is no more than an administrative
problem which should present no insurmountable difficulty.
82. There is no reason whatsoever why, under appropriate legal safeguards (see note 76 supra), these
provisions could not be made applicable to internal conflicts, and to conflicts of "national liberation," which
are frequendy much more sanguinary than are international conflicts. "Nigeria/Biafra: Armed Conflict with
a Vengeance," he. cit., note 64 supra.
83. The question will undoubtedly be asked immediately why the present discussion concerning the
elimination ofchemical and biological weapons does not include nuclear weapons. That matter has been, and
continues to be, one of the major subjects of discussion at the meetings of the nuclear powers themselves and
at the meetings of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (formerly the Eighteen-Nation
Committee on Disarmament). The status of these various discussions and the reason for the stalemate which
has now existed for more than a decade is well known. It could not conceivably serve any useful purpose for
this paper to make a proposal for the banning of nuclear weapons, with or without inspection. Probably only
some scientific breakthrough will solve that problem. In the meantime we have what some call "the equilibrium
of dissuasion." ICRC, Reaffirmation 50.
84. The Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other
Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on June 17, 1925 (94 L.N.T.S. 65; 25
Am. J. Int'l L. Supp. 94 (1931)), uses the term "bacteriological." Because scientific developments since 1925
have indicated the possible use in armed conflict ofvarious living organisms (e.g, rickettsiae, viruses, and fungi),
as well as bacteria, the more inclusive "biological" is now very generally used. In this regard see the Report
ofthe Secretary-General based on the Report ofthe Group ofConsultant Experts, United Nations Document
A/7575/Rev. 1 , Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and the Effect of Their Possible Use
(United Nations publication, Sales No.: E. 69, I. 24), paras. 17-18 [hereinafter cited as UN, CB Weapons],
and Article I of the British Draft Convention, note 130 infra, which refers to "microbial and other biological
agents."
85. In the Foreword to the Report of the Secretary-General (see UN, CB Weapons, note 84 supra, at
viii), U Thant quoted as follows from his 1968 Annual Report:
"... The question ofchemical and biological weapons has been overshadowed by the question
of nuclear weapons, which have a destructive power several orders of magnitude greater than that of
chemical and biological weapons. Nevertheless, these too are weapons of mass destruction regarded
with universal horror. In some respects, they may be even more dangerous than nuclear weapons
because they do not require the enormous expenditure of financial and scientific resources that are
required for nuclear weapons. Almost all countries, including small ones and developing ones, may
have access to these weapons, which can be manufactured quite cheaply, quickly and secredy in small
laboratories or factories ..."
86. A comparatively short list ofsome ofthe works in this area will be found in UN, CB Weapons, note
84 supra, at 99. To that list should certainly be added McCarthy, The Ultimate Folly: War by Pestilence,
Asphyxiation, and Defoliation (1969).
87. Mention need be made ofonly two authoritative forums where numerous discussions of this subject
have taken place: the United Nations, where it has been discussed at length both in the First Committee and
in the General Assembly; and the United States Congress where Representative Richard D. McCarthy and
others similarly concerned have not allowed the matter to pass unnoticed. See, for example, N.Y. Times,
Nov. 19, 1969, p. 9, col 1.
88. One author makes the rather pessimistic evaluation that this recent concern "is perhaps an index of
the growing role ofsuch weapons in military preparations." Brownlie, "Legal Aspects ofCBW" in Rose (ed.),
CBW: Chemical and Biological Warfare 141, 150-51 (1968). [This collection hereinafter cited as Rose, CBW].
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FOREWORD
The International Law Studies "Blue Book" series was initiated by the Naval
War College in 1901 to publish essays, treatises and articles that contribute to
the broader understanding of international law. In Levie on the Law of War, the
series republishes selected essays of Howard S. Levie.
Professor Levie has contributed to the articulation and development of the
law of war for over half a century; initially as a judge advocate in the United
States Army, next as a Professor at Saint Louis University School of Law, and
then as a widely published and highly respected Professor Emeritus. In 1971
Professor Levie began a long relationship with the Naval War College, when
he occupied the Charles H. Stockton Chair of International Law. In authoring
two volumes of the "Blue Book" series, Prisoners of War in International Armed
Conflict and Documents on Prisoners of War, he revitalized the series and restored
it to the forefront of scholarly works involving international law. Thus, it is
fitting that we again turn to Professor Levie for this, the seventieth volume of
the series.
The editors' selection of articles from Professor Levie's voluminous works
illustrate the breadth and depth of his scholarship, and evidence the profound
impact he has had on the law applicable to armed conflict. We are pleased to
be able to remind those who have long read Professor Levie, and acquaint those
who are new to his writings, of the continued vitality of his work. While the
opinions expressed in these writings are those of Professor Levie, and are not
necessarily those of the United States Navy nor the Naval War College, one
cannot quarrel with Professor Levie's commitment, as one ofmy predecessors,
Vice Admiral James B. Stockdale noted in the Foreword to Prisoners of War, "to
those principles of humanitarianism necessary to regulate an imperfect world."
On behalf of the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations and
the Commandant of the Marine Corps, I extend to the editors our thanks in
bringing together these outstanding examples of Professor Levie's work. To
Professor Levie, I extend my gratitude for his many contributions to the Naval
War College. His legacy at the College will be an enduring one.
JAMES R. STARK
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, Naval War College
Professor Howard S. Levie
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INTRODUCTION
It is a rare privilege in life to ascend to the top of one's chosen profession.
Yet to do so, and then, upon reaching mandatory retirement age, successfully
embark on a path that takes you to the pinnacle ofstill another is an extraordinary
accomplishment. Professor Howard Levie is just such an individual. Rising to
the rank of Colonel in the United States Army, he compiled an impressive
military record while serving in an array of high-level legal positions, including
ChiefofInternational Law for the United States Army, and Staffjudge Advocate
of the Southern European Task Force, European Command, and Sixth Army.
Colonel Levie also had the rare opportunity to shape history, most notably
through his participation in the Korean War Armistice talks.
Following retirement from the Army, now "Professor" Levie went on to
establish himself in academia as one of the masters of international law,
particularly the law ofarmed conflict. A second retirement as Professor Emeritus
from Saint Louis University only served to accelerate that process. He is as
prolific today at 90 as he ever was; more importandy, his work continues to
impact the direction the law ofarmed conflict takes—and is likely to take in the
future. Indeed, as will become apparent, his own views continue to evolve even
as this selection of his works is published.
The defining characteristic of Professor Levie's work is this very duality; he
is neither simply an academic in uniform, nor merely a soldier in academic robes.
Too often, academics, including some who have served in the military, are
divorced from the reality of the combat operations that law shapes. Their work
is thought provoking, but of little real utility to the warfighter or policy maker.
The view from the ivory tower is simply too distant. By the same token, as some
military officers enter the halls of academia, their output tends to the anecdotal,
rather than incisive. While there is merit in the "sea story" as the subject of
scholarly contemplation, it cannot replace the critical thinking that characterizes
true scholarship. These individuals aptly describe the fog of war, but do litde to
clear it away.
Professor Levie, by contrast, is as much the academic as soldier—and vice
versa. Thus, he brings a synergism to his writings that sets them apart from so
much else in the field. They are as relevant and useful at the Pentagon or Naval
War College as they are at Oxford or Yale. Therein lies their uniqueness . . .
and beauty. Perhaps it is fitting, then, that his selected works be edited by both
a military officer and an academic.
Professor Levie's writings appear in a variety ofjournals, not all ofwhich are
readily available. We thought, therefore, that it would be worthwhile to bring
together in one volume those which we considered most valuable and thought
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provoking. We also thought it would be fitting recognition on the occasion of
his 90th birthday in December 1997.
Of course, any editor who must select 20 or so writings from a body ofwork
that includes 10 books (several of which are multi-volume works) and over 75
articles, and continues to grow, understandably approaches that task with some
trepidation. In making our selection, we set two criteria for inclusion. First, we
wanted to include articles which remained especially relevant, to produce a book
which would be useful to today's, and tomorrow's, scholars and practitioners.
To that end, we asked Professor Levie to prepare addenda to five chapters
reflecting changes in the law since they were originally published. Second, we
hoped to emphasize those topics in the law of war to which Professor Levie
devoted his greatest attention, and upon which his international reputation is
primarily based. Thus, there is a heavy emphasis on prisoners of war, the first
subject to which he turned, and that which has been the focus of much of his
work since. There are also a number of articles discussing the legal issues
surrounding war crimes, an interest ofProfessor Levie's in which he has recendy
invested significant effort. Given his long ties to the Naval War College, it should
come as little surprise that we have also elected to include several articles dealing
with naval warfare. The articles are presented chronologically, both because
several pieces cut across subject-matter boundaries, and to emphasize the
impressive temporal scope and developmental vector of his jurisprudence. As
an aside, we also endeavored to remain true stylistically to the original articles,
with the exception ofconverting foot notes to end notes. Thus, we only altered
the original article when a clear editing error had been made.
The opening piece, The Nature and Scope of the Armistice Agreement (1956),
apdy meets these criteria for inclusion. Written while Professor Levie was on
active duty, it reviews the history and development of the armistice as an
instrument governing non-hostile relations between belligerents, concluding
that formal peace treaties are being supplanted by armistices as the prevailing
method ofending wars. Not unexpectedly, Nature and Scope was resorted to time
and again by practitioners to help ascertain the status of relations between Iraq
and Coalition States following cessation ofhostilities in Operation Desert Storm.
Indeed, it was referenced as late as 1997 byjudge advocates considering the status
of aircrew members that might fall into Iraqi hands while enforcing the no-fly
zones of Operations Southern and Northern Watch. The scholarly treatment
provided the topic in Nature and Scope is complemented neady by Across the Table
at Pan Munjom (1965), an account of Professor Levie's own experiences as a
negotiator in the Korean armistice talks.
In Prisoners of War and the Protecting Power (1961), Professor Levie turns to a
topic for which he has become best known, prisoners of war. Writing in the
American Journal of International Law nearly four decades ago while still a
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military officer, he discusses the historical evolution and functioning of the
institution ofthe Protecting Power, arguing that it deserves to play a central role
in safeguarding prisoners from excesses by Detaining Powers. It is a theme to
which he will return time and again. For instance, in Some Major Inadequacies in
the Existing Law Relating to the Protection of Individuals During Armed Conflict
(1971),he singles out the non-existence of a means for ensuring the presence of
a Protecting Power in each State party to an armed conflict as one offour major
lacunae in the law. Soon thereafter, in International Law Aspects of Repatriation of
Prisoners of War During Hostilities: A Reply (1973), an extended comment on an
article by Professor Richard Falk on repatriation, Professor Levie rejects the idea
of releasing repatriated prisoners of war to "ad hoc and self-styled humanitarian
organizations," as occurred on occasion during the Vietnam conflict. Instead,
he argues, repatriation is best accomplished by Protecting Powers, or, in their
absence, the International Committee of the Red Cross. He returns to the topic
once more in the last work included in the book, Enforcing the Third Geneva
Convention on the Humanitarian Treatment of Prisoners of War (1997). It is there
that he labels it a "tragedy" that the sole use ofProtecting Powers since the 1949
Convention occurred during the Falklands War.
As the tides just cited suggest, though the need for Protecting Powers is a
pervasive call in Professor Levie's work, he delved into virtually every facet of
the prisoner of war theme. For instance, in The Employment of Prisoners of War
(1963), he outlines the Geneva Prisoners ofWar Convention limitations on the
use of prisoner labor. In this piece, Professor Levie's "soldier" persona surfaces
in his understanding ofthe need for balance in treatment ofthe subject, for while
prisoner labor is certainly subject to abuse by a Detaining Power, productively
occupying prisoners can actually enhance their morale.
Of the articles reproduced here, Maltreatment of Prisoners of War in Vietnam
(1968) offers the most wide ranging treatment of prisoner of war prescriptions.
In it, Professor Levie takes on the contentious issue of the applicability of the
Prisoners ofWar Convention to the Vietnam War. Was it an international armed
conflict thereby requiring compliance by all Parties to the Convention, or was
it a non-international armed conflict, in which case only the minimal protections
of Common Article Three to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 would apply?
What customary law applies to the treatment of those captured? What
responsibilities does a belligerent have vis-a-vis maltreatment of prisoners by an
ally? Professor Levie then surveys allegations of mistreatment by the United
States, South Vietnam, North Vietnam, and the Vietcong. The piece retains its
relevance, for the applicability of the Convention and the quality of treatment
required to be accorded to prisoners were both issues that surfaced during the
GulfWar, not only with regard to the treatment of Coalition prisoners held by
the Iraqis, but also as to the treatment of Iraqi prisoners of war.
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Professor Levie has also devoted much of his effort to writing about war
crimes and the appropriate enforcement regime for them. Criminality in the Law
of War (1986) sets the stage by distinguishing between the treatment accorded
prisoners for pre-capture and post-capture offenses. Also setting the stage is The
Rise and Fall of an Internationally Codified Denial of the Defense of Superior Orders
(1991). Superior orders—the claim that the accused committed a war crime
because he was so ordered by a superior officer (or Government) and that refusal
would have resulted in harsh punishment—is a purported defense that has been
presented for as long as war crimes have been prosecuted. Upon review of its
historical assertions and the largely unsuccessful efforts to codify a denial of the
defense, Professor Levie concludes that "any defense counsel . . . would be
professionally derelict if he failed to assert . . . that the rule denying availability
ofthe defense ofsuperior orders has been rejected as a rule ofinternational law."
It is a conclusion that draws into question the official US position, as stated in
law ofarmed conflict manuals such as the Commander's Handbook on the Law
of Naval Operations, that no such defense exists.
Several of Professor Levie's more recent articles on the subject follow. In
Violations ofHuman Rights in Time of War as War Crimes (1995), he emphasizes
that the law of war includes much of what is in peacetime labeled "human
rights," and that violations of human rights norms during armed conflict may
subject the offender to punishment as a war criminal, as has been done in the
case of the former Yugoslavia. Writing the same year, in Prosecuting War Crimes
Before an International Tribunal, Professor Levie offers a primer on how to conduct
a war crimes prosecution. How does one accumulate evidence or determine
whom to charge? Which rules of evidence apply? The Statute of the International
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: A Comparison with the Past and a Look at the
Future (1995) serves as the mechanism by which Professor Levie looks at how
one war crimes tribunal has been set up to handle such matters. The article is a
comprehensive description of the International Tribunal and its procedures;
topics range from organizational structure and jurisdiction to rules ofprocedure
and penalties. Having described an actual war crimes tribunal, in War Crimes in
the Persian Gulf (1996) he conducts a retrospective analysis of war crimes
committed by the Iraqis during the GulfWar, and oudines how a tribunal might
have handled them had the political decision been taken to establish one. Finally,
Was the Assassination ofAbraham Lincoln a War Crime? (1995) is a fascinating look
back in history at the question: "Is the murder of an individual committed in
wartime by one or more individuals of the same nationality as the victim a war
crime?" Given the contentiousness of events ranging from incidents of
involvement in overseas assassination attempts cited by the Church Committee
to speculation concerning US intentions regarding Saddam Hussein, the article
remains timely despite its use of a case study over 100 years old.
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While Professor Levie may be best known as one ofthe world's most eminent
prisoners ofwar and war crimes scholars, his contributions have ranged far more
widely. Given his enduring affiliation with the United States Naval War College,
it should come as little surprise that he has spent much time considering the law
of naval warfare. We have selected three noteworthy pieces on the subject.
Methods and Means of Combat at Sea (1988) is an excellent survey of the subject
generally, serving as a primer on everything from the applicability of Protocol
I Additional of 1977 and protection of the environment to exclusion zones and
submarine warfare. He deals with the latter subject much more thoroughly in
Submarine Warfare: With Emphasis on the 1936 Protocol (1993). It is an exhaustive
study of the development of the laws of submarine warfare from the American
Revolution through both world wars to the present. Finally, in The Status of
Belligerent Personnel 'Splashed' and Rescued by a Neutral in the Persian Gulf Area
(1991) he addresses the status of Iranian or Iraqi personnel who fell into the
hands of US forces engaged in escort operations during the Iran-Iraq war.
Finding that there was, despite occasional hostile incidents involving US forces,
no state of armed conflict between the United States and either Iran or Iraq,
Professor Levie concludes that they would not be entided to prisoner of war
status under the Prisoners ofWar Convention, but that they would be entitled
to basic humanitarian protections such as adequate food and water and being
free from torture.
We have included several articles dealing with specific weaponry which lies
at the heart ofcurrent debates in the law ofarmed conflict community. Weapons
of Warfare (1975) is an analysis of three types of "weapons" that created great
controversy during the Vietnam War—lachrymatories, napalm, and herbicides.
Finding the use of all three most likely legal during that conflict, Professor Levie
goes on to urge, on practical and humanitarian grounds, against their use in
future wars. In light of the Chemical, Conventional Weapons, and
Environmental Modification Conventions, and Protocol I Additional to the
Geneva Conventions, this piece, written over two decades ago, is particularly
prescient.
Two articles on the subject explore both extremes along the continuum of
weaponry. Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Weapons (1991) surveys the law
applicable to each titled category, with special emphasis on naval warfare.
Professor Levie concludes that while there is no per se prohibition on the use of
nuclear weapons, the use of either biological or chemical weapons is legally
proscribed. Ultimately, he notes that "one might almost regret our inability to
turn back the clock to the nineteenth century, when nuclear, chemical, and
biological weapons . . . were not even a gleam in a scientist's eyes." An addendum
to the piece illustrates the extent to which his aspirations are slowly being realized
in the Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions, which outlaw the use
xii Levie on the Law of War
of either genre of weapons, and the 1996 holding of the International Court of
Justice in the Nuclear Weapons Case, which finds the use of nuclear weapons
generally contrary to international law, except in self-defense "in which the very
survival of a State would be at stake." (The Court did not rule on the legality
of use even in the latter circumstances.)
At the other end of the continuum of weapons lie conventional weapons.
Prohibitions and Restrictions on the Use of Conventional Weapons (1994) examines
the Conventional Weapons Convention and its three annexed Protocols
governing non-detectable fragments, land mines, and incendiaries, respectively.
Despite initial US opposition to Protocol III (the US ratified I & II), Professor
Levie argues that "it is an extremely humanitarian agreement which contains
nothing irreparable of either a political or a military nature that warrants the
refusal of the United States and other major military powers to accept it."
Broader in its coverage of methods and means of warfare is The Law of War
Since 1949 (1995), a sweeping survey of the major post-war instruments
governing armed conflict—the Seabed Treaty, Bacteriological Convention,
Environmental Modification Convention, Protocol I Additional, Conventional
Weapons Convention, and Chemical Weapons Convention. It is a provocative
piece in which he restates his support of Protocol III (concerning incendiaries)
to the Conventional Weapons Convention, and then bemoans the fact that a
convention to prohibit the existence of nuclear weapons is unlikely (even had
the International Court found their use fully contrary to international law) due
to the reality that a number of actual, or potential, possessors would fail to
become Parties, "or would become Parties with the preconceived idea of
violating their agreement and thereafter being in a position to hold the
non-nuclear world hostage."
Professor Levie's willingness to at times swim against the tide of official US
positions is perhaps most evident in The 1911 Protocol I and the United States
(1993). In this article he serially reviews those provisions of the Protocol which
the US finds objectionable, setting forth why they are in fact not contrary to
US interests, or in the case of those which are, explaining how concerns could
be addressed with a very few understandings or reservations at the time of
ratification. Given his credibility as an objective and insightful scholar, and his
impressive credentials as an accomplished military officer, the article has proven
expectedly influential, particularly in military circles.
As should be apparent, Professor Levie has not shied away from forcefully
expressing his opinion. That has certainly been the case with regard to Protocol I
Additional and the weapons treaties. However, it is not a recendy emergent
propensity on his part. For instance, in Major Inadequacies (1971), cited supra
regarding Protecting Powers, he argues for a method by which an automatic
determination that the law of armed conflict applies to a situation can be made,
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cites the need for "a complete and total prohibition of the use in armed conflict
of any and all categories of chemical and biological weapons," and laments the
non-existence of a code governing aerial warfare. It was in the same year that
he wrote Civilian Sanctuaries: An Impractical Proposal. In the article, Professor
Levie takes issue with a proposal contained in two reports of the UN Secretary
General (prepared at the request of the General Assembly) that civilian
sanctuaries be established during armed conflict to ease the difficulty belligerents
experience in discriminating civilians and civilian objects from legitimate
military objectives. To Professor Levie, the proposal did not comport with
reality; States would not be willing to set apart large areas in which any activity
contributing to the war effort would be forbidden, nor willing to deprive
themselves of the labor necessary for defense industries. In a worst case scenario,
the areas could actually become a source of blackmail leverage for a nuclear
nation facing total defeat. In its stead, Professor Levie argues for compliance (not
new norms), codification of the law of air warfare, and creation of a system of
sanctions against States (in addition to individuals) which violate the principle
of military necessity.
Finally, The Falklands Crisis and the Laws of War (1985) has been included in
the collection as a capstone piece—a case study of sorts—that examines many
of the principles discussed throughout the book, but in the context of a single
conflict. In it, Professor Levie considers maritime exclusion zones, protection
of fishing vessels and hospital ships, incendiary weapons, the role of protecting
powers, treatment of civilians, prisoners of war, and mercenaries. The result is
a classic Levie tour deforce.
What was perhaps most gratifying in preparing Levie on the Law ofWar was
the extent to which those involved found themselves distracted from the
somewhat tedious editing process by the substantive brilliance of the articles.
We almost unconsciously found ourselves reading when we should have been
editing. Indeed, a recurring experience for all was rediscovering how relevant
and perspicacious pieces that were in some cases decades old remained. It is our
hope that others will share in that experience.
When all is said and done, this book would not have been possible without
the invaluable assistance of many friends at the Naval War College. Professor
Jack Grunawalt, Director of the College's Oceans Law and Policy Department,
provided encouragement throughout the project, enthusiastically agreeing to
write the opening chapter about Professor Levie's distinguished careers. While
funding was intermittendy problematic, Captains Ralph Thomas and Dan
Brennock of the Center for Naval Warfare Studies ensured it never was for the
editors, thereby giving us the much appreciated luxury of concentrating on the
task at hand. Ms. Carole Boiani and Ms. Allison Sylvia of the College's
Publications and Printing Division supervised the preparation ofthe manuscript,
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an oft onerous task that involved scanning less than optimally preserved articles,
and then correcting the coundess errors that result from this "miracle
technology." They did so with professionalism, speed, and most importantly, a
seemingly inexhaustible supply ofgood spirits. We are indebted to our colleagues
in the Oceans Law and Policy Department—Professor Grunawalt, Captain
Thomas, Colonel Lou Reyna, Commander Jeff Stieb, and Lieutenant Colonel
James Duncan—who willingly read page proofs to identify "typos" that had
eluded our own proofreading efforts. Colonel Duncan was especially helpful as
overall director of the International Law Studies series (Blue Books) in handling
the mechanics of transforming a completed manuscript into a finished book. Of
course, we would be horribly remiss ifwe failed to thank our families for their
understanding support throughout.
Of course, we owe our deepest debt of gratitude to Professor Levie. He
allowed us full editorial control of the project, never once providing anything
but the gendest of suggestions. In fact, upon reviewing the notional table of
contents, he only recommended one addition, Across the Table at Pan Munjom,
emphasizing that the decision on whether to include it was ours, not his. We
did, as we should have in the first place, and the book benefited thereby. Indeed,
our sole complaint is that as we were putting the collection together, Professor
Levie continued to write high quality pieces that deserved to be included,
thereby creating a dilemma ofwhere to draw the line in a corpus ofjurisprudence
that grew as we worked. In fact, Enforcing the Third Geneva Convention was
included at the final hour, forcing us to work with drafts because it was not
actually published until our page proofs were in their last revision. Simply put,
Professor Levie was an absolute joy to work with.
We wish Professor Levie well as he continues to guide the rest of us to better
understanding of the law of war. It was our great honor to serve as editors for
this labor of love.
Michael N. Schmitt, Lt Col, USAF Leslie C. Green, CM., LL.B., LL.D., F.R.S.C.
Professor of International Law Stockton Professor of International Law
United States Naval War College United States Naval War College
Professor Howard Levie and the Law of War
Professor RichardJ. Grunawalt
Once in a great while, someone conies along who makes a significant and
lasting contribution to his or her chosen profession, a contribution that conies
to define the paradigm of that calling. With respect to the development and
articulation ofthe law ofwar, Professor Howard Levie is just such an individual.
Soldier and scholar, patriot and humanitarian, Professor Levie has compiled a
most remarkable record ofachievement in furthering the understanding of, and
compliance with, the law ofwar over the past six decades.
Born in Wolverine, Michigan on 19 December 1907, Professor Levie moved
to Baltimore, Maryland in 1912. Five years later, his family moved to New York
City, where Howard graduated from Dewitt Clinton High School in 1924.
Matriculating at Cornell University that year, Professor Levie was selected to
participate in the "Junior Year in France" program (sponsored by the University
ofDelaware) and, in Paris, attended both the Cours de Civilisation at the Sorbonne
and the Ecole Libre des Sciences Politiques during academic year 1926-27. (Howard
was later to recount that among his instructors at the latter was Professor Pierre
Laval, who became Premier of the Vichy Government during World War II
and who was tried, convicted and executed by the French following the war
for collaborating with the Nazis. Howard describes Professor Laval as, "an
excellent teacher.") Returning to Ithaca, New York in 1927, Professor Levie
entered Cornell Law School under a program that allowed him to combine his
senior year as an undergraduate with his first year oflaw school. He was elected
to Phi Beta Kappa that year and received a Bachelor ofArts degree the following
Spring. In June 1930, he was awarded a Juris Doctor degree from Cornell Law
School.
The young attorney was admitted to the practice of law in New York State
inJune 1931 following a brief (six months) mandatory clerkship. He was engaged
in the private practice oflaw in New York City from 1931 until he entered the
United States Army through the Volunteer Officer Candidate program in
September 1942. It was during that period that he met and married the lovely
Blanche Krim in 1934. Shortly after Howard joined the Army, Blanche did the
same, enlisting in the Women's Army Corps.
Howard underwent basic training at Fort Eustis, Virginia, where, aged 35,
he was 15 to 18 years older than most of his fellow soldiers. In December 1942,
Private Levie reported to the Anti-Aircraft Artillery Officer Candidate School
at Camp Davis, North Carolina. Commissioned a Second Lieutenant in March
1943, he was assigned to Battery K of the 701st Coast Artillery Regiment at
Camp Miles Standish, Taunton, Massachusetts, but soon relocated to Newport,
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Rhode Island where Battery K was tasked to provide anti-aircraft protection to
the Navy torpedo factory on Goat Island. Although his war-time sojourn in
Newport was short-lived, this assignment marked the beginning ofwhat was to
become in later years a close and enduring affinity to this lovely city by the sea.
Having completed a course of instruction for "Triple A" battery officers at
Fort Totten, New York, and one in photo-interpretation at Camp Richie,
Maryland, Howard was directed to Camp Stoneman, Pittsburgh, California, for
further transport to a "permanent station outside the continental limits of the
United States, tropical climate." And "tropical climate" it turned out to be.
Arriving in New Guinea in March 1944, Professor Levie was assigned to Staff
Headquarters, Intermediate Section (responsible for all New Guinea). Promoted
to First Lieutenant in November, he was subsequently reassigned to
Headquarters, Army Forces, Western Pacific (AFWESTPAC) in Manila in July
1945. On 2 September 1945, the Japanese surrendered in a ceremony aboard
USS MISSOURI in Tokyo Bay.
Following cessation of hostilities, AFWESTPAC became heavily involved in
supervising the repatriation ofBritish and American prisoners ofwar from China,
Korea and Japan. It was this experience that helped prompt Howard's interest
in the law applicable to prisoners of war; an interest that led to a life-time study
of that discipline, to include the writing of two books and innumerable law
review articles (many of which are reprinted in this collection). It was also this
assignment that initiated Howard's long involvement in war crimes issues.
Present at the arraignment ofJapanese General Tomoyuki Yamashita before a
U.S. Military Commission in Manila on 8 October 1945, Professor Levie
became in later years, an internationally recognized authority on war crimes.
Indeed, his book Terrorism in War: The Law of War Crimes (1993) is widely
regarded as one of the best of the genre.
In November 1945, Professor Levie was awarded the Bronze Star Medal for
his service in the Southwest Pacific area and, more importantly (at least from
Blanche's point ofview), returned to the United States (terminating a 22-month
separation). Blanche having recently been discharged from active duty, joined
Howard in Washington, DC where he was assigned to the War Department
General Staff as Executive Officer, Supply Control Branch, Requirements
Division, Army Service Forces. A collateral duty as Recorder of the Board for
a joint Army-Navy review of Alaskan defenses took Howard throughout the
length and breadth of Alaska in June of 1946.
In September 1946, Howard accepted a Regular Army commission in the
Judge Advocate General's Corps with a date of commissioning backdated to 19
December 1932 and in the rank of Captain backdated to 19 December 1942.
The following January he was promoted to Major.
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Major Levie began his service in the Judge Advocate General's Corps in
March 1947 in the Legislative Branch of the Claims Division of the Office of
the Judge Advocate General. In February 1949, he entered the Master of Law
program at George Washington University School ofLaw. However, that effort
was interrupted by his selection to attend the Army Command and General Staff
College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Following graduation inJune 1950, Major
Levie received orders to the Far East Command. The North Korean invasion
ofSouth Korea on the 25th ofJune 1950, and the re-designation of the Far East
Command as the United Nations and Far East Command, was to have a
substantial impact on Professor Levie's career. Promoted to Lieutenant Colonel
in September 1950 while assigned to the Judge Advocate Division at General
Headquarters in Tokyo, Howard became involved with the legal review for
General MacArthur ofseveralJapanese war crimes trials in which death sentences
had been adjudged. It was in this period that he also became involved in the
issue of the status of North Koreans captured by United Nations Command
Forces. In March 1951, he was detailed to Korea to serve as Law Member of a
General Court-Martial convened by General Mathew Ridgway, which tried
several U.S. Army members for offenses involving the killing of North Korean
soldiers and, in one case, North Korean civilians.
In July 1951, Lieutenant Colonel Levie was reassigned to the staff of the
United Nations Command Armistice Delegation. That delegation initially
included Vice Admiral TurnerJoy, U.S. Navy (Senior Delegate); Major General
Henry Hodes, U.S. Army; Rear Admiral Arleigh Burke, U.S. Navy; Major
General Lawrence Craigie, U.S. Air Force and Major General Paik Sun Yup,
ROK Army. As detailed in Chapter IV of this volume, Howard played a major
role in the drafting of the Korean Armistice Agreement. He completed his
Korean assignment in June 1952 and returned to Japan. Thereafter, Howard
served as Liaison Officer between the Judge Advocate Division at Command
Headquarters (which had relocated to Yokohama) and other command elements
that remained in Tokyo. He also participated in several important courts-martial
cases, including that of Dorothy Krueger Smith, who was convicted of
murdering her Army Colonel husband; the case reached the Supreme Court of
the United States where it was overturned on jurisdictional grounds.
Lieutenant Colonel Levie's next assignment was as StaffJudge Advocate at
the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. While
there, he and Blanche renewed many old acquaintances and Howard pursued
further his interests in the law of war. That tour of duty commenced in March
1953, but was cut short in September of the following year to permit Howard
to assume the reins of the newly-established International Affairs Division of the
Office of the Judge Advocate General in Washington as its first Chief. Shortly
thereafter, he was promoted to the rank of Colonel. It was during this tour that
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Howard first met with such future international law luminaries as Richard Baxter
(then in the Office of General Counsel, Department of Defense, and in later
years a Judge of the International Court ofJustice), Lou Henkin (then a foreign
affairs officer at the State Department and subsequendy a Professor of Law at
Columbia Law School and President of the American Society of International
Law) and Monroe Leigh (then in the office ofthe General Counsel, Department
of Defense, and later Counselor of the Department of State). Now firmly
immersed in the practice of public international law, Howard was instrumental
in building the International Affairs Division, with its International Law and
War Crimes branches, into a front line authority on the law of war. It was also
during this assignment that he first visited the Naval War College in Newport,
Rhode Island, beginning a lifetime association with this institution. Another
memorable event was his participation in the presentation of the four 1949
Geneva Conventions for the Protection of Victims ofWar to the United States
Senate for its advice and consent to their ratification.
In July 1955, Colonel Levie had occasion to make a lengthy visit to Europe
to assess various status of forces agreement (SOFA) issues with several NATO
nations. While in Europe, he also attended the Academy of International Law
at the Hague for which he received a Certificat d'Assiduite. In November 1955,
Howard was again in Europe, this time to participate in NATO meetings
regarding prisoner of war matters.
Colonel Levie's Washington assignment also allowed him to renew his
determination to obtain a Master ofLaw degree from George Washington Law
School (with a specialization in international law). While studying under
Professor Tom Mallison during that process, Howard authored a paper entitled
''The Nature and Scope of the Armistice Agreement." Subsequently published
in the American Journal of International Law (and included in this present work
as Chapter I), that paper launched Professor Levie's life-long career as an
articulate spokesman for, and commentator on, the law of war. Despite his
frequent trips abroad and heavy work schedule as Chief, International Affairs
Division, Howard earned his LL.M. degree in 1957. He also had occasion during
this period to lecture on SOFA matters at a variety of fora, including the
Washington Foreign Law Society, the Federal Bar Association, the National
War College and the Judge Advocate General's School in Charlottesville,
Virginia.
In April 1958, Colonel Levie was transferred to the Southern European Task
Force headquarters in Verona, Italy, as StaffJudge Advocate. During that tour
ofduty, he often was additionally tasked to support the U.S. Sending State Office
for Italy in a variety ofNATO SOFA matters. He also began a long and fruitful
association with the International Society of Military Law and the Law ofWar,
attending its first Congress in Brussels in May 1959.
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The next stop on Howard's distinguished military career was as Military Legal
Advisor at the U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) Headquarters, then
located in Paris, France. Arriving in Paris in December 1959, he was soon
intensively involved in operational law matters for USEUOM, a number of
which necessitated multiple visits to both NATO and non-NATO nations.
Throughout this period, Howard further honed his law of war credentials.
In June 1961, the Levies returned to the United States where Howard was
assigned to Sixth Army Headquarters at the Presidio ofSan Francisco, California,
as Staffjudge Advocate. He was to hold that position until January 1963, when,
having reached the age of55, he was required by law to retire from active service.
On 31 January 1963, Howard retired in the rank of Colonel, United States
Army. Awarded the Legion of Merit by an appreciative Army and a grateful
nation, he returned to civilian life after 21 years of active military service.
Professor Levie's retirement from the Army signaled not the end, but the
renewal of his journey toward international renown as a law of war scholar. In
September 1963, he joined the faculty of Saint Louis University Law School as
an Associate Professor of Law (he was to become a full Professor with tenure
just two years later). Although his first teaching assignment at the Law School
was Commercial Transactions, he soon assumed responsibility for instruction of
International Law. From September 1963, until his retirement from Saint Louis
University in June 1976 at age 69 (pursuant to mandatory rules then in force at
that institution), Howard wrote over 20 scholarly articles pertaining to the law
of war (seven of which are reprinted in this present volume). While much of
Howard's writings during his tenure at Saint Louis concerned prisoner of war
and war crimes matters, he also had occasion to address a broad spectrum oflaw
of war issues. It was also during this period that Howard and Blanche returned
to Newport to spend a sabbatical year (academic year 1971-72) at the Naval
War College where he was the Charles H. Stockton Professor of International
Law.
As the Stockton Chairholder, Professor Levie filled a Chair which had been
held by some of the preeminent international legal scholars in the world. His
predecessors included the legendary John Bassett Moore, one of the first judges
on the Permanent Court of International Justice; Professor Manley O. Hudson,
then of Harvard Law School, and later a judge on the International Court of
Justice; Professor Hans Kelsen of the University of California at Berkeley;
Professor Leo Gross ofthe Fletcher School ofLaw and Diplomacy; and Professor
Oliver J. Lissitzyn of Columbia Law School.
Professor Levie's retirement from Saint Louis University in 1977, and
attainment of Professor Emeritus ofLaw status, once again marked both an end
and a beginning. Indeed, 21 years of active military service and 14 years of law
school teaching were but the prologue to this illustrious career. As we shall see,
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Howard's most prolific and influential writing has occurred since 1977; some
20 years later, Professor Levie continues to contribute to the development and
articulation of the law of war.
In 1977, the Levies established their permanent home in Newport. Howard
resumed his teaching of international law within the Naval War College as
lecturer in the International Law and Oceans Affairs program of the Naval Staff
College (a role he continued, pro bono, for 20 years, teaching 40 consecutive
classes, until voluntarily withdrawing from the program in July 1997 at age 89
- much to the regret of the College); as the Lowry Professor in 1982-83; and as
an Adjunct Professor of International Law from 1991 to the present. He
continues to lecture in the Naval War College elective course on the Law of
Combat Operations. For over a decade he provided instruction in the Geneva
Conventions to military attorneys of all the services at the Naval Justice School.
During 1984-1988, he was also lecturer in International Law at Salve Regina
College. In addition, Howard has been an honored participant in various
conferences and symposia on the law of naval warfare within the Naval War
College. His enormous contribution to the Naval War College was formally
recognized in October 1994 when Rear Admiral Joseph Strasser, President of
the College, announced the establishment of the Professor Howard S. Levie
Military Chair ofOperational Law in theJoint Military Operations Department.
Through this singular honor, Howard joined an elite listing of distinguished
Americans forwhom such Chairs have been established at the College, including
Admirals Chester Nimitz, William Halsey , Arleigh Burke and Raymond Spruce,
and Generals Tasker Howard Bliss and Colin Powell. As many readers of this
volume can personally attest, Howard has also been a major contributor
throughout these past two decades to the work of a wide variety ofinternational
and domestic organizations and societies concerned with the law of war.
Levie on the Law of War is a compilation of25 articles written by Howard over
the course of his distinguished career. Selected by the editors to reflect the broad
range of topics which he has addressed with great incisiveness, they represent
some of the most influential of his works. However, it must be remembered
that he is also the author or editor of an impressive array of books. His first was
written during his tenure as the Stockton Professor of International Law at the
Naval War College. Perhaps the finest treatise ever written on the law governing
prisoners of war, Prisoners of War in International Armed Conflict, was published as
volume 59 of the Naval War College International Law Studies (the "Blue
Book") series. The book won international acclaim for its scholarship, including
the 1982 Triennial Ciardi Prize of the International Society ofMilitary Law and
the Law of War. That monumental effort was supported by an exhaustive
compilation of source materials (which he edited) entided Documents on Prisoners
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of War. Published as volume 60 of the "Blue Book" series, Documents remains
an essential resource for law of war scholars.
The year 1979 also witnessed publication of the first of a multi-volume set
edited by Howard recording the proceedings ofthe 1974-77 Geneva Diplomatic
Conference which drafted the 1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I). Entided Protection of War Victims,
the fourth and final volume of which was published in 1981, this work was
described by Ambassador George Aldrich, head of the U.S. Delegation to the
Conference, as "an invaluable tool in interpreting and applying the new law
developed by means of the Geneva Protocol."
The second book authored by Howard was published in 1983. Entided The
Status of Gibraltar, this work examines the historical background and status of
the dispute between Great Britain and Spain over that strategically situated
British Crown Colony, making extensive use of documents not previously
analyzed in depth. As with all of his writings, Gibraltar reflects close attention to
thoroughly researched sources and a balanced and honest appraisal of the issues.
Just three years later (1986), Professor Levie's third book was published. A
two-volume work entitled The Code ofInternational Armed Conflict, it constitutes
a comprehensive presentation of the entire law of war, both conventional and
customary. Presented in the form of a code of that body of law, the book sets
forth each rule, identifies its source (s) and presents cogent commentary on its
meaning and application. A superb research tool, The Code ofInternational Armed
Conflict remains an essential part of any law ofwar collection.
Howard next turned his attention to the critically important and intellectually
challenging arena of non-international armed conflict. In 1987, he edited Tlie
Law of Non-International Armed Conflict, which complements his earlier work
Protection of War Victims, and which utilizes the same effective format. Providing
the negotiating history of the 1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to Non-International Armed
Conflicts (Protocol II), this volume provides the reader with a clear
understanding of, and appreciation for the complexities of law and policy
inherent in the regulation of non-international conflict.
1988 witnessed the publication ofHoward's seventh book. Entided The Law
of War and Neutrality: A Selective English-Language Bibliography, this work is
remarkable for both its thoroughness and its organizational clarity. Once again,
his attention to detail, coupled with his mastery of the subject, enabled Howard
to produce a volume that no law of war research scholar should be without.
Professor Levie's long association with the Naval War College and his study
ofthe law ofnaval warfare kindled his interest in the legal aspects ofmine warfare
at sea, a subject that had not previously been comprehensively addressed in the
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literature. His book Mine Warfare at Sea, published in 1992, superbly fills that
gap. Written in non-technical language, this very readable work provides an
overall study of the military, legal, operational and technical history of mine
warfare at sea. Rich with illustrations drawn from four hundred years ofpractice,
Mine Warfare recounts how naval mines have been employed in warfare, how
nations have attempted to regulate their use, and how such mines will likely be
employed in the future. Complete with an exhaustive bibliography and extensive
index, this book is also a "must have" volume on the law ofwar research scholar's
shelf.
Howard's incomparable book on violations of the law of war was published
in 1993. Entitled Terrorism in War: The Law of War Crimes, it draws upon
Howard's extensive experience in war crimes trials and his unequaled expertise
in all matters pertaining to breaches of the Geneva Conventions and to other
violations of the law of war. In the view of many scholars and practitioners in
this field, Terrorism in War is the quintessential treatment of this subject in the
literature, providing the reader, whether scholar or layman, with a
comprehensive analysis of law of war crimes issues—past, present and future.
Presented chronologically, the book examines the early history of war crimes
and war crimes trials through the Gulf Crisis of 1990-91. It then focuses on
procedural matters including jurisdiction, asylum and extradition, and trial
procedures, before turning to the analysis of conventional war crimes, crimes
against peace and crimes against humanity. The book concludes with an
examination of the accused, their victims and their defenses. Ofparticular utility
for research scholars is the inclusion in the appendices of key provisions of all
relevant documents, from the Lieber Code of 1863 through the 1977 Additional
Protocol I. It is in this magnificent work that one sees most convincingly the
enormous contribution of Howard's scholarship to the articulation and
enforcement of the law of war.
In 1995, Howard took on yet another major tasking, the editing of volumes
7 through 12 of Terrorism, Documents ofInternational and Local Control. For those
serious readers not familiar with this superb series, I commend it to you. Volume
12, the last to be edited by Howard, is a veritable well-spring of information
pertaining to contemporary practice and problems relating to terrorism, from
the sentencingjudgment ofthe International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
in the Erdemovic case to the report of the Secretary of Defense concerning the
bombing of Khobar Towers. Here again we see Howard's thoroughness and
objectivity at work.
Not one to rest on his many laurels, Howard Levie continues in his
unrelenting quest to advance the cause of respect for the rule of law in armed
conflict. Indeed, as this volume goes to press, Howard is nearing completion of
yet another important treatise on the law of war. That book, entitled Capitalist
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and Communist Prisoners of War in Korea, draws on his extensive personal
experience in the Korean War and its aftermath as a member of the Staff of the
United Nations and Far East Command and legal advisor to the United Nations
Command Armistice Delegation, and on his peerless expertise in the law
applicable to prisoners of war. This eagerly awaited work will add to the
enormous contribution of this incomparable scholar.
I would certainly be remiss if I failed to mention what is perhaps the most
significant achievement ofHoward's long and illustrious career—his genius and
great good fortune in marrying Blanche. From that date to this, Blanche has
been an integral part of Howard's life work. Indeed, those of us who have had
the privilege and pleasure of knowing the Levies over the years have come to
appreciate that Howard is but one-half of an extraordinary team. Sixty three
years following their exchange ofmarriage vows, Blanche remains the vivacious
spirit of this incomparable duo.
In the end, recounting selected highlights ofHoward Levie's illustrious career
as a lawyer, soldier and scholar does not do justice to either the man or his work.
To those of us privileged to work with and learn from him, Howard is far more.
He is the embodiment ofknowledge and commitment in all matters pertaining
to the law ofwar. Always open and objective, he nonetheless retains the enviable
perspective of the long view. Indeed, this sense of perspective pervades his
writing. All too acquainted with the brutal realities of war, Howard is a man of
compassion—of resolute commitment to the development and enforcement of
rules of normative behavior that mitigate, as much as possible, the suffering
which war inevitably entails. Those acquainted with the Levies will surely
appreciate the enormous influence of Blanche's humanity on Howard's
profound compassion for the victims of war. Yet, he remains a realist, fully
appreciative of the equation of military necessity and of the dictates of national
security during conflict. He understands the plight of the victims ofwar and the
hardship of the individual soldier engaged in its execution. The writings
compiled in this volume reflect Howard's abiding sense of balance, of fairness,
of reality.
I will conclude these remarks with an anecdote that, to me, is the essence of
Howard Levie. Upon completion of a typically erudite lecture on the 1949
Geneva Conventions and the 1977 Protocols to a class of some thirty-five
international naval officers attending the Naval War College, Howard was
approached by an Eastern European officer who appeared to be somewhat
distressed by what he had heard. That officer commented that he fully endorsed
all that Howard had said, but was concerned that in the heat of batde he might
not remember all that he had learned. The officer asked Howard what he should
do in such a circumstance. Howard replied, "Commander, just do what you
know is the right thing to do and you will not go wrong." That is also the
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underlying message in all of Howard's writings on the law of war: whether
national political leader or individual soldier—do what is right and hold
accountable those that do not.
I
The Nature and Scope of the
Armistice Agreement
50 AmericanJournal of International Law 880 (1956)
I. Introduction
For many centuries the armistice agreement has been the method most
frequently employed to bring about a cessation ofhostilities in international
conflict, particularly where the opposing belligerents have reached what might
be termed a stalemate. This practice has not only continued but has probably
increased, during the present century.
The first World War ended in an extended series of so-called armistice
1
agreements. During the twenty-one years which elapsed before the outbreak
of the second World War there were really only two such agreements of any
historical importance: that entered into in Shanghai on May 5, 1932, which
brought about a cessation of hostilities in the Sino-Japanese conflict of that
period; and that entered into at Buenos Aires on June 12, 1935, which ended
hostilities between Bolivia and Paraguay over the Gran Chaco.
The second World War also ended in an extended series ofso-called armistice
agreements; and in the comparatively short period of time since then, there
have already been no less than ten major general armistice agreements concluded
by belligerents. This increased importance in modern practice of the general
armistice as an instrument leading to the restoration of peace has resulted in it
having been likened to the preliminaries of peace (which it has, in fact,
practically superseded), and even to a definitive treaty of peace. Under the
circumstances, it appears appropriate to review the history and development of
the general armistice as a major international convention concerned with the
non-hostile relations of belligerents, as well as to determine its present status
under international law.
II. General Discussion
What is the nature of a general armistice agreement, the war convention
which has properly been termed "the most important and most frequentiy
reached agreement between belligerents"? A general armistice is an agreement
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between belligerents which results in a complete cessation of all hostilities for a
specified period of time, usually of some considerable duration, or for an
indeterminate period. It applies to all of the forces of the opposing belligerents,
wherever they may be located. It may have a political and economic, as well as
a military, character.
This definition, while adequate to describe the nature of a general armistice,
necessarily omits many peripheral but nevertheless important facets of the term
defined, facets which it is essential should be borne in mind in any searching
analysis of the problem. What is the legal basis of the general armistice? How
does it come into being? Does it create a new juridical status between the
belligerents? These are but a few of the more important of the many questions
relating to this problem.
As has already been noted, the armistice is a war convention. By definition a
convention is an agreement; it is a contract; it is consensual. That this is all true
of an armistice is fully established by reference to numerous international
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conventions, military manuals, and authors of texts of international law.
Belligerents are free to enter into an armistice or to decline to do so. They are
free to include in an armistice any provisions which they may desire, unfettered
1
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by either legal restrictions or precedents, guided only by the necessities ofwar.
As one author has apdy stated:
The contractual field for an armistice is completely open. Here again "contracts
take the place of law as between those who enter into them."
It follows that there is no fixed rule or custom which prescribes what provisions
should or should not be included in an armistice agreement. On the other
hand, there are certain provisions which, as will be seen, are very generally
included by the parties, not because ofany legal compulsion, but rather because
experience has proven that such provisions are ofa nature to facilitate the purpose
of the armistice and to insure against violations thereof. And whether the
parties specifically provide therefor or not, an armistice does result in a complete
cessation of active hostilities; that is, it results in a cease-fire. Without a
cease-fire there would, by definition, be no armistice.
Being a contract, it must be negotiated. Because a general armistice results in
a cessation of all hostilities, and because it may contain political and economic
as well as military provisions, it has political significance. It may, therefore, be
made only on behalf of the sovereignty of the state. This sovereignty may be
expressed by either of two methods: first, the armistice may contain a specific
provision that it is to become effective only after ratification; or second, the
representatives of the state designated to negotiate the armistice, and they may
2
1
be military or civilian or both, may be provided with full powers. Modern
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practice appears to prefer the latter method. There were no ratifications of the
so-called Armistice Agreements reached during either World War I or World
22
War II. All of the armistice agreements reached under the aegis of the United
Nations have been negotiated by representatives with full powers. None has
23
required ratification.
While it cannot be disputed that a state has complete freedom in determining
who will represent it in negotiating an armistice, there have been conflicting
expressions ofopinion as to the advisability ofthe selection ofmilitary personnel
for this purpose. Gentili did not believe that the task of negotiating an armistice
should be delegated to the military. He said: "Therefore the leaders in war should
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handle matters which belong to war and not other matters." On the other
hand, one modern writer states that "it is clear that, once the decision is made,
25
the actual negotiations should be conducted by the military organs."
It cannot be said that there is any established modern practice in this regard.
The Renville Truce Agreement (Netherlands-Indonesia) and the India-Pakistan
Cease-fire Order and Truce x\greement were both negotiated by diplomatic
representatives. The four Israeli-Arab Armistice Agreements were negotiated by
the military on behalf of each of the Arab countries and by mixed
civiHan-military delegations on behalf of Israel. The Korean Armistice
Agreement was negotiated and signed exclusively by the military on both sides.
And the three Agreements on the Cessation of Hostilities in Indochina were
negotiated by both military and diplomatic representatives. As a matter offact,
with modern methods ofcommunication, the question is no longer ofvery great
importance inasmuch as the decision of the negotiator, whether he be military
or civilian, will actually be made in each instance pursuant to instructions
received direcdy from his home capital. Perhaps the best solution would be a
"mixed team" consisting of members drawn both from the military and from
the diplomatic corps, the practice followed by Israel in its negotiations with the
Arab states, and by both sides in the Indo-Chinese negotiations.
A matter ofmajor legal interest is that ofthe juridical status which exists during
the period while an armistice is in effect. Is it war, or peace, or some third status?
While there has, on occasion, been some rather loose language used with regard
to this question, it may be stated as a positive rule that an armistice does not
terminate the state ofwar existing between the belligerents, either de jure or de
facto, and that the state of war continues to exist and to control the actions of
neutrals as well as belligerents.
As long ago as the days when Greece and Rome were at the zenith of their
power, it became accepted law that, although the indutiae (armistice or truce)
resulted in a cessation of hostilities, it did not, as did thefoedus (treaty of peace),
result in a termination of the war. The early writers on international law
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concurred in this conclusion. The great majority of contemporary writers
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likewise do so. Both the American and the British military manuals have
uniformly taken the position that an armistice is merely a cessation of active
hostilities and is not to be described as either a temporary or a partial peace.
The rule stated above has received affirmative judicial approval on a number
of occasions. Thus, the United States Supreme Court, confronted with the
question of whether the 1918 Armistice had brought about a state of peace,
ruled that "complete peace, in a legal sense, had not come to pass by the effect
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of the Armistice and the cessation of hostilities."' Similarly, on November 3,
1944, the French Court of Cassation stated that "an armistice convention
concluded between two belligerents constitutes only a provisional suspension
of hostilities, and cannot itself put an end to the state of war.
A few years ago an incident occurred in the Security Council of the United
Nations which has been misconstrued as indicating a rule contrary to that
discussed immediately above. Subsequent to the execution of the
Israeli-Egyptian General Armistice Agreement, Egypt continued to maintain its
"blockade" of the Suez Canal insofar as Israel was concerned. Israel complained
to the Security Council asserting that the four armistice agreements had, in effect,
terminated the state of war between all of the belligerent parties. Egypt, on the
other hand, contended that the state of war continued despite the armistice
agreements and that the blockade was legal. The Security Council on
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September 1, 1951, passed a resolution calling upon Egypt to lift its blockage.
This action of the Security Council has been construed as indicating that a
general armistice is a kind of defacto termination of war. It is considered more
likely that the Security Council's action was based upon a desire to bring to an
end a situation fraught with potential danger to peace than that it was attempting
to change a long established rule of international law. By now it has surely
become fairly obvious that the Israeli-Arab General Armistice Agreements did
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not create even a defacto termination of the war between those states.
One of the most frequent problems to arise with regard to the interpretation
of a general armistice has been the determination of those acts which are
permitted and those which are prohibited. There have been two very definite
schools ofthought on this problem. One school, long designated as the one with
the weight of authority behind it, takes the position that during a general
armistice a belligerent cannot legally do anything which the enemy would have
wanted to and could have prevented him from doing but for the armistice.
The other school, long designated as the one with the weight of reasoning as
well as the weight of practice behind it, takes the position that during a general
armistice the belligerents must refrain from doing only those acts which are
expressly prohibited by it. This dispute is apparendy as old as history, and is
now of historical significance only. Modern discussions of the subject point
out the problem of enforcement and the invitation to charge and countercharge
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inherent in what might be termed the classical approach. In recent years the
belligerents have been prone to spell out with particularity all those specific acts
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which are to be renounced during a general armistice. Whether or not this is
more conducive to an atmosphere which will lead to a restoration of peace is
probably debatable, with strong arguments to be made on either side.
Nevertheless, the modern rule appears to be that belligerents may be presumed
to have the right to do anything which is not specifically forbidden by the terms
of the armistice agreement; and, conversely, that the doing of an act not
specifically prohibited, even though the other side could have prevented it but
for the agreement on the cessation ofhostilities, cannot validly be made the basis
for a complaint of violation or for the denunciation of the armistice.
III. Provisions of Armistice Agreements
Mention has already been made of the fact that the modern general armistice
may, and frequently does, contain military, political, and economic provisions.
An analysis ofthe various provisions ofa number ofgeneral armistice agreements,
using as models not only the post-World War II agreements of this category,
but also a number of older ones, will disclose the direction which the armistice
is taking in the dynamics of international law, and will permit the drawing of
certain conclusions.
Incorporated within the hundreds of armistice agreements which have been
concluded over the course of centuries it is possible to discover provisions
covering almost every conceivable topic. Many such provisions are probably no
longer relevant under conditions of modern warfare; and many were apt only
because of the situation pertaining to a particular conflict. With the foregoing,
which are interesting for historical reasons but which have no particular present
legal significance, it is not necessary to concern oneself. The present-day student
of this problem will be concerned exclusively with the provisions which
belligerents have, either consistently over the centuries, or at least in recent times,
believed it appropriate to incorporate in armistice agreements concluded by
them.
In general, what matters should one expect to find included in a typical
armistice agreement? Probably the most thorough and up-to-date answer to that
question is contained in The Law ofLand Warfare, the new Manual of the United
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States Army. Summarized, the provisions suggested therein relate to:
(1) Effective date and time;
(2) Duration;
(3) Line of demarcation and neutral zone;
(4) Relations with inhabitants;
(5) Prohibited acts;
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(6) Prisoners of war;
(7) Consultative machinery;
(8) Miscellaneous politico-military matters.
Any discussion of the contents of an armistice agreement must logically begin
with a discussion of the suspension of hostilities. That subject disposed of, one
may turn to those of the above-enumerated items which are of some particular
current interest.
A. Suspension of Hostilities
As has already been remarked, an armistice per se, with or without a specific
provision, results in a cessation of hostilities. Nevertheless, only on very rare
occasions have the parties failed to include such a provision.
The Truce ofRatisbonne, signed on August 15, 1684, on behalf ofLeopold,
Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire, and Louis XIV, King of France, did not
specifically suspend hostilities. It contained a provision establishing a truce for
twenty years from the date of ratification. For whatever significance it may
have, it should be noted that we find the same parties entering into the Truce
of Vigevano on October 7, 1696, only twelve years later, and this time with a
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specific provision for a suspension of hostilities.
In April, 1814, Napoleon abdicated as Emperor and an armistice was entered
into between the Allies and the French. While the brother of Louis XVIII had
come to France as the representative ofthe King, there was considerable question
as to the extent of control which he would be able to exercise over Napoleon's
Grand Army. Accordingly, the armistice provided for a suspension of hostilities
but only if "the commanding officers of the French armies and fortified places
shall have signified to the allied troops opposed to them that they have recognized
the authority ofthe Lieutenant General of the Kingdom of France." Although
a somewhat similarly confused political situation existed in Italy in 1943, it was
apparently considered unnecessary to include such a provision in the Armistice
Agreement of September 3, 1943, between the United Nations forces and the
government of Marshal Badoglio which had succeeded Mussolini.
The Armistice Protocol signed by the Russians and the Japanese at
Portsmouth on September 1, 1905, contained a clause prohibiting
bombardment of enemy territory by naval forces, but no other provision with
regard to the suspension ofhostilities. It directed the two governments to order
their military commanders to put the Protocol into effect. On September 13 an
agreement was reached by the army commanders in Manchuria which
specifically provided for the suspension ofhostilities effective on September 16.'
On September 18, a "Naval Protocol of Armistice" was signed by the navy
commanders which, while it established a boundary line between the two fleets,
Armistice Agreement 7
54
again did not specifically suspend hostilities. And the two army commanders
in Korea were unable to reach an agreement prior to the exchange ofratifications
of the peace treaty on September 25.
On a number of occasions the United Nations has adopted, apparently
without any reason therefor, terminology new to international law in its actions
relating to armistice agreements. The Renville Truce Agreement uses the novel
term "stand-fast and cease-fire."' The India-Pakistan Agreement provides for
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a "cease-fire." The Israeli-Arab General Armistice Agreements adopt the
procedure ofomitting a specific provision for a suspension ofhostilities—perhaps
on the theory that this was unnecessary in view of the "truce" which had
previously been imposed on the belligerents by the United Nations—and merely
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established "a general armistice between the armed forces of the two Parties."
The Korean Armistice Agreement reverted to standard procedure, providing
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for "a complete cessation of all hostilities" in Korea.
B. Effective Date and Time
It has been stated that
in armistices time is of the first consideration. The time of commencement and
the moment of termination should be fixed beyond all possibility of
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misconception.
In the event that the armistice fails to specify an effective date and time, it is
assumed that it is intended to become effective immediately upon signing.
Because of difficulties in assuring the receipt of proper notification by all
commands, or for other reasons, it has, on occasion, been deemed advisable to
have the armistice become effective on a later date. For the same reason, the
suspension of hostilities has on occasion been made effective at different times
in different areas. In view of the nature of the elaborate communications
systems with which the modern army is usually equipped, neither of these
situations should any longer occur.
The United States has been involved in at least one controversy with regard
to the effective date of an armistice. The Protocol of Washington (United
States—Spain) , which was signed on August 12, 1898, provided that
upon the conclusion and signing of this protocol hostilities between the two
countries shall be suspended, and notice to that effect shall be given as soon as
possible by each Government to the commanders of the military and naval
c 64forces.
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The effective date of the suspension of hostilities was obviously not stated with
sufficient precision. Spain later contended that the protocol had been effective
from the date of signature. The United States took the position that this would
render meaningless the latter part of the provision and that the suspension of
hostilities had become effective only upon receipt of notification by the military
and naval commanders in the field. More care in the drafting of the provision
would have obviated this dispute, which involved the capitulation of Manila.
The importance ofclearly indicating the effective date and time ofan armistice
agreement appears to be a lesson well learned, for we find that the subject is fully
covered in all of the post-World War II armistice agreements. Continued
adherence to this practice will be at least a small step in minimizing the difficulties
between belligerents which inevitably arise during any armistice.
C. Duration
Two types of provision with regard to duration are found in armistice
agreements. Some specify a definite period. Thus, the Armistice of Nikolsburg
and that of Shimonoseki provided for durations of four weeks and twenty-one
days, respectively. The Armistice ofMalmoe, concluded by the King ofPrussia
and the King of Denmark on August 26, 1848, provided for an armistice of
seven months with automatic prolongation unless one month's advance notice
was given by either party. And the agreement reached by the French and the
Austrians in Vienna on July 13, 1809, provided for an armistice of one month,
but with fifteen days advance notice of resumption of hostilities. Others
provide for an indefinite duration or contain no provision whatsoever on this
subject. Where this is the situation, the armistice remains effective until due
notice of denunciation has been given by one of the belligerent parties.
It has been said that "it is customary to stipulate with exactness the period of
time during which hostilities are suspended." Although, prior to the twentieth
century, armistice agreements, more frequendy than not, specified an exact
duration, modern practice seems to be otherwise. No duration is specified in
any of the major armistice agreements concluded since World War II. Thus, for
example, the Renville Truce Agreement provides that it shall be considered
binding unless, in effect, one party terminates it because of violations by the
other party. The Israeli-Lebanese General Armistice Agreement provides that
it "shall remain in effect until a peaceful settlement between the Parties is
achieved." The Korean Armistice Agreement provides that it shall remain in
effect until superseded by "an appropriate agreement for a peaceful settlement
at a political level between both sides." Of course it may be argued that these
two latter agreements are determinate, inasmuch as they remain in effect until
an event certain. Perhaps so, but it can scarcely be said that there has been any
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stipulation with exactness as to the duration of the armistice under these
circumstances. The Israeli-Lebanese General Armistice Agreement is seven years
old and no "peaceful settlement" is in sight. And while the Korean Armistice
Agreement is only three years old, the "peaceful settlement" mentioned therein
looks equally remote.
It has been stated above that where an armistice is ofindeterminate duration,
it remains effective until "due notice" of denunciation has been given.
Sometimes an armistice specifies the period of advance notice of denunciation
which is required. Thus, the second Thessaly Armistice entered into by the
Greeks and the Turks on June 3, 1897, provided for 24 hours' notice of
73
resumption ofhostilities. More often, it does not. Article 47 ofthe Declaration
of Brussels admonished that "proper warning be given to the enemy, in
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accordance with the conditions of the armistice"; and Article 36 of both of
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the Hague Regulations (1899 and 1907) said approximately the same thing.
The practical value of these provisions is dubious. It is precisely when there
is no relevant condition in the armistice agreement that resort must be had to
general international law. In this instance, conventional international law being
lacking, resort must be had to custom—and custom says that "good faith requires
that notice be given of the intention to resume hostilities."
A number of authors have commented on Sherman's ire when the armistice
which he had concluded with Johnston on April 18, 1865, was disapproved by
President Johnson and Secretary Stanton, and upon his honor and fairness in
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giving 48 hours' notice of resumption of hostilities to General Johnston. Of
his ire there can be no doubt. ' Without attempting to detract from General
Sherman's honor and sense of fairness, it is necessary to point out that the
armistice itself provided for 48 hours' notice of resumption of hostilities.
Actually, Sherman even referred to this provision of the armistice agreement in
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giving the notice which it required.
D. Demarcation Line and Neutral Zone
A demarcation line between the two belligerent forces, frequently
accompanied by a neutral zone, has long been a technique employed for the
purpose of preventing incidents which, even though inadvertent, might lead to
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a resumption of hostilities. The statement that a "neutral zone is actually the
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only means there is of preventing violations of the armistice" is probably too
strong and tends to overevaluate the neutral zone. A neutral zone is
unquestionably a very great aid in preventing incidents. However, it is definitely
not a cure-all.
The last century provides a number of historical examples of the use of the
demarcation line and the neutral zone in armistice agreements. In the Armistice
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of Cintra (France—Allies) provision was made for the River Siandre to be the
line of demarcation between the two armies with Torres Vidras as "no man's
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land.'" The French-Austrian Armistice of Vienna of 1809 plotted a line of
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demarcation from point to point, but did not provide for a neutral zone. " The
Armistice of Nikolsburg required the Austrians to remain 2 !/4 miles from a line
of demarcation which had been previously established, thus creating a neutral
zone entirely at the expense of the Austrians. And in the Greco-Turkish War
of 1897 both the Armistice of Epirus and that of Thessaly provided for lines of
demarcation.
The post-World War II armistice agreements have, in the main, followed the
long established tradition. The Renville Truce Agreement provided for both a
line of demarcation and a demilitarized zone. Like so many other novelties in
this document, the line of demarcation was designated "the status quo line"—
a
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term unique to this agreement! The Israeli-Lebanese General Armistice
Agreement created a demarcation line and provided that only defensive forces
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would be permitted "in the region" of the line. This rather unusual
arrangement was probably due to the fact that the demarcation line was the
international boundary line between Lebanon and Palestine.
The Korean Armistice Agreement contains a rather elaborate series of
provisions establishing and regulating both a "Military Demarcation Line" and
a "Demilitarized Zone." The same may be said ofthe agreements entered into
at Geneva on July 20, 1954, between representatives of the
Commanders-in-Chief of the French Union Forces in Indochina and of the
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People's Army of Viet-Nam.
It will be noted that the foregoing enumeration does not include the
India-Pakistan Resolution for a Cease-Fire Order and Truce Agreement. In that
agreement it was not necessary to create a demarcation line or a neutral zone,
inasmuch as Pakistan agreed to withdraw her forces from the territory of the
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State ofJammu and Kashmir.
E. Relations with Inhabitants
A number of different problems arise during an armistice with regard to the
relations between the belligerents and the local inhabitants. These problems
include the movement of civilians from the territory controlled by one
belligerent to that controlled by the other, commercial intercourse between the
two territories, etc. However, as will be seen, these problems are all interrelated.
Article 50 of the Declaration of Brussels merely stated that it was within the
power of the two belligerents "to define in the clauses of the armistice the
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relations which shall exist between the populations." Article 39 ofboth of the
Hague Regulations purported to extend the contractual freedom of the parties
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by specifically including therein "what communications may be held in the
theatre ofwar with the inhabitants and between the inhabitants ofone belligerent
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State and those of the other." Neither of the foregoing provisions included
Lieber's corollary to the effect that "if nothing is stipulated the intercourse
remains suspended, as during actual hostilities." Both the Rules of Land
Warfare and The Law ofLand Warfare elaborate somewhat on Lieber, pointing
out the necessity for a specific provision in the armistice, and then stating:
Otherwise these relations remain unchanged, each belligerent continuing to
exercise the same rights as before, including the right to prevent or control all
intercourse between the inhabitants within his lines and persons within the enemy
lines.
It is probably also appropriate to point out here that Article 134 of the 1949
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War, directs the belligerents, upon the close of hostilities, "to ensure the return
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ofall internees to their last place ofresidence, or to facilitate their repatriation."
From the foregoing it is clear that the official point ofview is that the parties
may include provisions concerning civilians in the armistice agreement, but that,
failing such provisions, the condition of civilians remains unchanged from that
existing during hostilities. The writers of texts on the subject are not quite so
unanimous. The majority concur with the doctrines set forth above. At least
one author believes that "liberty of movement [for the civilian population] is
presumed ifthe armistice is general and is concluded for a sufficiendy long period
of time." No justification has been found for that statement. Another states
that it may be desirable to provide in the armistice for the relaxation of the
prohibitions imposed on civilians—but he does not even hint that there is any
presumption in the absence of specific provision.
What has been the actual practice in this regard? Probably the most unusual
suggestion was that made to the Estates General in 1608 by the French and
British Ambassadors when they were attempting to use their good offices to
terminate the hostilities in which the United Provinces were then engaged with
Spain. They proposed armistice provisions which would not only have permitted
commerce and communications between the territories controlled by the two
belligerents, but also included what could only be characterized as a
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most-favored-nation clause! This proposal, perhaps understandably, was not
included in the Truce ofAntwerp, which was eventually reached by the parties
in 1609.
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The Armistice of Ulm, which was concluded on March 14, 1647, between
Louis XIV and his allies on one side and the Elector Maximilian and his allies
on the other side, authorized a complete resumption ofcommerce between the
citizens of the two sides except for certain specified items such as saltpeter,
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powder, arms, etc. The Truce of Ratisbonne also reestablished commerce
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between the two belligerents. Then, two and a half-centuries later, we find
a somewhat similar provision in the Renville Truce Agreement, where Article 6
specifies that "trade and intercourse between all areas should be permitted as far
as possible.
While the Korean Armistice Agreement contains no provision with regard
to commercial intercourse, it does contain elaborate provisions for the
movement of civilians who were in territory controlled by one belligerent and
who were normally resident in territory controlled by the other. The
Vietnamese Agreement went even a step further, permitting any civilian to cross
over to the territory controlled by the other belligerent if he desired to go there
to live, the only restriction being that the move had to be made during the
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period allocated for troop withdrawals. The latter Agreement also provides
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for the "liberation and repatriation" ofall civilian internees held by either side.
This bears some resemblance to the provision of the Geneva Civilian
Convention to which reference has already been made.
F. Prisoners of War
The problem of prisoners of war has received extremely varied treatment in
armistice agreements over the centuries and still remains one which can be most
difficult of solution.
The Armistice ofUlm provided for the release of all prisoners ofwar by both
sides without the payment of ransom, this last proviso probably having been the
most important feature of that agreement as far as the belligerents themselves
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were concerned. Surprisingly enough, we find that the parties still considered
it essential to specify a waiver of ransom in the armistice agreement concluded
in 1814 after Napoleon's first downfall. However, the importance of the latter
armistice from our point ofview is twofold: It provided that all prisoners ofwar
should be "immediately sent back to their respective countries"; and it provided
for the appointment ofcommissioners by each side "in order to carry this general
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liberation into effect." In the Armistice of Malmoe it was agreed that all
prisoners of war would be "set free"; and a supplementary agreement stated
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where they would be taken for "delivery to their officers."
Article 20 of both of the Hague Regulations provided for the repatriation of
prisoners of war only after "the conclusion of peace." As we have seen, this
phrase is not applicable to an armistice. The 1929 Geneva Prisoner of War
Convention changed this considerably, providing that an armistice must, in
principle, contain stipulations regarding the repatriation of prisoners of war.
It further provided that, iffor some reason, the parties had been unable to include
such a provision in their armistice, they would conclude a separate agreement
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on the subject as soon as possible and repatriate the prisoners of war with the
least possible delay. The 1949 Geneva Prisoner ofWar Convention went still a
step further, providing that prisoners of war should be "released and repatriated
without delay after the cessation of active hostilities." and providing further that,
failing such a provision in the armistice, each Detaining Power must establish
and execute without delay a unilateral plan of repatriation. In view of the
foregoing, and because of the experience in Korea, The Law of Land Warfare,
unlike Lieber's Instructions and the Rules of Land Warfare, states that "if it is
desired that prisoners of war and civilian internees should be released or
exchanged, specific provisions in this regard should be made."""
Prior to the Diplomatic Conference which drafted the Conventions in
Geneva in 1949 most writers on the subject took the position that the final
answer to the question of the return of prisoners of war was for the treaty of
peace, not for the armistice.*" They reasoned that to act otherwise would be
to give an unwarranted advantage to the side which had lost the greater number
of soldiers to the enemy and a corresponding disadvantage to the side which had
been successful in capturing the larger number of prisoners of war. It was
suggested that it would be appropriate to reach a separate agreement, after the
armistice had been signed, under which prisoners would be exchanged in equal
numbers and corresponding grades, thus avoiding any change in the relative
r : i::ions ofthe belligerents. This is the procedure normally followed in cartels
for the exchange of prisoners of war/* While there is much to be said for this
position, it is not fully supported by history and. in the light of the quoted
provisions of the 1949 Geneva Convention, it is not in conformity with the
requirements of an international convention which has been so widelv accepted
as already to be considered as constituting universal international law. This
is not to say that the basic reason for the theory expressed above is not a valid
one. \^ nen pnsoners of war are held by the two belligerent sides in such
disproportionate numbers as was the case in Korea, there is no question but that
total release and repatnation considerably changes the balance between the two
sides, even where there is a provision, as there is in the Korean Armistice
Agreement, against the employment in subsequent acts of war of pnsoners of
war released and repatnated pursuant to an armistice agreement.
The Renville Truce Agreement (which, it will be recalled, was signed on
January 17, 1948, pnor to the drafting of the 1949 Geneva Convention and
pnor even to the Stockholm Conference where the working draft of the
subsequent pnsoner of war convention was prepared) contains the following
significant provision:
To accept the pnnciple of the release of pnsoners by each party and to
commence discussions with a view of the most rapid and convenient
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implementation thereof, the release in principle to be without regard to the
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number of prisoners held by either party.
The Israeli-Lebanese General Armistice Agreement provided for an
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immediate exchange of all prisoners of war. ' The provisions of the Korean
Armistice Agreement with regard to prisoners of war are too well known to
require repetition here. Article 21 of the Agreement for the Cessation of
Hostilities in Viet-Nam provided generally for the "liberation and repatriation
of all prisoners ofwar." In elaborating on that provision the agreement states
that prisoners of war will be "surrendered" to the other side—which would
seem to indicate acceptance ofthe principle of"forcible repatriation." However,
the agreement further provides that the side to which they have been surrendered
will assist them in proceeding to the zone of their choice—which would seem
to indicate a right ofself-determination by the individual. It is extremely doubtful
that any of these unfortunates were among the horde of refugees who moved
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from the Communist to the non-Communist zone.
The omission of the India-Pakistan Cease-Fire Order and Truce Agreement
from the above discussion was not inadvertent. For some reason the United
Nations Commission resolution which became the Agreement made no
mention of this subject; and apparently neither of the parties ever suggested that
it be included.
G. Consultative Machinery
Provisions in an armistice agreement for the establishment of commissions
with various functions have a long history. Under the circumstances, it is
somewhat strange to find that the subject had not been mentioned in the
literature on the subject prior to the inclusion of a provision with regard thereto
in The Law of Land Warfare. That provision reads as follows:
Consultative machinery. It is generally desirable to provide for the establishment
of a commission, composed ofrepresentatives ofthe opposing forces, to supervise
the implementation of the armistice agreement. Additional commissions,
composed of representatives of the belligerents or of neutral powers or both, may
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be constituted to deal with such matters as the repatriation of prisoners ofwar.
The armistice proposed by the ambassadors of France and Great Britain in
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1608 has already been mentioned in another connection.
4
That document
also contained a provision to the effect that in the event the parties were unable
to agree concerning the continued occupation of certain villages and hamlets,
some "notable persons" would be selected to decide the question. This provision
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was among those which the parties omitted from the Truce of Antwerp.
However, the Truce ofRatisbonne established a commission to delimit frontiers
so that in the future there may be no dispute to the prejudice of the truce herein
agree upon. The said Commissioners shall work together to the end that if either
party fails to make the promised restitutions, or to comply with any provision of
this agreement, it will be entirely his own act.
Similarly, the 1809 Vienna agreement provided for commissioners to be
named by both sides for the purpose of supervising the execution of the
agreement. And the Finnish-Russian Armistice of 1940 called for special
representatives ofthe two sides to decide problems arising in the implementation
of the agreement.
All of the post-World War II armistice agreements establish commissions of
one type or another for the purpose of either implementing or supervising the
implementation of various provisions of the agreements. Thus, the Renville
Truce Agreement made use of the Committee of Good Offices created by the
United Nations and the Committee's military assistants for the investigation of
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incidents, supervision of the withdrawal of troops, etc. The India-Pakistan
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Agreement availed itself of the services of the United Nations Commission.
The Israeli-Lebanese Agreement created a Mixed Armistice Commission and
also provided for the use of the personnel of the United Nations Truce
Supervision Organization. The Korean Armistice Agreement created a
variety oforgans, including a Military Armistice Commission, a Neutral Nations
Supervisory Commission, a Committee for the Repatriation ofPrisoners ofWar,
Joint Red Cross Teams, a Committee for Assisting the Return of Displaced.... 135
Civilians, and a Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission. Similarly, the
Viet-Nam Agreement created a Joint Commission and an International
r^ • • 136Commission.
It is believed that on the basis ofthe foregoing consistent experience ofrecent
years it may be assumed that the device of commissions made up of members
of the belligerent forces and commissions made up of representatives of neutral
nations, to which is assigned the mission ofimplementing and ofsupervising the
implementation of the provisions of an armistice agreement, has become an
accepted feature of such agreements.
H. Political
It has already been pointed out that one of the characteristics of an armistice
is that it may contain political and economic, as well as military, clauses. " The
Law of Land Warfare enumerates a number of categories of such clauses which
may be contained in an armistice, including disposition of aircraft and shipping;
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co-operation in the punishment ofwar crimes; restitution of captured or looted
property; shipping, communications facilities and public utilities; civil
administration; displaced persons; and the dissolution of organizations which
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may subvert public order. * It is obvious that a number of these subjects would
only be appropriate in an armistice such as most of those which were concluded
during or at the end of the two world wars where the victors were dictating
terms to the vanquished. Some, such as those relating to displaced persons,
movement of civilians, commercial intercourse, etc., have already been
discussed. Generally speaking, it may be stated that the scope of this type of
provision is limited only by the ability of the belligerents to reach agreement
with regard thereto. Numerous examples of such provisions may be found in
the armistice agreements of the past decade which we have been examining
u 139herein.
I. Violations
The question of denunciations has already been discussed in connection with
armistice agreements ofindefinite duration. Now it is appropriate to examine
the problem of violations of an armistice agreement and denunciations in
connection therewith.
In his Instructions, Lieber stated that "if either party violates any express
condition, the armistice may be declared null and void by the other." Article
51 of the Declaration of Brussels also included a statement to the effect that a
violation of an armistice gave the other party the right to terminate it ("le
142
denoncer"). It will be noted that under either of these rules a belligerent had
the right to denounce an armistice for a violation of even a minor condition.
An attempt was made to remedy this situation by Article 40 ofboth ofthe Hague
Regulations which authorized a denunciation for a "serious violation," with the
additional proviso that in cases of "urgency" the violation might warrant the
recommencing of hostilities immediately. Clearly, the failure to define the
term "serious violation" and the indefiniteness ofthe term "urgency" left a great
deal to the discretion of the aggrieved party. After analyzing the applicable
international conventions and the writers on the subject, one eminent author
arrives at this conclusion:
. . . Three rules may be formulated from this—(1) violations which are not serious
do not even give a right to denounce an armistice; (2) serious violations empower
the other party to denounce the armistice, but not, as a rule, to recommence
hostilities at once without giving notice; (3) only in case of urgency is a party
justified in recommencing hostilities without notice.
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Parties negotiating armistice agreements have apparently been loathe to
include any reference therein with regard to the possibility of denunciation for
violation, perhaps because they have preferred to rely on the rather vague rule
1 46
of international law. It is suggested that in these days of extremely detailed
agreements it might be well to consider the advisability of specifying in the
agreement which of its provisions are considered by the parties to be of such
importance that a violation would be considered either "serious" or "urgent."
One ofthe important problems with regard to violations is that ofthe violation
of a provision of an armistice by an individual acting independently. Grotius
stated that "private acts do not break a truce unless in addition there is a public
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act, that is, through command or approval. This is the basic tenor of Article
52 of the Declaration of Brussels and Article 41 of both of the Hague
Regulations, all ofwhich, in substance, provide that a violation by a private act
only entitles the aggrieved side to demand that the individual offender be
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punished and, in an appropriate case, to demand compensation for damages.
The Rules of Land Warfare defined the term "private individuals" as
excluding members of the armed forces. The Law ofLand Warfare reverses
that position, stating that in the sense of Article 41 of the 1907 Hague
Regulations a private individual is any person, including a member ofthe armed
forces, who acts on his own responsibility. *"" It is believed that the Hague
Regulation intended, like Grotius, to distinguish between official and unofficial
acts, and that the definition appearing in the later manual is fully consonant with
that distinction! The Law of Land Warfare states further that violations by
individuals do not justify denunciation unless they are proved to have been
committed with the knowledge and consent of their government or
commander—and that consent may be inferred from a persistent failure to punish
the offenders.
As far back as the Armistice ofUlm in 1647 we find a provision to the effect
that officers of either side who violated any provision ofthe armistice agreement
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would be severely punished. Paragraph 13e of the Korean Armistice
Agreement requires the commanders of the two sides to "insure that personnel
oftheir respective commands who violate any ofthe provisions of this Armistice
Agreement are adequately punished"; and Article 22 of the Viet-Nam
Agreement is identical, except for minor differences which probably resulted
during the course of translating from English to French and then back into
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English. It can logically be assumed that if the parties provide for the
punishment ofindividual violators, they do not contemplate that such violations
constitute a basis for denunciation.
The emergence ofthe guerrilla or partisan as a potent force in modern warfare
has emphasized this problem. Irregular forces are frequently difficult to control;
but it is not unusual to find them specifically included, with the regular forces,
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within the restrictions contained in the armistice. While this procedure is
obviously appropriate, their frequent disregard of the orders of the commander
of the organized military forces, who is responsible for insuring compliance with
the provisions ofthe armistice, can become an acute problem insofar as violations
of the armistice are concerned.
J. Naval
Authorities writing on the war conventions have, with rare exception,
devoted little more than a sentence or two to the subject ofthe effect of a general
armistice on naval warfare. ' ' They are, however, practically unanimous with
regard to the few rules which they do enunciate.
Naturally, a general armistice would impliedly include a prohibition against
a naval bombardment or a naval battle, inasmuch as every general armistice
includes a complete suspension of active hostilities. However, the problem is
more difficult when the question involved is the maintenance ofa naval blockade
with its concomitant factors such as the right of visit and search, control over
neutral vessels, seizure of contraband, taking of prizes, etc.
One of the more recent works on this subject states:
. . . During a general armistice, belligerents probably also have the right to capture
vessels belonging to the enemy and to stop and visit neutral ships as well as to
prevent them from breaking a blockade and from carrying contraband, unless
otherwise agreed upon. The question is not, however, settled and the taking of
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prize in particular may be considered as a hostile act.
As a practical matter, it is difficult to see how a belligerent who continues the
maintenance of a blockade during an armistice can avoid committing hostile
acts. However, most writers are far more positive than the above quotation
would indicate concerning the right ofa belligerent to continue during a general
armistice a naval blockade which had been previously established and concerning
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which the armistice agreement makes no provision. There is some indication
that modern thinking in this direction is premised on the equally modern
doctrine which permits a naval blockade even in time of peace—the so-called
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"pacific blockade." The limitation with regard to prizes noted above is
undoubtedly based upon the statement made by one writer to the effect that
such an act "is irreconcilable with a state of suspension of hostilities." It is
apparent that the failure, in an appropriate case, to include within an armistice
a clear provision with regard to naval blockade, and naval warfare generally, can
be the cause of serious difficulties and, perhaps, even of the resumption of
hostilities. Let us review some of the armistice agreements in which an
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attempt has been made to cover the subject and weigh the sufficiency or
insufficiency of the provisions drafted for that purpose.
The Truce of Antwerp (Spain-United Provinces) stated that "all acts of
1 zro
hostility of all nature on sea and on land shall cease." Such a clause would
prohibit a pitched battle at sea or a naval bombardment ofan enemy shore—but
would it prohibit a blockade? The Armistice ofParis which followed Napoleon's
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abdication in 1814 was more specific. It provided that the blockade ofFrance
would be lifted and that all prizes taken after various dates (which allowed for
the time necessary for the news to reach different areas) would be restored. No
difficulties should arise under such an armistice; nor under the somewhat similar
provisions of the Armistice of Malmoe, which even went so far as to require
the return ofprizes legitimately taken and to provide for indemnification ifprizes
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and their cargoes could not be returned in kind.
The Armistice of Versailles of 1871 (France-Germany) created a naval line
of demarcation and provided for the restoration of all captures made after the
conclusion ofthe armistice and before its notification. Again, this would seem
to meet the requirements of precision and completeness essential to prevent
disputes.
The Armistice ofShimonoseki (Japan-China) adopted the opposite approach,
specifically authorizing the seizure ofany military sea movements. While this
is, of course, entirely within the power of the parties, some act pursuant thereto
may cause such a public reaction as to practically compel a government to resume
hostilities—and, also, a government which is looking for an excuse to do so can
avail itself of an incident thereunder as a basis for the resumption of hostilities.
Neither the two original armistice agreements entered into on May 19, 1897
(Epirus), and May 20, 1897 (Thessaly), in the Greco-Turkish War ofthat period,
nor the amended agreements reached on June 3, contained any provisions
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relating to the naval situation. On June 4 a supplementary agreement was
concluded which lifted the Greek blockade, but prohibited Turkey from
reinforcing her armies in Greece or bringing in any munitions, limiting her to
revictualing her troops twice a week through designated Greek ports. These,
and certain other naval provisions of the supplementary agreement were so
indefinite as to be calculated to encourage disputes—which they did.
It has already been noted that the Protocol of Portsmouth (Russia-Japan)
prohibited bombardment of enemy territory by naval forces and that the
subsequent "Naval Protocol of Armistice" established a boundary line between
1 6S
the two fleets. ' The Protocol of Portsmouth also provided that "maritime
captures will not be suspended by the armistice." It is to be assumed that the
Japanese were following the precedent which they had established in the
Armistice of Shimonoseki.
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The early post-World War II armistice agreements tended to follow the
irregular pattern indicated above. The Renville Truce Agreement contains no
reference to naval warfare or the sea—a strange situation for an armistice relating
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to an island area. The Israeli-Lebanese General Armistice Agreement
provided that "a general armistice between the armed forces of the two
parties—land, sea and air—is hereby established" and that "no element of the
land, sea or air military or para-military forces of either Party . . . shall commit
170
any warlike or hostile acts." We have already seen how identical provisions
have caused grave disputes between Israel and Egypt with regard to their effect
on Egypt's naval blockade.
In the Korean Armistice Agreement the required precision and completeness
on this subject were almost reached. Paragraph 12 of that Agreement called for
a complete cessation of all hostilities, including naval hostilities; and paragraph
15 provides:
This Armistice Agreement shall apply to all opposing naval forces, which naval
forces shall respect the waters contiguous to the Demilitarized Zone and to the
land area of Korea under the military control of the opposing side, and shall not
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engage in blockade of any kind of Korea.
This is probably one of the most complete naval provisions ever included in an
armistice agreement. However, the general descriptive statement concerning
this armistice is qualified in view of the fact that in negotiating it an attempt to
reach an agreement on the extent of the territorial waters was unsuccessful
because the United Nations Command proposed the traditional three-mile limit,
the Communists insisted on the twelve-mile limit, and the Republic of Korea
had established the arbitrary "Rhee Line" which extends anywhere from 60 to
200 miles from shore. According to unofficial accounts the United Nations
Command has voluntarily imposed a twelve-mile limit on its personnel in order
to avoid incidents. However, this has not been entirely successful.
Finally, the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Viet-Nam is almost,
though not quite, as complete as the Korean Armistice Agreement. Article 24
provides that the agreement applies to all of the armed forces of either party and
states that such armed forces "shall commit no act and undertake no operation
against the other party and shall not engage in blockade of any kind in
Viet-Nam." It also defines the territory of a party as including "territorial
waters." France supports the three-mile definition of territorial waters and it is
to be assumed that the state ofViet-Nam does likewise. It is equally to be assumed
that the Viet-Minh will subscribe to the twelve-mile limit of territorial waters
supported by the U.S.S.R. Accordingly, here, too, there is a possibility of
dispute.
Armistice Agreement 21
The foregoing discussion has, it is believed, indicated the necessity of
including in an armistice agreement specific and precise provisions with regard
to naval warfare, blockades, etc. It should also have indicated that progress in
the right direction has been made in recent years and that care on the part of
the negotiators of future armistice agreements can quickly and simply eliminate
the naval problem as a source of irritation during the often uneasy period of
armistice.
IV. Conclusion
The general armistice is a living, dynamic war convention which, despite
centuries of use, is still continuing in each decade to expand its scope and to
increase the importance of its position among the agreements concerning the
non-hostile relations of belligerents. The elaborate armistice agreements of
recent years have, in effect, rendered the preliminaries of peace obsolete. It is
not inconceivable that the formal treaty of peace will suffer the same fate and
that wars will one day end at the armistice table.
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Prisoners of War and the Protecting Power
55 AmericanJournal of International Law 374 (1961)
One of the more significant, but inadequately recognized, developments
in the field of the law of war which has occurred during the past
half-century is that with respect to the institution of the Protecting Power.
Surprisingly little has been written, especially in English, either on the general
subject of the Protecting Power or on the specific subject of the Protecting
1
Power and its relationship to the prisoner-of-war problem. This article will
endeavor, to a necessarily limited extent, to fill that void, with the emphasis
being placed on the gradual, but steady, expansion of the authority,
responsibility, and functions ofthe Protecting Power in safeguarding the welfare
of prisoners of war.
The term Protecting Power is comparatively simple of definition. It is a state
which has accepted the responsibility ofprotecting the interests of another state
in the territory of a third, with which, for some reason, such as war, the second
state does not maintain diplomatic relations. Because the protection is most
frequendy rendered to nationals of the protected state found in the third state,
the former is often referred to as the Power of Origin and the latter as the Power
of Residence. For obvious reasons, in the case of prisoners of war the state by
which they are held is known as the Detaining Power rather than as the Power of
Residence. And while the term Power of Origin may be a misnomer in the case of
certain prisoners ofwar, as, for example, those who were captured while serving
in the armed forces of a state other than their own, it will be used herein for
lack of a more appropriate term.
I. Historical
The earliest indication ofwhat we now term the Protecting Power probably
appeared in the Capitulations ofthe Ottoman Empire of the sixteenth century.
Curiously enough, in those early days protection of non-nationals came about,
not as a result ofagreements reached with the Power ofResidence by the Power
of Origin, but as a result of agreements reached with the Power of Residence
by the prospective Protecting Power itself, the latter having probably been
primarily concerned with the resulting increase in its own prestige and influence
in the territory in which it was acting and in the home territories ofthe protected
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persons. At that period the Protecting Power was, and in the three succeeding
centuries it remained, completely a creature of custom and usage, with no
conventional basis, definition, or functions. As a result, the extent of the activity
of Protecting Powers varied in different countries and even, with respect to
different Protecting Powers, within the same country. The passage of time
resulted in the passing of the initiative for the designation of a Protecting Power
in a particular case from the Protecting Power to the Power of Origin, where
it more properly belonged. It also resulted in the concept of the Protecting
Power as an international institution becoming more and more firmly intrenched
in international law and practice. In its present form, however, the Protecting
Power dates back less than one century—and its codified form is of even more
recent vintage.
Most writers attribute the modern genesis of the Protecting Power to
developments which occurred during the Franco-Prussian War (1870-1871). In
that conflict, probably for the first time, all of the belligerents were represented
by Protecting Powers in the territory of the enemy. England was charged with
the protection of the French in Germany; and the United States, Switzerland,
and Russia acted as Protecting Powers in France for the various German States.
It may be said that the expansion ofthe functions ofthe Protecting Power during
this conflict was, in large measure, due to two practices which originated during
its course: that of expelling enemy consuls; and that of imposing stringent
restrictions on enemy aliens. Unquestionably, each ofthese practices could and
did contribute to the need for the enlargement ofthe functions ofthe Protecting
Power.
The precedents established during the Franco-Prussian War were adhered to
in most subsequent international conflicts, many of which had, however, their
own peculiar aspects. Thus, in the Sino-Japanese War (1894—1895) each side
requested the United States to act as its Protecting Power and so we find the
same state acting as the Protecting Power for each belligerent within the territory
of the other. Similarly, Germany acted as the Protecting Power for both
belligerents in the Italo-Turkish War (1911-1912) and in the Sino-Soviet War
(1929) . Going to the other extreme, in the Greco-Turkish War (1 897), Germany
acted as the Protecting Power for Turkey in Greece, while three other nations,
England, France, and Russia, acted jointly for Greece in Turkey; in the
Spanish-American War (1898), England acted as the Protecting Power for the
United States, while France and Austria-Hungary acted joindy for Spain (it was
during this conflict that, for the first time recorded, a belligerent, the United
States, specifically requested neutral inspection of installations within which
prisoners of war were being held); and during the Balkan Wars (1912-1913)
France and Russia acted joindy as the Protecting Power for Montenegro. This
practice of using more than one friendly state as a Protecting Power has since
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almost disappeared, although at one time during World War II Spain was acting
as the Protecting Power forJapan in the continental United States, while Sweden
acted for her in Hawaii, and Switzerland in American Samoa.
The Boer War (1899-1902) may, perhaps, be considered to have been, at
least to some extent, an exception to what was fast becoming a firmly established
institution of international law. Early in that conflict the British requested the
United States to represent their interests with the Boers. Apparently the consent
of the Boers was not sought and they not only failed to designate a Protecting
Power of their own, but, for all practical purposes, at first refused to recognize
the right of the United States consular representatives to act on behalf of the
British. Subsequendy the Boers did agree to permit the United States consuls in
their territory to perform certain specific and limited functions with respect to
British prisoners of war, upon the understanding that United States consuls in
England would have similar privileges with respect to Boer prisoners ofwar held
there. Thus, to a limited degree, the institution of the Protecting Power was
recognized even here.
The Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) found the Protecting Powers once
again exercising the full powers which it had become customary to allot to them.
Perhaps as a result of the favorable experiences of the Sino-Japanese War,
immediately upon the outbreak of hostilities Japan requested the United States
to act on its behalf in Russia; while France was designated by Russia as its
Protecting Power in Japan and Korea. And once again, but to an even greater
extent than during the Spanish-American War, we find the representatives of
the Protecting Powers concerning themselves with the welfare of prisoners of
8
war.
Thus it can readily be seen that when World War I burst upon Europe, the
designation of Protecting Powers by belligerents was a firmly established
international custom, although the Protecting Power as an institution had yet
to be the subject of international legislation. During the course of that conflict
four definite items of progress occurred: first, it was during World War I that
public opinion in the belligerent countries achieved an understanding ofhow a
friendly neutral could represent, at times vigorously, an enemy belligerent and
its nationals; second, the use ofthe Protecting Power as a means ofsafeguarding
the welfare of prisoners of war, although at first somewhat restricted, was later
10
greatly extended and received rather general acceptance; third, the practice
was adopted that when a neutral which had been acting as a Protecting Power
itself became embroiled in the conflict, a successor Protecting Power would be
11 • •
designated to fill the vacuum; and finally, the Protecting Power received legal
recognition in a number of international agreements entered into by various of
the belligerents during the course of the hostilities in which, to a surprising
extent, its functions were spelled out with some degree of definiteness.
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The precedents established during World War I were destined to bear fruit.
A draft prisoner of war convention prepared in 1921 by the International
Committee of the Red Cross (hereinafter referred to as the ICRC), while
contemplating the use of Protecting Powers for certain limited purposes, would
have assigned to the ICRC the responsibility for establishing mobile
commissions composed of neutrals charged with assuring that the belligerents
were complying with the convention. This proposal was probably due to two
factors: first, the failure of the states which had acted as Protecting Powers during
World War I adequately to report their activities; and second, the belief that the
duties involved in the effective protection ofthe rights ofprisoners ofwar would
1
"\
exceed the capacity of the diplomatic personnel of Protecting Powers.
However, when the Diplomatic Conference convened in Geneva in 1929 and
drafted the convention which subsequently received the ratification of the vast
majority of states, the ICRC proposal was not adopted and, instead, the basic
principle of the Protecting Power received general acceptance, the former
Protecting Powers taking the position that all that was needed to assure their
activities was that their role "be distinctly set out, and their task clearly
defined." The Prisoner ofWar Convention drafted at that Conference thus
became the first international agreement negotiated in time of peace to give
official recognition to the institution of the Protecting Power. However, it
did not create a new international concept. It did not make the use of the
Protecting Power by belligerents obligatory. It did not affect the relationships
which had previously existed between the Power of Origin, the Protecting
Power, and the Detaining Power. It did give the relationship a formal and agreed
status which it had not previously had. It may well be considered that the
provisions of the 1929 Convention relating to Protecting Powers constituted
the most important advance contained in that convention over the provisions
of the regulations relating to prisoners of war contained in the Annex to the
Fourth Hague Convention of 1907. The lessons learned during World War
I had not been forgotten.
The advent of World War II provided, all too soon, an opportunity for the
implementation and testing of this novel international legislation. Most of the
belligerents were represented by Protecting Powers and, in general, these found
the provisions of the 1929 Convention relating to their activities extremely
helpful. True, the designation and functioning of Protecting Powers on behalf
ofprisoners ofwar had previously become an almost universally accepted custom
in international law. But it is necessary to bear in mind that, despite this, in the
U.S.S.R. and Japan, neither of which nations was a party to the 1929
Convention, there was either complete or substantial failure in the functioning
1 o
of the Protecting Powers. In general, the fact that such a large number of
countries were parties to the World War II hostilities had two distinct but related
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results. In the first place, not only did the absence of strong neutrals present a
problem in the selection of Protecting Powers, but it also meant that there was
no large neutral world public opinion to be affected by violations of the
convention, and the power ofneutral public opinion in forcing compliance with
a humanitarian convention cannot be overestimated. And in the second place,
because of the small number of neutrals available to act as Protecting Powers, it
frequently occurred that the same neutral was designated to act as the Protecting
Power for two opposing belligerents.
Once again wartime lessons were not forgotten and on August 12, 1949, just
four years after the final termination ofWorld War II, a new Prisoner ofWar
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Convention was signed in which, as we shall see, the functions of the
Protecting Power are identified and defined with even greater particularity than
had been the case in the 1929 Convention. Since that time the hostilities in
Korea have occurred. At the outbreak of those hostilities General Douglas
MacArthur, as the commander of the United Nations Command, immediately
announced that his forces would comply with the humanitarian principles of
the 1949 Convention. In answer to a query made by the ICRC, the Foreign
Minister of the so-called Democratic People's Republic ofKorea sent a message
to the Secretary General of the United Nations stating that its forces were
"strictly abiding by principles of Geneva Conventions in respect to Prisoners of
War." Unfortunately, the provisions of the convention relating to the
Protecting Power were evidently not among the principles with which they
were "strictly abiding" so that, despite all efforts expended in this regard, those
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provisions were never implemented.
From the foregoing brief historical survey it is apparent that prior to 1870
only the precursors of the modern Protecting Power existed, and not the latter
itself; that during the period from 1870 to 1914 the concept of the Protecting
Power began to take form, particularly with respect to its relationship to the
problem of the prisoner of war; and that during the period subsequent to 1914
the form has become definite, the institution of the Protecting Power having
become the subject of numerous bilateral and multilateral international
agreements, culminating in the 1949 Geneva Conventions to which most of the
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nations of the world are parties. It now becomes appropriate to analyze the
form and the character which the Protecting Power received during this
evolutionary process.
II. The Modern Concept of the Protecting Power
A Designation
As will have been noted, Article 86 of the 1929 Convention was, to say the
least, somewhat vaguely worded:
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The High Contracting Parties recognize that the regular application of the present
Convention will find a guaranty in the possibility of collaboration of the protecting
Powers charged with safeguarding the interests of belligerents . . . (Italics added.)
There is nothing mandatory here. There is no requirement here that a Protecting
Power actually be designated or that, if designated, it be permitted to function
as such by the Detaining Power. The comparable provision of the 1949
Convention reads quite differently. Article 8 of this latter convention provides:
The present Convention shall be applied with the cooperation and under the scrutiny of
the Protecting Powers whose duty it is to safeguard the interests of the Parties to
the conflict. . . . (Italics added.)
It would appear that the designation of Protecting Powers has now become at
least a moral obligation ofthe belligerent; and that, once designated, a Protecting
Power has a duty not only to the Power of Origin, but also to the other parties
to the conflict, to perform the functions which have been assigned to it by the
1949 Convention.
What are the qualifications required of a state before it may be designated as
a Protecting Power? It must, first of all, be a state within the meaning of that
term in international law. It must also, of course, be a neutral state—and it is
advisable that it be one which can reasonably be expected to remain neutral,
although this latter qualification has become more and more difficult to assure.
And, finally, it must be a state which maintains diplomatic relations with both
the requesting state (the Power of Origin) and the state in which it is being
requested to operate (the Detaining Power).
How does a state actually become a Protecting Power? The belligerent state
desiring the services of a Protecting Power requests a neutral state which has the
qualifications listed above to act on its behalf. If the latter is willing to assume
the functions of a Protecting Power, it so notifies the requesting state. It must
then obtain from the Detaining Power permission to function as the Protecting
Power for the requesting state vis-a-vis and within the territory of the Detaining
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Power. In other words, the actual designation ofthe Protecting Power is based
upon the request of the Power of Origin and the consent of both the proposed
Protecting Power and the Detaining Power.
As we have seen, it has frequently occurred in the past that more than one
state has been designated as the Protecting Power for a belligerent, and there is
nothing in the 1949 Convention, nor in general international law, to preclude
this practice. However, the advantages of the other extreme—one and the same
Protecting Power for both belligerents—are many. Even a small nation, when
acting as the Protecting Power for both sides, is in a unique position to obtain
a general observance of the law of war by each belligerent on the basis of
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reciprocity. This was made quite apparent during World War II. when
Switzerland acted as the Protecting Power for many of the belligerents on both
sides of the conflict. Some of the advantages of this situation are summed up as
folic" 5
For uniformity and simplicity ofadministration it is obviously desirable for the
protected power to entrust its interests in another country to only one protecting
power, and in instances involving the protection ofbelligerent interests there are
advantages to all concerned ifboth belligerents entrust their interests in the othe
:
territory to the same protecting power. . . . The expenence of World War II
indicates that a more uniform administration and a higher standard of treatment
of enemy interests by both belligerents result from a reciprocal protection of the
interests of those belligerents bv the same protecting power throughout the
territories under the control of each belligeren:
"
The limited number of states which would be available and competent to act as
Protecting Powers in any future world conflagration would, in all probability,
almost automatically bring about this result, just as it did during World War II.
The delegates at the Diplomatic Conference which drafted the 1949
Convention foresaw the possibility ofnumerous situations in which there would
be no Protecting Power." ' They attempted to solve this problem by providing
in Article 10 ofthe convention for the designation of "substitutes" for Protecting
Powers. It must, however, be emphasized that the provisions of this article
should not be considered as affecting the basic method of selecting either
Protecting Power or successor Protecting Powers as long as the Power ofOrigin
continues to exist. A successor Protecting Power, necessitated, perhaps, because
the original Protecting Power has become a belligerent, is not a "'substitute' : :
a Pro:e:~r:g Power within the meaning of Article 10, and its designation is
governed by the same rules of international law as those which govern the
designation of the original Protecting Power. " It must also be emphasized that
a state or organization designated under the provisions of Article 10 is not a
Protecting Power as that term is used generally in international law and as it is
used specifically elsewhere in the 1949 Convention, but is merely a state or
organization performing some or many of the functions allocated to Protecting
Powers by the convention.
B. Personnel
Article 8 of the 1949 Convention provides that
. . . the Protecting Powers may appoint, apart from their diplomatic and consular
staff, delegates from amongst their own naaonals or the nationals of other neutral
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Powers. The said delegates shall be subject to the approval of the Power with
which they are to carry out their duties.
It is obvious that the convention has accorded to the Protecting Power two
sources ofpersonnel for the execution ofits functions: its diplomatic and consular
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officers stationed within the territory of the Detaining Power; and others of
its nationals and other neutral nationals specifically appointed for the purpose.
We shall discuss each of these sources in turn.
The normal and natural source ofpersonnel for the execution ofthe functions
of the Protecting Power is, of course, the diplomatic and consular personnel
already assigned to and stationed in the territory of the Detaining Power. These
officials, working under the ambassador, are experienced, they are known to
the local officials, and, perhaps most important, they are already present within
the area of operations. It is, of course, true that they already have their usual
functions to perform; but many of these functions disappear or are seriously
curtailed upon the advent of war (commercial, immigration, tourists, etc.).
While any large-scale war of lengthy duration will undoubtedly make it
necessary for the Protecting Power to supplement its regular diplomatic and
consular staff within the territory of the Detaining Power, there will be
numerous instances in which the Protecting Power will be able to perform its
functions with only its normal complement of officials, at least for some
considerable period of time and until the number of prisoners of war held by
the Detaining Power makes a build-up of personnel essential. Of course, the
term "diplomatic and consular staff' includes not only those officials of the
Protecting Power who were already stationed within the territory of the
Detaining Power at the time of the designation of the Protecting Power, but
also any of its other diplomatic and consular personnel who may be sent to
replace or supplement them.
With the heavy commitments which Switzerland had during World War II,
it would obviously have been impossible for it to have made even a pretense of
performing its far-flung responsibilities as a Protecting Power without a
considerable increase in its staffs in the territories of the many Detaining Powers
where it had consented to function. To accomplish this purpose the Swiss
Government recruited in Switzerland and sent to its various affected embassies
and legations "camp inspectors," who had the function of periodically visiting
prisoner-of-war camps and work areas to assure that there was compliance by
the Detaining Power with the provisions of the 1929 Convention. This is
typical of the second source of personnel the use of which is authorized by
Article 8 of the 1949 Convention—the non-career national who is selected by
the government of the Protecting Power solely for the purpose of assisting it in
performing its functions. He may also be the national of another neutral, but
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normally the Protecting Power would resort to this type of selection only when
it has exhausted its own manpower potential. Of course, a major source of
non-career personnel is to be found among the nationals ofthe Protecting Power
and of other neutral Powers who are residing within the territory of the
Detaining Power when the use of additional personnel becomes necessary. The
ProtectingPower may sometimes find it more convenient, when it has exhausted
the list of its own nationals residing in the territory of the Detaining Power, to
use neutral nationals falling within this category before resorting to the policy
: : recruiting its own nationals in its own territory and sending them to the
territory of the Detaining Power.
It will have been noted that these non-career, or auxiliary, personnel are
subject to the approval ofthe Detaining Power. This has occasioned considerable
discussion, both at and since the Diplomatic Conference. No objection can be
perceived to this procedure. The diplomatic and consular personnel of the
Protecting Power stationed within the territory of the Detaining Power must
have the normal approval of the state to which they are accredited (agretnent,
exequatur), required for all such personnel, and any one of them may, at any
time, be declared persona non grata by that state, the Detaining Power. The writer
finds himself in complete accord with the statement that
... it appeared to be incompatible with international usage that the occasional,
auxiliary and temporary staff recruited by the Protecting Power should enjoy a
more favorable status than the usual diplomatic or consular staff.
The fear has been expressed that a Detaining Power might arbitrarily refuse
to approve any of the auxiliary personnel nominated by the Protecting Power
and thereby make it impossible for the latter properly to perform its functions.
But a Detaining Power so minded could also, and with equal ease, arbitrarily
decline to grant the necessary agrement or exequatur to replacement or
supplementary diplomatic or consular personnel ofthe Protecting Power. Either
of these acts would constitute a violation of the spirit, if not the letter, of the
convention. Until the contrary is afiirmatively established, it must be assumed
that states parties to the convention will carry out their obligations in good faith.
The restriction which we have just been discussing is logical from another
standpoint. The individuals concerned will, in the performance of their
functions, be required to do considerable traveling within a country at war. Any
country at war must institute controls on the right to enter into and to travel
within its territory. To tell it that it must accept anyone selected by the Protecting
Power, even though it has good reason not to trust the particular individual, is
to close one's eyes to the facts of life. And for this same reason, the Detaining
Power must retain the right to declare members of the staff of the Protecting
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Power persona non grata, whether the individual concerned has diplomatic,
consular, or auxiliary status.
It has been stated that the representatives of the Protecting Power engaged
in performing its functions in the territory of the Detaining Power have a triple
responsibility: to their own government; to the government of the Power of
Origin; and to the government of the Detaining Power. If this is another way
of saying that these individuals must be completely neutral and unbiased, it is
correct. It would, however, be less controversial to state, as did WilliamJennings
Bryan, that they are "representatives of a neutral power whose attitude toward
the parties to the conflict is one of impartial amity."
C. Functions
Unfortunately, with only a very few exceptions, the drafters of the 1949
Convention apparently found it necessary to avoid any attempt to specify in
detail the functions of the Protecting Power. Most frequently these functions
are expressed either in the form of duties of the Detaining Power or rights of
the prisoners of war. Where a precedent had previously been established, it is
set forth in appropriate detail. Where no precedent had previously been
established, the problem is normally left to ad hoc decision. It was probably
anticipated that such problems would be solved by the Protecting Power through
the exercise by it of the basic power guaranteed to it, that of surveillance to
insure that there is, at all times, full compliance with the provisions of the
convention. Should the Protecting Power ascertain that there is a default in the
performance of some particular provision, it is apparently assumed that it will
find a means ofprocuring a correction of the situation, even though such means
is not specified.
Nevertheless, the convention does contain repeated references to the
Protecting Power and a function may usually be implied in a particular instance
merely from such a reference. It is difficult, indeed, to categorize these varied
references to the Protecting Power. Extremely broad categories are required,
and even then not every function will fall within them. Several not wholly
successful efforts have been made to list these references on a functional basis.
For the purposes of this discussion they will be considered under three general
categories: powers and duties; liaison functions; and miscellaneous functions (the
functions listed in each category do not purport to be all-inclusive).
(1) Powers and Duties:
The basic and overriding power granted to the Protecting Power by the 1949
Convention is, of course, that contained in Article 8, the very first sentence of
which states that the convention
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. . . shall be applied with the cooperation and under the scrutiny of the Protecting
Powers whose duty it is to safeguard the interests of the Parties to the conflict.
This provision has been termed, and rightlv so. "the keystone of the
conventions.
Strangely enough, the only extended debate on this extremely crucial article
which took place at the Diplomatic Conference concerned the selection of the
proper word to characterize the activities of the Protecting Power, and that
debate occurred primarily as a result of difficulties of translation. The delegates
at the Diplomatic Conference were agreed that the Protecting Power could not
give orders or directives to the Detaining Power. The idea which it was desired
to convey was that the authority of the Protecting Power would entitle it to
verify whether the convention was being properlv applied and. if necessary, to
suggest measures on behalf of prisoners of war.
x
In the draft text the words
'"under the supervision of the Protectmg Power" were used in the English
version and the words "sous le controle des Puissances yrc:-cc:>:ccs" in the French.
This was acceptable to the French-speaking delegates but was opposed by those
who were English-speaking. It eventually became apparent that the two groups
were actually in agreement and that the seeming dispute had arisen because the
word "controle''' in French is much weaker than either "control" or "supervision"
in English. The English-speaking delegations were given a choice of a number
of words to be used as a counterpart for the French word "controle" and
42
unammous agreement was ultimately reached on the word "scrutiny."
The importance of Article S may. perhaps, be found to he in the very
generahty of its phrasing. The fact that the entire convention "is to be "applied
with the cooperation" ofthe Protectmg Power undoubtedly empowers the latter
to make suggestions to the Detaining Power with a view to the improvement
of the lot of the prisoner of war even with respect to areas m which no specific
reference is made to the Protecting Power. Thus, a Protecting Power might
suggest to. and seek to obtain the agreement of. the Detaining Power that certain
specified types of offenses committed by prisoners of war be punished by
disciplinary rather than judicial measures, even though Article S3 contains no
reference to the Protecting Power. Similarly, the fact that the convention is to
be applied "under the scrutiny" ofthe Protecting Power undoubtedly empowers
it to investigate and to request reports from the Detaining Power in unspecified
areas. Thus, a Protecting Power might seek from the Detaimng Power a
complete report as to the reasons for delays in the delivery or dispatching ofmail
or for the prohibition of correspondence, even though Article 76, dealing with
these subjects, contains no mention of the Protecting Power; again, it might
seek a report from the Detaining Power as to the action taken with respect to
a complaint made by a prisoner ofwar, through the Protecting Power, regarding
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the conditions of his captivity, even though Article 78, which authorizes such
complaints, does not specifically provide for such a report.
Perhaps on only a slighdy lower level of importance than Article 8 is Article
126 which empowers the representatives of the Protecting Power to visit all
places where prisoners of war may be, themselves selecting the places they will
visit and determining the frequency of the visits; to have access to all premises
where prisoners are confined; to go to the place ofdeparture, passage, and arrival
of prisoners who are being transferred; and to interview prisoners and prisoners'
representatives without witnesses. " The significant nature of these provisions
is so patent as to make any discussion superfluous.
Other powers and duties of the Protecting Power are, indeed, varied. For
example, it is directed to lend its good offices to assist in settling disputes with
respect to the application and interpretation of the convention (Article 11); it is
authorized to inspect the financial records ofindividual prisoners ofwar (Article
65); it may, in the interests of the prisoners, permit the Detaining Power to
reduce below the specified minimum the number of communications which
may be sent out each month by each prisoner (Article 71); it may, in the interests
of the prisoners, propose a limit on the number of packages which a prisoner
may receive (Article 72); it may itself take over the transport of capture cards,
mail, packages, and legal documents, should military operations prevent the
Detaining Power from fulfilling its obligations in this respect (Article 75); it has
an unrestricted right to receive complaints from individual prisoners and from
prisoners' representatives (Article 78); it has the right to inspect the record of
disciplinary punishments (Article 96); and it has the duty to find counsel for a
prisoner against whom judicial proceedings have been instituted, and the right
to attend the trial (Article 105).
(2) Liaison Functions:
In its liaison capacity the Protecting Power is actually little more than a
conduit. It serves merely as the means of relaying necessary communications
between the Detaining Power and the Power of Origin. Protecting Powers are,
not infrequently, the sole means readily available for the transmittal of messages
between the two belligerents. And, of course, while a great many liaison
functions are specifically set forth in the 1949 Convention, this is one area in
which the Protecting Power may safely operate, even where the particular liaison
mission which it undertakes is not among those enumerated in the convention.
The Detaining Power is required to give to the Protecting Power for relay
to the Power of Origin the geographical location of all prisoner-of-war camps
so that the prisoners will not, as has happened, accidentally become the target
of their own compatriots (Article 23). The reasons for any limitations placed by
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the Detaining Power on the amount of funds made available to a prisoner of
war from advances of pay must be conveyed to the Protecting Power,
presumably for transmittal to the Power of Origin (Article 60). The Detaining
Power must advise the Protecting Power, for relay to the Power of Origin, of
the rate of daily working pay which it has fixed (Article 62) . Transmittals of
payments by prisoners of war to their own country are made by notification
from the Detaining Power to the Power of Origin through the medium of the
Protecting Power (Article 63). Notifications with respect to the status of the
accounts of prisoners of war (Article 65) and of prisoners whose captivity has,
for some reason, such as escape, death, or other means, terminated (Article 66),
are also sent by the Detaining Power to the Power ofOrigin through the medium
of the Protecting Power. Claims of prisoners for injury or disease arising out of
assigned work are similarly transmitted (Article 68). Information with respect to
the measures taken by the Detaining Power to enable prisoners to communicate
with the exterior must be transmitted to the Power of Origin through the
Protecting Power (Article 69). And the Protecting Power must be informed,
presumably for the information of the Power of Origin, as well as for its own,
ofall offenses punishable by death under the laws ofthe Detaining Power (Article
100).
In several instances the convention provides for the exchange ofinformation
between the belligerents without specifying how this is to be accomplished.
Unquestionably, these are areas in which, as noted above, the Protecting Power
would feel qualified to intervene, even though it has no specific mandate. For
example, Article 21 provides for an exchange of information between
belligerents as to their respective laws and regulations on the subject of parole,
and Article 43 provides for an exchange of information with respect to military
titles and ranks, but neither of these articles states how the exchange is to be
made. The Protecting Powers are available and competent to perform this liaison
function; and it may be assumed that either the Detaining Powers would request
their services for this purpose or the Protecting Powers would, themselves, offer
their services for the transmittal of the required information.
(3) Miscellaneous Functions:
There are a number of references to the Protecting Power in the 1949
Convention which cannot rightly be designated as powers or duties but which
are likewise not precisely liaison functions. For lack of a more descriptive term,
and because, for the most part, they bear little or no relationship to each other,
they are here considered as miscellaneous functions.
Thus, Article 12 provides that if a Detaining Power, to whom prisoners of
war have been transferred by the original Detaining Power, fails to carry out the
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provisions of the convention, the original Detaining Power will, upon being
notified to that effect by the Protecting Power, either take measures to correct
the situation or request the return of the prisoners concerned. And Article 58
indicates, without specifically so providing, that some time after the outbreak
of hostilities the Detaining Power and the Protecting Power will enter into an
arrangement relating to the possession of money by prisoners of war.
Again, Article 79 requires the Detaining Power to inform the Protecting
Power of its reasons therefor whenever it refuses to approve a duly elected
prisoners' representative; and Article 81 requires the Detaining Power to inform
the Protecting Power of its reasons for dismissing a prisoners' representative. In
neither of these articles is there any indication of the action it is contemplated
that the Protecting Power will take when the required information is given to
it. While the information might, in the exercise ofthe Protecting Power's liaison
function and as a matter ofroutine, be passed to the Power of Origin, this action
alone would have little significance. Under its right to scrutinize the application
ofthe convention, the Protecting Power would probably, in an appropriate case,
take issue with the Detaining Power's action with respect to the non-approval
or the dismissal of a prisoners' representative.
Further, Article 121 provides that the Detaining Power shall investigate and
make a full report to the Protecting Power of every death or serious injury of a
prisoner of war caused or suspected to have been caused by a sentry, another
prisoner of war, or any other person, or where the cause of death is unknown;
and that if guilt is indicated, the Detaining Power will prosecute the responsible
persons. Certainly it is to be expected that the Protecting Power will forward
the report of the incident to the Power of Origin; but it is equally certain that
the Protecting Power would, on its own initiative, make demarches to the
Detaining Power, if it felt that the investigation had been inadequate or that a
prosecution indicated by the investigation had not taken place.
It is believed that the foregoing short presentation of only a few types of
provisions adequately establishes that the Protecting Power has certain functions
which cannot exactly be fitted into either the category of powers or duties or
the category of liaison functions, and that these miscellaneous functions can
probably become whatever the particular Protecting Power desires them to be.
(4) Limitations:
Each of the four conventions drafted at the 1949 Diplomatic Conference
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contains an article similar to Article 8 of the Prisoner of War Convention.
However, in the Third and Fourth Conventions (Prisoner ofWar and Civilian
Conventions, respectively) the Protecting Powers are merely admonished to
"take account of the imperative necessities of security of the State wherein they
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carry out their duties," while in the First and Second (Wounded and Sick of
Armed Forces in the Field—the "Red Cross Convention"—and Wounded,
Sick and Shipwrecked at Sea, respectively), not only are they so admonished,
but they are told in an oblique fashion that their activities may be restricted "as
an exceptional and temporary measure when this is rendered necessary by
imperative inilitary necessities." The importance of the distinction drawn
between the two pairs of conventions was fully appreciated at the time of the
drafting ofthe conventions and was the occasion for some spirited debate. While
on its face the solution reached by the convention is plainly a victory for those
who sought to exclude the possibility of any shackles being placed on the
Protecting Power in the performance of its functions with respect to prisoners
of war, it remains to be seen whether this result was actually attained.
Assuming that the Detaining Power desires to impose the "exceptional and
temporary" restrictions on visits of the Protecting Power which are authorized
in Article 126 of the 1949 Convention, or the right to the even more extensive
restrictions on the activities of the Protecting Power which is asserted by some
states to exist, whether or not specified in the convention, how and by whom
is the decision to be made as to whether "imperative military necessities" do, in
fact, exist? There is one school ofthought which takes the position that it would
be illogical to permit the determination to be made by the Detaining Power
itself, as it would be judging its own case, and which insists that only the
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Protecting Power can validly make such a determination. While, from a strictly
humanitarian point ofview, there is much to be said in favor of this position, it
cannot, as a practical matter, be justified. If, for example, the Detaining Power
deems it essential to keep representatives of the Protecting Power temporarily
out of an area, lest military movements noted therein inadvertendy lead to the
disclosure of important impending military actions, there would be little logic
in compelling it to advise the Protecting Power what and why it was so doing
in order to permit the latter to determine whether imperative military necessities
actually existed and whether the restriction was really justified. This is
unquestionably a matter which will, in the course of events and through
reciprocal actions of the belligerents, adjust itself inasmuch as time and
experience will very quickly result in an informal mutual appreciation as to
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where the line is to be drawn.
D. Relationship to the ICRC
The multifold operations of the ICRC are obviously not within the scope of
this article. However, inasmuch as the functions of the Protecting Power and
those of the ICRC often overlap insofar as prisoners of war are concerned, it
appears appropriate to mention, at least briefly, some of the overlapping areas.
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The basic safeguard to the activities of the ICRC is contained in Article 9 of
the 1949 Convention, which specifies:
The provisions of the present Convention constitute no obstacle to the
humanitarian activities which the International Committee of the Red Cross or
any other impartial humanitarian organization may, subject to the consent of the
Parties to the conflict concerned, undertake for the protection of prisoners ofwar
and for their relief.
Despite a substantially similar provision in Article 88 of the 1929 Convention,
the ICRC found, during World War II, that it was, at times, necessary to
overcome the feeling of some belligerents that it was attempting to duplicate
the functions of the Protecting Powers. Apparently it succeeded in convincing
them that such was not the case.
It has already been pointed out that Article 10 of the 1949 Convention
contains provisions for the designation of "substitutes" for Protecting Powers
under certain circumstances. The third paragraph of Article 10 provides that,
failing such a "substitute," the Detaining Power shall request or accept
. . . the offer ofthe services ofa humanitarian organization, such as the International
Committee of the Red Cross, to assume the humanitarian functions performed
by Protecting Powers under the present Convention.
It must be emphasized that when the ICRC is thus called upon to serve, it does
so as a humanitarian organization and not as a Protecting Power which, by
definition, it cannot be, inasmuch as it is not a state.
In a number of areas the convention places the ICRC on the same plane as
the Protecting Power. As we have seen, Article 126 is of major importance in
its grant of authority to the Protecting Power to go wherever prisoners of war
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are located. ' That article also specifies that "The delegates of the International
Committee of the Red Cross shall enjoy the same prerogatives." A similar
parallel is to be found in Article 56 dealing with the locations of, and visits to,
labor detachments. And it is not surprising that we find the ICRC referred to
along with the Protecting Power in Articles 72 and 75, for these two articles are
among those relating to individual and collective relief shipments, a subject of
particular interest to the ICRC and one with respect to which it has developed
an unchallengeable expertise as a result of experience gained in innumerable
conflicts. Most Protecting Powers would probably be more than willing to
permit the ICRC to pre-empt the handling of this difficult and complicated
function.
Articles 79 and 81 authorize the prisoners' representatives to communicate
with the ICRC as well as the Protecting Power. Here, however, it is believed
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that the purpose of each such authorization to communicate is fundamentally
different. The creation of the position of prisoners' representative was first
suggested during the Franco-Prussian War (1870—1871) and became a reality
during World War I. The function for which it was originally created was to
receive and distribute relief packages. However, over the course of time, the
functions of the prisoners' representatives have been greatly expanded, and
during World War II it was not unusual to find them involved in practically all
of the problems of a prisoner-of-war camp. Thus, they were frequently used by
the prisoners as the channel for the transmittal of complaints both to the
Detaining Power and to the Protecting Power. The drafters of the 1949
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Convention were fully aware of this development, and it appears that the steps
which they took were intended to insure that the privileges accorded to the
prisoners' representative would permit him to communicate with the delegates
of the ICRC on problems relating to relief shipments and with the Protecting
Power on this subject as well as on the myriad of other problems into which
the prisoners' representative is now projected.
It is probably safe to state that, while the allocation of functions by the 1949
Convention between the Protecting Power and the ICRC is not always as clearly
stated as it might have been, the fundamental differences between the two and
between their methods ofoperation are such that conflicts between them would
be extremely rare.
III. Conclusion
The past century has seen tremendous advances made in the concept of the
Protecting Power as an instrument of international law, both in the role which
it is called upon to play and in the prestige which it enjoys and which goes far
in assisting it to perform the numerous functions which have now been assigned
to it. It appears unquestionable that:
The presence ofthe Protecting Powers today remains the sole means ofputting
a brake on the excesses ofDetaining Powers, the sole element ofmoderation and
ofmorality in the treatment ofenemy persons, their belongings, and their interests:
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this was noted and affirmed many times at Geneva.
The results of the 1949 Diplomatic Conference reveal clearly that the nations
of the world were generally prepared to accept a solid basis for the activities of
the Protecting Power. It was conceded a mission of close observation of the
application of the provisions of the Prisoner ofWar Convention drafted at that
Conference, a mission which necessarily incorporates within it a right to call to
the attention of the Detaining Power any failure of performance which it finds
and to report any such failure of performance to the Power of Origin; a sizeable
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expansion was made in its functions and, correlatively, in its power and authority;
provision was made for substitutes for Protecting Powers in order to insure that
prisoners of war would at all times benefit from the exercise of the functions of
the Protecting Power, thus correcting the situation which had arisen all too
frequendy during World War II; and the use of the institution of the Protecting
Power was extended not only to the Red Cross Convention (Wounded and
Sick ofArmed Forces in the Field), but also to the convention which adapts the
Red Cross Convention to maritime warfare (Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked
at Sea), and to the completely new Civilian Convention. These few examples
alone demonstrate the great distance which has been traversed since 1907, when
the prisoner-of-war provisions of the Regulations Respecting the Laws and
Customs ofWar on Land were drafted at The Hague and contained no reference
whatsoever to the Protecting Power.
In many respects the provisions of the 1949 Geneva Conventions relating to
the Protecting Power represent compromises. Positions reached solely in order
to bring about agreement between opposing viewpoints can rarely be considered
perfect and the present case is no exception. However, these provisions
unquestionably represent a great step forward in the evolution of international
law and would undoubtedly be viewed with amazement by those who drafted
the first Red Cross Convention in 1864 or even by those who acted on behalf
of the Protecting Powers as recendy as in 1914, at the beginning ofWorld War
I.
59
The Protecting Power is now a generally accepted institution ofinternational
law. It is the subject of international agreements to which most of the states of
the world are parties. There are clear indications that it has been weighed in the
balance and not been found wanting, with the result that it has been, and in the
future will continue to be, requested to assume numerous new functions on
behalf of states at war.
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11. Eroglu, op. tit. 27-28.
12. For example, Art. VIII of the Final Act of the Conference ofCopenhagen ofNov. 2. 1917 (photostatic
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Russia were the belligerent parties, dealt with "Arrangements concerning the Admission of the Delegates of
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for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick of Armies in the Field (better known as the
1929 Geneva Red Cross Convention), 47 Stat. 2074; Treaty Series, No. 847; 27 AJ.I.L. Supp. 43 (1933), a
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16. Art. 86 of the 1929 Convention reads as follows:
"The High Contracting Parties recognize that the regular application of the present Convention will find
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ofbelligerents; in this respect, the protecting Powers may, besides their diplomatic personnel, appoint delegates
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functions by the Protecting Power of such terms as "mediation" (Art. 31) and "good offices" (Art. 87).
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on Land, 36 Stat. 2277; Treaty Series, No. 539; 2 AJ.I.L. Supp. 90 (1909).
18. The U.S.S.R. took the position that, as it was a party to the Fourth Hague Convention of 1907, the
Annex to which, it asserted, covered "all the main questions of the regime of captivity" (but not, as has
previously been pointed out in note 8 above, the question of the designation or functions of the Protecting
Powers), there was no need for it to consider an Italian proposal to apply reciprocally the provisions of the
1929 Convention (Report ofthe International Committee ofthe Red Cross on its Activities during the Second
World War (hereinafter referred to as ICRC Report), Vol. I, p. 412). Whilejapan stated its intention to "apply
this Convention mutatis mutandis, to all prisoners of war" (ibid. 443), the Protecting Powers were never
permitted to function in a manner even remotely resembling their manner of functioning in the territories"
of most of the other belligerents. As a result of the foregoing, and of the disappearance of many Powers of
Origin during the course of hostilities, the ICRC estimates that during World War II approximately 70% of
all prisoners of war were deprived of the services of a Protecting Power. De la Pradelle, op. cit. 226. Thus,
Germany denied the status of states to Poland, Yugoslavia, France and Belgium (after the 1940 armistices),
Free France, and Italy (after Mussolini's overthrow in 1943), and refused to permit the intervention of
Protecting Powers on behalf of their captured personnel. Pictet, "La Croix-Rouge et les Conventions de
Geneve," in 76 Hague Academy Recueil des Cours 5, 87 (1950, I).
19. The 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (hereinafter referred
to as the 1949 Convention), 6 U.S. Treaties 3316; 75 U.N. Treaty Series 135 (I: 972); 47 AJ.I.L. Supp. 119
(1953). There were signed, on the same day, three other conventions in which, for the first time in other than
a prisoner-of-war convention, references were made to Protecting Powers: Art. 8 and others of the 1949
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the
Field (the successor to the 1929 Red Cross Convention mentioned in note 15 above), 6 U.S. Treaties 3114;
75 U.N. Treaty Series 31 (I: 970); Art. 8 and others of the 1949 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of
the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, 6 U.S. Treaties
3217; 75 U.N. Treaty Series 85 (I: 971); and Art. 9 and others of the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to
the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time ofWar, 6 U. S. Treaties 3516; 75 U.N. Treaty Series 287 (I: 973);
50 AJ.I.L Supp. 724 (1956). This latter convention will undoubtedly prove ofmajor importance in extending
the functions of the Protecting Power in any future international conflict.
20. References to the Protecting Power are contained in 36 of its 132 substantive articles (4, 8, 10, 11,
12, 23, 56, 58, 60, 62, 63, 65, 66, 68, 69, 71, 72, 73, 75, 77, 78, 79, 81, 96, 98, 100, 101, 104, 105, 107, 108,
120, 121, 122, 126, and 128) as well as in two of its Annexes The basic charter for the Protecting Power is
contained in Art. 8, which reads:
Protecting Power 49
"The present Convention shall be applied with the cooperation and under the scrutiny of the Protecting
Powers whose duty it is to safeguard the interests of the Parties to the conflict. For this purpose, the Protecting
Powers may appoint, apart from their diplomatic or consular staff, delegates from amongst their own nationals
or the nationals of other neutral Powers. The said delegates shall be subject to the approval of the Power with
which they are to carry out their duties.
"The Parties to the conflict shall facilitate to the greatest extent possible the task of the representatives or
delegates of the Protecting Powers.
"The representatives or delegates of the Protecting Powers shall not in any case exceed their mission under
the present Convention. They shall, in particular, take account of the imperative necessities of security of the
State wherein they carry out their duties."
21. Le Comite International de la Croix-Rouge et le Conflit de Coree: Recueil de Documents, Vol. I,
p. 16 (1952).
22. The UN. Command permitted the ICRC to perform its usual functions with respect to the
Communist prisoners of war held by the UNC. Pictet, Commentary 546. As we shall see many of these
functions parallel, or may be substituted for, those of a Protecting Power. Unfortunately, all efforts of the
ICRC to act north of the batde line were repulsed by the Communists. Treatment ofBritish Prisoners ofWar
in Korea 33-34 (British Ministry of Defence, 1955).
23. Up to the end of 1959 there had been 77 ratifications of, and accessions to, these conventions.
International Committee of the Red Cross, Annual Report, 1959, at p. 45 (1959). These include all of the
more important Powers except Canada and the Republic of China. The use of the institution ofthe Protecting
Power has since been resorted to in the Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of
Armed Conflict, signed at The Hague on May 14, 1954 (249 U.N. Treaty Series 215 (I: 3511)), where it is
adopted as a means of overseeing the protection of inanimate objects—which is, actually, merely a variation
of the protection furnished historically by the Protecting Power, a very large part of its energies having once
been directed towards the protection ofthe embassy buildings and diplomatic archives of the Protected Power.
24. As was aptly stated by one author: "What happened was that an existing usage was taken, and
transformed into a regulation. It was the organ which created the function." Siordet, op. cit. 3.
25. It must at all times be borne in mind that the Protecting Power is not a general agent of the Power of
Origin. In his book, The Present Law ofWar and Neutrality (1954), Castren defines the over-all relationship
between these two Powers as follows (at p. 92):
"The protecting Power does not act in its own name but rather as a kind of caretaker or intermediary.
Nevertheless, it acts independently in so far as the State whose interests it protects cannot demand, but only
request, it to perform certain services, and the protecting Power itself decides the way in which it discharges
its mission. Nor may a belligerent give instructions to those organs of the protecting Power which carry out
this mission. Instead, requests to the protecting Power have to be made through diplomatic channels. The
protecting Power may refuse to act when compliance with a request would be contrary to its own interests
or infringe the lawful right of the enemy State."
26. Siordet states that the designation of a Protecting Power is no longer optional but is now "quasi
obligatoire" ("De l'Application et du Controle des Conventions de Geneve de 1949," in 1956 Revue
Internationale de la Croix-Rouge 464, 468); that it is now put in the "imperative form" (The Geneva
Conventions of 1949: The Question of Scrutiny 36); and that in performing its mission the Protecting Power
is no longer the special representative of one of the parties, but is "the representative of all the Contracting
Parties to the Convention" (ibid.).
27. This is the step which the United States apparently failed to take when it was requested to perform
the functions of the Protecting Power for Great Britain during the Boer War. See discussion above.
28. The 1 949 Convention contains no provisions with respect to the qualifications of a Protecting Power,
the method of designation, etc., leaving these problems for setdement under general international law.
Heckenroth, Les Puissances Protectrices et les Conventions de Geneve 62 and 224 (unpublished thesis,
Universite d'Aix-Marseille, 1951). This solution will work until one belligerent arbitrarily elects to deny its
consent to every neutral nominated by its enemy. In the light of the adamant refusal of the U.S.S.R. to permit
any type ofinspection to take place on its territory during peacetime, it seems unlikely that such activity would
be permitted in time ofwar, even though the U.S.S.R. participated actively in the drafting of the 1949 Geneva
Conventions and has ratified them, as have all of its satellites, without any reservations as to Art. 8.
29. Franklin, op. cit. 164-165. A similar conclusion is reached in Pictet, Commentary 95-96, wherein this
statement appears:
"It became more and more common for these neutral Powers to find themselves responsible for
representing the respective interests oftwo opposing Parties at one and the same time. This gave them additional
authority, and incidentally altered their role; for once a Power represented the interests of two opposing
belligerents, it became not so much the special representative of each of them, as the common agent of both,
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or a kind of umpire. This enabled it to bring directly into play that powerful instrument, the argument of
reciprocity, to obtain the improvements desired."
In 1945 Switzerland alone represented 34 belligerents, and in many cases it represented opposing
belligerents in the territory of each other. Eroglu, op. cit. 144-148.
30. For some of these possible situations see Siordet, op. cit. 49-53; and Heckenroth, op. cit. 229-236.
31. The French Delegation strongly urged that a provision be included in the 1949 Convention setting
up an international body to perform the functions of Protecting Powers in the absence of the latter (Final
Record, Vol. II B, p. 27; ibid., Vol. Ill, pp. 30-31). The substance of this proposal was included in Resolution
2 adopted by the Diplomatic Conference (ibid., Vol. I, p. 361), but, as far as the writer has been able to ascertain,
no steps have been taken, or are contemplated, to implement the resolution. The U.S.S.R. opposed both the
original French proposal and the adoption of the resolution, stating as to the latter that it "sees no need to
consider this question or to create such a body, since the problem ofthe Protecting Powers has been satisfactorily
solved by the Conventions established in the present Conference." Declaration made by the Delegation of
the U.S.S.R. at the time of the signing of the conventions. Ibid., Vol. I. n. 201.
32. Pictet, Commentary 117-118. All of the Communist countries (and Portugal) made reservations to
Art. 10 to the effect that they would not recognize as legal "requests by the Detaining Power to a neutral State
or to a humanitarian organization, to undertake the functions performed by a Protecting Power, unless the
consent of the Government of the country of which the prisoners of war are nationals is obtained." While
there is a not unnatural tendency to view with suspicion this position taken almost uniquely by the U.S.S.R.
and its satellites (see, for example, Brockhaus, "Sowjetunion und Genfer Kriegsgefangenen-Konvention von
1949," 2 Ost-Europa Recht 286, 291 (1956)), it appears to have a valid basis. If there is an existing Power of
Origin, not only is its consent to the designation of a Protecting Power to act on its behalf essential, but it has
the right to make the selection itself in the first place! And the statements made at the Diplomatic Conference
by Soviet representatives Morosov (Final Record, Vol. II B, pp. 29 and 351) and Sokirkin (ibid., p. 347) make
it clear that they merely desired to limit specifically the right of the Detaining Power to select a substitute for
the Protecting Power to those cases where there is no existing Power of Origin—a limitation as to which
there should have been no dispute. It is to be hoped that by overruling the Soviet thesis the Diplomatic
Conference did not establish the proposition that a Detaining Power may, on its own, select and designate a
substitute for a Protecting Power even though there is a Power of Origin in being.
33. Neither the 1929 Convention nor the working (Stockholm) draft used at the Diplomatic Conference
includes the term "consular" in specifying the authorized representatives of the Protecting Power. The
authorization for the Protecting Power to use this category of personnel as representatives was proposed by
Australia and was unanimously approved. Final Record, Vol. II B, p. 58.
34. Janner, op. cit. 52.
35. Siordet, op. cit. 21. A provision of the working (Stockholm) draft used at the Diplomatic Conference
would have required the Detaining Power to give "serious grounds" for any refusal to approve the nomination
of a non-career individual by the Protecting Power. Final Record, Vol. I, p. 13. This proposal was equally
lacking in logic, since a state need give no reasons for refusing to agree to the assignment to a post in its territory
of a member of the diplomatic or consular service of the Protecting Power or for declaring such an individual
persona non grata. The provision was deleted at Geneva. Ibid., Vol. II B, pp. 58 and 110.
36. De la Pradelle, "Le Controle de 1 'application des Conventions Humanitaires en cas de Conflit arme,"
in 2 Annuaire Francais de Droit International 343, 344 (1956).
37. Letter of Instructions of Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan, dated Aug. 17, 1914 (9 A.J.I.L.
Supp. 118 (1915)). See also, Franklin, Op. cit. 114; United States Foreign Service Manual, Vol. 2, Consular
Affairs, pars. 924.1 and 931.
38. "It is not the function of the Protecting Power to command or to overrule; it is its function to observe,
to comment, to make representations, and to send reports to the outside world. If we are faced with an
unscrupulous belligerent, the presence of the Protecting Power and the ability of the Protecting Power to
examine what is going on and to observe is the only preventive measure which we have." Statement of
Quentin-Baxter, representative of New Zealand, at the 1949 Diplomatic Conference, Final Record, Vol. II
B, p. 344.
39. Thus, Heckenroth, op. cit. 135, and Janner, op. cit. 52, have each listed seven separate categories of
functions of the Protecting Power, but the lists coincide with respect to only four functions! Still a third
functional listing appears in Pictet, Commentary 98-99.
40. Yingling and Ginnane loc. cit. 397. In the British Army Manual of Military Law (Part III, The Law
ofWar on Land, 1958) 92, the Protecting Power is termed "the principal organ, apart from the Contracting
Parties themselves, for ensuring the observance of the Convention." Part III of the Manual was largely the
work of the late Sir Hersch Lauterpacht.
41. Final Record, Vol. II B, p. 110.
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42. Ibid.; Siordet, op. cit. 24-25.
43. The right of visitation granted by Art. 126 is reiterated in Arts. 56 (labor detachments), 98 (prisoners
undergoing disciplinary punishment), and 108 (prisoners undergoing judicial punishment).
44. Pictet, Commentary 571.
45. See note 19 above.
46. A similar restriction is contained in Art. 126 of the 1949 Convention with respect to visits to places
where prisoners of war may be. This is the only area in which the 1949 Convention specifically permits the
activities of the Protecting Power to be restricted by the Detaining Power. While it is, of course, a very
important one, it is not believed that a Detaining Power could really justify the imposition ofsuch a restriction
except in very rare cases, such as prohibiting visits to extremely forward collecting points during the actual
course of an attack.
47. The proponents of the distinction between the two pairs of conventions argued that it was "obvious
and reasonable that the activities of a Protecting Power in sea warfare and on the field of battle must be
restricted, "but that as to the Prisoner ofWar and Civilian Conventions" "the vital force which animates those
rules and gives them effect is the presence of the Protecting Power." Final Record, Vol. II B, p. 344. The
pessimism which may be apparent in the text is occasioned by the fact that the U.S.S.R. took the position
that, even without such a restrictive limitation in the convention, it would exist in fact. Ibid. 345.
48. Pictet, Commentary on the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick ofArmed Forces in the Field 101 (1952). Even there it is admitted that "this is precisely
what it [the Protecting Power] would, in such a case, be debarred from doing. It will only be possible to show
after the event whether or not the restriction was justified." In Pictet, Commentary, published 8 years later,
a much more realistic approach is taken (at p. 611):
"If they are to justify the prohibition of visits, military necessities must be imperative. Whether they are
or not is a matter for the Detaining Power alone to decide and the right of supervision of the Protecting
Powers is restricted by this exercise of sovereignty. Such a decision must not be lightly taken, however, and
any prohibition of visits must be an exceptional measure."
49. In Pictet, Commentary, he. cit., the following remedial procedure is suggested:
"The Protecting Powers and the International Committee will have the right to bring the temporary
nature of the prohibition to the notice of the Detaining Power and, after a certain length of time, to request
it to raise all restrictions. Moreover, the Protecting Power will be able to check afterwards whether the
prohibition of visits has been used by the Detaining Power to violate the Convention. In any case, it is not in
the interests of the Detaining Power to misuse this reservation, because it would very soon be suspected of
deliberately violating the Convention by evading supervision by qualified witnesses."
50. As stated in the ICRC Report, Vol. I, p. 39:
"Despite partial overlapping, the functions of the Protecting Power are fundamentally dissimilar in kind
and extent [from those of the ICRC]. The Protecting Power is the mandatory of one or both belligerents,
with competency to protect the rights and interests of the States from which it derives authority. The
Committee is concerned exclusively with humanitarian tasks; its functions are not limited to those which are
guaranteed by law, but embrace such enterprises in the interests of humanity as appear essential, or which are
justified through a request made by a belligerent."
51. Ibid.
52. In Pictet, Commentary 119, the following statement appears:
"The Convention in this case [paragraph 3 ofArticle 10] no longer uses the words 'undertake the functions
performed by a Protecting Power,' but speaks only of 'humanitarian functions.' The distinction is logical.
There is no longer any question of a real substitute, and a humanitarian organization cannot be expected to
fulfil all the functions incumbent on a Protecting Power by virtue ofthe Conventions." See also Final Record,
Vol. II B, pp. 61 and 63.
53. See above.
54. ICRC Report, Vol. I, pp. 342-343. At that time a prisoners' representative was known as a "man of
confidence." In the 1929 Convention they were called "agents."
55. See, for example, Art. 78, wherein specific provision is now contained permitting individual
complaints to be transmitted to the Protecting Power either directly, as had been provided in Art. 42 of the
1929 Convention, or through the medium of the prisoners' representative. Although Art. 42 of the 1929
Convention, the predecessor of Art. 78 of the 1949 Convention, made no mention of the ICRC as an
authorized recipient of complaints from prisoners of war, the ICRC took the position that "it is, according
to the spirit of the [1929] Convention, undoubtedly meant to be placed, in this respect, on the same footing
as the Protecting Powers." ICRC Report, Vol. I, p. 341. This conclusion is subject to dispute and, in view
of the fact that Art. 78 of the 1949 Convention again omits all reference to the ICRC, it would, in interpreting
that article, now be even more difficult to accept the ICRC position. Certainly, ifsuch had been the intention
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of the drafters, they could easily have attained their objective by merely including the ICRC in the article,
along with the Protecting Power, as they did in a number of other articles. Their failure to do so in the light
of the announced ICRC position strongly militates against the ICRC interpretation.
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The Employment of Prisoners of War
57 AmericanJournal of International Law 318 (1963)*
From the days when the Romans first came to appreciate the economic
value of prisoners of war as a source of labor, and began to use them as
1
slaves instead of killing them on the field of batde, until the drafting and
adoption by a comparatively large number of members of the then family of
sovereign states of the Second Hague Convention of 1899, no attempt to
regulate internationally the use made ofprisoner-of-war labor by the Detaining
Power had been successful. The Regulations attached to that Convention
dealt with the subject in a single article, as did those attached to the Fourth
Hague Convention of 1907 which, with relatively minor changes, merely
repeated the provisions ofits illustrious predecessor. A somewhat more extensive
elaboration ofthe subject was included in the 1929 Geneva Convention relative
to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (hereinafter referred to as the 1929
Convention). And, although still far from perfect, the provisions concerning
prisoner-of-war labor contained in the 1949 Geneva Convention relative to the
Treatment ofPrisoners ofWar (hereinafter referred to as the 1949 Convention)
constitute an enlightened attempt to legislate a fairly comprehensive code
governing the major problems involved in the employment of prisoners ofwar
by the Detaining Power. The purpose of this study is to analyze the provisions
of that code and to suggest not only how the draftsmen intended them to be
interpreted, but also how it can be expected that they will actually be
implemented by Detaining Powers in any future war.
While there are very obvious differences between the employment ofworkers
available through a free labor market and the employment of prisoners of war,
even a casual and cursory study will quickly disclose a remarkable number of
similarities. The labor union which is engaged in negotiating a contract for its
members is vitally interested in: (1) the conditions under which they will work,
including safety provisions; (2) their working hours and the holidays and
vacations to which they will be entitled; (3) the compensation and other
monetary benefits which they will receive; and (4) the grievance procedures
which will be available to them. (Of course, in each industry there will also be
numerous items peculiar to that industry.) Because of the uniqueness of
* Reprinted in 23 MIL. L. REV. 41 (1964).
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prisoner-of-war status, the 1949 Diplomatic Conference which drafted the latest
prisoner-of-war convention felt it necessary, in negotiating for the benefit of
future prisoners of war, to continue to cover certain items in addition to those
listed above, such as the categories of prisoners of war who may be compelled
to work (a problem which does not normally exist for labor unions in a free
civilian society, although it may come into existence in a total war economy);
and, collateral to that, the specific industries in which they may or may not be
employed. Inasmuch as these latter problems lie at the threshold ofthe utilization
of prisoner-of-war labor, they will be considered before those enumerated
above.
Before proceeding to a detailed analysis of the labor provisions of the 1949
Convention, and how one may anticipate that they will operate in time of war,
it seems both pertinent and appropriate to survey briefly the history of, and the
problems encountered in, the utilization of prisoner-of-war labor during the
past century. That period is selected because its earliest date represents the point
at which cartels for the exchange of prisoners of war had ceased to have any
considerable importance and yet belligerents were apparently still unaware of
the tremendous potentiality of the economic asset which was in their hands at
a time of urgent need.
The American Civil War (1861-1865) was the first major conflict involving
large masses of troops and large numbers ofprisoners ofwar in which exchanges
1
1
were the exception rather than the rule. As a result, both sides found
themselves encumbered with great masses of prisoners of war; but neither side
made any substantial use of this potential pool of manpower, although both
suffered from labor shortages.
At
This was so, despite the statement in Lieber's
13
Code that prisoners of war "may be required to work for the benefit of the
captor's government, according to their rank and condition," and despite the
valiant efforts of the Quartermaster General of the Union Army, who sought
unsuccessfully, although fully supported by Professor Lieber, to overcome the
official reluctance to use prisoner-of-war labor. The policy of the Federal
Government was that prisoners of war would be compelled to work "only as
an instrument of reprisal against some act of the enemy."
In 1874 an international conference, which included eminent representatives
from most of the leading European nations, met in Brussels at the invitation of
the Tsar of Russia "in order to deliberate on the draft of an international
agreement respecting the laws and customs ofwar." This conference prepared
a text which, while never ratified, constituted a major step forward in the effort
to set down in definitive manner those rules of land warfare which could be
considered to be a part of the law of nations. It included, in its Article 25, a
provision concerning prisoner-of-war labor which adopted, but considerably
amplified, Lieber's single sentence on the subject quoted above. This article was
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subsequently adopted almost verbatim by the Institute of International Law
when it drafted Articles 71 and 72 of its "Oxford Manual" in 1880; and it
furnished much of the material for Article 6 of the Regulations attached to the
Second Hague Convention of 1899 and the same article of the Regulations
attached to the Fourth Hague Convention of 1907.
Despite all of these efforts, the actual utilization of prisoner-of-war labor
remained negligible during the numerous major conflicts which preceded World
War I. This last was the first modern war in which there was total economic
mobilization by the belligerents; and there were more men held as prisoners of
war and for longer periods of time than during any previous conflict.
Nevertheless, it was not until 1916 that the British War Office could overcome
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opposition in the United Kingdom to the use of prisoner-of-war labor; and
after the entry of the United States into the war, prisoners of war held in this
country were not usefully employed until the investigation ofan attempted mass
escape resulted in a recommendation for a program of compulsory
prisoner-of-war labor, primarily as a means ofreducing disciplinary problems.
When the belligerents eventually did find it essential to make use of the
tremendous prisoner-of-war manpower pools which were available to them,
the provisions of the Regulations attached to the Fourth Hague Convention of
1907 proved inadequate to solve the numerous problems which arose, thereby
necessitating the negotiation of a series of bilateral and multilateral agreements
between the various belligerents during the course of the hostilities. Even so,
the Report of the "Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the
War and on Enforcement of Penalties," created by the PreHminary Peace
Conference in January, 1919, listed the "employment of prisoners of war on
unauthorized works" as one of the offenses which had been committed by the
20
Central Powers during the war.
The inadequacies in this and other areas of the Fourth Hague Convention of
1907, revealed by the events which had occurred during the course of World
• 21War I, led to the drafting and ratification of the 1929 Convention. It was this
Convention which governed many of the belligerents during the course of
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World War II; but once again international legislation based on the experience
gained during a previous conflict proved inadequate to control the more serious
and complicated situations which occurred during a subsequent period of
hostilities. Moreover, the proper implementation of the provisions of any
agreement must obviously depend in large part upon the good faith ofthe parties
thereto—and belligerents in war are, perhaps understandably, not motivated to
be unduly generous to their adversaries, with the result that frequently decisions
are made and policies are adopted which either skirt the bounds oflegal propriety
or actually exceed such bounds. The utilization ofprisoner-of-war labor by the
Detaining Powers proved no exception to the foregoing. Practically all prisoners
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of war were compelled to work. To this there can be basically no objection.
But during the course of their employment many of the protective provisions
of the 1929 Convention (and of the Fourth Hague Convention of 1907 which
it complemented) were either distorted or simply disregarded.
The leaders of Hitler's Nazi Germany were aware of its shortage oflabor and
appreciated the importance of the additional pool of manpower afforded by
prisoners ofwar as a source of that precious wartime commodity. Nevertheless,
for a considerable period of time they permitted their ideological differences
with the Communists to overcome their common sense and urgent needs.
And in Japan, which, although not a party to the 1929 Convention, had
committed itself to apply its provisions, those relating to prisoner-of-war labor
were among the many which were assiduously violated.
Like the other belligerents, the United States found an urgent need for
prisoner-of-war labor, both within its home territory and in the rear areas of the
embatded continents. One study even goes so far as to assert that the use of
Italian prisoners of war in the Mediterranean theater was the only thing which
made it possible for the United States to sustain simultaneously both the Italian
campaign and the invasion of Southern France, thereby hastening the downfall
of Germany. ' Similarly, it was found that in the United States the use of
prisoners of war for work at military installations, and in agriculture and other
authorized industries, served to release both Army service troops and civilians
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for other types ofwork which were more directly related to the war effort.
While the benefits of prisoner-of-war labor to the Detaining Power are
patent, benefits flowing to the prisoners ofwar themselves as a result of their use
in this manner are no less apparent. The reciprocal benefits resulting from the
proper use of prisoner-of-war labor is well summarized in the following
statement:
The work done by the PW has a high value for the Detaining Power, since it
makes a substantial contribution to its economic resources. The PW's home
country has to reckon that the work so done increases the war potential of its
enemy, maybe indirecdy; and yet at the same time it is to its own profit that its
nationals should return home at the end of hostilities in the best possible state of
health. Work under normal conditions is a valuable antidote to the trials of
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captivity, and helps PW to preserve their bodily health and morale.
During the close reappraisal of the 1929 Convention which followed World
War II, the provisions thereof dealing with the labor of prisoners of war were
not overlooked; and the Diplomatic Conference which met in Geneva in 1949
redrafted many of those provisions of the 1929 Convention in an effort to plug
the loopholes which the events of World War II had revealed. It is the 1949
Convention resulting from this work which will be used in the review and
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analysis of the rights and obligations of belligerents and prisoners of war in any
future conflict insofar as prisoner-of-war labor is concerned.
Categories of Prisoners of War Who May be Compelled to Work
In general, Article 49 of the 1949 Convention provides that all prisoners of
war, except commissioned officers, may be compelled to work. However, this
statement requires considerable elaboration and is subject to a number of
limitations.
a. The Detaining Power is specifically limited in that it may compel only
those prisoners ofwar to work who are physically fit, and the work must be of
a nature to maintain them "in a good state of physically and mental health." In
determining physical fitness, it is prescribed that the Detaining Power must take
into account the age, sex, and physical aptitude of each individual prisoner of
war. It may be assumed that these qualities are to be considered not only in
determining whether a prisoner of war should be compelled to work but also
in determining the type ofwork to which the particular prisoner ofwar should
be assigned. For example, women (and it must be accepted that in any future
major war there will be many female prisoners ofwar) should not be given tasks
requiring the lifting and moving of heavy loads; and, frequendy, men who are
physically fit to work may not have the physical aptitude for certain jobs by
reason of their size, weight, strength, age, lack of experience, et cetera. It
would appear that the provisions of Article 49 of the 1949 Convention require
the Detaining Power, within reasonable limits, to assure the assignment of the
proper man to the job.
Moreover, under the provisions ofArticles 31 and 55 ofthe 1949 Convention,
the determination of physical fitness must not only be made by medically
qualified personnel and at regular monthly intervals, but also whenever the
prisoner of war considers himself physically incapable of working. It should be
noted that the first of the cited articles is a general one which requires the
Detaining Power to conduct thorough medical inspections, monthly at a
minimum, primarily in order to supervise the general state of health of the
prisoners ofwar and to detect contagious diseases; while the second, which calls
for a medical examination at least monthly, is intended to verify the physical
fitness of the prisoner of war for work, and particularly for the work to which
he is assigned. It is evident that one medical examination directed
simultaneously towards both objectives would meet the obligations thus
32
imposed upon the Detaining Power.
The provision of Article 55 which authonzes a pnsoner of war to appear
before a medical board whenever he considers himself incapable ofworking has
grave potentialities. It can be expected that well-organized prisoners of war,
intent upon creating as many difficulties as possible for the Detaining Power,
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will be directed by their anonymous leaders to report themselves en masse and
at frequent intervals as being incapable of working and to request that they be
permitted to appear before the medical authorities of the camp. Is the Detaining
Power to be helpless, if thousands of prisoners of war, many more than can be
examined by available medical personnel, all elect at the same time to claim
sudden physical unfitness and to demand physical examinations? Where the
Detaining Power has good grounds for believing that such is the situation, and
this will normally be quite apparent, it would undoubtedly be justified in
compelling every prisoner of war to work until his turn for examination is
reached in regular order with the complement of medical personnel which had
previously been adequate for the particular prisoner-of-war camp. Thus the act
of the prisoners of war themselves in attempting to turn a provision intended
for their protection into an offensive weapon, illegal in its inception, would
actually result in their causing harm to the very people it was intended to
protect—the truly physically unfit prisoners of war.
The suggestion has been made that the medical examinations to determine
physical fitness for work should preferably be made by the retained medical
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personnel of the Power upon which the prisoners of war depend. ' This
suggestion is based upon the fact that Article 30, in providing for the medical
care and treatment of prisoners ofwar, states that they "shall have the attention,
preferably, of medical personnel of the Power on which they depend and, if
possible, oftheir nationality." However, there is considerable difference between
permitting the medical personnel of the Power on which the prisoner of war
depends to render medical assistance when he ill or injured, and permitting such
personnel to say whether or not he is physically qualified to work. It is not
believed that any Detaining Power would, or that the Convention intended that
it should, permit retained medical personnel to make final decisions in this
regard.
b. In his Instructions, Lieber gave no indication that the labor of all prisoners
of war, regardless of rank, was not available to the Detaining Power in some
capacity. However, Article 25 of the Declaration of Brussels and Article 71 of
the "Oxford Manual" both provided that prisoners of war could only be
employed on work which would not be "humiliating to their military rank."
The Second Hague Convention of 1 899 reverted to Lieber's rather vague phrase,
"according to their rank;" and the Fourth Hague Convention of 1907 went a
step further, adding to the foregoing phrase the words "officers excepted,"
thereby giving a legislative basis to a practice which had, in fact, already been
followed.
Both the 1929 Convention and the 1949 Convention are much more specific
in this regard, the latter amplifying and clarifying the already more detailed
provisions of its predecessor. While the first paragraph of Article 49 of the 1949
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Convention authorizes the Detaining Power to utilize the labor of "prisoners
of war," the second paragraph of that article specifies that non-commissioned
officers (NCOs) may only be required to do supervisory work, and the third
paragraph states that officers may not be compelled to work. It thus becomes
clear that, as used in the first paragraph of this article, the term "prisoners of
war" is intended to refer only to enlisted men below the non-commissioned
officer grade.
During World War II several problems arose with respect to the identification
ofnon-commissioned officers for labor purposes. In the first place, many NCOs
had had their identification documents taken from them upon capture (probably
for intelligence purposes) and were thereafter unable to establish their
"IS
entitlement to recognition of their grade. On the other hand, a number of
individuals apparently claimed NCO grades to which they were not actually
entitled, probably in order to avoid hard labor as well as to be entitled to the
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higher advances in pay. In a number of respects the 1 949 Convention attempts
to obviate these problems. Thus, Article 21 of the 1929 Convention provided
only that, upon the outbreak of hostilities, the belligerents would communicate
to one another the tides and ranks in use in their armies in order to assure
"equality of treatment between corresponding ranks of officers and persons of
equivalent status." This was construed as Hmiting the requirements of this
exchange ofinformation to the ranks and tides ofcommissioned officers. Article
43 of the new Convention makes it clear that information is to be exchanged
concerning the ranks and tides of all persons who fall within the various
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categories of potential prisoners of war enumerated in the Convention.
Further, during World War II the military personnel of each belligerent carried
such identification documents, if any, as that belligerent elected to provide to
its personnel. In addition, asjust noted, it was not unusual for capturing personnel
to seize these documents for whatever intelligence value they might have,
leaving the prisoner of war with no official identification material. The 1949
Convention attempts to rectify both of these defects. In Article 17 it provides
for an identification card containing, as a minimum, certain specified material
concerning identity; prescribes the desirable type of card; provides that it be
issued in duplicate; and states that while the prisoner ofwar must exhibit it upon
the demand of his captors, under no circumstances may it be taken from him.
This article, if complied with by the belligerents, should do much to eliminate
the problem of identifying non-commissioned officers, which existed during
World War II and which undoubtedly resulted in many incorrect decisions.
Two other problems connected with the labor ofnon-commissioned officers
are worthy ofcomment. On occasions disputes may arise as to the types ofwork
which can be construed as falling within the term "supervisory." The drafters
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of the 1949 Convention made no attempt to solve this problem. There is much
merit in the solution offered by one authority, who says:
The term "supervisory work" is generally recognized as denoting
administrative tasks which usually consist ofdirecting the other ranks; it obviously
39
excludes all manual labor.
The other problem relates to the right of a non-commissioned officer, who
has exercised the privilege given him under both conventions to request work
other than supervisory, thereafter to withdraw his request. During World War
II different practices were followed by the belligerents. Thus Germany gave
British non-commissioned officers the right to withdraw their requests; while
the policy ofthe United States was not to grant such requests for non-supervisory
work in the first place, unless they were for the duration of captivity in the
A 1
United States. It has been urged that, inasmuch as a non-commissioned officer
is free to undertake non-supervisory work, he should be equally free to
discontinue such work, subject to the right of the Detaining Power to provide
him with such employment only if he agrees to work for a fixed term, which
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may be extended upon his request. This appears to be a logical and practical
solution to the problem, although it is probably one to which not every
belligerent will subscribe.
Officers cannot be required to do even supervisory work unless they request
it. Once they have done so, the problems relating to their labor are very similar
to those relating to the voluntary labor of non-commissioned officers, except
that they were apparently rather generally permitted to discontinue working
whenever they decided to do so. In general, the labor of officers has not caused
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any material dissension between belligerents.
c. Scattered throughout the 1949 Convention are a number of other
provisions specifically limiting the work which may be required of certain
categories of enemy personnel, prisoners of war or others, held by a Detaining
Power. Thus, medically trained personnel who, when captured, were not
assigned to the medical services in the enemy armed forces and who are,
therefore, ordinary prisoners of war, may be required to perform medical
functions for the benefit of their fellow prisoners of war; but if they are so
required, they are entitled to the treatment accorded retained medical
personnel and are exempted from any other work (Article 32). The same rule
applies to ministers of religion who were not serving as such when captured
(Article 36). Prisoners of war assigned to provide essential services in the camps
of officer prisoners of war may not be required to perform any other work
(Article 44). And prisoners' representatives may likewise not be required to
perform any other work, but this restriction applies only "ifthe accomplishment
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of their duties is thereby made more difficult" (Article 81). While these various
provisions are not of very great magnitude in the over-all prisoner-of-war
picture, they can, of course, be ofmajor importance to the particular individuals
involved.
Types of Work Which Prisoners of War May Be Compelled to Perform
The types ofwork which prisoners ofwar may be compelled to perform and
the industries to which they may be assigned have generated much controversy.
Long before final agreement was reached thereon at the 1949 Geneva
Diplomatic Conference, the article of the Convention concerned with the
subject of authorized labor was termed "the most disputed article in the whole
Convention, and the most difficult of interpretation." Unfortunately, it
appears fairly certain that the agreements ultimately reached in this area are
destined to magnify, rather than to minimize or eliminate, this problem.
The early attempts to draft rules concerning the categories oflabor in which
prisoners of war could be employed merely authorized their employment on
"public works which have no direct connection with the operations in the
theater ofwar," or stated that the tasks of prisoners ofwar "shall have nothing
to do with the military operations." The insufficiency of these provisions
having been demonstrated by the events of World War I, an attempt at
elaboration was made in drafting the comparable provisions (Article 31) of the
1929 Convention, in which were included not only prohibitions against the
employment of prisoners of war on labor having a "direct relation with war
operations," but also against their employment on several specified types ofwork
("manufacturing and transporting arms or munitions of any kind, or . . .
transporting material intended for combatant units").
During World War II these latter provisions proved no more successful than
their predecessors in regulating prisoner-of-war labor. The term "direct relation
with war operations" once again demonstrated itself to be exceedingly difficult
to interpret in a total war in which practically every economic resource of the
belligerents is mobilized for military purposes. So each belligerent attempting
to comply with the labor provisions ofthe 1929 Convention found itselfrequired
to make a specific determination in all but the very few obvious cases as to
whether a particular occupation fell within the ambit of the prohibitions. As
could be expected, there were many disputed decisions.
In drafting a proposed new convention aimed at obviating the many
difficulties which had arisen during the two world wars, the International
Committee of the Red Cross attempted a new approach to the prisoner-of-war
labor problem. Instead ofspecifying prohibited areas in broad and general terms,
as had been the previous practice, leaving to the belligerents, the Protecting
Powers, and the humanitarian organizations the decision as to whether a specific
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task was or was not prohibited, it decided to list affirmatively and with
particularity the categories of labor in which Detaining Powers would be
permitted to employ prisoners of war, at least impliedly prohibiting their use in
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any type of work not specifically listed. ' The International Red Cross
Conference held at Stockholm in 1948, to which this new approach was
proposed, accepted the idea of affirmatively specifying the areas in which
prisoners of war could be required to work; but, instead of the enumeration of
specifics which the Committee had prepared, the Conference substituted general
terms. ' The Committee was highly critical of this action. At the 1949
Diplomatic Conference the United Kingdom proposed the substitution of the
original proposal in place of that contained in the draft adopted at Stockholm,
and it was this original text, with certain amendments which will be discussed
later, which ultimately became Article 50 of the 1949 Convention. While
there is considerable merit to the new approach, the actual phraseology of the
article leaves much to be desired.
An analysis of the various provisions contained in Article 50 of the 1949
Convention and, to the extent possible, a delimitation of the areas covered, or
probably intended to be covered, by each category ofwork which a prisoner of
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war may be "compelled" to do, and the problems inherent in each, is in order.
(1) Camp Administration, Installation or Maintenance. This refers to the
management and operation of the camps established for the prisoners of war
themselves; in other words, broadly speaking, it constitutes their own
"housekeeping." Early in World War II the United States divided all
prisoner-of-war labor into two classes: class one, that related to their own camps;
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and class two, all other. This distinction still appears to be a valid one. It has
been estimated that the use of prisoners of war in the United States for the
maintenance and operation of their own camps and of other military
installations constituted their major utilization. While this is believed to be
somewhat ofan overstatement, it can be assumed that a very considerable portion
of them will always be so engaged. However, it can also be assumed that in any
future major conflict demands for prisoner of-war labor will be so great that
shortages will exist, requiring that the administration of prisoner-of-war camps
be conducted on an extremely austere basis.
(2) Agriculture. This field ofprisoner-of-war utilization, with its collateral field
offood processing, combines with camp administration to account for the labor
of the great majority of employed prisoners of war. There are no restrictions
imposed by the Convention on the employment of prisoners of war in
agriculture, the fact that the product of their labor may eventually be used in
the manufacture of a military item or be supplied to and consumed by combat
troops being too remote to permit of, or warrant, restrictions.
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(3) Production or Extraction of Raw Materials. This category of authorized
compulsory employment includes activities in such industries as mining, logging,
quarrying, et cetera. It is one ofthe areas in which problems are constandy arising
and in which there are frequent disagreements between belligerents as well as
between Detaining Powers and Protecting Powers or humanitarian
organizations. Thus, after the conclusion of World War II the International
Committee ofthe Red Cross reported that it was called upon to intervene more
frequently with respect to prisoners of war who worked in mines than with
respect to any other problem.
Inasmuch as the utilization of prisoners of war in this field has been, and
continues to be, authorized, the problems which arise usually relate to the
physical ability of the particular prisoner of war to participate in heavy and
difficult labor of this nature, and to working conditions, including safety
precautions and equipment, rather than to the fact of the utilization ofprisoners
of war in the specific industry. The first of these problems has already been
reviewed and the latter will be discussed at length in the general analysis of that
specific problem.
(4) Manufacturing Industries (except Metallurgical, Machinery, and Chemical). In
modern days of total warfare and the total mobilization of the economy of
belligerent nations, it has become increasingly impossible to state with
positiveness that any particular industry does not have some connection with the
war effort. Where the degree ofsuch connection is the criterion for determining
the permissibility of the use of prisoners ofwar in a particular industry, as it was
prior to the 1949 Convention, problems and disputes are inevitable. In this
respect, by authorizing compulsory prisoner-of-war labor in most manufacturing
industries and by specifically prohibiting it in the three categories of industries
which will be engaged almost exclusively in war work, the new Convention
represents a positive and progressive development in the law of war and has
probably eliminated many potential disputes.
During World War II the nature of the item manufactured and, to some
extent, its intended ultimate destination determined whether or not the use of
prisoners of war in its manufacture was permissible. Thus, in the United States
it was determined that prisoners of war could be used in the manufacture of
truck parts, as these had a civilian, as well as a military, application; but that they
could not be used in the manufacture of tank parts, as these had only a military
application. Under the 1949 Convention neither the nature nor the ultimate
destination nor the intended use of the item being manufactured is material. All
motor vehicles fall within the category of "machinery" and prisoners of war
therefore may not be used in their manufacture. On the other hand, prisoners
ofwar may be used in a food processing or clothing factory, even though some,
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or perhaps all, of the food processed or clothing manufactured may be destined
for the armed forces of the Detaining Power.
Two sound bases have been advanced for the decision of the Diplomatic
Conference to prohibit in its entirety the compelling ofprisoners ofwar to work
in the metallurgical, machinery, and chemical industries: first, that in any general
war these three categories of industries will unquestionably be totally mobilized
and will be used exclusively for the armaments industry; and second, that
factories engaged in these industries will be key objectives of enemy air (and
now of enemy rocket and missile) operations and would, therefore, subject the
prisoners ofwar to military action from which they are entided to be isolated.
The Diplomatic Conference apparently balanced this total, industry-wide
prohibition of compulsory labor in the three specified industries against the
general authorization to use prisoners of war in every other type of
manufacturing without requiring the application of any test to determine its
relationship to the war effort.
It should be borne in mind that the prohibition under discussion is directed
only against compelling prisoners of war to work in the specified industries. (As
we shall see, by inverted phraseology, subparagraphs b, c, and fofArticle 50 also
prohibit the Detaining Power from compelling them to do certain other types
of work where such work has "military character or purpose.") The question
then arises as to whether they may volunteer for employment in those industries.
Based upon the discussions at the Diplomatic Conference, it clearly appears
that the prohibitions contained in Article 50 are not absolute in character and
that a prisoner ofwar may volunteer to engage in the prohibited employments,
just as he is affirmatively authorized by Article 52 to volunteer for labor which
is "of an unhealthy or dangerous nature." The problem will, of course, arise of
assuring that the prisoner of war is a true volunteer and that neither mental
coercion nor physical force has been used to "persuade" him to volunteer to
work in the otherwise prohibited field of labor. However, the fact that this
particular problem is difficult of solution (and that the possibility undoubtedly
exists that some prisoners of war will be coerced into "volunteering") cannot
be permitted to justify an incorrect interpretation of these provisions of the
Convention, as to which the indisputable intent of the Diplomatic Conference
is clearly evidenced by the travaux preparatoires .
(5) Public Works and Building Operations Wliich Have No Military Character or
Purpose. With respect to this portion of the subparagraph, it is first necessary to
determine the meaning to be ascribed to the phrase "military character or
purpose." This is no easy task. Because the term defies definition in the
ordinary sense, it will be necessary to define by example. Moreover, the
discussions at the Diplomatic Conference, unfortunately, provide little that is
helpful on this problem.
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A structure such as a fortification clearly has, solely and exclusively, a "military
character." Conversely, a structure such as a bowling alley clearly has, solely and
exclusively, a civilian character. The fortification is intended for use in military
operations; hence it has not only a "military character" but also a "military
purpose." The bowling alley is intended for exercise and entertainment; hence
it does not have a "military purpose," even ifsome or all of the individuals using
it will be members of the armed forces.
These examples have been comparatively black and white. Unfortunately, as
is not unusual, there is also a large gray area. This is especially true of the term
"military purpose." A structure will usually be clearly military or clearly civilian
in character; but whether its purpose is military or civilian will not always be so
easy of determination. A sewer is obviously civilian in character, and the fact
that it is to be constructed between a military installation and the sewage disposal
plant does not give it a military purpose. On the other hand, a road is likewise
civilian in character, but a road leading only from a military airfield to a bomb
dump would certainly have a military purpose. And a theater is civilian in
character, but if it is a part of a military school installation and is to be used
exclusively or primarily for the showing of military training films, then it, too,
would have a military purpose. However, a theater which is intended solely for
entertainment purposes, like the bowling alley, retains its civilian purpose, even
though the audience will be largely military.
To summarize, if the public works or building operations clearly have a
military character, prisoners of war may not be compelled to work thereon; if
they do not have a military character, but are being undertaken exclusively or
primarily for a military use, then they will usually have a military purpose and
again prisoners ofwar may not be compelled to work thereon; while if they do
not have a military character and are not being built exclusively or primarily for
a military use, then they have neither military character nor purpose, and
prisoners ofwar may be compelled to work thereon, even though there may be
incidental military use.
Having determined, insofar as is possible, the meaning ofthe phrase "military
character or purpose," let us apply it to some of the problems which have
heretofore arisen. Although the use of compulsory prisoner-of-war labor in the
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construction of fortifications has long been considered improper, after World
War II a United States Military Tribunal at Niirnberg found "uncertainty" in
the law, and held such labor not obviously illegal where it was ordered by
superior authority and was not required to be performed in dangerous areas.
Under the 1949 Convention such a decision would clearly be untenable. A
fortification is military in character and the use of compulsory prisoner-of-war
labor in its construction is prohibited, no matter what the circumstances or
location may be. The same is, ofcourse, true ofother construction of a uniquely
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military character such as ammunition dumps, firing ranges, tank obstacles, et
cetera. On the other hand, bush clearance and the construction of firebreaks in
wooded areas far from the battle fronts, the digging of drainage ditches, the
building of local air-raid shelters, and the clearing of bomb rubble from city
streets are typical of the categories of public works and building operations
which have neither military character nor purpose.
If the foregoing discussion has added but little light to the problem, it is hoped
that it has, at least, focused attention on an area which can be expected to produce
considerable controversy; and here, too, the problem will be further complicated
by the question of volunteering.
(6) Transportation and Handling of Stores Which Are Not Military in Character or
Purpose. Article 31 of the 1929 Convention prohibited the use of prisoners of
war for "transporting arms or munitions ofany kind, or for transporting material
intended for combatant units." The comparable provisions of the 1949
Convention clarify this in some respects and obscure it in others.
The former provision created problems in the determination of the point of
time at which material became "intended" for a combatant unit and ofthe nature
of a "combatant unit." These problems have now been eliminated, the ultimate
destination of the material transported or handled no longer being decisive.
Creating new difficulties is the fact that the problem of the application of the
amorphous term "military in character or purpose" is presented once again.
Apparently a prisoner of war may now be compelled to work in a factory
manufacturing military uniforms or gas masks or camouflage netting, as these
items are neither made by the three prohibited manufacturing industries nor is
their military character or purpose material; but once manufactured, a prisoner
of war may not be compelled to load them on a truck or freight car, as they
probably have a military character and they certainly have a military purpose.
Conversely, prisoners ofwar may not be compelled to work in a factory making
barbed wire, inasmuch as such a factory is in the metallurgical industry; but they
may be compelled to handle and transport it where it is destined for use on farms
or ranches, as it would have no military character or purpose. Surely, the
Diplomatic Conference intended no such inconsistent results, but it is difficult
to justify any other conclusions.
Just as was determined with respect to public works and building operations,
it is extremely doubtful that the ultimate destination or intended use ofthe stores
is, alone, sufficient to give them a military character or purpose. Thus, agriculture
and food processing are, as has been seen, authorized categories of compulsory
labor for prisoners of war. The food grown and processed obviously has no
military character; and the fact that it will ultimately be consumed by members
of the armed forces, even in a battle area, does not give it a military purpose.
Accordingly, prisoners of war may be compelled to handle and transport such
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stores. The same reasoning would apply to blankets and sleeping bags, to tents
and tarpaulins, to socks and soap.
In this general category, again, the prohibition is only against compulsion,
and the prisoner of war who volunteers may be assigned to the work of
transporting and handling stores, even though they have a military character or
purpose. And, once again, the problem will arise of assuring that the prisoner of
war has actually volunteered for the work to which he is assigned.
(7) Commercial Business, and Arts and Crafts. It is doubtful whether very many
prisoners ofwar will be given the opportunity to engage in commercial business.
The prisoner-of-war barber, tailor, shoemaker, cabinetmaker, et cetera, will
usually be assigned to ply his trade within the prisoner-of-war camp, for the
benefit of his fellow prisoners of war as a part of the camp activities and
administration. However, it is conceivable that in some locales they might be
permitted to set up their own shops or to engage in their trades as employees of
civilian shops owned by citizens of the Detaining Power.
That prisoners of war will be permitted to engage in the arts and crafts is
much more likely. No prisoner-of-war camp has ever lacked artists, both
professional and amateur, who produce paintings, wood carvings, metal objects,
et cetera, which find a ready market, through the prisoner-of-war canteen,
among the military and civilian population of the Detaining Power. However,
normally this category of work will be done on spare time as a remunerative
type of hobby, rather than as assigned labor.
(8) Domestic Service. The specific inclusion of this category of labor merely
permits the continuation of a practice which was rather generally followed
during World War II and which has rarely caused any difficulty, inasmuch as
domestic services have, of course, never been construed as having a "direct
relation with operations ofwar." As long as the domestic services are not required
to be performed in an area where the prisoner ofwar will be exposed to the fire
of the combat zone, which is specifically prohibited by Article 23 of the 1949
Convention, the type of establishment in which he is compelled to perform the
domestic service, and whether military or civilian, is not material.
(9) Public Utility Services Having No Military Character or Purpose. This is the
third and final usage in Article 50 of the term "military character or purpose."
Its use here is particularly inept, inasmuch as it is difficult to see how public
utility services such as gas, electricity, water, telephone, telegraph, et cetera, can,
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under any circumstances, be deemed to have a military character. With respect
to military purpose, the conclusions previously reached are equally applicable
here. If the utility services are intended exclusively or primarily for military use,
they will have a military purpose and the Detaining Power is prohibited from
compelling prisoners of war to work on them. Normally, however, the same
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public utility services will be used to support both military and civilian activities
and personnel and will not have a military purpose.
(10) Unhealthy, Dangerous, or Humiliating Labor. Article 52 of the 1949
Convention contains special provisions with respect to labor which is unhealthy,
dangerous, or humiliating. These terms are not defined and it may be anticipated
that their application will cause some difficulties and controversies. Nevertheless,
the importance of the provision cannot be gainsaid.
Employing a prisoner of war on unhealthy or dangerous work is prohibited
"unless he be a volunteer." Assigning a prisoner ofwar to labor which would be
considered humiliating for a member ofthe armed forces ofthe Detaining Power
is prohibited. No differences can be perceived to have resulted from the use of
the verb "employed on" in the first instance and "assigned to" in the second.
Accordingly, it is believed that the omission of the clause "unless he be a
volunteer" in the case of "humiliating" labor would preclude a prisoner of war
from volunteering for labor which is considered to be of a humiliating nature
and that such a clause would be mere surplusage. However, this is probably not
so.
Article 32 ofthe 1929 Convention forbade "unhealthful or dangerous work."
In construing this provision the United States applied three separate criteria:
first, the inherent nature of the job (mining, quarrying, logging, et cetera);
second, the conditions under which it was to be performed (under a tropical
sun, in a tropical rain, in a millpond in freezing weather, et cetera); and third,
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the individual capacity of the prisoner ofwar. These criteria would be equally
relevant in applying the substantially similar provisions of Article 52 of the 1949
Convention.
It is quite apparent that there are criteria available for determining whether
a particular job is unhealthy or dangerous and is, therefore, one upon which
prisoners of war may not be employed. Nevertheless, there will undoubtedly
be some borderline cases in which disputes may well arise as to the utilization
ofnon-volunteer prisoners ofwar. However, there unquestionably will be more
jobs in clearly permissible categories than there will be prisoners ofwar available
to fill them. Accordingly, the Detaining Power, which is attempting to handle
prisoners of war stricdy in accordance with the provisions of the Convention,
can easily avoid disputes by not using prisoners ofwar on labor ofa controversial
character.
The third paragraph of Article 52 specifies that "the removal of mines or
similar devices shall be considered as dangerous labor." By this simple statement
the Diplomatic Conference, after one of its most heated and lengthy
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discussions, made it completely clear that the employment of prisoners ofwar
on mine removal is prohibited unless they are volunteers. The compulsory use
of prisoners of war on this type of work was one of the most bothersome
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problems of prisoner-of-war utilization ofWorld War II, particularly after the
termination of hostilities.
The application of the prohibition against the assignment of prisoners ofwar
to work considered humiliating for members of the armed forces of the
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Detaining Power should cause few difficulties. Certainly the existence or
non-existence of a custom or rule in this regard in the armed forces of the
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Detaining Power should rarely be a mater of controversy. It is probable that,
in the main, problems in this area will arise because the standard adopted is that
applied in the armed forces of the Detaining Power rather than that applied in
the armed forces of the Power upon which the prisoners ofwar depend. While
this decision was indubitably the only one which the Diplomatic Conference
could logically have reached, it is not unlikely that prisoners ofwar will find this
difficult to understand and that there will be tasks which they consider to be
humiliating, even though the members of the armed forces of the Detaining
Power do not, particularly where the prisoners ofwar come from a nation having
a high standard of living and are held by a Detaining Power which has a
considerably lower standard.
Conditions of Employment
We have so far considered the two aspects of prisoner-of-war labor which
are peculiar to that status: who may be compelled to work; and the fields of
work in which they may be employed. Our discussion now enters the area in
which most nations have laws governing the general conditions ofemployment
of their own civilian citizens—laws which, as we shall see, are often applicable
to the employment of prisoners of war.
General Working Conditions. Article 51 of the Convention constitutes a fairly
broad code covering working conditions. Its first paragraph provides that:
Prisoners of war must be granted suitable working conditions, especially as
regards accommodation, food, clothing and equipment; such conditions shall not
be inferior to those enjoyed by nationals of the Detaining Power employed in
similar work; account shall also be taken of climatic conditions.
These provisions, several of which derive directly from adverse experiences of
World War II, are, for the most part, so elementary as to require little exploratory
discussion. However, one major change in basic philosophy is worthy of note.
The 1929 Convention provided, in Articles 10 and 11, that the minimum
standard for accommodations and food for prisoners of war should be that
provided for "troops at base camps of the detaining Power." This standard was
equally applicable to working prisoners of war. Article 25 of the 1949
Convention contains an analogous provision with respect to accommodations
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for prisoners of war generally—but the quotation from Article 51 given above
makes it abundantly clear that, as to the lodging, food, clothing, and equipment
of working prisoners of war, the minimum standard is no longer that of base
troops of the Detaining Power, but is that of "nationals of the Detaining Power
employed in similar work. " While this represents a continuation of adherence
to a national standard, it is probable that the new national standard will be higher
than the one previously used, inasmuch as workers are frequendy a favored class
under wartime conditions.
With regard to a somewhat similar provision contained in the second
paragraph of the same article, less optimism appears to be warranted. This
paragraph, making applicable to working prisoners of war "the national
legislation concerning the protection of labor and, more particularly, the
regulations for the safety of workers," was the result of a proposal made by the
U.S.S.R. at the Diplomatic Conference, which received the immediate support
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of the United States and others. This support was undoubtedly premised on
the assumption that, if adopted, the proposal would increase the protection
afforded to working prisoners of war. Second thoughts indicate that this
provision may constitute a basis for reducing the protection which it was
intended to afford prisoners of war engaged in dangerous employments. The
International Committee of the Red Cross has found it necessary to point out
that national standards may not here be applied in such a way as to reduce the
minimum standards established by the Convention. " It now appears
unfortunate that the Diplomatic Conference adopted the U.S.S.R. proposal
rather than the suggestion of the representative of the International Labor
Organization that it be guided by the internationally accepted standards of safety
for workers contained in international labor conventions then already in being.
Moreover, the safety laws and regulations are not the only safety measures which
are tied to national standards. The third paragraph of Article 51 requires that
prisoners of war receive training and protective equipment appropriate to the
work in which they are to be employed "and similar to those accorded to the
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nationals ofthe Detaining Power."' This same paragraph likewise provides that
prisoners of war "may be submitted to the normal risks run by these civilian
workers." Inasmuch as the test as to what are "normal risks" is based upon the
national standards of the Detaining Power, this provision, too, would appear to
be a potential breeding ground for disagreement and dispute, particularly as the
"normal risks" which civilian nationals of the Detaining Power may be called
upon to undergo under the pressures of a wartime economy will probably bear
little relationship to the risks permitted under normal conditions.
The reference to the climatic conditions under which the labor is performed,
contained in the portion of Article 51 quoted above, is one of the provisions
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deriving from the experiences of World War II. The 1929 Convention
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provided, in Article 9, that prisoners of war captured "where the climate is
injurious for persons coming from temperate climates, shall be transported, as
soon as possible, to a more favorable climate." It is well known that in a large
number of cases this was not done. The 1949 Convention contains a somewhat
similar general provision (in Article 22) concerning evacuation; but it was
recognized that, despite the best of intentions, belligerents will not always be in
a position to arrange the immediate evacuation of prisoners of war from the
areas in which they are captured. Accordingly, the Diplomatic Conference
wrote into the Convention the quoted additional admonition with respect to
climatic conditions and prisoner-of-war labor. It follows that, where a Detaining
Power cannot, at least for the time being, evacuate prisoners of war from an
unhealthy climate, whether tropical or arctic, it must, if it desires to utilize the
labor ofthe prisoners ofwar in that area even temporarily, make due allowances
for the climate, giving them proper clothing, the necessary protection from
the elements, appropriate working periods, et cetera.
Article 51 of the 1949 Convention concludes with a prohibition against
rendering working conditions more arduous as a disciplinary measure. In other
words, the standards for working conditions, be they international or national,
established by the Convention may not be disregarded in the administration of
disciplinary punishment to a prisoner of war, and it is immaterial whether the
act for which he is being punished occurred in connection with, or completely
apart from, his work. Thus, a Detaining Power may not lower safety standards,
avoid requirements for protective equipment, lengthen working hours,
withhold required extra rations, et cetera, as punishment for misbehavior. On
the other hand, "fatigue details" of not more than two hours a day, or the
withdrawal of extra privileges, both of which are authorized as disciplinary
punishment, undoubtedly could be imposed, as they obviously do not fall within
the terms of the prohibition; and the extra rations to which prisoners ofwar are
entided under Article 26, when they are engaged in heavy manual labor, could
undoubtedly be withheld from a prisoner ofwar who refuses to work, inasmuch
as he would no longer meet the requirement for entitlement to such extra rations.
In the usual arrangement contemplated by the Convention for the utilization
of the labor of prisoners of war, the prisoners, each working day, go from their
camp to their place ofemployment, returning to the camp upon the completion
of their working period. However, another arrangement is authorized by the
Convention. Thus, where the place at which the work to be accomplished is
too far from any prisoner-of-war camp to permit the daily round trip, a so-called
"labor detachment" may be established. These labor detachments, which were
widely used during World War II, are merely miniature prisoner-of-war camps,
established in order to meet more conveniently a specific labor requirement.
Article 56 ofthe 1949 Convention requires that it be organized and administered
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in the same manner as, and as a part of, a prisoner-of-war camp. Prisoners of
war making up a labor detachment are entided to all the rights, privileges, and
protections which are available under the Convention to prisoners of war
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assigned to, and living in, a regular prisoner-of-war camp. However, the fact
that local conditions render it impossible to make a labor detachment an exact
replica of a prisoner-of-war camp does not necessarily indicate a violation of the
Convention. As long as the provisions of the Convention are observed with
respect to the particular labor detachment, it must be considered to be properly
constituted and operated.
One other point with respect to labor detachments is worthy of note. While
Article 39 requires that prisoner-of-war camps be under the "immediate
authority of a responsible commissioned officer belonging to the regular armed
forces of the Detaining Power," there is no such requirement as to labor
detachments. Although each labor detachment is under the authority of the
military commander of the prisoner-of-war camp on which it depends, who
will, of course, be a commissioned officer, there appears to be no prohibition
against the assignment of a non-commissioned officer as the immediate
commander. In view of the large number of labor detachments which will
probably be established by each belligerent, it is safe to assume that the great
majority of them will be under the supervision of non-commissioned officers.
A situation under which the utilization of prisoner-of-war labor will usually,
although not necessarily, require the establishment oflabor detachments is where
they are employed by private individuals or business organizations. This is the
method by which most of the many prisoners ofwar engaged in agriculture will
probably be administered. During World War II, prisoners of war performing
labor under these circumstances were frequendy denied the basic living standards
guaranteed to them by the 1929 Convention. Article 57 ofthe 1949 Convention
specifically provides, not only that the treatment of prisoners of war working
for private employers "shall not be inferior to that which is provided for by the
present Convention," but also that the Detaining Power, its military authorities,
and the commander of the prisoner-of-war camp to which the prisoners belong,
all continue to be responsible for their maintenance, care, and treatment; and
that these prisoners of war have the right to communicate with the prisoners'
representative in the prisoner-of-war camp. It remains to be seen whether the
changes made in the provisions of the applicable international legislation will be
successful in accomplishing their purpose.
One problem which may arise in the use of prisoner-of-war labor by private
employers is that of guarding the prisoners of war. Frequendy, the Detaining
Power will provide military personnel to guard such prisoners of war. When it
does so, the problems presented are no different from those which arise at the
prisoner-of-war camp itself. If paroles have been given to and accepted by the
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prisoners of war concerned, there are likewise no problems peculiar to the
situation. But suppose that civilian guards are used. What authority do they
have to compel a prisoner ofwar to work if he refuses to do so? Or to prevent
a prisoner of war from escaping? And to what extent may they use force on
prisoners of war?
If a prisoner ofwar assigned to work for a private employer refuses to do so,
the proper action to take would unquestionably be to notify the military
commander of the prisoner-of-war camp to which he belongs. The latter is in
a position to have an independent investigation made and to impose disciplinary
or judicial punishment, if and as appropriate.
If a prisoner of war assigned to work for a private employer who is not
provided with military guards attempts to escape, the authority of the civilian
guards is extremely limited. That they may use reasonable force, short offirearms,
seems fairly clear. That the guards may use firearms to prevent the escape is
highly questionable. Detaining Powers would be well advised not to assign
any prisoner ofwar to this type oflabor, where he is to be completely unguarded
or guarded only by civilians, unless the prisoner of war has accepted parole, or
unless the Detaining Power has evaluated the likelihood of attempted escape by
the particular prisoner ofwar and has determined to take a calculated risk in his
case.
It would not be appropriate to leave the subject ofconditions ofemployment
without at least passing reference to the possibility of special agreements in this
field between the opposing belligerents. Strangely enough, despite the fact that
prisoner-of-war labor has been the subject of special agreements (or of attempts
to negotiate special agreements) between opposing belligerents on a number of
occasions during both World War I and World War II, and despite numerous
references elsewhere in the 1949 Convention to the possibility of special
agreements, nowhere in the articles of the Convention concerned with
prisoner-of-war labor is there any reference made to this subject. Nevertheless,
such agreements, provided that they do not adversely affect the rights ofprisoners
of war, may be negotiated under the provisions of Article 6 of the Convention,
as well as under the inherent sovereign rights of the belligerents.
Working Hours, Holidays, and Vacations. Article 53 of the 1949 Convention
covers all aspects of the time periods ofprisoner-of-war labor. As to the duration
of daily work, it provides that (1) this must not be excessive; (2) it must not
exceed the work hours for civilians in the same district; (3) travel time to and
from the job must be included; and (4) a rest of at least one hour (longer, if
civilian nationals receive more) must be allowed in the middle of the day.
It thus appears that the new Convention contains the same prohibition as its
predecessor against daily labor which is of "excessive" duration. Here, again, we
have the application of the national standard, and in an area in which such
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standard had proved to be disadvantageous to prisoners of war during World
99War II. The Greek Delegation to the Diplomatic Conference attempted to
obtain the establishment ofan international standard—a maximum ofeight hours
a day for all work except agriculture, where a maximum of ten hours would
have been authorized. This proposal was overwhelmingly rejected. As has
already been pointed out with regard to other problems, where a national rather
than an international standard has been adopted, very few nations at war could
afford to grant to prisoners ofwar more favorable working conditions than those
accorded their own civilian citizens. With respect to hours of daily work, it
must be noted, too, that the limitations contained in the article cannot be
circumvented by the adoption ofpiece work, or some other task system, in lieu
of a specific number of working hours. The Convention specifically prohibits
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rendering the length of the working day excessive by the use of this method.
The provision for a midday rest of a minimum ofone hour is new and is only
subject to the national standard if the latter is more favorable to the prisoner of
war than the international standard established by the Convention. It may be
necessary for the Detaining Power to increase the midday rest period given to
prisoners of war, if its own civilian workers receive a rest period in excess of
one hour, but it may not, under any circumstances, be shortened to less than
one hour.
Article 53 further provides that prisoners ofwar shall be entided to a 24-hour
holiday every week, preferably on Sunday "or the day of rest in their country
of origin." Except for the quoted material, which was adopted at the request of
Israel but which should be of equal importance to the pious Moslem, a similar
provision was contained in the 1929 Convention. This provision is not subject
to national standards, whether or not the national standard is more liberal.
And finally, this same article grants to every prisoner of war who has worked
for one year a vacation of eight consecutive days with pay. This provision is new
and is of a nature to create minor problems, as, for example, whether normal
days of rest are excluded from the computation of the eight days, what activity
is permitted to the prisoner of war during his "vacation," and what he may be
required to do during this period. However, despite these administrative
problems, the provision should prove a boon to every person who undergoes a
lengthy period of detention as a prisoner of war.
Compensation and Other Monetary Benefits. The 1929 Convention provided,
in Article 34, that prisoners of war would be "entitled to wages to be fixed by
agreements between the belligerents." No such agreements were, in fact, ever
concluded. The comparable provision of the 1949 Convention (Article 62)
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provides for "working pay" in an amount to be fixed by the Detaining Power,
which may not be less than one-fourth of one Swiss franc for a full working
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day. The amount so fixed must be "fair" and the prisoners of war must be
informed of it, as must the Protecting Power.
With regard to the establishment by the Detaining Power of a "fair working
rate of pay," several matters should be noted. First, no basis can be seen for
attempting to determine what is "fair" by endeavoring to compare the "working
pay" ofprisoners ofwar with the wages of civilian workers. There are too many
diverse and unequal factors involved; and the extremely nominal minimum
set by the Convention is clearly indicative ofthe fact that there was no intention
on the part of the Diplomatic Conference to establish any such relationship.
Second, while there appears to be nothing to preclude a Detaining Power from
establishing a fair basic "working rate of pay," and then providing for amounts
in addition thereto for work requiring superior skill or heavier exertion or greater
exposure to danger, or as a production incentive, no authority exists for
establishing different working rates of pay for prisoners of war of different
nationalities who have the same competence and are engaged in the same types
of work. And finally, the rate established as "fair" may not thereafter be
administratively reduced by having a part of it "retained" by the camp
administration. The authority for this procedure, which was contained in Article
34 of the 1929 Convention, has been specifically and intentionally deleted from
the 1949 Convention.
There is one provision ofthe new Convention which could render this entire
subject moot. An individual account must be kept for each prisoner of war. All
of the funds to which he becomes entitled during the period of his captivity,
including his working pay, are credited to this account and all of the payments
made on his behalf or at his request are deducted therefrom (Article 64). Under
Article 34 of the 1929 Convention it then became the obligation of the
Detaining Power to deliver to the prisoner of war "the pay remaining to his
credit" at the end of his captivity. Under Article 66 of the 1949 Convention,
upon the termination of the captivity of a prisoner of war, it will be the
responsibility of the Power in whose armed forces he was serving at the time of
his capture, and not ofthe Detaining Power, to settle any balance due him. Under
these circumstances, there appears to be little reason why a Detaining Power
should not be extremely generous in establishing its "fair working rate of pay."
In effect, it will, for the most part, merely be creating a future liability on the
part of its enemy! This factor may result in the negotiation of agreements
between belligerents fixing mutually acceptable "working rates of pay," despite
the lack of a specific provision for such agreements in the 1949
Convention—agreements which, as has been noted, were not reached under
the 1929 Convention where there was specific provision for them.
A number of changes have been embodied in the 1949 Convention with
regard to the types ofwork which entitle a prisoner ofwar to working pay. Of
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major importance is the fact that, while Article 34 of the 1929 Convention
specifically provided that "prisoners of war shall not receive wages for work
connected with the administration, management and maintenance of the
[prisoner-of-war] camps," Article 62 of the present Convention is equally
specific that prisoners of war "permanently detailed to duties or to a skilled or
semi-skilled occupation in connection with the administration, installation or
maintenance ofcamps" will be entided to working pay. This article also contains
a specific provision under which non-medical service medical personnel (Article
32), and retained medical personnel and chaplains (Article 33) are entided to
working pay. And while the prisoners' representative and his advisers are,
primarily, paid out ofcanteen funds, ifthere are no such funds, these individuals,
too, are entitled to working pay from the Detaining Power. Finally, because
enlisted men assigned as orderlies in officers' camps are specifically exempted
from performing any other work (Article 44), it appears that they should be
entided to working pay from the Detaining Power.
What of the prisoner of war who is the victim of an industrial accident or
contracts an industrial disease and is thereby incapacitated, either temporarily or
permanently? Does he receive any type ofcompensation, and, ifso, what, when,
from whom, and how?
The Regulations attached to the Second Hague Convention of 1899 and to
the Fourth Hague Convention of 1907 were silent on this problem. The
multilateral prisoner-of-war agreement negotiated at Copenhagen in 1917
adopted a Russian proposal which placed upon the Detaining Power the same
responsibility in this regard that it had towards its own citizens; but the
British-German agreement, which was negotiated at The Hague in 1918,
provided merely that the Detaining Power should provide the injured prisoner
ofwar with a certificate as to his occupational injury. The procedure adopted
at Copenhagen was subsequently incorporated in Article 27 of the 1929
Convention, and in 1940, after some abortive negotiations with the British,
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Germany enacted a law implementing this procedure. The United States
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subsequently established this same policy, but the United Kingdom
considered that it was only required to furnish the injured prisoner of war all
113
required medical and other care.
Inasmuch as no payments were ever, in fact, made to injured prisoners ofwar
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by the Detaining Powers after their repatriation, it is not surprising that in
drafting the pertinent provisions of the 1949 Convention the Diplomatic
Conference replaced the 1929 procedure with one more nearly resembling that
115
which had been adopted by the British and Germans at The Hague in 1918.
It may actually be asserted that there is little difference between the previous
practice and the present policy.
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The procedure established by the 1949 Convention is contained in the
somewhat overlapping provisions of Articles 54 and 68. When a prisoner of
war sustains an injury7 as a result of an industrial accident (or incurs an
industrial disease), the Detaining Power has the obligation of providing him
with all required care, medical, hospital, and general maintenance during the
period of his disability and continuation in the status of a prisoner of war.
The only other obligation of the Detaining Power is to provide the prisoner
ofwar with a statement, properly certified, "showing the nature of the injury
or disability, the circumstances in which it arose and particulars of medical
or hospital treatment." Also, a copy of this statement must be sent to the
Central Prisoners of War Agency. This latter action insures its permanent
availability.
If the prisoner ofwar desires to make a claim for compensation while still in
that status, he may do so, but his claim will be addressed, not to the Detaining
Power, but to the Power on which he depends and will be transmitted to it
through the medium of the Protecting Power. The Convention makes no
provision for the procedure to be followed beyond this point, probably for the
reason that the problem is a domestic one which would be inappropriate for
inclusion in an international convention. Nevertheless, it may well be that, in
the long run, the present policy, by transferring responsibility to the Power upon
which he depends, upon the repatriation of the prisoner of war, will prove of
more value to the disabled prisoner of war than the apparently more generous
policy expressed in the 1929 Convention.
Grievance Procedures. In general, any prisoner of war who believes that the
rights guaranteed to him by the 1949 Convention are, in any manner
whatsoever, being violated in connection with his utilization as a source oflabor,
would have the right to avail himself of any of the channels of complaint
established by the Convention: to the representatives of the Protecting Power
(Articles 78 and 126); to the prisoners' representative (Articles 78, 79, and 81);
and, perhaps, to representatives ofthe International Committee ofthe Red Cross
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(Articles 9, 79, 81, and 126). Nevertheless, the Diplomatic Conference felt
it advisable to include in Article 50 (which lists the classes of authorized labor)
a specific provision permitting prisoners of war to exercise their right of
complaint, should they consider that a particular work assignment is in a
prohibited industry. It is somewhat difficult to perceive the necessity for this
provision or that it adds anything to the general protection otherwise accorded
to the prisoner ofwar by the appropriate provisions of the Convention. In fact,
the clanger always exists that by this specific provision the draftsmen may have
unwittingly diluted the effect of the general protective provisions in areas where
no specific provision has been included.
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Conclusion
Utilization ofprisoner-of-war labor means increased availability ofmanpower
and a reduction in disciplinary problems for the Detaining Power, and an active
occupation, better health and morale, and, perhaps, additional purchasing power
for the prisoners of war. It is obvious that both sides will have much to gain if
all of the belligerents comply with the labor provisions ofthe 1949 Convention.
On the whole, it is believed that these labor provisions represent an
improvement in the protection to be accorded prisoners of war in any future
conflict. True, they contain ambiguities and compromises which can serve any
belligerent which is so minded as a basis forjustifying the establishment ofpolicies
which are contrary to the best interests of the prisoners of war detained by it
and which are probably contrary to the intent of the drafters. However, it must
be assumed that nations which have ratified or adhered to the 1949 Geneva
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, many of which
were likewise involved in its drafting, will, to the maximum extent within their
capabilities, implement it as the humanitarian charter which it was intended to
be. And, in any event, two factors are always present which tend to call forth
this type of implementation: the presence of the Protecting Power and the
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doctrine of reciprocity. Information as to the interpretation and
implementation of the Convention by a belligerent is made known to the other
side through the Protecting Powers and thus becomes public knowledge with
the resulting effect, good or bad, on world public opinion. Policies which, while
perhaps complying with a strict interpretation of the Convention, are obviously
overly restrictive in an area where a more humanitarian attitude appears justified
and could easily be employed, will undoubtedly result in the adoption of an
equally or even more restrictive policy by the opposing belligerent. Such
retorsion can easily lead to charges of reprisals, which are outlawed, and thus
create a situation which, whether or not justified, can only result in harm to all
of the prisoners of war held by both sides. While there were nations which,
during World War II, appeared to be disinterested in the effect that their
treatment ofprisoners ofwar was having on the treatment received by their own
personnel detained by the enemy, it is to be hoped that in any future war, even
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one which represents the "destruction of an ideology," at the very least,
concern for the fate of its own personnel will cause each belligerent to apply the
doctrine pacta sunt servanda scrupulously in establishing policies which
implement, among others, the labor provisions of the Geneva Prisoner ofWar
Convention of 1949.
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22. As the U.S.S.R. was not a party to this Convention, it considered that its relations with Germany
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G. Farben Case (U. S. v. Krauch), 8 Trials 1 187. The ICRC Delegate in Berlin finally proposed to the German
High Command that prisoners of war over 45 years of age be exempted from working as miners, but this
proposal was rejected by the Germans on the ground that the 1929 Convention made no reference to age as
a criterion of physical qualification for compulsory labor. 1 ICRC Report 329-331. This situation has now
been rectified.
31. The procedures followed in the United States during World War II were as follows:
"Prisoners of war ... are given a complete physical examination upon their first arrival at a prisoner of
war camp. At least once a month thereafter, they are inspected by a medical ofFicer. Prisoners are classified by
the attending medical officer according to their ability to work, as follows: (a) heavy work; (b) light work; (c)
sick, or otherwise incapacitated—no work. Employable prisoners perform work only when the job is
commensurate with their physical condition." MacKnight, "The Employment of Prisoners of War in the
United States," 50 International Labour Review 47 (July, 1944).
Major MacKnight's statement was based, at least in part, upon the U. S. War Department's Prisoner of
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(e) domestic service;
(/) public utility services having no military character or purpose.
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"c. Work within the respective prisoner companies as cooks, cook's helpers, tailors, cobblers, barbers,
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470.
63. 1 ICRC Report 329. For a specific example, see note 30 above. Unfortunately, little data is available
concerning the activities ofProtecting Powers in this regard, as they rarely publish any details of their wartime
activities, even after the conclusion ofpeace (Levie, " Prisoners ofWar and the Protecting Power, " 55 A.J.I.L.
374, 378 (1961)). An unofficial report ofSwiss activities as a Protecting Power during WorldWar II is contained
injanner, note 50 above.
64. The source ofsome of the wording and punctuation of subpara. (b) ofArt. 50 is somewhat obscure.
As submitted by Committee II (Prisoners ofWar) to the Plenary Assembly of the Diplomatic Conference, it
read:
".
. . manufacturing industries, with the exception of iron and steel, machinery and chemical industries
and of public works, and building operations which have a military character or purpose" (2A Final Record
585-586). Although this portion of Art. 50 was approved by the Plenary Assembly without amendment, in
the Final Act of the Conference (which is, of course, the official, signed version of the Convention), the same
provision reads:
"... manufacturing industries, with the exception of metallurgical, machinery and chemical industries;
public works and building operations which have no military character or purpose" (1 Final Record 254).
These changes in wording and punctuation (made in the English version only) represent a considerable
clarification and should eliminate many disputes which might otherwise have arisen. However, it would be
interesting to know their origin!
65. Lewis, History 77. After World War II one of the U. S. Military Tribunals at Nuernberg held:
".
. . as a matter oflaw that it is illegal to use prisoners ofwar in armament factories and factories engaged
in the manufacture of airplanes for use in the war effort." The Milch Case (U. S. v. Erhard Milch), note 25
above, at 867. The decision would, in part, probably have been otherwise had the defense been able to show
that the airplanes were intended exclusively for civilian use.
66. Pictet, Commentary 268-269.
67. As indicated in note 57 above, the decision to use the words "compelled to" in the first sentence of
Art. 50 was reached only after the consideration and rejection of numerous alternatives. Words such as
"prisoners ofwar may only be employed in" were strongly urged because they would preclude the Detaining
Power from using pressure to induce prisoners of war to "volunteer" for work which they could not be
compelled to do (2A Final Record 343); and words such as "prisoners of war may be obliged to do only"
("compelled to do only") were just as strongly urged on the very ground that the alternative proposal would
preclude volunteering (ibid, at 342). The proponents of the latter position were successful in having their
phraseology accepted by the Plenary Assembly.
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68. See Levie, "Penal Sanctions for Maltreatment of Prisoners ofWar," 56 A.J.I.L. 433, at 450, note 71
(1962). The ICRC appears to be inconsistent in asserting that the prohibition against prisoners ofwar working
in these industries is absolute (Pictet, Commentary 268), but that prisoners of war may volunteer to handle
stores which are military in character or purpose (ibid, at 278), work which the Detaining Power is likewise
prohibited from compelling prisoners of war to do. The statement that the absolute prohibition of Art. 7
against the voluntary renunciation of rights by prisoners of war was necessary "because it is difficult, if not
impossible, to prove the existence of duress or pressure" (ibid, at 89) is, of course, equally applicable to all of
the prohibitions of Art. 50, but the Diplomatic Conference obviously elected to take a calculated risk in this
regard insofar as prisoner-of-war labor is concerned.
69. In his article (note 45 above, at p. 52), General Dillon showed considerable restraint when he said
merely that many delegations believed that the phrase "will create some difficulty in future interpretations. "
He had been much more vehement at the Diplomatic Conference! (2A Final Record 342-343.)
70. The test is whether it is intended for military use, and not whether it is intended for use by the
military. A bowling alley or a tennis court or a clubhouse might be intended, perhaps exclusively, for use by
the military, but such structures certainly have no military use perse and, therefore, they do not have a "military
purpose."
71. The foregoing position closely resembles the legal interpretation of the phrase in question proposed
by the present author and approved by The Judge Advocate General of the United States Army in an
unpublished opinion written in 1955 (JAGW 1955/88). It differs from the ICRC position, which is that
"everything which is commanded and regulated by the military authority is of a military character, in contrast
to what is commanded and regulated by the civil authorities." Pictet, Commentary 267.
72. Flory, op. cit. note 29 above, at 74.
73. The High Command Case (U. S. v. Wilhelm von Leeb), 1 1 Trials 534. No such uncertainty existed
in the minds of the members of the Tribunal with respect to the use of prisoners of war in the construction
of combat zone field fortifications. Ibid. 538.
74. Lewis, History 89.
75. Sec. 738, German Regulations, Compilation of Orders No. 39, July 15, 1944.
76. Pictet, Commentary 267-268, where a distinction is justifiably drawn between clearing debris from
city streets and clearing it from an important defile used only for military purposes.
77. In Pictet, Commentary 268, the statement is made that these public utility services have a military
character "in sectors where they are under military administration." The present writer finds it impossible to
agree that the nature of the administration of these public services can determine their inherent character. If
this were possible, then public utility services administered by the military authorities in an occupied area, as
is normally the case, would be military in character, even though originally constructed for and then being
used almost exclusively by the civilian population of the occupied territory.
78. Lewis, History 112; MacKnight, loc. cit. note 31 above, at 55. The latter continues with the following
statement:
"... The particular task is considered, not the industry as a whole. The specific conditions attending
each job are decisive. For example, an otherwise dangerous task may be made safe by the use of a proper
appliance, and an otherwise safe job rendered dangerous by the circumstances in which the work is required
to be done. Work which is dangerous for the untrained may be safe for those whose training and experience
have made them adept in it." The third criterion mentioned in the text has already been discussed above.
79. In determining whether an industry was of a nature to require special study, The Judge Advocate
General of the United States Army rendered the following opinion in 1943:
".
. . If in particular industries the frequency of disabling injuries per million man-hours is:
"a. Below 28.0—prisoner-of-war labor is generally available therein;
"b. Between 28.0 and 35.0—the industry should be specifically studied, from the point of view of
hazard, before assigning prisoner-of-war labor therein;
"c. Over 35.0—prisoner-of-war labor is unavailable, except for the particular work therein which is
not dangerous. . . ."
80. Those interested in the history and background of this problem and the debate at the Diplomatic
Conference are referred to the following sources: 1 ICRC Report 334; 3 Final Record 70-71 ; 2A ibid. 272-273,
443-444, 345; 2B ibid. 290-295, 298-299; Pictet, Commentary 277-278.
81. "This rule has the advantage of being clear and easy to apply. The reference is to objective rules
enforced by that Power and not the personal feelings of any individual member of the armed forces. The
essential thing is that the prisoner concerned may not be the laughing stock of the those around him." Pictet,
Commentary 277.
82. Although prohibitions against the use of prisoners of war on humiliating work were contained in
Art. 25 of the Declaration of Brussels and Art. 71 of the Oxford Manual (note 4 above), there was no similar
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provision in the 1929 Convention. Nevertheless, during World War II the United States recognized the
prohibition against the employment of prisoners of war on degrading or menial work as a "well settled rule
of the customary law of nations" (MacKnight, he. cit. note 31 above, at 54), and even prohibited their
employment as orderlies for other than their own officers (Lewis, History 113). While this latter type ofwork
is prohibited for personnel of the U. S. Army, it is believed that the prohibition is based upon policy rather
than upon the "humiliating" nature of an orderly's functions. Apparently this is settled policy for the United
States, as the same rule is found in the draft of the new directive on the subject ofprisoner-of-war labor which
is being prepared by the U. S. Army.
83. In addition, Art. 25 prescribes specific minimum standards for accommodations; Art. 26 provides for
such additional rations as may be necessary because of the nature of the labor on which the prisoners of war
are employed; and Art. 27 provides that prisoners of war shall receive clothing appropriate to the work to
which they are assigned. It has been asserted that not only must the living conditions ofprisoner-of-war laborers
not be inferior to those of local nationals, but also that this provision may not "prevent the application of the
other provisions of the Convention if, for instance, the standard of living of citizens of the Detaining Power
is lower than the minimum standard required for the maintenance of prisoners of war." Pictet, Commentary
271. While the draftsmen did intend to establish two separate standards (2A Final Record 401), at least as to
clothing, it is difficult to believe that any belligerent will provide prisoners of war with a higher standard of
living than that to which its own civilian citizens have been reduced as a result of a rigid war economy.
84. Ibid. 275.
85. Pictet, Commentary 271-272.
86. 2A Final Record 275.
87. It could be argued that a proper grammatical construction of the provision of the Convention makes
only the protective equipment and not the training subject to national standards. However, this is debatable,
and, even if true, it would merely result in the application of an international standard in the very area where
the national standard would probably be highest.
88. The Judgment of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (note 26 above, at 1002)
mentioned "forced labor in tropical heat without protection from the sun" as one of the atrocities committed
against prisoners of war by the Japanese. The motion picture, "The Bridge on the River Kwai," graphically
portrayed the problem.
89. Art. 27 of the 1949 Convention specifically mentions that, in issuing clothing to prisoners of war
(without regard to the work at which they are employed), the Detaining Power "shall make allowance for
the climate of the region where the prisoners are detained.
"
90. Art. 89 of the 1949 Convention contains an enumeration of the punishments which may be
administered to a prisoner of war as a disciplinary measure for minor violations of applicable rules and
regulations.
91. At the Diplomatic Conference Mr. B.J. Wilhelm, the representative of the International Committee
of the Red Cross, stated that experience had indicated that the majority of all prisoners ofwar were maintained
in labor detachments. 2A Final Record 276. This is confirmed by the series of articles which had appeared in
the International Labour Review during the course of World War II. See 47 International Labour Review
169, note 23 above, at 187 (general); 48 ibid. 316, note 24 above, at 318 (Germany); Anon., "The Employment
of Prisoners ofWar in Great Britain," 49 ibid. 191 (Feb., 1944); and MacKnight, he. cit. note 31 above, at 49
(United States).
92. In addition to the requirements of Art. 56 for the observance of the present Convention in labor
detachments, specific provisions as to these detachments are contained in Arts. 33 (medical services), 35
(spiritual services), and 79 and 81 (prisoners' representatives), among others.
93. For example, Art. 25 provides that the billets provided for prisoners ofwar must be adequately heated.
The fact that the parent prisoner-of-war camp has central heating, while the billets occupied by the men of
the labor detachment have separate, but adequate, heating facilities, does not constitute a violation of the
Convention.
94. This latter provision is included in order to enable them to register a complaint concerning their
treatment, should they believe that it is below Convention standards. Of course, complaints may also be made
to the representatives of the Protecting Power, who may visit these detachments whenever they so desire
(Arts. 56 and 126), but these latter are not always immediately available, while the prisoners' representatives
are. During World War II, both Great Britain and the United States provided for inspections by their own
military authorities of the treatment of prisoners of war who were working for private employers. Anon.,
"The Employment of Prisoners of War in Great Britain," note 91 above, at 192; Mason, he. cit. note 51
above, at 212.
95. Members of the U. S. Armed Forces may not accept parole, except for very limited purposes. Code
of Conduct, Exec. Order No. 10631, Aug. 17, 1955, 20 Fed. Reg. 6057; The Law of Land Warfare, FM
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27-10, U. S. Army, July, 1956, sec. 187. The British rule is substantially similar. Manual of Military Law, Part
III, The Law ofWar on Land, 1958, sec. 246, note 1.
96. In Pictet, Commentary 296, the argument is made, and with considerable merit, that escape is an
act of war and that only military personnel of the Detaining Power are authorized to respond to this act of
war with another act of war—the use of weapons against a prisoner of war. This theory finds support in the
safeguards surrounding the use ofweapons against prisoners of war, especially those involved in escapes, found
in Art. 42 of the 1949 Convention.
97. See, for example, the World War I agreements listed in note 19 above, and Lauterpacht, "The
Problem of the Revision of the Laws of War," 29 Brit. Yr. Bk. of Int. Law 360, 373 (1952).
98. By becoming parties to the Convention they have given up their sovereign right to enter into special
agreements adversely affecting the rights guaranteed to prisoners of war by the Convention.
99. Statement ofMr. R.J. Wilhelm, the representative ofthe International Committee ofthe Red Cross,
2A Final Record 275.
100. 2B ibid. 300.
101. The Conference of Government Experts called by the ICRC in 1947 had originally considered
setting maximum working hours, but finally decided against it as being "discrimination in favour ofPW, which
would not be acceptable to the civilian population of the DP." Report on the Work of the Conference of
Government Experts 176 (1947). As stated in Anon., "The Conditions ofEmployment of Prisoners ofWar,"
note 23 above, at 194:
"The prisoner cannot expect better treatment than the civilian workers of the detaining Power.... His
fate depends upon the extent to which the standards of the country where he is imprisoned have been lowered
through the exigencies of the war."
102. During World War II, many countries used the piece or task-work method of controlling
prisoner-of-war labor. Pictet, Commentary 282; Anon., "The Employment of Prisoners ofWar in Canada,"
note 61 above, at 337. In the United States the piece-work system was used, but to control pay rather than
work hours. Lewis, History 120-121. As long as the pay does not drop below the minimum prescribed by the
Convention, there would appear to be no objection to this procedure.
103. Nor was it subject to national standards in the 1929 Convention, but the Germans refused to accord
prisoners of war a weekly day of rest on the ground that the civilian population did not receive it. Janner,
op.cit. note 50 above.
104. Pictet, Commentary 313; ICRC Report 286.
105. Actually, Art. 62 refers to "working rate of pay" twice and to "working pay" four times, while Arts.
54 and 64 refer only to "working pay." The term "indemnite de travail" is used in the French version of all
of these articles and the difference in English appears to be an error in drafting. The report of the Financial
Experts at the 1949 Diplomatic Conference (2A Final Record 557) states:
"It appeared that the expression 'wages' was inappropriate and might give the impression that prisoners
ofwar while fed and housed at the cost of the Detaining Power were in addition being remunerated for their
work at a rate corresponding to the remuneration of a civilian worker responsible for maintaining himself and
his family out of his wages. For this reason, it was decided to substitute the terms 'working pay' wherever this
was necessary."
106. The inadequacy of the minimum set by the Convention, which amounts to approximately six cents
a day in money of the United States (approximately 5 d. in British money), is illustrated by the fact that almost
a century ago, in 1864, during the American Civil War, the Federal Government set the rate ofprisoner-of-war
pay at ten cents a day for the skilled and five cents a day for the unskilled! Lewis, History 39. During World
War II the United States paid prisoners ofwar 80 cents a day. Ibid, at 77. Under the incentive ofthe piece-work
system it was possible to increase this to $1.20 a day. Ibid, at 120.
107. For some of these differences, see the quotation in note 105 above, and Mojonny, The Labor of
Prisoners of War 24 (unpublished thesis, Indiana University, 1954). For a contrary view, see Pictet,
Commentary 115.
108. During World War II the Germans habitually paid Soviet prisoners of war as little as one-half of the
amount paid to prisoners of war of other nationalities. Dallin, note 25 above, at 425. Art. 16 of the 1949
Convention specifically prohibits "adverse distinction based on race, nationality, religious belief or political
opinions, or any other distinction founded on similar criteria."
109. This was the policy followed by the United States during World War II. Prisoner of War Circular
No. 1, note 31 above, sec. 85.
110. Flory, op. cit., note 29 above, at 79-80. The prisoner-of-war agreement concluded between France
and Germany in 1915 had still a different approach: it provided that, upon repatriation, prisoners of war who
had suffered industrial accidents would be treated as wounded combatants. Rosenberg, "International Law
Concerning Accidents to War Prisoners Employed in Private Enterprises," 36 A.J.I.L. 294, 297 (1942).
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111. Lauterpacht, loc. cit. note 97 above. Lauterpacht labels the negotiations as "elaborate" and as
"concerning the relatively trivial question of the interpretation of Article 27."
112. Prisoner ofWar Circular No. 1, note 31 above, sees. 91 and 92; MacKnight, loc. cit. note 31 above,
at 63.
113. Lauterpacht, loc. cit.
114. E.g., Lewis, History 156.
115. In the British Manual of Military Law, op. cit. note 95 above, sec. 185, note 1, the statement is made
that during the World War II negotiations the United Kingdom "considered that its domestic workmen's
compensation legislation was too complex and so bound up with the conditions of free civilian workmen as
to make it impracticable to apply it to prisoners of war." That position has become no less valid with the
passing of the years since the end of that war.
116. Arts. 40 and 95 of the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time ofWar (6 U. S. Treaties 3516; 75 U.N. Treaty Series 287 (1:973); 50 A.J.I.L. Supp. 724 (1956)) place
upon the Detaining Power the additional burden of providing compensation for occupational accidents and
diseases. The variation between the two conventions was noted by the Co-ordination Committee of the
Diplomatic Conference (2B Final Record 149), but Committee II, to which had been assigned the
responsibility for preparing the text of the prisoner-of-war convention, determined that such a provision was
not necessary for prisoners of war (2A Final Record 402).
117. The suggestion has been made that, "since under Article 51, paragraph 2, he [the prisoner of war]
is covered by the national legislation [of the Detaining Power] concerning the protection oflabour," a prisoner
of war disabled in an industrial accident or by an industrial disease would, while still a prisoner of war, be
entitled to benefit from local workmen's compensation laws. Pictet, Commentary 286-287. It is believed that
the application of this general provision of the Convention has been restricted in this area by the specific
provision on this subject.
118. Anon., "The Conditions of Employment of Prisoners of War." note 23 above, at 182; Pictet, loc.
cit.
119. The availability of the latter as a channel of complaint is not clearly defined. Levie, "Prisoners of
War and the Protecting Power," loc. cit. note 63 above, at 396.
120. The activities of the International Committee of the Red Cross are likewise a major deterrent to the
improper application of the Convention.
121. Statement of German General Keitel, quoted in the "Opinion and Judgment of the International
Military Tribunal," 41 A.J.I.L. 172, 228-229 (1947).

IV
Across The Table At Pan Mun Jom
38 Saint Louis University Magazine 10 (March 1965)'
In July 1951 the writer, then an Army legal officer stationed in Tokyo, was
suddenly ordered to an undisclosed destination in Korea, for an undisclosed
purpose, for about two weeks. In view of what was being discussed at great
length over the radio and in the press, it was not difficult to conclude that the
assigned mission was to help negotiate with the North Korean and Chinese
Communists for an armistice to end fighting in Korea. One year later the writer
was the last of the original staff to return to Tokyo, and there still was no
agreement with the Communists on such an armistice. In fact, that agreement
was not reached until July, 1953, two years rather than two weeks after the
opening of the talks!
To write with purported authority on the basis ofexperiences which occurred
more than a decade ago would be presumptuous in most areas ofhuman conduct.
Not so with respect to the negotiating techniques employed by the Communists.
In this regard they all wear the same old school tie, whether they are Russian
or Chinese, Bulgarian or North Korean. A perusal ofboth official and unofficial
reports concerning negotiations with Communists conducted yesterday, a year
ago, or a decade ago, will quickly reveal the use of some or all of the definitely
non-diplomatic methods early adopted by Soviet negotiators. Subsequently they
have been developed and refined until they have become standard operating
procedure for any self-respecting Communist who is given the task of
negotiating with representatives of a "decadent" capitalistic system.
Without attempting to be a psychiatrist, it is safe to say that one of the first
things which impressed the United Nations Command (UNC) personnel at the
armistice negotiations was that, without exception, every Communist
representative, from senior delegate to substitute interpreter, suffered from an
inferiority complex. This "chip-on-the-shoulder," "I'm-as-good-as-you-are"
attitude is undoubtedly one of the many things which makes negotiations with
Communists so difficult. Perhaps Soviet successes in space and Chinese nuclear
successes will mitigate this, but psychiatrists will probably agree that a complete
* Revised and reprinted from Sidelights on the Korean Armistice Negotiations, 48
American Bar Association Journal 730 (1962).
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change in this mental attitude will require many more successes and a
considerable period of time.
The publicly expressed Communist opposition to the use of helicopters by
the UNC representatives was unquestionably motivated by their inability to
provide a helicopter lift for their own personnel. When the UNC put in gravel
walks around its side of the conference area at Pan Mun Jom, the Communists
immediately put in gravel walks on their side. When the UNC lined the sides
of its walks with rocks, they lined the sides oftheir walks with bricks and painted
them white. When the UNC planted small fir trees in its area, they planted big
ones in theirs. When the UNC installed green sentry boxes to protect its military
police from the weather, they countered with sentry boxes for their guards which
were painted like barber poles—until jokes by the Western correspondents
caused them to reconsider and repaint. Similarly, it was undoubtedly this
inferiority complex which caused the almost hysterical demands that the UNC
negotiators stop referring to the Communist side as "North Korean
Communists" and "Chinese Communists" and give them their "rightful' names,
"Democratic Peoples' Republic ofKorea" and "Chinese Peoples' Volunteers."
Another characteristic which appears to be endemic among Communists is
a complete lack of a sense of humor and an accompanying marked inability to
be on the receiving end of a joke. The incident of the sentry boxes which has
just been mentioned was one example of this. Another involved a ten-year-old
Korean boy who one day followed the UNC convoy into the neutral zone. He
was arrested by the Communists who claimed that he was a spy for the United
Nations Command. The UNC liaison officers demanded and obtained his return
and the Western press treated the whole thing as a huge joke, making numerous
references to the ten-year-old "master spy." There were no further attempts by
the Communists, except behind the bamboo curtain, to capitalize on that
particular incident. Similarly, when a small anti-epidemic team of the Republic
of Korea Army inadvertently drove its truck into the neutral zone the
Communists, in returning the men to the UNC liaison officers, labeled the
incident a "very serious violation" of the agreement creating the neutral zone.
The Western press wrote humorous stories about the "invasion of the neutral
zone by soldiers armed to the teeth with DDT spray guns," and nothing further
was heard about the matter from the Communists.
When the meetings began at Kaesong, the Communists did everything
possible to create the impression that they were the hosts and that the UNC
personnel were the visiting suppliants. Communist guards armed with
sub-machine guns swarmed around the entire conference area. Packages of
Chinese cigarettes and decanters of Chinese wine were on the conference table.
And the Communists attempted to dictate who could be included in the UNC
party and refused to pass a UNC convoy which included news correspondents.
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Within twenty-four hours General Matthew B. Ridgway. the UNC
Commander, ordered the conferences halted and laid down the terms upon
which he would permit them to be resumed. The Communists quickly agreed.
This was the first of a number ot occasions upon which an immediate display
of a firm and irrevocable intent brought quick acquiescence from the
Communists. Not only the armed guards but the cigarettes and wine
disappeared. It is perhaps appropriate to add that none of the UNC personnel
had ever availed themselves of the Commumst "hospitality" and that when,
more or less intentionally, Amencan cigarettes were left overnight on the
conference table, they would be found untouched the following day.
Until the advent ot the Communist era, the agenda was something upon
which agreement was normally reached during the first few minutes of a
diplomatic conference if not before hand. Now, reaching an agreement on the
agenda sometimes has become harder than reaching agreement on substantive
matters. This is primarily because of the Communists' attempt to tnck the other
side into concessions by means of the wording on agenda items.
For example, both sides were agreed at the very outset that there should be
an item concerned with the selection of a military demarcation line, a dividing
line between the opposing military forces once the cease-fire became effective.
The UNC delegation proposed that this subject be included under the rubric
"Establishment of a military demarcation line." The Communists refused to
accept this proposed terminology, submitting as a counter-proposal the phrase
"Establishment of the thirty-eighth parallel as a military demarcation line."
Obviously, after agreement on such wording for the agenda item, there would
have been little need tor substantive discussions. Any attempt to discuss locating
the military demarcation line at a point other than at the thirty-eighth parallel
would have met with an immediate complaint by the Communists that the
discussion was not within the framework of the mutually accepted agenda and
with absolute refusal to take part in negotiations which would "violate" the now
sacrosanct agenda. Here, again, the UNC refused to make any concession and
the Communists eventually accepted the UNC-proposed terminology which
thus permitted the substantive discussions to cover a whole range of suggested
demarcation lines with the battle line finally being agreed upon for that purpose.
Parenthetically, it is interesting to recall that while it took many months to get
the Commumsts to abandon the thirty-eighth parallel, some months thereafter,
when the UNC suggested using that line for determining which civilian refugees
would be entitled to be sent to the other side, the Commumsts asserted that the
UNC was attempting to revive the "obsolete" thirty-eighth parallel.
It is comparatively simple to trace the continuity over the years of the use ot
the agenda technique by the Commumsts. The problem of China has, ofcourse,
plagued the United Nations since early in 1950. The difference between the
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traditional approach to the establishment of an agenda item and the Communist
approach is well illustrated by the two items inscribed on the agenda of the
Sixteenth Session of the General Assembly in 1961. The item proposed by New
Zealand, worded so as to permit complete discussion ofall aspects ofthe problem,
was: "Question of the representation of China in the United Nations." The
item proposed by the USSR (which was then still acting as Communist China's
sponsor in the United Nations), was: "Restoration of the lawful rights of the
Peoples' Republic of China."
The use of tactful language in international negotiations is merely evidence
of bourgeois decadence in so far as the Communists are concerned.
(Khrushchev's shoe-pounding performance at the 1960 meeting of the United
Nations General Assembly, which so astounded most non-Communist
representatives, was probably considered to be quite normal by the
representatives of the satellite nations.) Any proposal that they made was
invariably labeled "fair and reasonable." Just as invariably, any proposal made by
the UNC was labeled "absurd and arrogant." Libelous statements about the
United States, the Republic of Korea and the Republic of China were the
Communist order of the day. Every UNC action was characterized as
"barbarous" and "criminal" and every UNC statement as "deceitful" and a
"fabrication." It was obvious that all ofthis was part of a strategy aimed at making
the UNC negotiators lose their tempers, the theory probably being that when
emotionally disturbed, unintended statements might be inadvertently made. But
whatever the theory, the plan failed to work as the UNC representatives, naive
as some of them may have been when the negotiations began, quickly came to
appreciate what was being attempted and had no difficulty in avoiding the pitfall
which had been so carefully prepared for them. In fact, the Communists soon
found it necessary to completely reverse their tactics and to attempt to induce
reciprocity by purported loss oftemper on their side, loss oftemper which could
be turned on and off like water from a faucet. After a few polite but patently
amused requests that they stop yelling across the table, this tactic was more or
less abandoned, especially when one of the UNC staff officers pointed out that
yelling in Chinese or Korean served no useful purpose since it was in a language
he did not understand.
Major General (later General) Henry I. Hodes, one of the original members
ofthe United Nations Command Delegation and the senior member of the first
UNC sub-delegation (the other was Rear Admiral Arleigh. A. Burke, later an
Admiral and Chief of Naval Operations), had a faculty for rubbing his
Communist counterpart, Chinese Major General Hsieh Fang, the wrong way.
The informal sub-delegation meetings on the military demarcation line had
come to a complete halt. After both sides had maneuvered for some time with
no perceptible progress being made, General Hodes suggested that a coin be
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tossed to determine who would "break the ice." Hsieh Fang indicated great
astonishment that General Hodes would be willing to let such an important
matter be determined by the toss of a coin. To him the negotiatory technique
employed was a matter of the utmost importance. General Hodes was just
interested in getting the discussions moving. On another occasion, Hsieh Fang
attempted to indicate his low regard for the United Nations Command
Delegation by referring to AdmiralJoy (almost a Chinese name) as "your Senior
Delegate, whose name I do not recall." General Hodes answered him by
referring to the Communist Senior Delegate and adding the phrase "whose name
I trust you do recall." That ended that interchange very quickly.
When the UNC negotiators had no objection to something proposed by the
Communists they would unhesitatingly so state. Not so the Communists. They
would concede that their views were generally the same as those expressed by
the UNC representative, or that they could see no reason why agreement should
not be reached on the matter under discussion. It was just plain impossible to
get them to say a simple "yes." Naturally, there was much speculation on the
UNC side that this difficulty arose because the Communist representatives were
not permitted on their own initiative to agree on even a minor administrative
matter. No such difficulty was encountered when it came to getting them to
say no.
Over the course of time both sides became very reticent about the manner
in which they proposed compromises. The UNC negotiators soon found that
if they offered a compromise position somewhere between the announced
positions of the two sides, the Communists would reject it out ofhand, but that
for all subsequent negotiations the two extremes were the original Communist
position and the UNC compromise proposal. The UNC negotiators evened the
score when the Communists made a proposal calling for agreement to a demand
made by UNC on one matter in return for UNC agreement to a Communist
demand on an entirely unrelated matter. The UNC accepted the Communist
concession on its demand and declined to agree to the Communist demand on
the other matter. It worked—but only once.
The Communists were either amazingly unimaginative or severely restricted
when it came to administrative matters. Every suggestion without exception for
expediting the progress of the negotiations was made by the UNC
representatives. And that wasn't because they jumped the gun, either. On a
number of occasions the UNC representatives would ask the Communists for
a suggestion as to how some administrative matter should be handled. The
Communists would come right back and ask for the UNC opinion. It would
be given to them, and the next day they would agree to it, usually with some
minor and unimportant modification made just to show that they had had a
hand in reaching the decision. Incidentally, Navy Lieutenant Horace G.
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Underwood, the senior UNC interpreter, stated that he had found it necessary
to adopt the policy of intentionally inserting at least one fairly obvious error in
all interpretations on which agreement was required, because then the
Communists would be satisfied when they corrected the error, whereas, if there
was no error, they invariably proposed some change in substance. More
inferiority complex?
If any reader of this article should ever have the necessary but exhausting
chore of negotiating with representatives of a Communist nation, he
undoubtedly will encounter many of the techniques discussed here. For it is safe
to say that Communist negotiating techniques are as immutable as the laws of
nature.
V
Maltreatment of Prisoners of War In Vietnam
48 Boston University Law Review 323 (1968)'
After the adoption of the Southeast Asia (Gulf of Tonkin) Resolution by
the Congress ofthe United States in August, 1964, there was a substantial
increase in the American military presence in South Vietnam and consequent
and parallel increases in the range and extent of belligerent activities. In
accordance with its customary practice, the International Committee ofthe Red
Cross (hereinafter referred to as the ICRC) thereupon addressed a letter to the
several parties to the conflict, pointing out that they had all ratified or adhered
to, and were bound by, the 1949 Geneva Conventions for the Protection of
Victims ofWar. The ICRC reminded the parties of their specific obligations
under the Conventions, and requested information as to the measures being
taken by each of them to conform to the duties devolving upon them.
Replies were received from all of the parties concerned. The United States
advised that it "has always abided by the humanitarian principles enunciated in
the Geneva conventions and will continue to do so." Specifically, it affirmed
that it was "applying the provisions of the Geneva Conventions [in Vietnam]
and we expect the other parties to the conflict to do likewise." ' The Republic
ofVietnam (hereinafter referred to as South Vietnam) assured the ICRC that it
was "fully prepared to respect the provisions of the Geneva Conventions and
to contribute actively to the efforts of the International Committee of the Red
Cross to ensure their application."
The reply received from the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (hereinafter
referred to as North Vietnam) was the usual propaganda tirade which appears
to be endemic in Communist documents, thus making it rather difficult to isolate
any truly responsive portions. However, the letter did state that North Vietnam
would "regard the pilots who have carried out pirate-raids, destroying the
property and massacring the population of the Democratic Republic of
Vietnam, as major [war] criminals caught in flagrante delicto and liable for
judgment in accordance with the laws of the Democratic Republic ofVietnam,
although captured pilots are well treated."' The National Liberation Front
(hereinafter referred to as the NLF), the political arm of the Vietcong, flady
* Reprinted in 2 THE VIETNAM WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 361 (Richard Falk
ed., 1969).
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refused to apply the Conventions, stating that it "was not bound by the
international treaties to which others beside itself subscribed. . . . [T]he NLF,
however, affirmed that the prisoners it held were humanely treated and that,
above all, enemy wounded were collected and cared for."
This article has well-defined limitations in scope. It will be concerned solely
with some of the instances ofmaltreatment of prisoners ofwar which constitute
violations of several of the more important humanitarian provisions of the 1949
Geneva Prisoner-of-War Convention, or ofcustomary international law, which
10
appear to have occurred during the course of the fighting in Vietnam.
Unfortunately, the positions taken by North Vietnam and the NLF necessitate
at least some discussion of the problems created by their attitude toward
compliance with the humanitarian aspects of the law ofwar and by the question
of the applicability of the Convention under the circumstances which exist in
Vietnam.
I. Past Communist Practice With Respect to the Treatment
of Prisoners of War
Inasmuch as the long list of States which have ratified or adhered to the 1949
Geneva Conventions contains all of the Communist countries, including the
major sponsors ofNorth Vietnam and the NLF, viz the USSR and the People's
Republic of China, it is obvious that the refusal ofNorth Vietnam and the NLF
to consider themselves bound by even the limited humanitarian provisions
enumerated in Article 3 ofthe Convention cannot be because these provisions
are in any manner contrary to the Communist concept of the law ofwar. The
only alternative is to assume that they consider that it is in their own self-interest
not to be under any ofthe constraints imposed by a requirement to comply with
these purely humanitarian aspects of the law of war. However, one engaged in
armed hostilities, even as a rebel in a civil war, cannot thus divest himself of the
requirement to comply with those portions of the law ofwar which constitute
a part of the customary rules of international law recognized by all civilized
nations—and, as we shall shortly see in more detail, the provisions of Article 3
of the Convention, for the most part, fall within this category.
A. The USSR during World War II
During World War II, the USSR acknowledged that it was bound by the
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1907 Hague Regulations " and the 1929 Geneva Wounded-and-Sick
\(\
Convention, and took the position that the provisions ofthese two agreements
covered "all the main questions of captivity." Based upon this statement the
ICRC assumed that there would be, among other things, exchanges of lists of
prisoners of war and of mail and relief packages, and that its delegates would be
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permitted and enabled to enter Russia and to inspect prisoner-of-war camps
located in that country. This was also the assumption of the enemies of the
USSR. Despite continuous efforts on the part of the ICRC, however, none of
18
these things ever eventuated. One author ascribed this negative policy adopted
by the USSR to the alleged "official Soviet position, that any soldier who fell
into enemy hands was ipso facto a. traitor and deserved no protection from his
government."
B. North Korea
During the Korean hostilities the North Korean Government announced that
its forces were "strictly abiding by principles of Geneva Conventions in respect
to Prisoners of War"; and in the lengthy dispute during the armistice
negotiations regarding "forced repatriation" of prisoners of war, the North
Korean and Chinese Communists relied very heavily on certain articles of the
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1949 Convention. Despite this, only two lists ofAmerican prisoners of war,
totalling just 110 names, were ever sent to the Central Tracing Agency of the
ICRC in Geneva (in August and September 1950, shordy after hostilities began),
death marches occurred, prisoners of war were inadequately fed, and mail was
allowed only on an irregular basis (usually to serve some propaganda purpose).
Repeated efforts, which continued even during the course of the armistice
negotiations, were unsuccessful in obtaining permission for the ICRC to send
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a delegate into North Korea to inspect the prisonerof-war camps located there.
C. North Vietnam
Now, in Vietnam, we have a third instance of a Communist regime (North
Vietnam) which has agreed to be bound by a humanitarian war convention but
which, when the conditions arise under which the convention is to be applied,
declines to comply with its provisions. North Vietnam persists in refusing to
provide the names of persons held as prisoners of war, refusing to permit
correspondence between the prisoners ofwar and their families, and refusing to
permit the neutral ICRC delegates to inspect the prisoner-of-war camps so as
to be able to determine whether the prisoners of war are, in fact, receiving the
humane treatment to which they are entitled and which that regime long ago
committed itself to provide. Similarly, the NLF refuses to consider itselfbound
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in any way, even by the limited provisions of Article 3 of the Convention.
It would seem, at this point, to be fairly well established that the Communist
countries, while ready to become parties to humanitarian war conventions, are
not ready to comply with their provisions, for they are either not concerned
about obtaining reciprocal treatment for their captured personnel, or, possibly,
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they may assume that by their present method they will still obtain humane
treatment for Communist personnel without any need to reciprocate—which
is what has actually occurred in both Korea and Vietnam. Unfortunately, the
result of this procedure can only be that eventually the other side in international
armed conflicts, and the established government in civil armed conflicts, will
refuse to apply the Convention until confirmation of the fact that it is being
applied by the Communist side. Although this procedure certainly would leave
much to be desired from the immediate humanitarian point of view, it might,
in the long run, prove to be more humanitarian to the greater number ofpersons.
Of course, the argument would undoubtedly be made, in opposition to such a
procedure, that the obligation to comply with the Convention does not depend
upon reciprocity, but upon the undertaking made to all the other parties thereto,
and also that the Convention creates individual rights which may not be
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withdrawn because of the failure of one side to comply. While this may well
be true, it is unquestionably going to be increasingly difficult to persuade a
country engaged in armed conflict with a Communist country, or an established
government engaged in civil strife with a Communist uprising, that it must give
Communist prisoners of war the benefits of the Convention while its own
captured personnel do not even receive the minimum benefits of customary
international law. They will undoubtedly tend to take the position that there
must be a point at which the refusal of the Communist side to comply with the
provisions of the Convention releases the other side from its obligations
thereunder.
II. Does Article 2 of the 1949 Convention Apply in Vietnam?
Whether the fighting which is taking place in Vietnam constitutes an
international armed conflict or a civil war has been the subject of considerable
dispute. It is the official position of the United States that what is taking place
in Vietnam is an international armed conflict. ' This position has received
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support from unofficial sources. Opponents of United States participation in
the Vietnamese hostilities assert that it is a civil war. Before proceeding to a
discussion of specific instances of the improper treatment of prisoners of war,
let us examine the law applicable under the various possibilities.
The first paragraph of Article 2 of the 1949 Convention provides that:
[T]he present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other
armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting
Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them. (Emphasis added).
The meaning of the quoted provisions is clear; and at no time since the drafting
of the Convention in 1949 has any state indicated the existence of any question
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with respect to that meaning. In fact, it is among those provisions of the
Convention which have been given both uniform interpretation and general
, 30
approval.
The only specific legal excuse ever advanced by North Vietnam for its
insistence that the Convention is not applicable, and that persons captured by it
are not entided to the humanitarian protections afforded by the Convention,
has been that there is no "declared war." It is surely beyond dispute that there
is an "armed conflict" in Vietnam between two or more of the parties to the
Convention. Under these circumstances, the fact that there has been no
declaration of war, or that a state of war is not recognized as existing, is
completely irrelevant to the requirement to apply the Convention. There is,
then, no validity whatsoever to the sole legal reason put forward by North
Vietnam to justify its refusal to apply the Convention by which it voluntarily
elected to be bound a number of years before the armed conflict in Vietnam
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reached its present status. The wording used in drafting the first paragraph of
Article 2 leaves no doubt that it was the intent of the Diplomatic Conference
which approved it that the Convention be applicable in every instance of the
use ofarmed force in international relations—and, beyond any shadow ofdoubt,
this intent was attained. It appears equally clear that the refusal ofNorth Vietnam
to apply the Convention under the circumstances which exist in
Vietnam—whether or not the United States is "waging a war of
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aggression" —constitutes a blatant disregard of an international obligation,
freely accepted.
III. Does Article 3 of the Convention Apply in Vietnam?
34
Article 3 of the Convention is sometimes referred to as a "convention in
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miniature," or as a "mini-convention." The draftsmen attempted to include
in a single article those basic humanitarian provisions which render
prisoner-of-war status somewhat less horrendous than it inherently is—thus, in
a relatively simple manner, calling to the attention of the participants in a
non-international armed conflict the specific humanitarian rules which control
their actions from the very outset. ' Unfortunately, even this minunum
approach has frequently proven unsuccessful.
The idea of including in an international convention a provision regulating
civil wars was extremely novel. While the ICRC had been aiming for such
an extension of the Geneva-type Conventions for many years, it was not
successful in this respect until the 1949 Diplomatic Conference. The main
objection voiced during the discussions in committee and in the plenary sessions
of the Diplomatic Conference was that under a number of the proposals the
established government would seemingly be required to apply the Convention
even in cases ofbrigandage. The other problem that had to be solved was the
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determination as to which provisions ofthe Convention should in an appropriate
case be applied.
4
' The compromise ultimately adopted left the term "armed
conflict not of an international character" undefined—which, in effect, was a
determination to make the term as broad and all-encompassing as possible. On
the other hand, the minimum provisions which the parties to the armed conflict
are obligated to apply are enumerated at length, rather than providing for the
application of the entire Convention (as the working draft had done) or of all
provisions falling within certain broad categories (as the USSR had proposed).
What is the effect of Article 3 of the Convention on the parties to an "armed
conflict not of an international character?" As far as the established government
is concerned, if it is a party to the Convention it is bound by the provisions of
Article 3 just as much as it would be bound by all of the provisions of the
Convention in an armed conflict of an international character. And the same
is true of third states which intervene to support either side in a civil war.
The foregoing has caused comparatively few legal problems. Where
problems arise, however, is with respect to the obligation of the insurgents.
How, it will be asked, can the action ofthe established government in becoming
a party to the Convention, an action perhaps taken many years before the
rebellion was even contemplated, now be held to bind the insurgents ? ' This
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is the position taken by the NLF. While it may have some minimum legal
basis—this is the most that can be said for it—there are a number of valid legal
theories under which a finding that the insurgents are bound by the provisions
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of Article 3 can be fully justified.
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While Soviet legal writers do not specifically state that insurgents are bound
by the provisions ofArticle 3, that is certainly the only logical conclusion which
can be drawn from their writings. Thus, their widely distributed textbook states:
[T]he Soviet delegation secured the [1949 Diplomatic] Conference's recognition
of a number of important humane clauses which were included in the new
Conventions. For example, the obligatory character of the application during
armed conflicts which are not of an international character of such principles as
the humane treatment of persons not taking a direct part in military operations or
who have ceased to take part in these operations as a result of sickness, illness or
captivity, was recognized ....
It has been said that the established government cannot be prejudiced by
applying Article 3, "for no Government can possibly claim that it is entitled to
make use of torture and other inhuman acts prohibited by the Convention as a
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means of combating its enemies." It would certainly seem that this argument
is equally applicable to the insurgent party, for how can armed conflict be
conducted with different rules controlling the actions of the two contending
sides ?
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Finally, there is much merit in a further statement made in the official ICRC
interpretation of Article 3 of the Convention to the effect that:
Ifan insurgent party applies Article 3, so much the better for the victims ofthe
conflict. No one will complain. If it does not apply it, it will prove that those who
regard its actions as mere acts of anarchy or brigandage are right ....
Certainly, any insurgent force or alleged "national liberation movement" which
does not comply with the provisions of Article 3 requiring humane treatment,
and prohibiting violence, murder, torture and maltreatment of prisoners ofwar
falls within the category of brigands and terrorists.
What if, despite the foregoing, insurgents take the position that they are not
bound by the provisions ofArticle 3, and this position gains acceptance? Except
for the rare case such as Algeria, where the insurgents themselves sought
55
application of the Convention, Article 3 will become a dead letter. Unusual,
indeed, would be the government willing to grant captured insurgents the
benefits flowing from Article 3 while knowing that its own personnel, when
captured, are tortured, otherwise maltreated and slaughtered. Although the
requirement for granting these benefits to captured insurgents is stated to be
absolute, and not to be dependent upon reciprocity, once again it will be
extremely difficult to convince any governtnent and its people that such a
unilateral compliance should be expected of them.
We may then be in a position in which there is no applicable international
legislation governing the actions ofthe insurgents and we would, therefore, have
need to resort to the customary law of war. What are the customary rules
accepted by the civilized nations ofthe world? Are they binding upon insurgents?
IV. The Pertinent Customary Law of War
In the opinion rendered by the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal
(hereinafter referred to as IMT), which all Communist nations seemingly regard
as a revelation second only to those of Marx, Engels and Lenin (and, it is to be
assumed, of Mao in China), it is stated that by 1939 the 1907 Hague
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Regulations were "declaratory of the laws and customs of war."' It is also
there confirmed that an individual is not held as a prisoner of war for purposes
ofrevenge or punishment, but merely to prevent him from further participation
in the conflict and that he is, therefore, a helpless person whom it is contrary to
military tradition to kill or injure. One of the subsequent Nuremberg Military
Tribunals, in deciding The High Command Case, correctly construed the IMT
opinion as holding that by 1939 both the 1907 Hague Regulations and the 1929
Geneva Prisoner-of-War Convention "were binding insofar as they were in
substance an expression of international law as accepted by the civilized nations
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of the world." Every military force engaged in armed conflict, whether or not
international in character, and whether representing an old or a new state, an
established government or an insurgent party, is bound to comply with these
established rules of the "civilized nations of the world." Failure to do so places
that military force, and the political organization which it represents and from
which it takes its orders and policies, in direct violation of the foregoing
principles enunciated at Nuremberg.
The Tribunal in The High Command Case did not limit itself to the general
statement that the 1907 Hague Regulations and the 1929 Geneva
Prisoner-of-War Convention now represented customary law. Inasmuch as
there were obviously provision in those two Conventions dealing with details
which could not be construed as customary law, the Tribunal assumed the task
of designating exactly which provisions of the two agreements did fall within
that category. It proceeded to review the specific provisions of each of the two
Conventions and found that those provisions requiring humane treatment of
prisoners ofwar, and those protecting them from acts ofviolence, insults, public
curiosity, corporal punishment and acts of cruelty, were "an expression of the
accepted views of civilized nations."
Of course, the Tribunal in The High Command Case was concerned only with
those aspects of the law accepted by civilized nations of the world under which
violations had been proven in the case before it. Its list is not, therefore,
all-inclusive. Some writers have extended it to include the four groupings listed
in Article 3 of the Convention, probably on the extremely plausible theory
that in rejecting both the ICRC and USSR proposals the Diplomatic
Conference had selected for inclusion in Article 3 (to be binding on both sides
in a civil war) only those humanitarian principles which already had received
demonstrable acceptance by the civilized nations of the world. It also appears
that both the Tribunals and the writers have definite ideas with respect to the
imposition upon prisoners of war of vicarious punishment in the form of
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reprisals.
Do these customary rules of warfare apply to insurgents? There seems little
doubt that they do, even though the rules have so frequendy been honored only
in the breach. The Soviet textbook states that "the laws and customs of war
apply not only to armies in the strict sense of the word, but also to levies,
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voluntary detachments, organised resistance movements and partisans. " Under
existing circumstances, where every insurgent movement other than one which
is avowedly anti-Communist immediately becomes a "national liberation
movement" enjoying full Communist support, further citation of authority
would appear to be redundant.
From the foregoing, it may be properly concluded that apart from any
international legislation represented by the Hague or Geneva or other
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Conventions, minimum customary law requires that prisoners ofwar be treated
humanely; forbids the use against them ofall forms ofviolence including corporal
punishment, torture, cruelty and killing; and protects them from insults and
public curiosity. With this in mind, we may now proceed to an examination of
the incidents reported to have occurred or to have been threatened in Vietnam,
applying the provisions of the Convention generally, those of Article 3, or
customary international law where appropriate.
V. Charges Made Against the United States
It has already been pointed out that the United States responded-prompdy to
the ICRC letter concerning the application of the Geneva Conventions in
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Vietnam and committed itself to apply the 1949 Convention. This
commitment was thereafter adopted by the various nations which have furnished
military forces to support South Vietnam and it has been reiterated on several
appropriate occasions. Although, strangely enough, no report has been found
of a Vietcong or North Vietnamese charge of improper treatment of their
captured personnel by United States niilitary forces in Vietnam, there has been
one charge of improper action in this respect made in the United States.
As early as 1964, when American personnel were serving in Vietnam solely
as advisers to South Vietnamese military units, reports began to reach the United
States ofthe maltreatment ofVietcong prisoners ofwar by members ofthe South
Vietnamese combat forces. American photographers and newsmen were
present during these episodes and, presumably, American military personnel
were also present. Photographs of this nature continued to appear in the
American press from time to time during 1965 and occasionally, although much
more rarely, during subsequent years. In a few instances American personnel
were pictured standing by while the maltreatment of the prisoners of war
occurred. These incidents apparently took place either at the scene of the
fighting or during evacuation from it.
Humanitarian reaction to these clear indications of violations of the
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Convention quickly appeared in the United States. ' The legal problem
presented by these incidents, in view of the nature of the United States position
in Vietnam, is whether the United States had a duty or was in a position to do
more than remonstrate with the South Vietnamese authorities.
There is no provision in the Convention making a contracting party
responsible for violations committed by one of its allies against prisoners ofwar
captured and held by that ally. A search of the Final Record of the 1949
Diplomatic Conference which drafted the Convention has failed to bring to
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light even a suggestion to this effect made by any delegation. ' The reasons for
this lacuna are obvious. To have included such a provision would have created
vicarious responsibility for a situation which, in the great majority of cases, could
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not be remedied by the state so held responsible. Moreover, no state would
willingly accept a responsibility which could well bring it into sharp conflict
with one or several of its allies during the course of a life-or-death struggle.
There was, then, no legal duty imposed upon the United States by the 1949
Convention to ensure that South Vietnamese troops did not maltreat personnel
captured by them. Of course, it is equally clear that the United States (and every
other contracting party) is under a moral obligation to exert all its influence to
bring about full compliance with the relevant provisions of the Convention by
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any other party engaged in armed conflict.
When units of the United States armed forces were committed to combat a
new situation arose, because, unlike the earlier period just mentioned, the
United States itself then began to take prisoners of war. These prisoners were
turned over to the South Vietnamese for detention in prisoner-of-war camps.
At first, the transfer of custody was made in the field immediately upon capture.
But apparently because most of the incidents of maltreatment occurred at this
time and in this area, in mid-1966 the United States changed its procedure.
Thereafter, prisoners of war captured by United States units were evacuated to
divisional headquarters and from there directly to the rear-area prisoner-of-war
camps maintained by the South Vietnamese. The United States
Commander-in-Chief in Vietnam has stated categorically that "these prisoners




of the Geneva Conventions." There is no evidence to indicate that h s
statement is not correct, nor have any claims been made which contradict it.
Of course, even after prisoners of war captured by United States forces reach
the camps and are turned over to the custody of the South Vietnamese, the
United States remains under a contingent responsibility for their humane
treatment in accordance with the provisions of the Convention.
VI. Charges Made Against South Vietnam
There appears to be little doubt that at least well into 1966 South Vietnamese
combat troops regularly maltreated captured enemy personnel by using threats,
torture, and other acts ofviolence in order to obtain intelligence information.
These acts were and remain direct violations of the law of war, whether
considered from the point of view of the entire Convention, Article 3, or
customary international law. The combined pressure of the ICRC and the
United States (and, perhaps, of other allied countries) has apparently gradually
made itself felt, at least at the official level. The Government of South Vietnam
has complied with the Convention by a liberal interpretation of the provisions
ofArticle 4 defining the categories ofpersons entided to prisoner-of-war status,
by supplying lists of persons detained as prisoners ofwar to the Central Tracing
Agency of the ICRC, by disseminating to its troops information concerning
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the duties imposed upon captors by the Convention and by other methods of
instruction of its troops, and by permitting unlimited inspection visits to the
prisoner-of-war camps by delegates of the ICRC. ' The fact that reports of
further instances of maltreatment of prisoners of war by South Vietnamese
combat troops have become more sporadic probably indicates that the campaign
of education has had some degree of success. However, it may also mean that
South Vietnamese combat commanders have been able to conceal most ofsuch
incidents from those who might report them.
To summarize: while the South Vietnamese Government has now
substantially complied with the obligations which the Convention imposes upon
it, during the course ofa period extending over several years there was apparently
an officially countenanced practice of the use of torture on newly-captured
prisoners of war by South Vietnamese combat troops for the purpose of
extracting information from them. The South Vietnamese Government appears
now to accept the fact that such conduct constituted a direct and major violation
of the Convention and, therefore, in 1966 instituted a campaign of education
which seems to have been at least partially successful in putting an end to this
grossly illegal practice. However, instances of maltreatment of newly-captured
prisoners ofwar by South Vietnamese combat troops continue to be reported.
The individuals responsible for such incidents, both soldiers who commit the
actual violence and commanders who permit and even encourage these acts, are
guilty of violations of the Convention and of the customary law of war.
VII. Charges Made Against North Vietnam
A. Parading Prisoners of War
With respect to the North Vietnamese treatment of American prisoners of
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war we have only the information which they have seen fit to disclose.
However, even this limited source of information has revealed one major
violation of the Convention and the threat of what was asserted to be another.
While this latter was apparently prevented by an unprecedented mobilization of
world opinion by the United States, it will be discussed below in section VII B.
On July 6, 1966, presumably to whip up local support for the trial ofcaptured
American pilots as "war criminals,'' the North Vietnamese authorities caused
these men, handcuffed in pairs, to be paraded through the crowd-lined streets
of Hanoi. Word of the incident was broadcast by Radio Hanoi and press
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releases and photographs were issued by the official North Vietnamese press
agency.
The United States Government immediatelv charged that this constituted a
violation of the Convention. The ICRC clearly was of the same opinion, for
on July 14, 1966, it drew the attention of the North Vietnamese Government
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to the fact that the Convention specifically prohibited the subjection ofprisoners
ofwar to public curiosity. ' The North Vietnamese did not deny the occurrence
of the incident; they merely called attention to their previous communications
concerning the nonapplicability of the Convention.
In May, 1967, Agence France Presse (the French news agency) reported from
Hanoi that three captured American pilots, one of whom was apparently
suffering from an injury, "were paraded through angry, shouting crowds" on
the streets of Hanoi and were later "put on display" at the International Press
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Club in Hanoi. Once again the United States Government immediately
charged that this constituted a "flagrant violation" of the Convention and stated
that it was sending a protest to North Vietnam through the ICRC.
Over a century ago Francis Lieber's first codification of the customary law of
war included a statement to the effect that prisoners of war were not to be
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subjected to any "indignity." The 1929 Geneva Prisoner-of-War
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Convention, " the predecessor of the Convention with which we are here
concerned, had (in its Article 2) a prohibition against subjecting prisoners ofwar
to "insults and public curiosity." In interpreting this provision in the course of
World War II, the Judge Advocate General of the Army said: "The 'public
curiosity' against which Article 2 . . . protects them is the curious and perhaps
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scornful gaze of the crowd. ..." During World War II a group ofAmerican
prisoners of war was marched through the streets of Rome by the Nazis as a
propaganda measure. After the war the Nazi commander responsible for the
march was tried and convicted of the war crime of failing to protect prisoners
104
of war in his custody from insults and public curiosity. The International
Military Tribunal for the Far East, the Pacific counterpart of the International
Military Tribunal ofNuremberg fame, included in its opinion a heading entitled
"Prisoners ofWar Humiliated" and listed thereunder various episodes in which
prisoners of war had been marched down city streets and exhibited to jeering
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crowds, specifically labeling such treatment as a violation of the law of war.
It has already been noted that the Military Tribunal which heard The High
Command Case at Nuremberg found that the protection ofprisoners ofwar from
insults and public curiosity was a part of the customary law of war recognized
by civilized nations.
Both Articles 3 and 13 of the Convention contain provisions which prohibit
the exhibiting of prisoners of war by parading them through city streets; and it
would appear that this rule has most probably attained the status of being part
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of the customary law of war. It follows that the actions ofNorth Vietnamese
authorities on the two occasions mentioned (and on other less well publicized
occasions) were violations of the Convention and of the customary law of
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war.
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B. War Crimes Trials
It will be recalled that in answering the letter from the ICRC in August,
1965, North Vietnam referred to captured American pilots as "major [war]
criminals caught in flagrante delicto and liable forjudgment in accordance with
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the laws ofthe Democratic Republic ofVietnam.
'
' Many statements ofsimilar
import were subsequently made by the North Vietnamese. By mid-July,
1966, press dispatches from Communist newsmen in Hanoi were mentioning
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that trials were definitely planned and tension began to build in the United
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States. It was then that the United States mounted a diplomatic offensive
which resulted in the intervention of personages from around the world,
including those who sided with the United States position in Vietnam, those
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who opposed it, and those who were neutral. On July 23, 1966, the North
Vietnamese Government announced the appointment of a committee "to
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investigate United States 'war crimes'" and then, on that same day, North
Vietnam President Ho Chi Minh took advantage of a cabled inquiry from the
Columbia Broadcasting System to state that there was "no trial in view" for the
American pilots. A few days later Ho was quoted as saying that the "main
criminals" were not captured pilots, "but the persons who sent them
there—Johnson, Rusk, McNamara—these are the ones who should be brought
to trial." For ten days in July, 1966, there was excitement and debate on this
subject throughout the world, with claims, counterclaims, and citation of legal
authorities and purported legal authorities for and against the trial.
Actually, the statement and allegations made by the North Vietnamese in
their August 31, 1965, letter to the ICRC and frequendy thereafter pose two
interwoven questions concerning the captured American pilots: (1) are they
entided to the status ofprisoners ofwar? and (2) do the North Vietnamese have
the right to try them for alleged war crimes ? It will be appropriate to discuss
these two questions in the order stated.
The captured pilots are all members ofthe United States Navy and Air Force.
They were captured when forced to eject from their planes while flying combat
missions over North Vietnam. They were wearing American flight uniforms
when captured and made no attempt to hide their identity. (Ofcourse, this series
of statements includes a number of assumptions—but they all appear to be
reasonable ones and there is no indication that any one ofthem is really disputed.)
These facts being accepted, the American pilots are entided prima facie to
prisoner-of-war status under the 1907 Hague Regulations, the 1929 Geneva
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Prisoner of-War Convention, and the 1949 Geneva Prisoner-of-War
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Convention. In fact, it would be difficult to imagine a more clear-cut case
of entitlement to such status.
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The North Vietnamese apparently do not contest the facts stated and assumed
above, but they attempt to avoid the conclusion which necessarily flows from
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these facts by asserting that the Convention does not apply to "war criminals."
The syllogism would be: war criminals are not entitled to the protection of the
Convention; American pilots are war criminals; therefore, American pilots are
not entitled to the protection of the Convention. Both the major and the minor
premises of that syllogism are incorrect. The North Vietnamese position
therefore necessitates a brief review of the events preceding and following the
approval of Article 85 of the Convention by the 1949 Diplomatic
r c 121Conference.
When the war in the Pacific ended in 1945, General Yamashita, who had
commanded the unsuccessful Japanese defense of the Phillipine Islands, was
charged with a number of war crimes and was brought to trial before an
American Military Commission in Manila. His counsel contended that he was
entided to all of the trial protections contained in the 1929 Prisoner-of-War
Convention. These protections were denied to him and on appeal to the United
States Supreme Court (after his conviction and death sentence) the denial was
affirmed on the ground that the trial protections contained in that Convention
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applied only to trials for post-capture—not pre-capture—offenses.
In the preparatory work which preceded the 1949 Diplomatic Conference,
the ICRC convened a group of "Government Experts" who recommended, as
one variation from the 1929 Convention, a provision that prisoners of war
prosecuted for pre-capture offenses should enjoy the benefits ofthe Convention
until convicted after a regular trial. When this was submitted to the XVIIth
International Red Cross Conference at Stockholm in 1948, where the final draft
which was to be the working draft for the 1949 Diplomatic Conference was
prepared, it was decided to change the provision drafted by the Government
Experts so that prisoners of war would continue to benefit by the provisions of
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the Convention even after conviction of a pre-capture offense.
At the Diplomatic Conference, the USSR proposed an amendment to the
draft provision under which once a prisoner ofwar had been convicted of a war
crime (apparendy this meant a conventional war crime) or a crime against
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humanity, he could be treated as an ordinary criminal. ' This was, in effect, a
return to the recommendation made by the Government Experts. General
Slavin, chief delegate of the USSR, stated to the committee charged with the
preparation of the Prisoner-of-War Convention, that the USSR proposal
applied only to prisoners of war who had been convicted.
4 The committee's
report to the Plenary Meeting called attention to the difference of approach
represented by the Stockholm draft and the USSR proposal, and stated that the
great majority of the committee considered that even after a prisoner ofwar had
been convicted of a pre-capture violation of the laws and customs of war, he
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should continue to enjoy the protection ofthe Convention. The Diplomatic
Conference rejected the Soviet proposal and approved the Stockholm draft
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provision.
The effect of Article 85 of the Convention was, then, to change the rule
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expounded in Yamashita and other similar cases. Now a prisoner ofwar retains
the benefits of the Convention from the moment of capture to the moment of
release and repatriation. If, while in captivity, he is tried and convicted of a
pre-capture violation of the law ofwar he is entided to all the judicial safeguards
of the Convention.
The USSR and all of the other Communist countries, both those present at
the Diplomatic Conference in Geneva and those which subsequently adhered
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to the Convention, have made reservations to Article 85. This fact caused
some concern to the United States Senate when it was asked to give its advice
and consent to the ratification of the Convention by the President. In its report
to the Senate the Committee on Foreign Relations said:
[I]n the light of the practice adopted by Communist forces in Korea of calling
prisoners ofwar "war criminals," there is the possibility that the Soviet bloc might
adopt the general attitude ofregarding a significant number ofthe forces opposing
them as ipso facto war criminals, not entitled to the usual guaranties provided for
prisoners of war. As indicated above, however, the Soviet reservation expressly
deprives prisoners ofwar ofthe protection ofthe convention only after conviction
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in accordance with the convention.
When North Vietnam advised the Swiss Government of its adherence to the
four 1949 Geneva Conventions in June 1957, the communication included a
reservation to Article 85 reading as follows:
The Democratic Republic ofVietnam declares that prisoners ofwar prosecuted
for and convicted of war crimes or crimes against humanity, in accordance with
the principles laid down by the Nuremberg Court ofJustice shall not benefit from
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the present Convention, as specified in Article 85.
Having made this reservation, it must be assumed that the North Vietnamese
authorities fully understood its meaning—and it is difficult to find any real
133
ambiguity in it so far as the present problem is concerned. The American
pilots have not been "prosecuted and convicted." Under Article 85 of the
Convention and the North Vietnamese reservation to it, they are entitled to the
benefits of the Convention until prosecution and conviction for war crimes or
crimes against humanity have occurred. The North Vietnamese contention that
the American pilots are "war criminals" and not entitled to the protection of
the Convention is, therefore, without merit. It is, in and of itself, a major
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violation of the Convention to arbitrarily deny prisoner-of-war status to
individuals entitled to that status. Ifthe North Vietnamese desire to comply with
the international commitment which they have made by voluntarily adhering
to the Convention, they are under an obligation to recognize that American
pilots captured while flying combat missions over North Vietnam are entitled
to the status of prisoners of war and to the protections provided by the
Convention which flow from that status.
The first question posed above, are American pilots entitled to the status of
prisoners ofwar, must be answered in the affirmative. This leads us to the second
question, do the North Vietnamese have the right to try them for alleged war
crimes?
In the discussions which took place in connection with the drafting ofArticle
85, it was at no time suggested by any delegation that prisoner-of-war status
should protect an individual from prosecution for an alleged pre-capture offense
which constituted a violation of the law of war. In fact, all of the parties who
engaged in the discussion apparently assumed that this was the rule. As we have
just seen, the only dispute on this subject concerned the regime under which
the detaining power would be entitled to place the individual after his trial and
conviction for a pre-capture offense. Under the circumstances, there seems to
be little doubt that the second question posed, do the North Vietnamese have
the right to try the American pilots for war crimes alleged to have been
committed prior to capture, should also be answered in the affirmative.
However, this answer requires amplification, because standing alone it is
subject to misconstruction. In the first place, the right to try a prisoner of war
for an offense which he is alleged to have committed prior to capture does not
mean that there is a right to treat him prior to trial and conviction in the manner
in which he might be treated after trial and conviction. (This, of course, is
inherent in the discussion and resolution of the first question on this subject
discussed immediately above.) In other words, a prisoner ofwar retains the status
of prisoner of war, and all the protections incident thereto, at least until he has
been finally convicted.
In the second place, while it appears that the North Vietnamese charge against
the American pilots is that they have been guilty ofbombing nonmilitary targets,
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such as civilian residential areas, * at this stage in the development of the law
of war, there may be considerable doubt expressed as to whether even
"target-area" bombing, a much more indiscriminate and inhumane act than that
apparently charged against the American airmen, is a violation of international
law. During World War II both sides engaged in this type of warfare. No one
who lived through that period or has read its history could have forgotten the
German bombing ofsuch targets as Warsaw, London, Coventry and Rotterdam,
and the Allied bombing of Berlin, Essen, Cologne and Tokyo. No political
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leader, no military commander, and no airman was ever convicted ofanv alleged
war crime arising out of these activities. One will look in vain in the opinions
of the LY1T or of the LMTFE for any reference to such activities as constituting
a war crime. For more than ten years the ICRC has been endeavoring., so far
with not even a modicum of success, to evolve a convention which would
protect the civilian populations in time of war and which would be acceptable
to the governments. ' This proposed Convention, in its Article 10, specifically
forbids target-area bombing. The fact that it is considered necessary to include
such a prohibition in a new draft international convention on the law of war
would seem to indicate rather conclusively that no such prohibition is presently
included therein. And, as has been stated, if target-area bombing is not
definitely oudawed, then certainly the lesser charge which appears to have been
levelled against the American pilots does not come within a prohibited category.
In the third place, we have moved far along the road from the era ofvicarious
punishment to a point where individuals are pumshed only for their own acts.
While evidence, such as "confessions," might be available to the North
Vietnamese with respect to some of the airmen, what of the others ? Why is the
charge of being a war criminal levelled against every captured American airman
held by the North Vietnamese? " Certainly, there is no evidence available to
them that every captured American airman participated in bombing or other
attacks on purely Chilian targets. Some of the airmen were probably shot down
on their first missions before they could drop a bomb. Some were probably
flying in unarmed reconnaissance planes, perhaps as photographers. Some were
probably flying fighter protection armed only with air-to-air weapons. These,
and probably many others, are within categories against whom no legitimate
war-crimes charge can be laid, even assuming that it can against the others.
Finally, there arises the problem of whether prisoners of war accused of
pre-capture war crimes can be or should be tried during the course of hostilities.
On this subject the author has previously said:
While there was never any concrete proposal made at the Diplomatic
Conference that trials of prisoners of war for pre-capture offenses should be
postponed until the cessanon of hostilities, the matter was the subject of
inconclusive discussion during the debate on Article 85. two delegates (Lamarle
ofFrance and Slavin ofthe U.S.S.R.) expressing the opinion that such trials should
not be put offuntil the close of hostilities, and one delegate (Gardner ofthe United
Kingdom) expressing the opposite view. The International Committee ofthe Red
Goss has long taken the posiuon that, if such a trial is conducted during the course
of hostiliaes, an accused does not have a fair opportunity to produce all of the
evidence which might be available to disprove or lessen his responsibility.
As we have already seen, a number of pnsoners of war were tried for alleged
pre-capture offenses during the course ofWorld War II. The patent unfairness of
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these trials glaringly reveals the danger of trials for pre-capture offenses conducted
during the course of the war.
To summarize: captured American airmen are entitled to the status of
prisoners of war until such time as they have been prosecuted and convicted of
pre-capture violations of the law of war; while they may legally be tried during
the course ofhostilities, there are serious practical objections to such a procedure;
and, ifthey are tried, they must be afforded all ofthe judicial safeguards contained
in the Convention.
VIM. Charges Made Against the Vietcong
Very little information is available as to how many prisoners ofwar, American
or South Vietnamese, are held by the Vietcong; even less is known as to how
they are being treated. However, there is reason to know that they do hold some
American prisoners of war—and that there have been at least two identical
instances of major violations of the law of war in the treatment of prisoners by
the Vietcong.
As we have seen, despite Vietcong insistence to the contrary, the generally
accepted position appears to be that insurgents such as the Vietcong are bound
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by the provisions ofArticle 3 of the Convention; and that, in any event, they
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are at a minimum bound by the customary law ofwar. Specifically, it appears
to be well established that customary international law prohibits the use of
violence and acts of cruelty against prisoners of war and, in all probability, also
• 145
prohibits making them the objects of reprisals.
On April 9, 1965, a Vietcong terrorist was tried, convicted and sentenced to
death by a South Vietnamese court. At that time the Vietcong announced that
if the sentence of execution was carried out, Gustav C. Hertz, a kidnapped
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civilian American aid officer, would be shot. The terrorist was apparently not
executed. Whether or not the threat against Hertz was the reason for the
clemency shown the terrorist has not been disclosed.
On June 22, 1965, another Vietcong terrorist was executed by a South
Vietnamese firing squad in Saigon after he had been tried, convicted and
sentenced for acts of terrorism by a South Vietnamese special military court.
Three days later both Radio Hanoi and the Liberation Radio announced that
an American soldier held as a prisoner ofwar by the Vietcong (Sergeant Harold
G. Bennett) had been executed in reprisal for the execution of the Vietcong
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terrorist. The United States labeled the act as "murder"; and a statement
released by the Department of State said that "people around the world cannot
help but be appalled and revolted by this show of wanton inhumanity."
On September 22, 1965, three more Vietcong terrorists were executed in Da
Nang after a trial, conviction and death sentence by a South Vietnamese court.
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Four days later, on September 26, the Liberation Radio announced that the
Vietcong had retaliated by the executions of two American prisoners of war,
Captain Humbert R. Versage [Versace] and Sergeant Kenneth M. Roraback.
Once again the United States labeled these reprisal executions as "murder" and
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as violations of the Convention. It filed a protest with the ICRC which was
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transmitted to and rejected by the NLF.
A "reprisal" is defined as an otherwise illegal act committed by one side in
an armed conflict in order to put pressure on the other side to compel it to
abandon a course of illegal acts which it has been committing and to comply
with the law of war. For a reprisal (a normally illegal act) to be legal there
are three requirements: the act ofthe state against which it is directed must have
been illegal; it must not be directed against an individual who, by the law of
war, is specifically protected against reprisals or against acts ofthe nature that the
contemplated reprisal will take; and it must be directed against the state which
first violated the law of war.
Were the alleged acts of reprisal of the Vietcong mentioned above valid
applications of the rules governing reprisals? The first requirement for a valid
reprisal is that the act or acts against which it is directed have been illegal. The
acts against which these reprisals were directed were the June 22 and September
22, 1965, executions of the Vietcong terrorists. Were those executions illegal?
According to the newspaper accounts, in each instance the individuals had been
tried, convicted and sentenced by a South Vietnamese court in accordance with
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the law of South Vietnam. While the National Liberation Front called the
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June 22 execution "[a] crime ofbloodthirsty men" and presumably feels the
same about the September 22 execution, it has never indicated in what way the
executions constituted a crime— other than the implication that it is a crime to
try, convict and execute a Vietcong apprehended in the course of committing
what was probably a Vietcong approved and ordered act of terrorism.
The reprisals, then, failed to meet the first requirement for a valid reprisal,
that it be called forth by an illegal act by the other side. Now let us examine the
second requirement for a reprisal to be valid under the law of war—that it not
be directed against a specifically protected person. Shortly after the Second
Hague Peace Conference of 1907 the German War Office issued a War Book
which escaped general attention until some years later. During the course of
World War I, it became well known and widely condemned because of its
emphasis on the the principle of military necessity and its disregard for the
customary and conventional law of war. Concerning reprisals against prisoners
of war the War Book said:
As regards the admissibility of reprisals, it is to be remarked that these are
objected to by numerous teachers of international law on grounds of humanity.
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To make this a matter of principle and apply it to every case, exhibits however,
"a misconception due to intelligible but exaggerated and unjustifiable feelings of
humanity, of the significance, the seriousness and the right of war. It must not be
overlooked that here also the necessity of war, and the safety of the State are the
first consideration, and not regard for the unconditional freedom ofprisoners from
molestation."
That prisoners should only be killed in the event of extreme necessity, and that
only the duty of self-preservation and the security of one's own State can justify
a proceeding of this kind is today universally admitted.
Thus, even a directive which was subjected to almost universal condemnation
limited reprisals against prisoners of war to cases of "extreme necessity,"
self-preservation, and the security of the State.
World War I so vividly demonstrated the inhumanity of reprisals against
helpless prisoners of war that restrictions on the use of this procedure were
incorporated into a number of agreements reached by the belligerents for the
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protection ofprisoners ofwar during the course ofthose hostilities. * A specific
provision completely prohibiting reprisals against prisoners ofwar was thereafter
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included in the 1929 Convention.
Writing in 1942, an American scholar stated that "it seems reasonable to
assume that reprisals, with prisoners ofwar as the objects, are permissible within
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limits in customary international law.
'
' A few years later the legality ofreprisals
against civilian hostages was considered at great length in The Hostage Case, a
decision by one of the Nuremberg Military Tribunals. The Tribunal said:
It is a fundamental rule ofjustice that the lives ofpersons may not be arbitrarily
taken. A fair trial before a judicial body affords the surest protection against
arbitrary, vindictive, or whimsical application of the right to shoot human beings
in reprisal. It is a rule of international law, based on these fundamental concepts
ofjustice and the rights of individuals, that the lives of persons may not be taken
in reprisal in the absence of a judicial finding that the necessary conditions exist
and the essential steps have been taken to give validity to such action. . . . We
have no hesitancy in holding that the killing of members of the population in
reprisal without judicial sanction is itself unlawful.
Inasmuch as members of the general public had not then been recognized as
specially protected persons, it would appear that, a fortiori, everything the
Tribunal said about the protections to which civilians were entitled would apply
to prisoners of war.
In considering the opinion quoted above, another Nuremberg Military
Tribunal, which would probably not have permitted reprisal executions under
any circumstances, stated in its opinion in The High Command Case:
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In the Southeast Case [Hostage Case], United States v. Wilhelm List, et al.,
(Case No. 7), the Tribunal had occasion to consider at considerable length the
law relating to hostages and reprisals. It was therein held that under certain very
restrictive conditions and subject to certain rather extensive safeguards, hostages
may be taken, and after ajudicial finding ofstrict compliance with all preconditions
and as a last desperate remedy hostages may even be sentenced to death. It was
held further that similar drastic safeguards, restrictions, and judicial preconditions
apply to so-called "reprisal prisoners." If so inhumane a measure as the killing of
innocent personsfor offenses ofothers, even when drastically safeguarded and limited, is ever
permissible under any theory of international law, killing withoutfull compliance with all
requirements would be murder. If killing is not permissible under any circumstances, then a
killing with full compliance with all the mentioned prerequisites still would be murder.
... In the instance of so-called hostage taking and killing, and the so-called
reprisal killings with which we have to deal in this case, the safeguards and
preconditions required to be observed by the Southeast judgment were not even
attempted to be met or even suggested as necessary. Killings without compliance
with such preconditions are merely terror murders. Ifthe law is in fact that hostage
and reprisal killings are never permissible at all, then also the so-called hostage and
reprisal killings in this case are merely terror murders.
And in reviewing the overall war crimes program which followed World War
II and the law which evolved from it, the United Nations War Crimes
Commission, in publications issued in 1947 and in 1949, stated without
equivocation that the killing ofprisoners ofwar without due cause violated both
customary and conventional international law.
Undeniably, then, there are compelling arguments to support the position
that reprisals against prisoners of war are prohibited by customary international
law. But even ifone is unwilling to accept these arguments, certainly customary
international law does specifically prohibit all acts of cruelty and violence against
prisoners ofwar, —who are, therefore, protected persons in so far as this type
of treatment is concerned. And with equal certainty it can be stated that in all
civilized countries killing is an act both ofcruelty and ofviolence. Hence, killing
a prisoner of war as a reprisal constitutes cruelty and violence against a person
who is protected from such treatment by customary international law. The
reprisals, then, also failed to meet the second requirement for a valid reprisal,
that they not be directed against a protected person.
The third requirement for a legal reprisal under international law is that it be
directed against the state which had first violated the law ofwar. The "crime"
charged by the NLF as the basis for the reprisal was, beyond dispute, an act of
the South Vietnamese authorities, and not of the American authorities. The
alleged acts of terrorism were committed within the territorial jurisdiction of
South Vietnam, the culprits were tried by South Vietnamese courts which
reached the decisions finding guilt and ordered the death sentence imposed, and
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the executions were carried out by the South Vietnamese authorities. If reprisals
were justified, and no ground for them has so far come to light, under the law
ofwar they should have been directed against the state which had by its alleged
illegal conduct created the need for and the right to take reprisals. This was
obviously not done—and the reason why it was not done is equally obvious.
To summarize: to be authorized by international law, reprisals, which are
otherwise illegal acts, must meet certain specific conditions. The undisputed
facts clearly disclose that the Vietcong had no legaljustification for taking reprisals
and, moreover, that the reprisals were taken against prisoners of war who were
protected persons under customary international law and against whom reprisals,
especially of a cruel or violent character, were specifically prohibited both by
international legislation binding upon the Vietcong and by customary
international law. Under these circumstances, the reprisals taken against the
American prisoners of war were nothing less than murder and constituted war
crimes for which, pursuant to the Nuremberg principles upon which the
Communists so heavily rely, those who ordered the executions and those who
carried them out are all subject to penal sanctions.
IX. Conclusion
A number of conclusions have been reached in the course of this discussion.
To recapitulate:
1. There is no legal justification for the position taken by the North
Vietnamese that they are not bound by the 1949 Geneva Prisoner-of-War
Convention. At the very least, they are bound by the provisions of Article 3
thereof.
2. While there is some legal basis for the position taken by the NLF that it
is not even bound by the provisions of Article 3 of the Convention, on balance
the decision probably should be that it is so bound. In any event, it is bound by
the customary law of war.
3. A state which is a party to hostilities is not legally responsible when an ally
violates the provisions of the Convention, but it is morally bound to attempt to
persuade its ally to conform to the obligations accepted by adhering to the
Convention. It does have a contingent responsibility for the proper treatment
of prisoners of war captured by its armed forces and turned over to the custody
of an ally for detention.
4. Torture or other maltreatment of prisoners of war in order to obtain
intelligence information from them, or for any other reason, or for no reason,
constitutes a serious violation of the Convention.
5. Parading prisoners ofwar before a hostile populace constitutes a violation
of the prohibition, contained in conventional and customary international law,
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against subjecting them to insults, public curiosity and humiliating and degrading
conduct.
6. Even under a reservation to Article 85 of the Convention, such as that
made by North Vietnam, it is a serious violation of the Convention to deny
captured enemy personnel prisoner-of-war status on the ground that they are
war criminals prior to their prosecution and conviction ofa pre-capture war crime
by a trial court in which they have been accorded all of the required judicial
safeguards.
7. There is no legal impediment to the trial ofa prisoner ofwar for an alleged
pre-capture war crime while hostilities are still being conducted. However, as
noted immediately above, such a prisoner ofwar continues to be entided to all
of the protection of the Convention, including the judicial safeguards therein
contained.
8. Reprisals against prisoners of war are prohibited by the Convention and,
probably, by customary international law. In any event, a reprisal which includes
a corporal act, such as killing, against a prisoner of war is prohibited by Article
3 ofthe Convention and by customary international law, both ofwhich prohibit
cruelty and acts of violence against prisoners of war.
And finally, although the application of the Convention is presumably not
dependent upon reciprocity, persistent and regular refusal by the Communist
nations to be bound by it during actual cases of armed conflict in which they
are involved may compel other countries to give second thoughts to the doctrine
which requires compliance without reciprocal compliance.
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735, 740 (1967). Of course, his argument svas based largely upon the ground that North Vietnamese Army
units had been committed to the fighting in South Vietnam; \s-hile those svho argue that it is a civil svar drasv
the opposite conclusion from this same fact! Secretary Rusk does strengthen his argument by pointing to the
post-World War II problem ofthe bifurcated States svhich appear in each instance to have become two separate
sovereignties: Germany, Korea, and Vietnam.
28. Moore, Underwood &c McDougal, The Las\-fulness of United States Assistance to the Republic of
Vietnam 32 (unpublished ms., Yale Lasv School, May 1966); Moore, The Lass-fulness of Military Assistance
to the Republic of Vietnam, 61 Am J. Ind L. 1, 2 (1967); Johnson, Aquinas, Grotius and the Vietnam War,
16 Quis Custodiet? 69, 67, 70 (1967); Kutner, "International" Due Process for Prisoners ofWar, 21 U. Miami
L. Rev. 721, 730 (1967). Many of those svho support the official position do not find it necessary to reach
the question of the nature of the conflict. Deutsch, The Legality of the United States Position in Vietnam, 52
A.B.A.J. 436 (1966). In Partan, Legal Aspects of the Vietnam Conflict, 46 BUT. Rev. 281, 299 (1966), the
author discusses the problem but reaches no conclusion. See also, the ICRC letter, notes 3 and 5 supra.
29. Fried (ed.), Vietnam and International Lasv 63 (1967); Falk, International Lasv and the United States
Role in the Viet Nam War, 75 Yale L.J. 1122, 1127 and passim (1966); Standard, United States Intervention
in Vietnam is not Legal, 52 A.B.A.J. 627, 630 (1966); Wright, Legal Aspects of the Viet-Nam Situation, 60
Am. J. Int'l L. 750, 756 (1966). Standard appears to argue from a conclusion already reached ss'hen, after
pointing out the State Department position, he says: "It is hardly open to dispute that the present conflict in
South Vietnam is essentially a cisil ss-ar." Certainly, Messrs. Rusk and Meeker (the latter the Legal Adviser of
the Department of State) svould dispute it! And Kutner, supra note 28, just as easily reaches the opposite
conclusion, stating: "Considering Communism's commitment to the success of all svars of 'national liberation'
and the participation of United States military on a large, escalating scale, it \s-ould be unrealistic to consider
the conflict as purely domestic. " The dispute on this question clearly indicates the correctness ofthe statements
that "the disiding line between international and internal s\rar is often exceedingly tenuous" (Greenspan,
International Law and its Protection for Participants in Unconventional Warfare, 341 Annals 30, 31 (1962))
and that "all international svar is, to some extent, cisil ss-ar, and all cisil svar, international ssrar." Pinto, supra
note 25, at 455 (translation mine).
30. See Stone, Legal Controls of International Conflict 313 n.85 (Rev. ed. 1959), svhere the follosving
appears: ". . . Art. 2, para. 1, of the resised Prisoners of War Cons-ention, 1949, declaring its prosisions
applicable not only to declared svar but also to 'any armed conflict . . . es-en if a state of svar is not recognized'
by a belligerent Contracting Party, is a welcome recognition of the need to place the point beyond doubt."
And in Pictet. Commentary on the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners ofWar 22-23
(1960) [hereinafter referred to as Commentary], it is stated: "By its general character, this paragraph deprives
belligerents, in advance, of the pretexts they might in theory put forward for evading their obligations. There
is no need for a formal declaration ofsvar, or for the recognition ofthe existence of a state ofsvar, as preliminaries
to the application of the Cons-ention. The occurrence of de facto hostilities is sufficient.
"... Any difference arising between tsvo States and leading to the intervention of members of the armed
forces is an armed conflict ssithin the meaning of Article 2, es-en if one of the Parties denies the existence of
a state of svar." And, finally, in Institute of Lasv, Academy of Sciences of the USSR, International Lasv 420
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(ca. 1960) [hereinafter referred to as Soviet International Law], this statement is made: "The absence of a formal
declaration ofwar does not deprive hostilities which have in fact begun, of the character ofwar from the point
of view of the need to observe its laws and customs. The Geneva Conventions of 1949 require that their
signatories apply these Conventions, which are a component part of the laws and customs of war, in the event
of a declaration of war or in any armed conflict, even if one of the parties to the conflict does not recognize
the existence of a state of war."
31. A news article from Cairo which appeared in the N.Y. Times, Feb. 12, 1966 at 12, col. 3, stated:
"The sources quoted the [North Vietnamese] Ambassador as having rejected the American contention that
United States airmen captured in attacks on North Vietnam should be treated as prisoners of war under the
terms of the Geneva conventions.
He was reported to have told influential Egyptians that this was impossible "because this is a case where
no war has been declared" by either country.
32. It will have been noted that the Convention provision quoted in the text states that the Convention
is applicable in an armed conflict between two or more High Contracting Parties even if a state of war is not
recognized by one of them. In Vietnam a state ofwar, in the legal sense, is not recognized by any of the parties
involved. 52 Dep't State Bull. 403 (1965). Does this remove the armed conflict in Vietnam from the reach of
Article 2? To answer this question in the affirmative would seem to be direcdy contrary to the intent of the
Article and to the object and purpose of the Convention. The ICRC states that it does not avoid Article 2.
Pictet, supra note 30, at 23. Lauterpacht believed that it was the intention of the draftsmen to make the
Convention applicable even if a state of war was not recognized by "one or both of them." 2 Lauterpacht's
Oppenheim, International Law 369 n.6 (7th ed. 1952).
33. One of the major purposes of the provision was to preclude a State from indulging in the excuses
put forward by Japan during the China Incident and by Nazi Germany during World War II as a basis for not
applying earlier humanitarian conventions: that there had been no declaration of war, that legally a state of
war did not exist, that the existence of a state of war was not recognized, that the armed conflict was only a
"police action," etc. See theJudgment of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East 1008-09 (mimeo.
1949) [hereinafter referred to as IMTFE Judgment], Latyshev; The 1949 Geneva Conventions Concerning
the Protection of Victims of War, 7 The Soviet State and Law 121 (1954) (original in Russian).
34. Article 3 states:
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one
of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the
following provisions:
(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who
have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any
other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded
on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria.
To this end the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever
with respect to the above-mentioned persons:
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment
and torture;
(b) taking of hostages;
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading treatment;
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment
pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized
as indispensable by civilized peoples.
(2) The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for.
An impartial humanitarian body, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, may
offer its services to the Parties to the conflict.
The Parties to the conflict should further endeavor to bring into force, by means of special
agreements, all or part of the other provisions of the present Convention.
The application of the preceding provisions shall not affect the legal status of the Parties to the
conflict.
35. Statement of Mr. Morosov (USSR), Final Record, supra note 13, Vol. IIB, at 325-26; Pictet,
Commentary, supra note 30, at 34.
36. Pictet, The XXth International Conference of the Red Cross: Results in the Legal Field, 7 J. Int'l
Comm'n Jurists 3, 15 (1966).
37. "[F]uture generations may consider it a sad commentary on our times that the nations of the world
thought it necessary in these conventions to provide that in case of an internal conflict, murder, mutilation,
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torture and other cruel treatment should not be practiced on prisoners and other noncombatants...." Yingling
& Ginnane, The Geneva Conventions of 1949 in 46 Am. J. Int'l L. 393, 396 (1952).
38. Greenspan, supra note 29, at 40; Note, The Geneva Conventions of 1949: Application in the
Vietnamese Conflict, 5 Va. J. Int'l L. 243, 249 (1965).
39. Pictet, supra note 36; de la Pradelle, Le Controle de L'Application des Conventions Humanitaires
en cas de Conflit Arme, 2 Annuaire Francais de Droit International 343, 364 (1956).
40. Pictet, Commentary, supra note 30, at 28-34.
41. Id. at 32. During the debate General Slavin (USSR) made the following statement: "[T]he United
Kingdom Delegation had alluded to the fact that colonial and civil wars were not regulated by international
law, and therefore that decisions in this respect would be out of place in the text of the Conventions. This
theory was not convincing, since though the jurists themselves were divided in opinion on this point, some
were of the view that civil war was regulated by international law. Since the creation of the Organization of
the United Nations this question seemed settled. Article 2 of the Charter provided that Member States must
ensure peace and world security. . . . Colonial and civil wars therefore come within the purview ofinternational
law." Final Record, supra note 13, Vol. IIB, at 14.
42. The Stockholm (working) draft would have made the entire Convention applicable. Id., Vol. I, at
73. The provisions of the draft article proposed by the USSR would have obligated each party to an armed
conflict not ofan international character to implement all ofthe provisions ofthe Convention which guarantee
"humane treatment of prisoners of war" and "the application of all established rules for the treatment of
prisoners of war." Id., Vol. Ill, Annex 15, at 28.
43. In construing the provision which was adopted, Pictet, Commentary, supra note 30, at 42, states:
"In the case of armed conflict not of an international character . . . the Parties to the conflict are legally only
bound to observe Article 3, and may ignore all the other Articles. . . ."
44. Id. at 37; Note, The Geneva Conventions of 1949: Application in the Vietnamese Conflict, 5 Va.
J. Int'l L. 243, 248 (1965).
45. Pinto, supra note 25, at 529. Pinto says: "When the parties to the civil war receive foreign assistance,
the assisting States have a strict obligation to comply with and to require compliance with Article 3. . . . Thus
the United States and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam are equally responsible for the application of
Article 3 in the civil war on the territory of South Vietnam." (Translation mine).
46. Of course, established governments have not infrequently failed to comply with their obligations
under Article 3—but this was not necessarily because they considered Article 3 invalid per se. See note 24
supra. As a matter of fact, when the French finally agreed to permit the ICRC to function in Algeria, it was
specifically stated that this action was taken "in accordance with Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions."
LeClercq, L'Application du Statut du Prisonnier de Guerre depuis la Convention de Geneve de 1949, in 43
Revue de Droit International et de Droit Compare 35, 45 (1966).
47. In Yingling & Ginnane, supra note 37, at 396, the authors, both lawyer-members of the United
States delegation to the 1949 Diplomatic Conventions, said: "Insofar as Article 3 purports to bind the insurgent
party to the conflict to apply its provisions, its legal efficacy may be doubted."
48. See text in connection with note 9 supra.
49. For a discussion of the several theories which have been advanced for holding a rebel organization
bound by the provisions of Article 3, even though it had never itself agreed to be bound, see Note, The
Geneva Convention and the Treatment ofPrisoners ofWar in Vietnam, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 851, 856-58 (1967).
See also Lauterpacht, The Limits of the Operation of the Law ofWar, 30 Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. 206, 213 (1953),
where that noted authority said: "The effect of these provisions [relating to armed conflict not of an
international character] is to subject the parties to a civil war—including the party which is not a recognised
belligerent—to important restraints of the law of war. . ."
50. The correct jargon, of course, would be "national liberation movements."
51. Soviet International Law, supra note 30, at 410; and see the further quotation from this textbook in
note 69 infra.
52. Pictet, Commentary, supra note 30, at 38 (emphasis in original). He also states: "What Government
would dare to claim before the world . . . that, Article 3 not being applicable, it was entitled to leave the
wounded uncared for, to torture and mutilate prisoners and take hostages? No Government can object to
observing, in its dealings with enemies, whatever the nature ofthe conflict between it and them, a few essential
rules which it in fact observes daily, under its own laws, when dealing with common criminals." Id. at 36-37.
Unfortunately, experience shows that some governments do just what is described, but without any such bald
admission
53. Several years ago the suggestion was made that in any armed conflict in which United Nations forces
were involved, they should not be bound by the law of war, but their opponent should be. The reaction to
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this proposal was violent and caustic, and properly so. See Bothe, Le Droit de la Guerre et les Nations Unies
(1967).
54. Pictet, Commentary, supra note 30, at 37-38. Of course, if they are mere brigands, they are not
entitled to the protection of the Convention.
55. It is essential to bear in mind that the last paragraph of Article 3 specifies that the fact that a party
complies with the provisions of the Article "shall not affect the legal status of the Parties to the conflict." This
provision was obviously included in order to permit the established government to comply with Article 3
without recognizing the existence of a state of belligerency with the insurgents. Paradoxically, in Algeria it
was the insurgents themselves who called attention to this provision of the Article. Algerian Office White
Paper, supra note 24, at 17-18.
56. See note 25 supra; Pictet, Commentary, supra note 30, at 35, Draper, The Geneva Conventions of
1949 at 114 Hague Recueil des Cours 59, 96 (1965).
57. See note 15 supra.
58. Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression: Opinion and Judgment 83 (1947).
59. Id. at 61-62. In speaking of Nazi violations of the law of war, the IMT said (at 57): "Prisoners of
war were ill-treated and tortured and murdered, not only in defiance of the well-established rules of
international law, but in complete disregard of the elementary dictates of humanity. ..."
60. United States v. von Leeb et al., 10 Trials ofWar Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals
1 (1948) [hereinafter cited as Trials]. This opinion carries over into Vol. 11 of the series.
61. 1929 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 47 Stat. 2021, T.S. No.
846, 118L.NT.S. 343.
62. United States v. von Leeb et al., 10 Trials 1 at 11 Trials 532-34 (1948).
63. Note, The Geneva Convention and the Treatment of Prisoners of War in Vietnam, 80 Harv. L.
Rev. 851, 858 (1967). A well known French expert in this field has said: "These obligations [enumerated in
Article 3] correspond to those which the domestic public law of civilized States recognizes, even in cases of
insurrection, riot or civil war. . . . The summary execution of prisoners is prohibited." Pinto, supra note 25,
at 532 (translation mine).
64. United States v. von Leeb et al., 10 Trials 1 at 11 Trials 535-38. But see Draper, supra note 56, at
90, where he states: "Undoubtedly, the prohibition of murder, mutilation or torture is absorbed in the
customary prohibitions of the law of war. On the other hand the taking of hostages, outrages upon personal
dignity, the passing of sentences by irregular tribunals, unfairly conducted, are not yet prohibited by the
customary law of war. . . ."
65. See note 34 supra.
66. See text in connection with notes 42 and 43 supra.
67. Pictet, Commentary, supra note 30, at 39 and 141; Smith, The Geneva Prisoner ofWar Convention:
An Appraisal, 42 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 880, 889 (1967); Pinto, supra note 63.
68. See text in connection with notes 156-163 infra.
69. Soviet International Law, supra note 30, at 423. Elsewhere (at 407) the statement is made that "the
laws and customs of war must be observed in any armed conflict."
70. It is not unusual to find, after hostilities have ended, that many incidents (or at least many of the
more gory details thereof) which have been reported during the course of hostilities, were basically figments
of the imagination: perhaps a minor incident which has been built up out of all proportion to the actual facts
by the addition of horrendous details, perhaps an entirely imaginary incident conceived by a public relations
officer or a reporter when headline news was lacking. However, the major violations to be discussed herein
are in the nature of admissions against interest: actions constituting, or allegedly constituting, violations by the
United States and the South Vietnamese, reported by the American news media, and actions constituting, or
allegedly constituting, violations by the North Vietnamese and the Vietcong, reported by Radio Hanoi and
the Liberation Radio, or by other sources in Hanoi. (As the alleged violation mentioned in note 9 supra does
not meet this criterion, it will not be discussed. It is, however, one of the most heinous violations not only of
the Convention, but also of the customary law of war).
71. See text in connection with note 6 supra.
72. Joint Communique of the Honolulu Conference, Feb. 8, 1966, at 54 Dep't State Bull. 304, 305
(1966), Joint Communique of the Manila Summit Conference, Oct. 25, 1966, at 55 Dep't State Bull. 730,
731 (1966), Text of Communique of the Washington Meeting, April 21, 1967, at 56 Dep't State Bull. 747,
749 (1967). The nations involved in the latter two meetings were Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines,
South Korea, South Vietnam, Thailand, and the United States.
73. That incidents of maltreatment of prisoners of war by American personnel have occurred is beyond
dispute. There will never be a war fought in which there are not, at the very least, isolated instances of
maltreatment ofprisoners ofwar on both sides. The general moral environment in which the individual soldiers
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have been raised may be judged, and the training which they have received while in military service may be
measured, by the frequency with which such incidents occur. While Clergy and Laymen Concerned About
Vietnam in their book, In the Name ofAmerica (issued in February, 1 968 after this article had been substantially
completed), allocates a chapter of 45 pages to the reprinting of published items about the maltreatment of
prisoners of war, there is only an occasional, and frequently misleading, indication (usually based on hearsay)
ofsuch misconduct by American troops. The weakness ofthe "evidence" quoted to support the organization's
thesis of misconduct is, in itself, extremely persuasive of the inaccuracy of the conclusion reached by one of
the commentators (at 23) that "these combat practices are so widespread in their occurrence as to suggest that
their systematic commission is a direct result of decisions reached at the highest levels of civilian and military
command." When Ambassador Harriman sent the ICRC a Department of Defense report on the methods
used by the several military services of the United States to disseminate information concerning the
requirements of the Conventions, the ICRC President replied: "We are convinced that in the context of the
war in Vietnam the U.S. Forces are devoting a major effort to the spread of knowledge on the Geneva
Conventions." Letter from Samuel A. Gonard to W. Averell Harriman, January 5, 1968, on file in the
Department of State.
74. A series of photographs and extracts from news stories recording maltreatment of prisoners of war
by the South Vietnamese which had appeared in a number ofrespected American publications were collected
and published in a brochure entitled What are we tied to in Vietnam? by Massachusetts Political Action for
Peace, Cambridge, Mass. (1964).
75. St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Oct. 22, 1965, at 3B; id. Nov. 3, 1965, at 2A; id. April 27, 1966, at 2A; id.
Feb. 9, 1968, at IB.
76. Id. Dec. 30, 1965, at 1A. Photographs indicating kind and generous treatment by American personnel
have also appeared (id. Mar. 5, 1966, at 2A, Mar. 6, 1966 at 12A), but these are suspect as they are self-serving
and could easily have been posed for an enterprising photographer.
77. The brochure referred to in note 74 supra is a good example of this reaction.
78. A letter to the editor of the N.Y. Times from the Chairman of the University Committee on
Problems of War and Peace at the University of Pennsylvania said: "Responsible American journalists have
frequently reported the torture of Vietcong prisoners by their South Vietnamese captors. Because of these
reports W. W. Rostow, chairman of the foreign policy research division of our State Department, was asked
. . . 'why does the United States not abide by the Red Cross Convention in the treatment of Vietcong
prisoners?' His reply was that the United States does not take prisoners in Vietnam, and that we were merely
advisers to the South Vietnamese Government, which bore the responsibility for dealing with prisoners.
Because of this immoral apathy, and narrow legalistic position taken by our State Department, neither the
United States nor the South Vietnamese, nor the Vietcong, nor the North Vietnamese are committed to
adhere to any of the 'sanctions established by international law for the protection of war prisoners.'" N.Y.
Times, June 30, 1965, at 36, col. 5. The writer of the letter erred in both his assumptions and his conclusions,
but he certainly raised the moral issue.
79. This problem did arise in one context at the Diplomatic Conference—in connection with Article
12, which concerns custody of prisoners of war transferred from one ally to another. Under Article 12 the
transferring state retains some residual power with respect to prisoners ofwar it transfers, because it can request
return of the prisoners to its custody where the transferee state is guilty of violating the Convention in their
regard. Article 12 requires that this procedure be followed where the Protecting Power finds violations of the
Convention and the Detaining Power does not correct them. The Communist countries have all reserved as
to this Article, insisting that the capturing power remain fully responsible for any maltreatment suffered by
prisoners ofwar at the hands of the transferee Detaining Power. See, for example, the USSR reservation made
at the time of signing (75 U.N.T.S. 135, 460) and maintained at the time of ratification (191 U N.T S. 367).
80. "The major United States effort, besides setting up its own procedures, has been to persuade the
South Vietnamese to go along. [South Vietnamese] Government officials, once openly hostile to the
convention, now grudgingly accept the American position. Much remains to be done, however, to persuade
the average South Vietnamese soldier to stop using torture. Each soldier will soon be shown a training film
prepared with American help. Most have already received booklets outlining the proper treatment of
prisoners." N.Y. Times, July 1, 1966, at 6, col. 3. See also Pinto supra note 45.
81. "United States ofmcials are quietly putting into effect an important change in their handling of
prisoners of war. Vietcong and North Vietnamese fighters captured on the battlefield will no longer be turned
over to the South Vietnamese Army immediately after the fighting has died down. Instead, they will be sent
to American divisional headquarters and kept in American hand [sic] until they can be transferred to new
Vietnamese prisoner-of-war compounds. . . . The system has been adopted to enable the United States to
meet its responsibilities under Article 12 of the Geneva Convention of 1949 governing the treatment of
prisoners of war. The article requires the country turning prisoners over to another country to guarantee their
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well-being." N.Y. Times, July 1, 1966, at 6, col. 3. The current official directive establishing this procedure
is United States Military Assistance Command, Directive No. 190-3, April 6, 1967.
82. 55 Dep't State BuU. 336, 338 (1966).
83. As stated in note 73 supra, there have without doubt been some acts of maltreatment of prisoners of
war by American personnel. Thus, it was reported that in the trial by court-martial of Captain Howard B.
Levy there was defense testimony that American Special Forces ("Green Beret") personnel maintained a
"permissive policy toward the torture of Vietcong prisoners by the South Vietnamese" and that a bounty of
$10 was paid to the Montagnards for every right ear brought in. N.Y. Times, May 25, 1967, at 2, col. 3. In
view of the hearsay nature of the testimony, and the partisan context in which it was given, it does not fall
within the criterion adopted for this article. For another incident of alleged maltreatment see St. Louis
Post-Dispatch, Feb. 9, 1968, at IB, col. 1.
84. See note 79 supra. The United States has officially acknowledged its contingent responsibility. Dep't
State Vietnam Information Note, No. 9, Prisoners of War, Aug. 1967, at 3. It maintains small detachments
of American military police at each South Vietnamese prisoner-of-war camp, apparently to ensure that its
responsibility is being met.
85. See text in connection with note 74-76 supra. When the ICRC considered that there was sufficient
evidence to warrant raising the issue with the South Vietnamese authorities, the latter responded by conveying
to the ICRC "a file on atrocities attributed to NLF forces. It also invited the Committee to investigate the
plight of Vietnam prisoners held by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam." ICRC, The International
Committee and the Vietnam Conflict, 6 Int'l Rev. of the Red Cross 399, 405 (1966) [hereinafter referred to
as ICRC, Vietnam]. It does not appear that there was a denial of maltreatment by the South Vietnamese;
rather there was a defense of tu quoque aimed at the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese. Whatever the merit
of the cross-complaint, it is no excuse for violating the Convention.
86. Id. at 404-05; 7 id. 188. For the categories of persons being given prisoner-of-war status, see para.
4, United States Military Assistance Command, Directive No. 20-5, Sept. 21, 1966.
87. E.g., 7 Int'l Rev. of the Red Cross 189 (1966).
88. 6 id. 141 (1966); 7 id. 188 (1967). See also note 80 supra.
89. 5 id. 300, 470, and 481 (1965); 6 id. 98, 405, 542, and 597 (1966); 7 id. 125 126, 188, 189, and 246
(1967). For a report of an unofficial and unauthorized visit by an American newsman to Pleiku, one of the
largest prisoner-of-war camps maintained by the South Vietnamese, see Gershen, A Close-Up Look at Enemy
Prisoners, Parade, Dec. 10, 1967, at 10. These ICRC inspection visits to the camps which have uniformly
included private and unsupervised consultations with selected prisoners of war designated by the ICRC
delegate, do not appear to have brought to light any instances of major violations of the Convention once
that captured personnel had reached the camps.
90. Wyant, Barbarity in Vietnam Shocks U.S., St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Feb. 9, 1968, at IB, col. 1. The
televised shooting of a just-captured Vietnamese by the head of the South Vietnamese National Police during
the attack on Saigon early in 1968 served to highlight this problem.
91. The sources of this information have included broadcasts over Radio Hanoi, information released
by the official North Vietnamese press agency, and an occasional dispatch from foreign reporters based in
Hanoi. Information in depth, the complete accuracy ofwhich is questionable, has been disseminated through
the medium of newsmen from other Communist countries. East German journalists and photographers were
the source of the material used in the article, U.S. Prisoners of War in North Vietnam, Life, Oct. 20, 1967,
at 21-33. These East German sources likewise provided the motion picture material purchased and televised
by NBC late in 1967. Information concerning the treatment of South Vietnamese prisoners of war by the
North Vietnamese is of insufficient reliability for discussion.
92. See text in connection with notes 109-1 15 infra.
93. N.Y. Times, July 8, 1966, at 3, col. 1.
94. Id. July 13, 1966, at 1, col. 7, and 5, col. 1.
95. Id. July 8, 1966, at 3.
96. Id. at 3, col. 1.
97. ICRC, Vietnam, supra note 85, at 404. Art. 13 ofthe Convention requires the protection ofprisoners
of war "against insults and public curiosity." Para. 1 (c) of Art. 3, quoted at note 34 supra, prohibits "outrages
against personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading treatment."
98. For the first of these communications, see text in connection with note 8 supra. The new reply also
stated that "the policy of the Government of the DRVN [Democratic Republic of Vietnam] as regards enemy
captured in time ofwar is a humane policy. " (Emphasis added). The ambiguous italicized words could be interpreted
as meaning "we have a policy of being humane to prisoners of war captured during a war, but this is not a
war and, therefore, there is no obligation on our part to be humane"!
99. N.Y. Times, May 9, 1967, at 15, col. 1.
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100. 56 Dep't State Bull. 825 (1967).
101. Instructions for the Government of the Armies of the United States in the Field, General Orders
No. 100, Apr. 23, 1863, Art. 75.
102. See note 61 supra.
103. 2Bull.JAG299(1943).
104. Trial of Lt. Gen. Kurt Maelzer, 11 Law Reports of Trials ofWar Criminals 53 (1946) [hereinafter
cited War Crimes Rep.].
105. IMTFE Judgment, supra note 33, at 1092-95 and 1030-31.
106. See text in connection with note 64 supra.
107. As we have seen, in so far as North Vietnam is concerned there are strong arguments for the position
that the entire Convention is applicable and, that at a minimum, Article 3 of the Convention (note 34 supra)
is certainly applicable despite the untenable position to the contrary taken by North Vietnam. It is therefore,
not even necessary to find that this particular humanitarian rule has attained the status of being a part of the
customary law of war in order to find that it is binding on North Vietnam.
108. It has been mentioned that in the parade conducted on July 6, 1966, the prisoners were handcuffed
in pairs. During the World War II commando raid on Dieppe the manacling of German prisoners of war by
Canadian troops was itself challenged by the German Government as a violation of the law ofwar and resulted
in a series of reprisals and counter-reprisals. For differing versions of this affair see British War Office, The
Law ofWar on Land (Part III of the Manual of Military Law) 53 n.2(a) (1958); Castren, The Present Law of
War and Neutrality 159 (1954); and ICRC Report, supra note 17, at 368-70.
109. See text in connection with note 8 supra.
110. N.Y. Times, Sept. 30, 1965, at 1, col. 6 and at 3, col. 3; id. Feb. 12, 1966, at 12, col. 3; id. July 13,
1966, at 1, col. 7 and at 5, col. 1. An ICRC report stated: "The [North Vietnamese] Red Cross and the
authorities of the DRVN have made known to the ICRC that the captured American pilots are treated
humanely, but that they cannot, however, be considered as prisoners of war. The DRVN Government is in
fact of the opinion that the bombing attacks constitute crimes for which these prisoners will have to answer
before the courts and that the Third Geneva Convention (prisoners of war) is consequently not applicable to
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I
n a book published in 1954 the author said: "By 1907 the proportion of the
laws ofwar embodied in general convention(s) far exceeded, and still exceeds
to this day, that ofthe law ofpeace." What he failed to mention was that, apart
from the 1925 Geneva Protocol concerning gas and bacteriological warfare,
the conventional law ofwar relating to the conduct of hostilities dated (and still
dates) from 1907; and that there was not (and is not) a single piece of
international legislation dealing specifically with what might well be considered
a fairly important aspect of modern warfare—war in and from the air!
Shordy after the end ofWorld War I an anonymous article appeared in the
prestigious British Yearbook ofInternational Law the thesis ofwhich was that, the
League of Nations having been established, it would be a "disastrous mistake"
for the governments ofmember nations to use this new machinery to codify (or
expand?) the law ofwar; and that the past failure of international law to provide
viable solutions to the problems of peace was, at least in part, due to the
preoccupation ofwriters and statesmen with the law ofwar and their consequent
neglect ofthe law ofpeace. Two arguments were advanced: first, that inasmuch
as war had been abolished, there was no longer anything for the law of war to
regulate; and second, that in any event there was no point in wasting time and
energy on rules of war because such rules would only be broken. These
arguments did not go unchallenged; but that they prevailed with the majority
of statesmen and international lawyers of the day is evident from the fact that
the Third Hague Peace Conference, which had not been convened because of
the advent of World War I, was never called into session and, despite the
tremendous technological advances demonstrated during that war, the
Regulations attached to the Fourth Hague Convention of 1907 continued to
be the latest expression of States with respect to the conduct of hostilities.
Thus it was these Regulations, drafted in 1907, prior to the advent of such
weapons as the tank and the airplane, weapons which had completely
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revolutionized warfare, which constituted the basic rules governing hostilities
during World War II.
It could easily be assumed that the events ofWorld War II would have caused
a less antagonistic attitude towards efforts to modernize the law of war.
However, such was not the case. In a statement which could have been written
by our anonymous post-World War I author and his adherents, the International
Law Commission made the following decision at its 1949 organizational
meeting:
"18. The Commission considered whether the laws ofwar should be selected as
a topic for codification. It was suggested that, war having been outlawed, the regulation
of its conduct had ceased to be relevant. On the other hand, the opinion was expressed
that, although the term 'laws of war' ought to be discarded, a study of the rules
governing the use of armed force—legitimate or illegitimate—might be useful. .
. . The majority of the Commission declared itself opposed to the study of the
problem at the present stage. It was considered that if the Commission, at the very
beginning of its work, were to undertake this study, public opinion might interpret its action
as showing lack of confidence in the efficiency of the means at the disposal of the United
Nations for maintaining peace. " (Emphasis added.)
As a result of that decision, and despite strong arguments in support of the need
to modernize the law of war advanced by many of the leading international
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lawyers, the Commission has, more than twenty years later, never of its own
volition considered any aspect of the law of war. At the present time, then, we
are compelled to apply to wars being fought in the eighth decade of the 20th
century rules governing the conduct of hostilities which were drafted in the first
decade of that century. Just imagine the chaos if we were using the traffic
regulations of that earlier horse-and-buggy decade to regulate today's traffic!
Imagine Broadway and Forty-second Street with no traffic lights, no traffic
policemen, no stop signs, and a five-mile per hour speed limit! But such are the
rules under which the world community of nations, by its ostrich-like attitude,
has permitted and continues to permit wars to be fought.
Like the anonymous writer after World War I and like the International Law
Commission after World War II, the United Nations itself has long been
extremely reluctant to exert any effort toward modernizing the law of war for
fear that public opinion might interpret such action as lack ofconfidence in that
organization's ability to maintain the peace. But more recently there is
evidence that the General Assembly is becoming increasingly realistic in its
approach to this problem and that humanitarian considerations are, at long last,
having an effect. The International Conference on Human Rights, meeting in
Teheran in May 1968, adopted a resolution which requested the General
Assembly to invite the Secretary-General to study
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"the need for additional humanitarian international conventions or for possible
revision of existing Conventions to ensure the better protection of civilians,
prisoners and combatants in all armed conflicts and the prohibition and limitation
of the use of certain methods and means of warfare."
This Resolution, in turn, resulted in the adoption by the General Assembly of
Resolution 2444 (XXIII); the preparation ofthe study RespectforHuman Rights
19
in Armed Conflict by the Secretary-General; and the adoption by the General
Assembly on December 16, 1969, of Resolution 2597 (XXIV), the pertinent
operative portions of which read as follows:
1. Requests the Secretary-General to continue the study initiated by resolution
2444 (XXIII), giving special attention to the need for protection of the rights
ofcivilians and combatants in conflicts which arise from the struggles ofpeoples
under colonial and foreign rule for liberation and self-determination and to
the better application of existing humanitarian international conventions and
rules to such conflicts;
2. Requests the Secretary-General to consult and cooperate closely with the
International Committee of the Red Cross in regard to the studies being
undertaken by that body on this question;
5
.
Decides to give the highest priority to this question at the twenty-fifth session
of the General Assembly;
6. Invites the Secretary-General to present a further report on this subject to the
20
General Assembly at its twenty-fifth session.
As it will have been noted from the foregoing, there is another powerful force
at work in this area—the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).
Even during the arid period in the codification of the so-called "Hague" law of
22
war after World War I, the ICRC was successful in obtaining the convening
ofa diplomatic conference in Geneva in 1929 which not only redrafted the 1906
23
Geneva Convention, but also drafted the first convention dealing exclusively
24 i
with the subject of prisoners of war. And in 1949, just shortly after the
International Law Commission had reached its decision not to include the law
of war on its agenda, another diplomatic conference was convened at Geneva
at the instance of the ICRC and, based on many years of preparatory work by
2S
the ICRC, it drafted and adopted four humanitarian conventions, including
the first ever to deal exclusively with the protection of civilians. Moreover,
when Resolution 2444 (XXIII) was adopted by the General Assembly, its basis
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was a resolution which had been adopted at the XXth International Conference
ofthe Red Cross at Vienna in 1 965; and at the XXIst International Conference
of the Red Cross, held in Istanbul in September 1969, a number of relevant
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resolutions were adopted. Assuredly, with the General Assembly and the
ICRC acting together in a concerted effort to reach the identical goal, the
prospect for the revision and modernization of the law of war may now be
viewed with some minimum degree of optimism. Of course, there is a long
international road to travel from proposals, to draft convention, to diplomatic
conference, to signed convention, to ratification by a sufficiently large number
of States, including the great powers, to make any such revision and
29
modernization meaningful; but the very willingness of the General Assembly
to acknowledge that the problem exists is "a giant step forward for all mankind."
It is perhaps appropriate to mention at this point a suggestion which has been
offered in order to make work in this area more palatable to those who have
heretofore opposed it. This suggestion is that the term "armed conflict" be used
as a substitute for the word "war" in the context of rules governing hostilities.
It will be recalled that in the 1949 decision ofthe International Law Commission
not to enter this field, those who opposed that decision suggested that the term
30
"laws ofwar" be discarded. The same suggestion is to be found in the ICRC's
proposals and practice and is stated to be based upon the need "to take account
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of the deep aspiration of the peoples to see peace installed."' And the Report,
A/7720, makes the same suggestion, but apparently for the perhaps more logical
reason that "armed conflict" is a considerably more all-inclusive term, and
32
therefore less subject to dispute, than is "war." Whatever the motivation, such
a change appears to be essentially one of semantics, and there does not appear
to be any substantive objection to it. Moreover, if it will reduce opposition to
the project for the revision and modernization ofthe applicable law, it will have
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served a useful and beneficial purpose. Accordingly, the balance of this paper
will use the terms "armed conflict," "rules ofarmed conflict," and "law ofarmed
conflict," and, except where speaking historically, will pointedly refrain from
the use of such antiquated terms as "war," "rules of war," and "law of war"!
Assuming then that the time is approaching when affirmative steps will be
taken to revise and modernize the law ofarmed conflict, the question is presented
as to the specific areas in which such revision and modernization is needed. Any
attempt to answer that question completely would probably necessitate a listing
which would cover many pages and explanatory matter which would fill many
tomes. This paper, as its title indicates, will be limited to several matters
considered to be the major inadequacies relating to the protection ofindividuals
during armed conflict which presently exist and require correction. They are:
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1. The non-existence of and the need for a method for the automatic
determination that a particular inter-State relationship requires the application
of the law of armed conflict;
2. The non-existence of and the need for a method which will ensure the
presence in the territory of each party to an armed conflict of a Protecting
Power or an international body with adequate authority to police compliance
with the law of armed conflict;
3. The non-existence ofand the need for a complete and total prohibition ofthe
use in armed conflict ofany and all categories ofchemical and biological agents;
and
4. The non-existence of and the need for a complete code governing the use of
air power in armed conflict with emphasis on the outright prohibition of any
type ofbombing which has as its basic target the civilian population.
In the discussion of each of these inadequacies in the present law governing
armed conflict, an effort will be made to show the nature of the particular
inadequacy and why it exists and to suggest possible remedies, with the caveat
that the suggested remedies are not intended to exclude other, possibly more
practical and practicable, solutions. In view ofthe very nature ofthe inadequacies
discussed, there would appear to be little need to advance arguments as to why
each is deemed of sufficient import to be considered a major inadequacy
requiring a remedy.
1. The non-existence of and the need for a method for the automatic determination
that a particular inter-State relationship requires the application ofthe law ofarmed conflict.
One of the major inadequacies of the present law of armed conflict is that
there is in existence no method for the automatic issuance of an authoritative
and effective determination that the relationship between two or more States
has reached a point where that law should be applied.
Under Article 1 of the Third Hague Convention of 1907 hostilities were
instituted by a "reasoned declaration ofwar or ... an ultimatum with conditional
declaration ofwar"; and under Article 2 of that Convention the belligerents had
35
the duty to notify neutrals of the existence of a state of war. Of course, were
these provisions uniformly complied with by States, the problem under
discussion would not exist. Unfortunately, more often than not they have been
honored in the breach. In 1914, just seven years after they had become a part
of international legislation, Germany attacked Belgium without a declaration of
war and started a policy which has been followed all too frequendy since then.
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Moreover, a number of nations have denied the applicability of the law of war
by the use of subterfuge or perversion of the facts. Thus, the Sino-Japanese
conflict of the late 1930s was designated by Japan as a "police action" which, it
was claimed, did not bring the law of war into effect; and in numerous other
cases the applicability of the provisions of the 1907 Hague and of the 1929
Geneva Conventions was rejected on the mere basis of a denial of the existence
of a state of war—despite clear and undeniable evidence to the contrary.
Concerning this situation the ICRC later said:
"... Since 1907 experience has shown that many armed conflicts, displaying all
the characteristics of a war, may arise without being preceded by any of the
formalities laid down in the Hague Convention. Furthermore, there have been
many cases where Parties to a conflict have contested the legitimacy ofthe enemy
Government and therefore refused to recognize the existence of a state ofwar. In
the same way, the temporary disappearance of sovereign States as a result of
annexation or capitulation has been put forward as a pretext for not observing one
or other of the humanitarian Conventions. It was necessary to find a remedy to
this state of affairs ..."
As the problem had thus long been recognized, in preparing the so-called
Stockholm draft conventions (the working papers for the 1949 Diplomatic
Conference which drafted the four 1949 Geneva Conventions) the ICRC
attempted to solve it by proposing the employment of a phrase making each
Convention applicable "to all cases of declared war or any other armed conflict
which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if
the state of war is not recognized by one of them." This proposal was adopted
by the Diplomatic Conference without change and without debate.
A great feeling of accomplishment was engendered by the acceptance of this
supposedly all-inclusive phrase by the Diplomatic Conference. The same ICRC
study quoted above said of it:
"By its general character, this paragraph deprives belligerents, in advance, of the
pretexts they might in theory put forward for evading their obligations. There is
no need for a formal declaration of war, or for the recognition of a state of war,
as preliminaries to the application of the Convention . . . The occurrence of de
facto hostilities is sufficient . . . Any difference arising between two States and
leading to the intervention of members of the armed forces is an armed conflict
within the meaning of Article 2, even if one of the Parties denies the existence of
. . f "39a state ot war. . . .
Unfortunately, it has not uniformly worked out this way in practice. Thus,
for example, in Vietnam, where thousands of planes have been shot down, tens
of thousands of human beings have been killed, and millions of rounds of
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ammunition have been expended, the position has been taken by North Vietnam
that the humanitarian conventions governing armed conflict, to which she long
ago acceded, do not apply.
Thus, after World War II it was considered necessary to evolve a method
which would make it impossible for States to engage in armed conflict and
attempt to justify non-compliance with the then law of war by denying the
existence of a state ofwar through some subterfuge such as labelling it a "police
action," alleging the lack of a declaration of war, etc. Now, once again, it is
necessary to seek a method which will make it impossible for States to engage
in armed conflict and attempt to justify non-compliance with the present (or
future) law of armed conflict by advancing the same or new subterfuges, such
as labelling the armed conflict as "legitimate self-defense," or as "assistance to
an ally in an internal conflict," or as "assistance to peoples engaged in a national
liberation movement aimed at throwing off the yoke of imperialism," etc.
And contriving new phrases of limitation will probably be no more successful
in solving the problem than they have in the past as they would merely serve as
a basis for future evasions of a different type.
It is suggested that a true and effective solution could be attained by assigning
the power to make a determination as to the existence ofa state ofarmed conflict
to a pre-selected international body; by making the decision reached by that
body as to the existence ofa state ofarmed conflict binding on the States direcdy
involved, as well as on all other Parties to the Convention; and by providing for
the automatic imposition of total sanctions whenever this body determines that
its decision is not being respected by a State party to the armed conflict in that
such State has, despite such decision, continued to deny the applicability of the
law of armed conflict, or any part of it, or is, in fact, violating such law.
At the 1949 Diplomatic Conference two proposals were made which can be
related to this problem. The Greek representative suggested that the existence
ofa state ofbelligerency should be decided by the Security Council ofthe United
Nations. He later amplified this proposal by explaining that he had meant that
such recognition of belligerency should be given by a majority of the countries
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represented on the Security Council. A French proposal, which was actually
concerned with the problem of a substitute for the Protecting Power, would
have established on a permanent basis, immediately upon the Conventions
becoming effective, a "High International Committee for the Protection of
Humanity," consisting of thirty members elected by the Parties to the
Convention from nominations made by the Parties, by the Hague "International
[Permanent] Court of Arbitration," and by the "International Red Cross
Standing Committee." Nominations were to be made from
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"amongst persons of high standing, without distinction of nationality, known for
their moral authority, their spiritual and intellectual independence and the services
they have rendered to humanity
—
"
"In particular, they may be selected from amongst persons distinguished in the




While this proposal was not incorporated into the Conventions, it was the
subject of a resolution adopted by the Diplomatic Conference which
recommended that consideration be given as soon as possible to the advisability
of setting up an international body to perform the functions of a Protecting
Power in the absence of such a Power.
These two proposals are mentioned here because they suggest alternative
methods of attempting to solve our problem: one by the use of an established
political body; the other by the use of a new body created specifically for the
purpose and which is made as neutral and apolitical as it is possible to do in these
days of hypernationalism.
The suggested use of the Security Council (or, indeed, of any political body)
is not considered to be a feasible solution. That body is composed of the
representatives of States, voting on the basis of decisions reached in Foreign
Offices, decisions which are made on the basis of self-interest and political
expediency, and which are not necessarily consonant with the facts. It is
inconceivable, for example, that the Security Council would ever reach a
decision, over the opposition of North Vietnam (and, more important, of the
Soviet Union), that the situation in Vietnam demands the application of the
humanitarian conventions which govern the law of armed conflict.
On the other hand, a specially constituted body of perhaps twenty-five
individuals, each of whom is of sufficient personal international stature to be
above politics and would act as an individual and as his or her moral and ethical
principles dictated, detached and unaffected by instructions, could well
constitute an acceptable and effective international body. The provisions for the
selection of the members of this body (the "International Commission for the
Enforcement of Humanitarian Rights during Armed Conflict"—ICEHFJ\.C)
would be sufficiendy restrictive to ensure the choice of the type of individual
described, without regard to nationality, race, religion, color, or geographical
distribution. The ICEHP<AC would be selected as soon as the constitutive
convention had become effective and would be a permanent body, perhaps
self-perpetuating. Any Party to the convention, whether or not itselfinvolved,
could, at any time, request a determination by ICEHFLAC as to whether the
relationship between two or more States was such as to call into effect the
application of the law of armed conflict; the States involved would be invited
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to present any facts or arguments they desired but would not otherwise
participate in the decision-making process; an affirmative decision would
immediately be binding not only upon the States involved, but on all of the
other Parties to the Convention; and a subsequent finding by ICEHRAC that
its decision was not being complied with would automatically, and without
further action of any kind, require the application of complete economic and
communications sanctions against the violating State by all of the other Parties
49
to the Convention.
To many this proposal will undoubtedly appear Utopian, idealistic, and
impractical. However, upon reflection this reaction may appear somewhat less
valid. There are today more than one hundred States which are not presendy
involved in the type of armed conflict under discussion. Each and every one of
them considers that should it become involved in such activities in the future,
it would be on the side of the angels—so the provisions ofany such convention
would naturally apply in its favor and against the opponent. Moreover, to what
will it have agreed? Merely that a neutral, internationally-created body, which
it helped create, may determine that a situation in which that State unexpectedly
finds itself calls for the application of the humanitarian law of armed conflict.
What would that mean to it? Only that it could not kill, or otherwise maltreat,
protected persons such as the sick and wounded, prisoners of war, and civilian
noncombatants, and that it could not have recourse to certain prohibited
methods of conducting hostilities. Can any State advance the argument that it
refuses to ratify such a convention because it does not wish its sovereign power
of action limited in these respects, it wishes to retain the unfettered ability to
kill and maltreat these people at will and that it wishes, for example, to retain
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the possibility of using weapons which have been banned? Moreover, once
such a convention is drafted and presented for signature and ratification, the
moral and humanitarian pressure to bring about ratifications would be
tremendous and there would be an excellent possibility of its general
acceptance. While certain States which have adopted obsolete attitudes
magnifying national sovereignty might well oppose such a proposal from
beginning to end, it is predictable that they would participate, albeit reluctantly,
in the diplomatic conference which was convened to draft such a convention
and would eventually, rather than risk international opprobrium, become Parties
to it.
This, then, is the suggested remedy to the problem of establishing a method
for the automatic determination that an existing situation necessitates the
application of the law of armed conflict. While it would, it is true, entail a
somewhat broader delegation of authority than States have heretofore been
willing to make, it is believed that the time is past when States may argue
"national sovereignty" as an excuse for refusing to participate in the creation of
1 38 Levie on the Law of War
an international institution the sole function ofwhich will be to limit the illegal
and nonhumanitarian conduct of hostilities in armed conflict.
2. The non-existence ofand the needfor a method which will ensure the presence in
the territory ofeach State party to an armed conflict ofa Protecting Power or an international
body with adequate authority to police compliance with that law.
Another major inadequacy in the old law of war and in the present law of
armed conflict is that there has never been an "umpire" with sufficient authority
to oversee the application ofthe law, to investigate alleged or possible violations,
to determine the facts with respect thereto, and to take the necessary action to
ensure the correction of the default.
For many centuries there has existed in customary international law an
institution known as the Protecting Power. By the time ofthe Spanish-American
War (1898), the traditional functions of that Protecting Power had come to
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include some aspects ofthe protection ofprisoners ofwar. During World War
I a number of formal agreements were entered into confirming the existence of
the Protecting Power and its activities with respect to prisoners of war, which
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had until then rested entirely on custom, and specifying a number offunctions.
Subsequendy, in Article 86 ofthe 1929 Geneva Prisoner-of-War Convention
this institution received formal recognition in a general multilateral treaty
concerned with ensuring humanitarian treatment for one class ofvictims ofwar.
The four 1949 Geneva Conventions reaffirm the Protecting Power as an
international humanitarian institution. There is now, therefore, binding
international legislation establishing the Protecting Power as an international
institution during time of armed conflict and specifying a number of its duties
and powers with respect to the protection of wounded and sick, prisoners of
war, and civilian noncombatants. Unfortunately, the provision concerning the
original designation of Protecting Powers by belligerents is less than clear,
apparently relying on customary international law in this respect, although a
great deal oftime, effort, and controversy were expended at the 1949 Diplomatic
Conference with respect to the designation of replacements and substitutes for
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an original Protecting Power. In any event, although there have probably been
close to one hundred armed conflicts of various sorts and sizes since the end of
World War II, the institution of the Protecting Power has not once during that
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period been called into being. While the Report advances a number ofpossible
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reasons for this failure, ' it is believed that many of them are completely
irrelevant and that, for the most part, the failure to secure the designation of
such a Power has resulted from the fact that the States involved did not wish to
have on their territory a neutral presence concerned with the problem of the
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extent to which there was compliance with the provisions of the specifically
humanitarian conventions governing the law of armed conflict.
The failure of the Protecting Power as an institution and the need for some
effective system of supervision appears to be very7 generally admitted. Thus in
answer to the Secretary General's inquiry concerning the preparation of his
Report, India stated that it believed that the solution to the problem "would
perhaps be found more through the complete implementation of the existing
conventions than through the search for new legal instruments." And the
response of the United States acknowledged "a strongly held conviction that
steps are urgendy needed to secure better application of existing humanitarian
international conventions to armed conflicts." Similarly, the Report states that
"there would be pressing need for measures to improve and strengthen the present
system of international supervision and assistance to parties to armed conflicts in
their observance of humanitarian norms of international law. ..."
And another organization concerned with preserving humanitarian rights
said, with respect to the Protecting Power:
"Certainly it is time that this valuable international custom was revived in the
modem context ofarmed conflicts. An initiative ofthis kind by the United Nations
would set a precedent as a means oflessening the brutality of conflicts, and would
accord with the aim expressed in the Charter. ..."
And, finally, Resolution XI of the XXIst International Conference of the Red
Cross "calls upon all parties to allow the Protecting Power or the International
Committee of the Red Cross free access to prisoners ofwar and to all places of
their detention." Further, it should be borne in mind that nowhere in either
customary7 or conventional international law is there any rule which would
authorize the Protecting Power, even if it were designated and functioning, to
supervise the compliance of a belligerent with that area of the law of armed
conflict governing the conduct of hostilities.
Although, as has been stated, no Protecting Power has been designated in
any armed conflict which has occurred since World War II, on a number of
occasions the ICRC has been permitted to perform its humanitarian functions.
Perhaps because ofthis, the Report calls it the most effective private organization
concerned with respect for human rights in armed conflict, ascribes this to "its
history, past experience, and its established and well deserved reputation of
impartiality," and recommends its strengthening. But not even the ICRC has
been uniformly successful in having its services accepted. Thus, while it was
permitted to perform humanitarian functions in the prisoner-of-war camps
maintained in South Korea during the period of hostilities in that country
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(1950-53), it was never permitted in North Korea where, as a result, there was
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no "guardian" of the Conventions; similarly, while it has functioned in South
Vietnam over a considerable period oftime, it has never been permitted in North
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Vietnam; and its trials and tribulations in Biafra and Nigeria are too recent to
require elaboration.
There is, then, a double need in this area: (1) a need to devise a method which
will ensure the existence of a "third" presence, either a Protecting Power or
some substitute therefor, on the territory ofeach State party to an armed conflict;
and (2) a need to grant to that Protecting Power, or the substitute therefor,
adequate authority to ensure compliance with all of the law of armed conflict,
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including that relating to the conduct of hostilities. The provisions ofthe 1949
Geneva Conventions for the designation of Protecting Powers have not been
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at all effective and those relating to substitutes for Protecting Powers have
been only partially successful. It is apparent, then, that the only real solution
would be, once again, to have a provision in a convention which would, in
appropriate cases, automatically trigger action by ICEHFA.C. Thus the
convention creating that institution could provide that, when the existence of
a state of armed conflict is acknowledged by the States involved, or when a
decision to that effect has been reached by ICEHRAC in accordance with the
other provisions of the convention, and no Protecting Powers have been
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designated in accordance with customary international law within one week
thereafter, ICEHP^AC would automatically begin to function in the capacity of
a substitute for the Protecting Power, with all the rights and duties which have
been, or which may be, granted to such Powers. And such rights and duties
should include the supervision of the application of all of the law of armed
conflict and should not be restricted to the protections afforded under the 1949
Geneva Conventions. After all, a human being, combatant or noncombatant,
suffersjust as much, or isjust as dead, be his improper treatment due to a violation
of those conventions or to the use ofdum-dum bullets (in violation of the 1899
Hague Declaration), or the use of poison (in violation of the 1907 Hague
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Regulations), or the use of gas (in violation ofthe 1925 Geneva Protocol), etc.
In many respects the foregoing proposal parallels suggestions contained in the
7R
Report. Nor is it believed that the U.S.S.R. and the other Communist
countries would necessarily oppose such a solution merely because they made
reservations to Article 10/10/10/11, and because the Soviet Union made a
statement indicating that it did not consider Resolution 2 ofthe 1 949 Diplomatic
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Conference necessary. Events subsequent to 1949 have demonstrated the need
for an institution capable of performing the functions of the Protecting Power
and competent to take such functions upon itself immediately when the need
Ml
therefor becomes apparent. It is believed that only in this fashion will the world
community of nations provide a satisfactory and effective method of ensuring
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in every case of armed conflict the presence of an impartial agency with the
function of making certain that the law of armed conflict is fully and properly
applied.
3. The non-existence ofand the needfor a complete and total prohibition of the use
in armed conflict ofany and all categories ofchemical and biological agents.
A third major inadequacy in the existing law relating to the protection of
individuals during armed conflict is the lack of a comprehensive and generally
accepted ban on the use as weapons of all types and categories ofboth chemical
and biological agents.
While there is probably no real equal to the disaster that would descend upon
this earth should an all-out nuclear war occur, potentially the use of other
uncontrollable methods of mass destruction could be almost equally disastrous
83 . 84
for mankind. Dozens of chemical agents, and numerous biological agents,
all with varying degrees of lethality, that have been determined to be the most
"useful" are now included in the arsenals of a number of nations for possible use
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in the event of armed conflict. Hundreds of books and articles have been
ozr 07
written and millions of words have been spoken on the subject. For the
most part they have been concerned with the questions ofwhether there is today
any customary rule of international law which prohibits the use of chemical
agents in armed conflict and whether biological agents fall within the
well-established prohibitions against the use of "poisons" and against the use of
weapons which cause "unnecessary suffering"; but also, in more recent days,
with the inhumanity of these weapons and the highlighting of the moral and
ethical basis for the universal acceptance by nations of a strict and all-inclusive
ban on the use in armed conflict of any and all types of both chemical and
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biological agents.
A very brief history of the attempts to ban the use of chemical (and
bacteriological) agents as weapons will probably serve to clarify the current
problem as well as the suggestion for solving it. Chemical warfare of differing
varieties has existed for centuries. Although the 1868 Declaration of St.
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Petersburg actually dealt with explosive bullets, it is often cited as the beginning
of the attempt to ban the use of chemical agents in armed conflict because of a
preambular clause which deplored "the employment of arms which uselessly
aggravate the suffering of disabled men, or render their death inevitable."
Chemical agents, it is contended, fall within this classification.
The 1899 Hague Peace Conference adopted a number of provisions which
are said to have indirectly, or which did direcdy, ban the use ofchemical agents.
Thus the Regulations attached to the Second Hague Convention drafted by
that Conference stated that the right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring
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the enemy was not unlimited (Art. 22) and they especially prohibited the
employment of poison or poisoned weapons (Art. 23a) and of arms, projectiles,
or material of a nature to cause unnecessary suffering (Art. 23e). In addition, a
Declaration concerning the Prohibition ofUsing Projectiles the Sole Object of
which is the Diffusion ofAsphyxiating or Deleterious Gases was drafted. While
this Declaration was not repeated at the 1907 Hague Peace Conference, the
provisions of the Regulations attached to the Fourth Hague Convention of
1907 were identical with those cited from its 1899 predecessor.
World War I saw the use of gas introduced by Germany, followed thereafter
by its use by the Allies. The Treaty ofVersailles contained an article which stated
that the "use of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and all analogous liquids,
materials or devices being prohibited, their manufacture and importation are
strictly forbidden in Germany." Nevertheless, it would be an exaggeration to
say that when the Treaty ofVersailles was signed in 1919 there was in existence
any generally accepted rule of international law prohibiting the use of chemical
agents in armed conflict. In 1922 the five great maritime nations of that time
(France, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States) drafted and
signed the Treaty ofWashington relating to the use of submarines and noxious
gases which contained a provision that, the use of "asphyxiating, poisonous or
other gases, and all analogous liquids, materials or devices, having been justly
condemned by the general opinion of the civilized world and a prohibition of
such use having been declared in treaties to which a majority of the civilized
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Powers are parties," the signatories "declare their assent to such prohibition."
While this treaty never became effective (France failed to ratify it because of the
provisions relating to submarines), it constituted an important landmark in the
law of armed conflict. And three years later, at the Conference which met in
Geneva to establish controls on international trade in munitions, a Protocol
was drafted which contained wording lifted bodily from the Treaty of
Washington and, in addition, contained an agreement "to extend this
prohibition to the use of bacteriological methods of warfare." As of October
30, 1969, there were 68 States parties to this 1925 Geneva Protocol. The great
majority, however, have ratified it with reservations which make it applicable
only as regards other States which are also Parties to it; and which make it
inapplicable in the event it is violated by the enemy.
Gas was subsequently used by Italy against Ethiopia in the 1935-36 war.
Italy admitted this use in the League of Nations and unsuccessfully attempted to
justify it as a reprisal for other alleged violations ofinternational law by Ethiopia.
Japan used gas against China in their hostilities of the late 1930s; and the Soviet
Union contended that Japan used bacteriological agents against China in the
1930s. This was never established by acceptable evidence and, so far as appears,
there was no use in armed conflict of either chemical or bacteriological weapons
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by any belligerent during World War II. During the Korean hostilities the
Soviet Union, Communist China, and North Korea all contended that the
United States forces in the United Nations Command had used bacteriological
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weapons. The United States denied this and demanded an investigation
which was refused. It is interesting to note that in an official book published in
Moscow in 1967 no mention is made of these allegations, although the charge
against the Japanese is reiterated and the use of defoliants in Vietnam is strongly
criticized. The charge was also made, and apparently verified by the ICRC,
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that Egypt used a chemical agent against the Royalists in the Yemen. Egypt
denied the charge and invited an investigation. As in the case of the similar
demand made by the United States in Korea, no such investigation ever took
place.
The ICRC Draft Rules contain a blunt and broad prohibition against the use
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of "incendiary, chemical, bacteriological, radioactive or other agents"; on a
number of occasions the General Assembly has adopted resolutions calling for
strict observance ofthe "principles and objectives" ofthe 1925 Geneva Protocol
and inviting non-Parties to accede to it; and on at least one occasion it has
declared the use ofchemical and biological agents ofwarfare "as contrary to the
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generally recognized rules ofinternational law, as embodied in the Protocol."
Some writers also urge that the use ofthese weapons is prohibited by customary
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international law. It appears however that, particularly in the fight of recent
developments, this is a sterile approach to the problem.
When the 1925 Geneva Protocol was sent to the United States Senate for its
advice and consent to ratification, this was refused; and accordingly, the United
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States is not presendy a Party to the Protocol. As a result, the United States
has long taken the position that, while it will not be the first user ofthe weapons
prohibited by that international agreement, it "is not a party to any treaty, now
in force, that prohibits or restricts the use in warfare of toxic or nontoxic gases,
of smoke or incendiary materials, or of bacteriological warfare." Although
the United States has not used any toxic chemical, or any bacteriological agent,
since the Protocol became effective as between the Parties to it, the fact that it
refused to ratify the Protocol has not only caused it to have problems in the
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diplomatic field, but has also undoubtedly deterred a number of other States
from becoming Parties to it.
On November 25, 1969, President Nixon made an announcement of major
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importance concerning this subject. This announcement included:
1
.
A reaffirmation of the renunciation by the United States of the first use of
lethal chemical weapons;
2. An extension of this renunciation to the first use of incapacitating chemicals;
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3. An intention to resubmit the 1925 Geneva Protocol to the Senate for its advice
and consent to ratification;
4. Renunciation by the United States of the use of lethal biological agents and
weapons;
5. Confining biological research to defense measures;
6. Disposing of all stocks of bacteriological weapons; and
7. Associating the United States with the principles and objectives of the United
1 13Kingdom Draft Convention on biological weapons.
It is assumed that this action by the United States, its prospective ratification of
the 1925 Geneva Protocol, and its expressed willingness to become a party to a
convention banning biologicals will lead the way to the goal which the United
Nations General Assembly has long sought to reach—universal acceptance of
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prohibitions on chemical and biological agents and weapons. Unfortunately,
it appears that there is still one major problem which requires solution—the
status of the use of certain types of chemical agents. For while diplomats,
scientists, and international lawyers are, for the most part, in general agreement
that lethal gases and all biologicals either are, or should be, prohibited by the
law ofarmed conflict, there is no such concordance with respect to: the so-called
non-lethal gases, such as tear gas (CS); incendiaries, such as napalm; and
defoliants. Moreover, the use of all of these weapons by the United States in
Vietnam has considerably exacerbated this problem.
The difference ofopinion with respect to both the legal and the moral aspects
of the problem of the use of non-lethal or incapacitating chemicals such as tear
gas (lachrymatories) is evidenced by the division among the group of experts
convened by the ICRC:
"... Some [experts] . . . wondered whether the employment against the enemy
of chemical agents involving no serious danger for health might not in the final
issue be of a more humanitarian character than many other means ofwarfare. The
employment of means such as police gases (lachrymatory and others) is admitted
on the national level: why could they not a fortiori be admitted against the
enemy?"
"Other experts, on the contrary, considered that the prohibition in the 1925
Geneva Protocol should be taken as covering all gases, including those not direcdy
poisonous, in virtue of the deliberately broad terms of this prohibition in the
Protocol . . ."
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In 1930 the United Kingdom took the position that the use of smoke did not
violate the Protocol but that the use of tear gas did; but recendy a spokesman
for that country stated that today's tear gas is less harmful to man than was the
1930 smoke; that it is used widely for domestic purposes for riot control; and
that its use is not prohibited by any international convention.
Apart from the fact that even a non-lethal, incapacitating gas will occasionally
cause a fatality, there are two major objections voiced against their use in armed
conflict: first, that as a practical matter the legality oftheir use becomes extremely
debatable when its purpose is "to enhance the effectiveness of conventional
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weapons," "to force persons from protective covering to face attack by
1 1 o
fragmentation bombs "; and second, and more important, that the use ofany
chemical, albeit non-lethal, results inevitably in escalation: "except perhaps
when they are first used, non-lethal chemical weapons are unlikely to have much
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effect except to set the stage for more deadly CBW operations."
The second chemical weapon in the controversial area is napalm—an
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extremely effective weapon and hence one which is much feared, and much
121
denounced. Once again there is no general agreement as to whether this
chemical weapon is prohibited by the Protocol. And because the answer to
this question is even more difficult to ascertain than is that with respect to
lachrymatories, the position has been taken that it may be used, but only in a
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discriminating manner. The suggestion is made in A/7720 that in measures
of control and disarmament incendiary weapons such as napalm should be
considered separately from chemical and biological weapons and that a new
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convention is needed to clarify the situation; a suggestion which is probably
an admission that this is presently a gray area of the law.
Prior to Vietnam defoliants had never been used in warfare. As a result, there
is no real experience upon which scientists can base their opinions as to the
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ecological effects of their use. Here, as in the case of napalm, the suggestion
has been made that the legality of their use depends upon the purpose or target:
while it might be permissible to use them on a forest area used by combat troops,
it would not be permissible to use them on farm lands raising crops to feed the
civilian population. Apart from the fact that it would frequently be all but
impossible to make the correct determinations, if the use of defoliants does
change the ecology, then it would appear that the purpose or target should not
be the determining factor in reaching a decision on their use.
Because the use of non-lethal, or incapacitating, chemical agents will
inevitably lead to the use ofother, more lethal, chemical agents; because napalm
can cause both asphyxiation and unnecessary suffering; because defoliants may
well change the entire ecology of an area and could lead to the starvartion of
the civilian population; because of these and many other reasons, it is believed
that to be successful any prohibition on the use of chemical weapons in armed
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conflict must comprise all types of chemical agents, including those just
mentioned. It is on this basis that it is urged that there is a vital humanitarian
need for a universally accepted understanding that the prohibition of the use in
armed conflict of chemical agents includes any and all categories of such agents,
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not excluding incapacitating gases, incendiaries, and defoliants.
There is comparatively little dispute on the need for a far-reaching prohibition
on the use of biologicals in armed conflict. As has been noted, there is general
agreement that, like a nuclear war, a biological war would constitute a disaster
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to all mankind, belligerent and neutral, combatant and noncombatant. One
grave problem in this area is that even a small, comparatively undeveloped nation
could conceivably mass the necessary resources to enter this field—and there is
considerable dispute as to whether an inspection system, even if adopted, could
function effectively. The United Kingdom Draft Convention on the subject
of biological weapons does not provide for inspections except in the context of
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a specific complaint. " But, while every effort should most certainly be made
to devise means of ensuring against the illegal production and storage of
biological agents of military relevance by any nation, large or small, industrial
or undeveloped, this should not be permitted to unduly delay agreement on a
treaty completely outlawing the use in armed conflict of any and all biological
agents.
4. The non-existence ofand the needfor a complete code governing the use ofairpower
in armed conflict with emphasis on the outright prohibition ofany type ofbombing which
has as its basic target the civilian population.
The airplane was first successfully flown in 1903, just shordy prior to the
Second Hague Conference of 1907; it developed into a military weapon of
sizable proportions during World War I; during the between-wars period it
became obvious that it was a major military weapon; during and since World
War II technological advances in this field have been such that its importance
in the military arsenal is now unequalled (except for the nuclear ballistic missile);
and yet its use in armed conflict remains essentially unregulated!
In 1917, while the airplane was still in swaddling clothes, exponents of the
use of air power had already evolved the theory that
"the day may not be far offwhen aerial operations with their devastation ofenemy
lands and destruction ofindustrial and populous centres on a vast scale may become
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the principal operations of war."
While strategic bombing was probably not the "principal operation" ofWorld
War II, it certainly played a most important role in that war and will do so again
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in any future non-nuclear armed conflict—and perhaps even in one involving
the use of nuclear weapons.
As in the case of the discussion of chemical and biological weapons, while it
is unproductive to argue about whether or not the strategic bombing ofWorld
War II violated international law, a brief survey ofwhat has transpired in the
past will prove helpful in approaching the problem from the point of view of
the future. When the Second Hague Peace Conference met in 1907 the balloon
was more than a century old and had already been used for military purposes,
while the airplane had been successfully flown for the first time only four years
before. The Conference adopted a Declaration prohibiting bombing "from
balloons or by other new methods of a similar nature" and Conventions
which included restrictions on land bombardment and naval bombardment.
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Article 25 of the Regulations on the Laws and Customs ofWar provided:
"The attack or bombardment by whatever means, of towns, villages, dwellings, or
buildings which are undefended is prohibited." (Emphasis added.)
The records of the Conference indicate that the words "by whatever means"
1 36
were included in the article in order to cover air bombardment. And Article
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2 ofthe Convention on Naval Bombardment excluded from the prohibition
against the bombing of undefended places "military works, military or naval
establishments, depots ofarms or war materiel, workshops or plants which could
be utilized for the needs of the hostile fleet or army." The argument has been
advanced, not without justification, that this provision provides a basis for the
air bombardment in the "hinterland" of objectives such as those enumerated.
This was the extent of the efforts which had been made to control the use of
air power when World War I began; and during its course the airplane became
a full-fledged weapon. However, apart from a few incidents its use was restricted
to the battlefield and, usually, to air-to-air duels. In view ofthe technological
progress made and foreseen, it is indeed strange that although a number of efforts
were made in the between-wars period to obtain an international agreement on
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such matters as air bombardment none was successful. The most authoritative
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of these failures was the drafting of the 1923 Hague Rules of Air Warfare.
Two articles of those Rules are particularly relevant: Article 22, which would
have prohibited aerial bombardment which was "for the purpose of terrorizing
the civilian population ... or ofinjuring noncombatants"; and Article 24, which
would have limited it to specified military objectives in the vicinity of the zone
ofland operations and then only ifit would result in a distinct military advantage
and ifit could be accomplished without "indiscriminate" bombing ofthe civilian
population. These two articles were intended: (1) to preserve the traditional
distinction between combatant and noncombatant; and (2) to limit the allowable
1 48 Levle on the Law of War
military objectives to those in the area of the combat zone—the so-called
"occupation bombardment" because it is normally preliminary to physical
occupation.
In a discussion of air bombardment in the House of Commons on June 21,
1938, Prime Minister Chamberlain made the following statement:
"I think we may say that there are, at any rate, three rules of international law or
three principles of international law which are as applicable to warfare from the
air as they are to war at sea or on land. In the first place, it is against international
law to bomb civilians as such and to make deliberate attacks upon civilian
populations. That is undoubtedly a violation of international law. In the second
place, targets which are aimed at from the air must be legitimate military objectives
and must be capable of identification. In the third place, reasonable care must be
taken in attacking these military objectives so that by carelessness a civilian
population in the neighborhood is not bombed."
When World War II erupted in September 1939, President Roosevelt
immediately sent the belligerents a plea against the bombing of civilian
populations. The British, French, and Germans all replied that their planes were
instructed to attack military objectives only. In March 1940 the ICRC made
an appeal to the belligerents "to confirm general immunity for peaceful
populations, to define their military objectives, and to refrain from indiscriminate
bombardments and reprisals." Once again the belligerents responded
affirmatively—but continued to act as they felt necessary. The estimate has
been made that while World War I caused 10 million deaths, ofwhich 500,000
were civilians, World War II caused 50 million, of which 24 million were
civilians; and that half of the civilian deaths (12 million) were caused by air
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raids! It is worthy of note, too, that such air attacks were not specifically
included in the definition of war crimes in the Charter of the International
Military Tribunal and that there were no post-war trials based on a charge of
indiscriminate bombardment of the civilian population. Nevertheless,
Spaight takes the position that "nothing that has happened in the second world
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war has shaken the legal objection to indiscriminate bombing."
It is apparent from the foregoing that the attempt to control aerial
bombardment juridically has been based on analogy to two classical principles
of land and sea warfare: (1) the distinction between combatant and
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noncombatant; and (2) the restricting of lawful targets to military objectives.
Much of the humanitarian law regulating armed conflict which has been
accepted during the past century has been based upon the distinction between
combatant and noncombatant. The airman who has crashed and been
hospitalized, the sailor who has been rescued from the sea by the enemy after
his ship has been sunk, the soldier who has been captured on the field of
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battle—all of these have been removed from combatant status and are therefore
entided to the humanitarian protection afforded by international law. But they
are but a comparatively small percentage ofthe overall group ofnoncombatants,
the vast majority of whom are simply civilians, persons who are not a part of
the armed forces of a belligerent. It is with these latter that we are presendy
concerned. The distinction between combatant and civilian has been termed,
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and properly so, "the fundamental principle ofthe law ofwar." But air warfare
in general, and strategic bombing in particular, has tended to blur that
distinction and its validity has been questioned.
Let us take three examples. First, a city of 500,000 population located in the
"hinterland" (deep inside the country and far from the scene of actual land
combat) has no factories making any product in support of the country's war
effort. Is the city a proper target for air bombardment? Second, suppose that this
same city has in its midst a factory employing 1000 workers making a very
important instrument of war. Is the factory, or the city, a proper target for air
bombardment? And third, suppose that the same city has within its area a number
of factories making important instruments of war, and employing the entire
work force of the city. Are the factories, or is the city, a proper target for air
bombardment?
Under the classical rules discussed and enumerated above, to bomb the city
with no war production factories would be terror bombing, pure and simple,
and would be a violation of the law of armed conflict. It would be an attack on
a non-military objective which could be ofno military advantage to the attacker
except the possible demoralization of the enemy civilian population. With
respect to this type of activity Lauterpacht has said:
".
. . it is in that prohibition, which is a clear rule of law, of intentional
terrorization—or destruction—ofthe civilian population as an avowed or obvious
object ofattack that lies the last vestige ofthe claim that war can be legally regulated
at all. Without that irreducible principle ofrestraint there is no limit to the license
and depravity of force. ..."
Even the proponents of more "liberal" rules of air bombardment do not assert
the legality of bombing of this type.
What ofthe large city with only one small factory in which is made a product
of value to its country's war-effort? Certainly the bombing and destruction of
such a factory would meet the test of resulting in a distinct military advantage
to the attacker. It would not meet the test of being located in the zone of
operations—but is that test, originally established when only cities in the zone
ofland operations could be reached by artillery bombardment, a valid test to be
applied to air bombardment which can reach anywhere in the world? Moreover,
it would meet the test of the requirements for naval bombardment. It would
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probably not meet the test of being located where the bombing can take place
without clanger to the civilian population. However, it appears that practice
during and since World War II would permit the factory to be subjected to air
attack. As the Report points out, in recent armed conflicts belligerents have
frequendy made accusations of attacks upon non-military objectives and the
enemy belligerent has denied the fact without either side questioning the
propriety of the distinction as to types of objectives.
Finally, what ofthe large city with many factories and most of the work force
engaged in the war effort? Let us assume that in time of armed conflict 40% of
the population constitute the work force—but that still means that 60% of the
civilian population, 300,000 people of this city, is made up ofwomen, children,
aged, sick, etc. Must the attacker pick out individual targets, the real military
objectives? Or may he blanket the entire city with bombs, thus ensuring that all
of the plants are destroyed—but also ensuring that a large part of the population,
worker and nonworker, is likewise destroyed? Spaight would answer this latter
question in the affirmative. He says:
".
. . There are in any given enemy city thousands of civilians, of'noncombatants'
in the old sense, but there are also thousands who cannot be called 'noncombatants'
in any true meaning of the term. The former suffer inevitably because the latter
have, quite properly, to be prevented from pursuing their lethal activities. It is a
tragedy ofjuxtaposition which is not entirely without precedent. Noncombatants
have often suffered in bombardments by land and naval forces, but their suffering
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has never been held to make the bombardment illegal. ..."
And he repeatedly asserts that so-called "target-area bombing" is an "established
usage" and that it "cannot be considered to offend against the principles of the
international law of war." " The problem which then confronts us is that we
~ 1 S6
have returned to the doctrine of "total war," war as fought centuries ago:
when the besieged city fell, all of its inhabitants were slaughtered and the city
itself was put to the torch.
The Report makes the suggestion with respect to strategic bombing
conducted on a target-area basis that "(it) would seem that measures to examine
the effects of this kind of military operations within their legal context may now
be desirable, and the question of defining limits might be usefully studied."
With this modest proposal there can be no possible dispute. The question which
then presents itself is, what are possible solutions to the problem? And, which
ofthese possible solutions offers the greatest amount ofprotection to the civilian
population?
Air bombardment could, of course, be limited to areas where combat is
actually taking place—the old concept of the "zone of operations." This, in
effect, means tactical bombing, and would preclude strategic bombing. While
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this would, in large part, solve the problem, it is extremely doubtful that it would
be possible to secure the agreement of Governments to such a stringent rule.
Moreover, even if the agreement of Governments were obtained, it is doubtful
that there would be compliance with such a rule in practice.
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The Report proposes the establishment of safety zones, apparendy similar to,
but much larger than, the hospital zones referred to in Annex I to the First and
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Fourth Geneva Conventions of 1949. Presumably there would be no bombing
whatsoever permitted within the safety zones and no restrictions on bombing
elsewhere. While this might work for small groups and in small areas, it appears to
be totally impractical for the protection of tens or hundreds ofmillions of civilians.
The logistic problem alone would be insurmountable; and with thousands ofsquare
miles within a safety zone, the unlawful use of such areas for the protection of
important military matters would probably be inevitable.
The Draft Rules prepared by the ICRC and submitted to the XlXth
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International Conference of the Red Cross at New Delhi in 1957 contain a
number ofprovisions intended to provide maximum protection for the civilian
population. An examination ofthe various provisions ofthese Draft Rules makes
it clear why they were received by the Governments with a "crushing silence."
While they are, as would be expected, as humanitarian as it would be possible
to draft such rules, they are also impractical to the point where it is extremely
doubtful that any armed force would be able to comply with them in time of
armed conflict. While this, as we shall see, is not true of all ofthese Draft Rules,
a much more practical set of general principles was drafted by the ICRC for
consideration by its group of experts in 1968. These principles would limit air
bombardment to identified military objectives; would place upon the attacker
the duty to use care in attacking the identified military objective; and would
apply the principle ofproportionality as between the identified military objective
and any possible harm to the civilian population. '"" These principles would
clearly prohibit target-area bombing; but there does not appear to be any reason
why such an important rule should not be specifically set out.
It is clear now, as it has been in the past, that no rule has as yet been conceived
which will give full protection to the civilian population and yet will be
acceptable to Governments. However, ifman can devise instruments to send a
spaceship to the moon and have it land within a matter ofyards from its target,
man can certainly devise, if he has not already done so, instruments which will
put a bomb exactly on target. On the basis of this premise, the following rules
on aerial bombardment are suggested:
1. Terror Bombing Prohibited. Attacks directed against the civilian population,
as such, whether with the object of terrorizing it, or for any other reason, are
prohibited.
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2. Target-Area Bombing Prohibited. It is forbidden to attack, as a single
objective, an area including several military objectives at a distance from one
another where members of the civilian population are located between such
military objectives.
3. Military Objectives.
(a) Before bombing a military objective, the attacking force must have
sufficiently identified it as such.
(b) In bombardments against military objectives, the attacking force must
take every possible precaution in order to avoid inflicting damage on the civilian
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population.
(c) To constitute a military objective a target must fall within one of the
categories listed in the annex hereto.
It is believed that these rules will, under present and foreseeable technological
standards, provide a maximum of protection to the civilian population, while
placing acceptable limitations on the scope of strategic bombing.
Conclusion
Armed conflict is, by its very nature, unhumanitarian. However,
humanitarian rules, properly applied, can do much to mitigate this situation. It
is believed that were the proposals made herein to be adopted as part of the law
of armed conflict, they would go far to provide additional needed protection
for both combatant and civilian noncombatant.
As has been stated, this paper represents an attempt to deal with only some of
the present major inadequacies of the law of armed conflict; and their selection
and priority must be ascribed to the personal predilections of the author. There
are a number of other areas which might well have been included and which
may well be considered by some to have equal, or even greater, importance.
These might include: enforcement of the law of armed conflict; combat at sea,
particularly submarine warfare; the status of guerrillas and partisans; the use of
starvation as a weapon; etc. The selection made of the subjects to be discussed
should certainly not be considered as in any way denigrating the importance to





RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE
GENERAL ASSEMBLY
[on the report of the Third Committee (A/7433)]
2444 (XXIII). Respectfor human rights in armed conflicts
The General Assembly,
Recognizing the necessity of applying basic humanitarian principles in all armed conflicts,
Taking note ofresolution XXIII on human rights in armed conflicts, adopted on 12 May 1968
by the International Conference on Human Rights,
Affirming that the provisions of that resolution need to be implemented as soon as possible,
1. Affirms resolution XXVIII of the XXth International Conference of the Red Cross held at
Vienna in 1965, which laid down, inter alia, the following principles for observance by all
governmental and other authorities responsible for action in armed conflicts:
(a) That the right of the parties to a conflict to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not
unlimited;
(b) That it is prohibited to launch attacks against the civilian population as such;
(c) That distinction must be made at all times between persons taking part in the hostilities and
members of the civilian population to the effect that the latter be spared as much as possible;
2. Invites the Secretary-General, in consultation with the International Committee ofthe Red
Cross and other appropriate international organizations, to study:
(a) Steps which could be taken to secure the better application of existing humanitarian
international conventions and rules in all armed conflicts;
(b) The need for additional humanitarian international conventions or for other appropriate
legal instruments to ensure the better protection ofcivilians, prisoners and combatants in all armed
conflicts and the prohibition and limitation of the use of certain methods and means ofwarfare;
3. Requests the Secretary-General to take all other necessary steps to give effect to the provisions
of the present resolution and to report to the General Assembly at its twenty-fourth session on
the steps he has taken;
4. Further requests Member States to extend all possible assistance to the Secretary-General in
the preparation of the study requested in paragraph 2 above;
5. Calls upon all States which have not done so to become parties to the Hague Convention
of 1899 and 1907, the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and the Geneva Conventions of 1949.
1 748th plenary meeting,
19 December 1968.
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Am. J. Int'l L. Supp. 94 (1931)), uses the term "bacteriological." Because scientific developments since 1925
have indicated the possible use in armed conflict ofvarious living organisms (e.g, rickettsiae, viruses, and fungi),
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Some Major Inadequacies in the Existing Law Relating to the
Protection of Individuals During Armed Conflict
Addendum
This Working Paper for the 14th Hammarskjold Forum conducted by the
Association of the Bar of the City ofNew York was written in 1970. Since that
time there has been no change in the status of the first problem mentioned, the
absence of "a method for the automatic determination that a particular State
relationship requires the application of the law of armed conflict." Article 1 of
the 1907 Convention (II) Relative to the Opening ofHostilities requires a "previous
and explicit warning, in the form either of a declaration of war, giving reasons,
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or an ultimatum with conditional declaration ofwar." This provision has become
a nullity. Article 2 of the four 1949 Geneva Conventions for the Protection of War
Victims provides that these Conventions become applicable "in all cases of
declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or
more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state ofwar is not recognized
by one of them." The lack of value of this provision was demonstrated during
the hostilities in Vietnam where the North Vietnamese disregarded it by merely
asserting that all captured American personnel were war criminals captured in
flagrante delicto. There have been innumerable international armed conflicts since
1970 but in not one instance has there been a formal declaration of war or any
other affirmative action indicating that the international law ofwar was deemed
applicable. The last known compliance with the cited provision was when the
Soviet Union declared war on Japan on 8 August 1945 during World War II.
The second item discussed was "the need for a method which will ensure the
presence in the territory of each State party to an armed conflict of a Protecting
Power or an international body with adequate authority to police compliance
with that law." The international community had an opportunity to correct this
defect but failed miserably, The Diplomatic Conference which met in Geneva
from 1974 to 1977 before completing the 1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of8 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims ofInternational
Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) drafted provisions (Article 5 thereof) which once again
mean that there will usually be no Protecting Power and no substitute for a
Protecting Power. (The United States has not as yet ratified that Protocol.) In the
conflict in Korea there were no Protecting Powers. The International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) offered its services to both sides. The
United Nations Command (UNC) accepted the offer and the ICRC made over
100 inspections ofUNC prisoner of war facilities. The North Koreans and the
Chinese Communists never even deigned to answer the ICRC's offers. There
is nothing in the 1977 Protocol I which, will change that situation as every action
is dependent upon the willingness ofthe Party to the conflict. Thus, ifthe system
for designating a Protecting Power fails, as it probably will, a sort of lottery
system may be instituted, but its value is dubious; and the ICRC may offer its
services as a substitute, but the functioning of the ICRC as such a substitute "is
subject to the consent ofthe Parties to the conflict"—a consent which countries
like North Korea and the People's Republic of China, and a number of other
nations, will not give.
The third item discussed was "the need for a complete and total prohibition
of the use in armed conflict of any and all categories of chemical and biological
weapons." An addendum to the article entided Nuclear, Chemical and Biological
Weapons in this collection updates the subject.
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The final item discussed in that paper was "the need for a complete code
governing the use of air power in armed conflict with emphasis on the outright
prohibition of any type of bombing which has as its basic target the civilian
population." Some progress has been made in this area. Article 51(2) ofthe 1977
Additional Protocol /prohibits making the civilian population the object of attack,
Articles 54(2) and 56 thereof contain provisions aimed at protecting the civilian
population from attack. Article 2(1) of the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions
on the Use if Incendiary Weapons (Protocol HI to the 1980 Convention on Prohibitions
or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be Deemed to
be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects) specifically prohibits attacks
on the civilian population by incendiary weapons; and Article 2(2) thereof
prohibits attacks on a military objective located within a concentration of
civilians by air delivered incendiary weapons. (The United States has not as yet
ratified this Protocol, although it has ratified the. convention and Protocols I and
II thereof.)
VII
Civilian Sanctuaries: An Impractical Proposal
1 Israel Year Book ofHuman Rights 335 (1971)
Certainly, one should always take a positive stance with respect to any
practical and workable proposal aimed at increasing the protections
afforded the civilian population in time ofarmed conflict. Despite that premise,
which is basic to any consideration of the law of armed conflict, or perhaps
because of the restrictive adjectives "practical and workable" which have been,
and must be, used, it appears necessary to cast a negative vote with respect to a
well-intentioned, but impractical, proposal first made by the Secretary-General
of the United Nations in 1969 and greatly elaborated upon by him in 1970.
On December 19, 1968, by Resolution 2444 (XXIII), the General Assembly
of the United Nations requested the Secretary-General to study and prepare a
report on the subject of "Respect for Human Rights in Armed Conflict." He
did so, his staffproducing A/7720, November 20, 1969 (hereinafter referred to
as the "1969 Report"). On December 16, 1969, by Resolution 2597 (XXIV),
the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to continue his study and
to submit a further report on the same subject. Once again he did so, his staff
producing A/8052, September 18, 1970 (hereinafter referred to as the "1970
Report").
In the 1969 Report eight paragraphs (145-52) were devoted to the subject
of "civilian refuges or sanctuaries." In March, 1970, during the course of a Panel
which included the United Nations official actually responsible for the
preparation of that Report—the Director of Human Rights Division of the
United Nations Secretariat, the present writer, in passing, questioned the
practicality of the proposal for large-scale civilian sanctuaries. This adverse
comment, which really did not rise to the category of criticism, may well have
inadvertently contributed to the fact that the 1970 Report expanded the
coverage on the subject from eight to forty-three paragraphs (45-87). It is the
purpose of this paper to demonstrate the impracticality of the proposal for such
civilian sanctuaries and the actual lack of need for such a device if there is
compliance with already well-established norms of the law of armed conflict,
perhaps amplified in the light of currendy available and foreseeable methods of
conducting such conflict.
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Some discussion in depth of the proposal contained in the two Reports is
essential for an understanding of the problem. The basic proposal was originally
advanced in the following language:
The difficulties which are attendant on arriving at a practically useful definition
of what constitutes a legitimate military objective have led to the consideration
of other solutions which might effectively increase the protection afforded to
civilians in armed conflicts. One method might be to gather and place under
shelter as large a part of the civilian population as possible, especially women,
children, the elderly, the sick and those who do not participate in the armed
conflict, nor contribute in any way to the pursuit of military operations. This
might be achieved by adopting and developing, on a larger scale than provided at
present, a system of safety zones which would offer special protection and even
immunity from attack.
The purpose of the proposal for large-scale civilian sanctuaries was
subsequendy more clearly drawn when the 1970 Report stated:
The civilian sanctuaries would therefore be established to draw the attention
ofthe belligerents to the presence in a given area ofpersons whom they are already
obligated to respect, protect or refrain from injuring. In effect, refuges or
sanctuaries might assist in facilitating the observance by the belligerents of the
obligations incumbent upon them.
Both of the Reports recognized the need for numerous safeguards in order
to ensure the successful operation of the civilian sanctuaries and to prevent their




The necessity for the designation and recognition of civilian sanctuaries in
4
peacetime before hostilities have aroused animosity and suspicion;
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2. Restrictions on the selection and use of such sanctuaries;
3. Special identification markings for the sanctuaries and the personnel serving
in them; and
4. A system of control and verification.
It appears to the present writer that the mere enumeration of these few
requirements, which is far from exhaustive, demonstrates the lack of feasibility
of the proposal.
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The idea of civilian sanctuaries did not emerge full-blown from the
8 •
Secretary-General's brow. It is not even the application of existing ideas and
norms to a totally new concept. It is merely the elaboration and extension ofan
existing system ofprotection, which was designed for comparatively small groups
ofindividuals and for comparatively small areas of real estate, to potentially very
large segments of the population and potentially enormous portions of the land
mass of a belligerent nation. As the 1969 Report points out, the doctrine of
the "open city," which has been elsewhere defined as "an undefended city, open
10
to occupation by enemy forces without harm to the inhabitants," originated
in the customary law ofwar and was codified in the Fourth Hague Convention
11
of 1907. Thus, the entry of the Germans into Paris in June, 1940, during
World War II, has been termed "a classical example of the application of the
12
[1907] Hague Rules of Land Warfare." During that same War, the "open
city" doctrine failed to provide protection to the civilian populations in the cases
• 13
ofBelgrade, Zagreb, and Ljubliana in 1941 and in the case ofRome in 1943.
Three very small neutralized zones were apparendy established in Jerusalem in
1948, but these probably did not result from an application of the "open city"
doctrine.
Elaborating on earlier Geneva Conventions, each of the four 1949
Conventions provides for protected areas of one character or another: hospital
zones; prisoner ofwar camps; neutralized zones; and internment camps.
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The 1954 Hague Convention contains provisions setting up an elaborate
system for the protection of areas containing cultural monuments. And, finally,
the so-called Draft Rules disseminated by the International Committee of the
Red Cross in 1956 have a number of provisions on the subject of sanctuaries.
In summary, various types of protected zones for different categories of
noncombatants, emerging from the "open city" doctrine, have existed for a
considerable period of time. All of these protected zones have been restricted
to comparatively small land areas, perhaps a few thousand square yards or meters,
at most a few square miles or kilometers, intended to afford protection to a city
and its civilian population, to a hospital, its patients, and staff, to a prisoner of
war or internment camp and its inmates, to a museum and its attendants. The
Secretary-General's proposal would greatly enlarge this concept. It proposes
protected zones on a grand scale: not thousands of square yards or meters, but
thousands and hundreds of thousands of square miles or kilometers; not the
noncombatant personnel of a hospital, or of an internment camp, or of a
museum, or even of a city, but a very large part of the population of the nations
engaged in hostilities. Laudable and idealistic as the proposal obviously is, it
unfortunately appears to be completely impractical in the world in which we
live.
1 68 Levie on the Law of War
The problems involved in obtaining acceptance of and in implementing the
proposal appear to this writer to be insurmountable. Can anyone believe that
today's nations and their governments could reach agreement, even in
peacetime, either on a bilateral or on a multilateral basis, exempting large
portions of their respective territories from all types of attack in the event of
22
war? Can anyone believe that such nations would remove from, and prohibit
the subsequent introduction into, the zones so designated of every type of
industry and activity which could in any way contribute to a war effort? Can
anyone believe that in this age of nuclear weapons and "quick" wars, a nation
would, at the outset of hostilities, be in a position to devote the necessary energy,
manpower, and equipment to the task of moving millions of its civilians into
the neutralized zones? Can anyone believe that nations at war would be in a
position to devote the necessary energy, manpower, and equipment to the task
of providing logistic support for millions of its citizens who would necessarily
be nonproductive insofar as the war effort is concerned? Can anyone believe
that, human nature being what it is, the worker who stays on his job in support
of the war effort can be successfully separated from his wife and children? Can
anyone believe that any nation at war will voluntarily and actually deprive itself
of an urgendy needed resource by moving into a neutralized zone a great mass
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of potential labor, even though it be women, children, and the elderly? Can
anyone believe that today's nations will accept "a system of control and
verification" in the persons of foreign observers stationed within their territory
in time of war? Can anyone believe that the huge areas involved, the
impossibility of really effective control and verification, and the pressures of
wartime requirements, would not result in massive evasions of the restrictions
and improper usage of the neutralized zones? Can anyone believe that the
nations of today would accept any such proposal without an escape clause such
as the "imperative military necessity" clause ofthe 1949 Geneva Conventions?
Can anyone believe that a nuclear nation, envisioning the eventuality of defeat,
would not use the neutralized zones as a basis for blackmail? These are but a few
of the many questions raised by the Secretary-General's proposal, to each and
every one of which this writer would give a negative answer.
Is there an alternative to the Secretary-General's proposal for large-scale
civilian sanctuaries for the protection of the civilian population? There most
certainly is, and it is not only more feasible, but it is much more likely to be
acceptable to the community of nations. That alternative is as follows:
First, full-scale application of and compliance with the already existing
restrictions on allowable military objectives, modernized as necessary to meet
present-day requirements. What is needed is not new norms, but compliance
with existing norms. For example, target-area bombing certainly violated the
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principle of the military objective, but it was used by both sides so generally
during World War II that the principle practically ceased to exist. It must be
revived. Again, and perhaps somewhat peripherally, the Protecting Power is
already available to do all that the Secretary-General would have a
Commissioner-General or Observer-General do during time of actual
hostilities—but in not one of the scores of hostilities which have occurred since
the end of World War II has this extremely valuable international institution
been called into action.
Second, the law of air warfare, if any now exists, should be elaborated upon
31
and codified The extreme reluctance of nations to establish recognized and
accepted international rules in this very vital area is really incredible. For
example, all governments express horror at the mere suggestion that any other
nation, then engaged in hostilities, has resorted to "terror bombing"—the
bombing of nonmilitary objectives and of the civilian population in order to
destroy enemy morale and to bring an adversary to its knees on the home front
when it has not been possible to do so on the battlefront. The 1923 Hague Rules
32
of Air Warfare and the ICRC's 1956 Draft Rules specifically proposed such
33
a prohibition, but many years later that proposal is still in limbo. Here, too,
World War II practices have, unfortunately, probably negated the principle of
the military objective.
Third, the initiation of some system of effective sanctions against belligerents
who violate the principle of the rnilitary objective. Such a system of sanctions
has been drafted and accepted with respect to individual violators of the 1949
34
Geneva Conventions. There is no reason why some such system cannot be
devised for nation violators as well as individual violators of the principle of the
military objective, once that principle has been resurrected.
In summary, it is suggested that the existing law ofarmed conflict, elaborated
as may be necessary, particularly in the area of air warfare, ifcomplied with (and
with additional methods to be established for enforcing compliance), can provide
the civilian population with the protection which it requires and to which it is
already entitled under existing norms; and that it can do this much more readily
than can the elaborate and impractical proposal advanced by the
Secretary-General of the United Nations in his 1969 and 1970 Reports on
35
"Respect for Human Rights in Armed Conflict."
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VIII
International Law Aspects of Repatriation of
Prisoners of War During Hostilities: A Reply
67 AmericanJournal of International Law 693 (1973)*
I
In the July 1973 issue of theJournal, there appeared an article with the above
title written by Professor Richard Falk, in which he, in effect, advanced the
thesis that the release of prisoners of war for repatriation during the course of
hostilities in Vietnam to an ad hoc and self-styled "humanitarian organization"
(which admittedly consisted solely of individuals who were vocal opponents of
the United States participation in those hostilities) either constituted a valid and
forward-looking interpretation of the provisions of the Geneva Convention of
1949 relative to the Treatment of Prisoners ofWar (hereinafter referred to as
"the 1949 Convention") or indicated the need for revision of that instrument.
The subject appears to be one which calls for an analysis in considerably greater
depth than the treatment provided in the article by Professor Falk.
In this article, I shall discuss, independently of the facts alleged and the
arguments advanced in the article by Professor Falk, the legal aspects involved
in (1) the release and repatriation during the course of hostilities of prisoners of
war who do not come within the mandatory provisions of Article 109 et seq. of
the 1949 Convention (in other words, those who are not so "seriously
wounded" or so "seriously sick" as to be entided to release and repatriation as
a matter of right); and (2) the use of an "impartial humanitarian organization"
to accomplish this purpose. Thereafter, I shall point out some of the areas in
which I agree or disagree with the proponent of this procedure.
II
Historically, there have been three major methods employed by Detaining
Powers for the release and repatriation during the course of hostilities of
able-bodied prisoners of war—ransom, exchange, and parole. The ransom of
captured military personnel, which reached its peak in its application to chivalry
* Reprinted in THE VIETNAM WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 340 (Richard Falk
ed., 1976).
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in medieval times, had, for all practical purposes, disappeared by the end of the
seventeenth century. It was replaced by exchange when continental armies
became national and professional and when obtaining the release of captured
military personnel became accepted as the responsibility of the sovereign.
Exchange was man-for-man and grade-for-grade (with tables of "equivalent
values") so that, at least in theory, it would not result in any change in the relative
A
military strengths of the two sides. Exchange still existed as late as the American
Civil War, but it ceased to be a really effective procedure during that conflict.
Parole is the third method of effectuating the release and repatriation of
prisoners of war during the course of hostilities. Under this procedure, the
prisoner of war agrees to certain conditions that will govern his conduct upon
his release from a confined status. It has proven relatively unimportant as a
method of procuring the release and repatriation of prisoners ofwar during the
course of a conflict. Historically, it developed primarily into a method of
permitting the prisoner of war more freedom within the territory of the
Detaining Power, rather than of procuring his release and repatriation.
Moreover, Article 21(2) of the 1949 Convention, like its predecessors,
specifically contemplates that Powers of Origin may prohibit their captured
military personnel from giving or accepting parole; a number of countries,
including the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, have traditionally
restricted the right of their military personnel to give or accept parole.
Article 72 of the Geneva Convention of 1929 Relative to the Treatment of
8
Prisoners ofWar (hereinafter referred to as "the 1929 Convention") suggested
the possibility of agreements between belligerents for the repatriation during
hostilities of "able-bodied prisoners of war who have undergone a long period
of captivity." A similar but somewhat more extensive provision was included
in the 1949 Convention. Article 109(2) provides that the Parties may "conclude
agreements with a view to the direct repatriation or internment in a neutral
country of able-bodied prisoners of war who have undergone a long period of
captivity." This provision may be considered as an attempt to encourage the
belligerents to adopt one of these procedures (and to give neutral states and
others a basis for proposing them), rather than as a legal authorization to do so,
inasmuch as no such authorization was needed in order to enable belligerents
lawfully to enter into such agreements. Article 6(1) of the 1949 Convention
specifically contemplates the conclusion of special agreements by the Parties
concerning prisoner-of-war matters, subject only to the limitations that any such
agreement may not "adversely affect" the prisoners ofwar to whom it purports
to apply and that it may not "restrict the rights" elsewhere conferred upon them
by the Convention. Paragraph 2 of the same article contemplates that a Party
may unilaterally give prisoners ofwar more favorable treatment than is required
by the 1949 Convention itself. Certainly, an agreement for the repatriation of
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longtime, able-bodied prisoners of war during the course of hostilities would
not fall within the ambit of either of the limitations mentioned above; and it
would in any event be more favorable treatment than required by the 1949
Convention. Moreover, the Detaining Power could justifiably assert that
individuals so repatriated would be barred from further participation in the
hostilities against it.
Unfortunately, despite the fact that World War II saw many prisoners ofwar
held in captivity for periods in excess of five years, apparently no belligerent
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sought to implement Article 72 of the 1929 Convention. And in none of the
many armed conflicts which have occurred since the end ofWorld War II (and
since the 1949 Convention became effective) has there been an agreement for
the repatriation of able-bodied prisoners of war prior to the cessation of
hostilities. However, it is not really difficult to understand why neither of the
substantially similar provisions ofthe two Prisoner-of-War Conventions has ever
been implemented by belligerents. Any bilateral agreement providing for the
repatriation during hostilities of able-bodied prisoners ofwar would merely be
a new name for the old procedure of exchange, a procedure which fell into
disuse because, despite its man-for-man and grade-for-grade aspects, it inevitably
turned out to be more advantageous for one side than for the other. Indeed,
this same factor has even militated against the repatriation during the course of
hostilities of seriously wounded or sick prisoners of war.
It being accepted that releases and repatriations during the course ofhostilities
of longtime, able-bodied prisoners of war are within the contemplation of
existing international law, despite the failure of any belligerent state to do so as
a matter ofpractice, let us move to the next problem. What are the qualifications
required of a body for it to fall within the category of organizations empowered
to perform the humanitarian functions which the 1949 Convention authorizes
for the benefit of prisoners of war?
Article 8 ofthe 1949 Convention is the basic article establishing the Protecting
Power with its manifold humanitarian and other functions. However, Article
9 of that Convention specifically provides that humanitarian activities for the
benefit of prisoners of war may also be performed by the International
Committee of the Red Cross (the ICRC) or by "any other impartial
humanitarian organization." The organization and operations of the ICRC are
widely known and have received well-merited recognition throughout the 1949
Convention. The precise nature of the organizations which fall within the
meaning of the term "any other impartial humanitarian organization" is
considerably less clear.
Article 88 ofthe 1929 Convention, which was the direct progenitor ofArticle
9 of the 1949 Convention, did not include the possibility of the intervention of
any "humanitarian organization" other than the ICRC for the purpose of
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furnishing assistance to prisoners of war. That possibility received recognition
for the first time in a proposal made by the Italian representative during a meeting
of a committee of the Diplomatic Conference which drafted the 1949
19
Convention. The Italian proposal to add the words "or any other impartial
humanitarian body" after the reference to the ICRC in the original draft of the
article received the strong support of the Director-General of the International
Refugee Organization (IRO) who pointed out that, in view of the existing
collaboration between governments and the IRO, "it would seem opportune
to extend the provisions ofArticle 8 [now Article 9 ofthe 1949 Prisoner-of-War
Convention], to enable governments to avail themselves of its services in case
20
of necessity.'" The proposal was adopted by the Joint Committee of the
Diplomatic Conference after a debate in which the representative of the United
States had supported the use for humanitarian purposes of"welfare organizations
of a non-international character" and the Committee had rejected a Burmese
proposal to narrow the Italian proposal to "any other internationally recognized
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impartial humanitarian body."' It was approved at a Plenary Meeting of the
Diplomatic Conference without debate.
The foregoing is the substance of the travaux preparatoires concerning the
addition of the words "or any other impartial humanitarian organization" to
23
Article 9 of the 1949 Convention. " In attempting to elucidate the precise
meaning ofthese words, it is therefore necessary to look elsewhere for help. The
ICRC's discussion of the matter in a 1960 publication is extremely helpful.
The humanitarian activities authorized must be undertaken by the International
Committee of the Red Cross or by any other impartial humanitarian organization.
The International Committee is mentioned in two capacities—firsdy on its own
account . . .; and secondly, as an example of what is meant by "impartial
humanitarian organization. ..."
The organization must be humanitarian; in other words it must be concerned with
the condition of man, considered solely as a human being, regardless of his value
as a military, political, professional or other unit. It must also be impartial. Article
9 does not require it to be international.... Furthermore, the Convention does not
require the organization to be neutral, but it is obvious that impartiality benefits
gready from neutrality.
In order to be authorized, the organization's activities must be purely humanitarian
in character; that is to say they must be concerned with human beings as such,
and must not be affected by any political or military consideration. Within those
limits, any subsidiary activity which helps to implement the principles of the
24
Convention is not only authorized but desirable under Article 9. . . .
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There are, then, three basic requirements for an organization's qualifying as
"any other impartial humanitarian organization" within the meaning of Article
9 of the 1949 Convention: first, it must be impartial in its operations; second, it
must be humanitarian in concept and function; and third, it must have some
25
institutional, operational, and functional resemblance to the ICRC. Negatively,
it need not be international in creation and it need not be neutral in origin.
What is meant by "impartial"? An "impartial" organization is one which, as
an institution, is unbiased and unprejudiced, fair and equitable to both sides in
its operations, one which neither by act nor by statement gives any indication
that it prefers one side over the other. The mere fact ofbeing established and
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based in a neutral country does not of itselfmake an organization "impartial."
Conversely, the mere fact ofbeing established and based in a belligerent country
does not necessarily indicate a lack of "impartiality." While, as a practical matter,
it will undoubtedly be most difficult to identify an organization which is not
"neutral" in location but which is accepted as "impartial," this is neither a
paradox nor an impossibility. Such an organization will usually be one which
operates exclusively in the territory of its own nation, preparing material
assistance for dispatch through neutral relief channels, such as the ICRC, to the
prisoners ofwar of its own nationality held by the enemy; and, more relevandy,
it will be one which is permitted to and does provide material assistance to enemy
prisoners ofwar held in the territory of its own nation. It is, however, almost
inconceivable that an organization which is established and based in the territory
of one belligerent will be permitted to function in the territory of an opposing
belligerent, no matter how impartial and humanitarian its reputation and its
operations. ' Wartime public opinion alone would be a sufflciendy powerful
force to prevent an "enemy" organization from functioning freely in the territory
of the other side—except under the most unusual circumstances.
The meaning of the term "humanitarian" is considerably less controversial
and its application presents far fewer problems. As stated by the ICRC in the
excerpts quoted above, "humanitarian" denotes "concerned with the condition
of man, considered solely as a human being." In the context of the prisoner of
war, a "humanitarian organization" is one which has the objective ofprotecting
and improving the welfare ofthe prisoner ofwar and the conditions under which
he exists. Certainly, this is, and has long been, a major objective of the ICRC,
and, as we have seen, the ICRC serves as a model for identifying the
organizations which come within the meaning of Article 9 of the 1949
Convention.
Finally, the entity seeking to bring itselfwithin that provision—or which one
of the belligerents seeks to bring within that provision—must be an
"organization" and as such it must have some institutional, operational, and
functional resemblance to the ICRC. An individual does not qualify. A small,
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ad hoc loose-knit group consisting of individuals who have joined together for
a specific and limited purpose and which is obviously destined to have a limited
life span does not qualify. There must be some institutional basis, some
operational experience and tradition, which clearly establishes it as an
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organization that is both impartial and humanitarian. An established religious
organization could probably qualify institutionally even though it had not been
previously engaged in prisoner-of-war welfare activities. A national Red Cross
Society could probably qualify institutionally as could an organization which has
operated in the field ofrelieffrom natural disasters. An international organization,
7/X
such as the United Nations or the Organization of American States, or an
agency thereof, such as the UN High Commissioner for Refugees or the OAS
Council, could probably qualify institutionally. The possibilities are almost
limidess.
One additional facet of the designation of "impartial humanitarian
organizations" requires mention. Article 9 of the 1949 Convention makes the
activities of the ICRC or of any other impartial humanitarian organization
"subject to the consent ofthe Parties to the conflict concerned." In the debate
on the proposed amendment to the draft article which contemplated the
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activities of impartial humanitarian organizations other than the ICRC, the
representative of France pointed out that "the activities of humanitarian bodies
were always subordinated to approval by Parties to the conflict. "' The provision
of the 1949 Convention has been interpreted, and properly so, as requiring the
consent of all the Parties "upon which the possibility of carrying out the action
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contemplated depends."' This is why it is inconceivable that even a universally
recognized humanitarian organization, if established and based in the territory
of one belligerent, would be able to function in the territory of the other.
An organization obviously cannot function if it does not have the permission
and approval of the sovereign of the territory in which it proposes to operate
(normally, this would be the Detaining Power); it legally cannot, and certainly
should not, function if it does not also have the permission and approval of the
other sovereign concerned (normally, this would be the Power of Origin).
To summarize:
(1.) An adequate legal basis exists in international law for the release and
repatriation of longtime, able-bodied prisoners of war during the course of
hostilities (Article 109(2)).
(2.) While the legal basis for such action contemplates a consensual
arrangement, the 1949 Convention not only permits but encourages unilateral
action which is more favorable to the prisoners of war than is required by the
Convention itself (Article 6(2)).
(3.) Bilateral release and repatriation of longtime, able-bodied prisoners of
war during the course of hostilities, as provided in the 1949 Convention (Article
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109(2)), is actually a return to the historic procedure ofexchange with the added
limitation against the further use of the repatriated prisoners of war "on active
military service" (Article 117).
(4.) Either the International Committee of the Red Cross or "any other
impartial humanitarian organization" may perform humanitarian activities for
the welfare of prisoners of war provided that the appropriate Parties to the
conflict give their consent (Article 9)
.
(5.) An "impartial humanitarian organization" within the meaning ofArticle
9 of the 1949 Convention is one which is unbiased and unprejudiced, fair and
equitable to both Parties concerned, one which neither by act nor by statement
gives any indication that it prefers one side over the other; one which has the
humanitarian objective ofprotecting and improving the welfare ofthe prisoners
ofwar and the conditions under which they exist in their status as captives; and
one which is truly an "organization," a status measured, in the final analysis, by
its institutional, operational, and functional resemblance to the ICRC.
From the foregoing general discussion of the legal aspects of the release and
repartriation during hostilities oflongtime, able-bodied prisoners ofwar through
the intervention of humanitarian organizations, it is obvious that Professor Falk
and I are in substantial agreement on the merit ofsuch releases and repatriations
from a humanitarian point of view. He suggests the need for "flexible"
interpretation, or, alternatively, revision of the 1949 Convention in order to
accomplish his basic purpose. This is unnecessary because the provisions of
Article 109(2) ofthe 1949 Convention specifically cover exacdy the contingency
with which he is concerned, thereby making "flexible"" interpretation or
revision unnecessary.
We part company completely when he attempts to enlarge the scope of the
term "impartial humanitarian organization" so as to bring within its ambit a
group such as the self-styled "Committee ofLiaison with Families ofServicemen
Detained in North Vietnam" (hereinafter referred to as the "Committee of
Liaison") the members of which were far more concerned with anti-war
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propaganda than with the welfare of prisoners of war. The Committee of
Liaison was anything but "impartial"; it was more strongly motivated by political
than by humanitarian considerations; and its existence as an "organization"
within the meaning of the 1949 Convention was, at the very least, debatable.
To put the matter in proper perspective, it will be helpful to summarize briefly
the events which are the basis for the legal thesis with which we are dealing.
The process really began in October-November 1967 when the Viet Cong
released three captured American soldiers in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, to
Thomas E. Hayden, an American identified by the press as being the
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representative of "anti-war groups" in the United States. * Then in February
1968 the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) released three American
pilots in Hanoi to the Rev. Daniel Berrigan and Howard Zinn, also identified
by the press as representatives of "anti-war groups." Some months later, in
July-August 1968, the DRV released three more American pilots in Hanoi, this
time to Mrs. Robert Scheer, Vernon Grizzard, and Stuart Meacham, once again
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identified by the press as representatives of "anti-war" groups. In August 1969
the DRV released three American servicemen in Hanoi, this time to Rennard
C. Davis and David Dellinger, who were identified as representing the "National
Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam." Finally, in September
1972, there occurred the release ofthree American pilots in Hanoi to Mrs. Cora
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Weiss, David Dellinger, Professor Falk et al. Thus, the DRV made the first
release of three captured American servicemen in February 1968; the second in
August 1968; the third in August 1969; and the fourth and last in October 1972.
The first two of these releases were made to well-known anti-war individuals;
the latter two were made to two different anti-war groups. Each was attended
with great publicity over an extended period of time. Each involved the release
ofonly a token number ofprisoners ofwar. Each involved prisoners ofwar who
could only have been selected for release for reasons other than their physical
condition or length of confinement, the grounds mentioned in the 1949
Convention for releases and repatriations during the course of hostilities.
The cablegram sent by the "escort group" to the President of the United
States from Hanoi (which was, perhaps not unexpectedly, immediately
broadcast by Hanoi radio) displayed either remarkable presumption, remarkable
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ignorance, or remarkable naivete. ' The four "guidelines" laid down for the
benefit ofthe U. S. Government by the Committee ofLiaison warrant individual
comment, particularly in the light of the claim being advanced that the
Committee of Liaison was an "impartial humanitarian organization."
The first paragraph of the cablegram demanded that the three prisoners of
war released by the DRV to the Committee of Liaison for repatriation to the
United States "shall proceed home with us and representatives of their families
in civilian aircraft." The DRV could have made a case for insisting upon the
use of civilian aircraft up to the territorial limits of the United States; but that it
would omit such a major requirement from its public statement, and then
privately so advise the members ofthe escort groups seems, to say the least, rather
odd. " On the other hand, if the use of civil aircraft and the designation of
authorized fellow passengers was a condition asserted on the initiative of the
escort group, the group demonstrated that it, and the Committee of Liaison
which it represented, were anything but "impartial." Moreover, despite the
obvious mental reservations displayed by members of the escort group, it is a
universal rule of military law that upon his departure from the territory and
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control of the enemy (whether by release, escape, or any other method), a
prisoner ofwar has the duty to report at once to the first available authorities of
his country. Members of anti-war groups frequendy display a singular inability
to recognize that the relationship between a member of the military service and
the military authorities has evolved over the centuries as a result of the dictates
of necessity and differs considerably from the relationship between a civilian and
the civilian authorities.
The second paragraph of the cablegram called for the granting of a 30-day
"furlough" to the three prisoners ofwar being released and repatriated. How
such a completely internal, administrative matter could possibly have been
deemed to be within the purview of either the DRV or of an "impartial
humanitarian organization" is exceedingly difficult to perceive. It was just
about as much the business of either the DRV or the Committee of Liaison as
it would have been to lay down a condition that the men were to receive
automatic promotions or to be entitled to additional pay for the period during
which they had been prisoners of war. The members of the escort group seem
to have labored under the impression that their first contact (except for
Dellinger) with the problem of returned prisoners of war offered a subtle
occasion to educate the military services about the process of repatriation. They
were apparendy unmindful of the fact that thousands of prisoners of war had
been repatriated by the armed forces after World War II and the Korean War.
The third paragraph of the cablegram demanded a "complete medical
checkup at the hospital of their choice, civilian or military." Once again the
Committee of Liaison pronounced itself on an internal, administrative matter
in an area in which the military services have had far more experience than the
members of the escort group. The members of the Committee again
demonstrated an unwillingness to accept the fact that the three prisoners ofwar
continued to be members of the military service, subject to military control and
discipline, and were not just civilian members of the general public and
"proteges" of the Committee of Liaison. Moreover, despite the demand for a
medical checkup in a hospital made in the cablegram, the escort group later
apparently realized that this would completely remove their "proteges" from
their control and, as they approached the United States, their medicaljudgment
changed. "[I]t was clear to the escort group . . . that there was no immediate
need for medical surveillance."" However, once they were back in the United
States they had to concede that "the pilots preferred, or at least were unwilling
to contest, the Government's insistence on a medical checkup under military
auspices."
The fourth paragraph of the cablegram prescribed that the three men being
repatriated "shall do nothing further to promote the American war effort in
Indochina." As we have seen, Article 117 of the 1949 Convention contains an
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ambiguous prohibition against a repatriated prisoner of war's being "employed
on active military service." Like the United States, the ICRC interprets this
to prohibit taking part "in armed operations against the former Detaining Power
or its allies." Certainly, any reasonable interpretation of Article 1 17 is far from
the broad ban which the "impartial," anti-war Committee of Liaison sought to
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impose.
The fact that the Committee of Liaison opposed U. S. participation in the
hostilities in Vietnam is apparently considered one of the more decisive
arguments in establishing both its "impartiality" and its "humanitarianism."
Conversely, it is at least implied that support of U. S. participation in the
hostilities in Vietnam establishes a lack of "impartiality" and "humanitarianism."
Thus, the "National League of Families of American Prisoners and Missing in
Southeast Asia," an organization all of whose members were relatives of
servicemen either known to be prisoners ofwar or missing in action and whose
goal was "to achieve better treatment for Americans held captive and to learn
the status of those missing in action," is dismissed as being one of the "groups
that also proclaim their humanitarian purposes, despite their commitment to
Mr. Nixon's war policies." ' While there is merit to the conclusion that the
"National League" did not qualify as an "impartial humanitarian organization"
within the meaning of Article 9 of the 1949 Convention, this is not because of
its failure to oppose U.S. participation in the Vietnamese conflict, but because,
as in the case of the Committee of Liaison, there is no basis for concluding that
it was the type of organization envisaged by the draftsmen of the 1949
Convention.
The failure of the U.S. Government to oppose Dellinger's application for
leave to travel with the escort group when he was free on bail pending an appeal
is construed as evidence of an implied consent by the United States to the
activities of the Committee of Liaison. The fact that the U.S. Government
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did not "interfere with its activities," or "make an objection" to the
Committee, and that "the North Vietnamese initiative was not repudiated,"
are also cited as evidence that the United States agreed to and concurred in the
activities of the Committee of Liaison and that "it was a consensual process."
In other words, it is contended that the failure of the U.S. Government to
interfere with and to prevent the repatriation in 1972, just as it had taken no
action to interfere with or prevent the earlier repatriations, constituted a legal
acceptance of the Committee of Liaison as an "impartial humanitarian
organization." That contention does not even appear to warrant discussion.
The argument advanced with respect to the proper interpretation of Articles
9 and 10 of the 1949 Convention is also without validity. Despite the fact that
Article 9 is so specific in requiring the consent ofboth Parties to an armed conflict
before the ICRC or an impartial humanitarian organization may undertake
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activities for the protection or reliefofprisoners ofwar, the argument is made
that the language ofboth Articles 9 and 10 is "ambiguous with regard to whether
the belligerent [belligerents?] must agree to the designation of a humanitarian
organization"; and the conclusion is reached that it is "most reasonable" to
interpret Article 10(2) "as giving the Detaining Power, North Vietnam, the
capacity to deal with an organization like the Committee of Liaison."
The DRV is at least a de facto state and its "capacity to deal" with the
Committee of Liaison, or any other group, cannot be doubted; but to use this
circumstance to establish that the Committee of Liaison is, therefore, an
"impartial humanitarian organization" which may be unilaterally designated by
the DRV as a substitute for the Protecting Power is quite another matter. The
attempt to attain this result is, in effect, based upon the following reasoning:
Article 10(2) of the 1949 Convention provides that if there is no Protecting
Power and ifno organization offering all guarantees of impartiality and efficacy
to perform the duties of the Protecting Power has been designated to perform
those duties under Article 10(1), "the Detaining Power shall request a neutral
State, or such an organization, to undertake the functions" of the Protecting
Power. In acceding to the 1949 Convention, the DRV made a reservation to
Article 10 stating that it would not "recognize as legal" such a request by the
Detaining Power "unless the request has been approved by the State upon which
the prisoners ofwar depend." A substantially similar reservation to Article 10
had been made by the USSR and the Soviet bloc countries upon signing the
Convention in 1949 and in their subsequent ratifications. The reason given
by the USSR for the reservation was the belief that "the Government of the
country to which the protected persons belong [cannot be prevented] from
taking part in the choice of the substitute for the Protecting Power." In
recommending that the Senate give its advice and consent to the ratification of
the 1949 Convention by the United States, the Department of State advised the
Senate ofits opposition to the USSR and similar reservations. This opposition,
according to Falk,
seems to confirm the United States view that the Detaining Power had the
capacity, even the duty, to designate an impartial humanitarian organization and
that such designation would be determinative at least in the absence of objection
from the country whose men are detained that the organization is not "impartial"
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or not "humanitarian."
Thus, based upon the DRV reservation to Article 10 of the 1949 Convention
and the earlier stated objection of the Department of State to the DRV-type
reservation to that article, the conclusion is reached that a Detaining Power may
unilaterally designate an "impartial humanitarian organization" to perform
functions with respect to prisoners of war.
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In the first place, it must be borne in mind that Article 10 deals, not with the
activities of the "impartial humanitarian organization" referred to in Article 9,
but with the activities of Protecting Powers and of "substitutes" for Protecting
Powers. It seems incredible that the contention would be made that the
Committee of Liaison, a small group of completely inexperienced individuals,
whose only common thread was opposition to U.S. participation in the hostilities
in Vietnam, could possibly qualify as an organization "offering guarantees of
impartiality and efficacy to perform the duties ofthe Protecting Power,"—which
are the requirements set forth in Article 10(1) for an organization that may be
designated under Article 10(2).
In the second place, the DRV, like the USSR and the Soviet bloc countries
at the 1949 Diplomatic Conference, made its reservation to Article 10 because
it considered that the article improperly reduced the right ofthe Power ofOrigin
to participate in the selection ofa substitute for the Protecting Power. Inasmuch
as the DRV became a Party to the 1949 Convention only on the condition that
no neutral state or humanitarian organization could be designated by a Detaining
Power to act as a substitute for the Protecting Power without the consent of the
Power of Origin, it is certainly inverse reasoning to claim that this established
the right of the DRV acting as a Detaining Power, unilaterally so to designate
the Committee ofLiaison, without the consent ofthe United States, the Power
of Origin.
In the third place, instead ofreferring to the suggestion made in a letter written
by Secretary Dulles to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee concerning the
attitude which the United States should take with respect to the Soviet bloc
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reservations, it would have been more appropriate to refer to the position
actually and officially taken by the United States in connection with ratification
of the 1949 Convention:
Rejecting the reservations which States have made with respect to the Geneva
Convention relative to the treatment ofprisoners ofwar, the United States accepts
treaty relations with all parties to that Convention, except as to the changes
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proposed by such reservations.
In other words, while the United States has treaty relations with any state which
has ratified or acceded to the 1949 Convention with a reservation to Article 10,
those treaty relations are subject to the changes made by the reservation, which
means that neither the United States nor the reserving state, when acting as a Detaining
Power, may designate a neutral Power or a humanitarian organization as a
substitute for the Protecting Power without the approval of the Power of
Origin.
One basic question remains. Why did they do it? Why did the North
Vietnamese unilaterally release these randomly-selected, token-size groups of
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prisoners of war for repatriation? Were the North Vietnamese more
humanitarian-minded than the belligerents ofWorld War I? OfWorld War II?
Of Korea? Were they inspired to do what they did because of empathy for the
men released and repatriated? All of these questions carrv their own negative
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responses.
The Vietnam War was unlike past conflicts. Previous wars had not seen the
establishment and proliferation of anti-war groups which functioned openly,
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seeking publicity that was not always easy for them to obtain. The release of
token numbers of prisoners of war to these groups for repatriation at rather
lengthy intervals served, on each occasion, as a major propaganda device, one
which for a number of days gave the North Vietnamese and the particular
anti-war group large-scale newspaper, television, and radio coverage. Had the
releases been purely humanitarian in nature, the prisoners of war selected for
release would have been those who were the most seriously wounded or sick,
or those who had been the longest in prisoner-of-war status; but neither of these
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valid criteria was used in the selection process.
The significance for the future ofwhat transpired in the concluding months
ofAmerican participation in the war in Vietnam is not great. In an all-out armed
conflict, one which is a "war" both under international law and in an American
constitutional sense, private repatriations by civilians will probably not be
practical, because the members of the antiwar group in any belligerent country
participating in such an event would undoubtedly find themselves spending at
least the balance of the period of hostilities in close confinement after having
been tried and convicted of treason or of communicating with the enemy.
Second, as a practical matter, with the limitations which would exist on wartime
travel, particularly across international borders, it would probably be all but
impossible for an "escort group" to accomplish its function. Third, and most
important, with the close censorship of the news media which is maintained
during wartime, there would be litde or no propaganda value in releasing
token-sized groups of prisoners of war for repatriation as the Power of Origin
could completely control the amount ofpublicity, if any, which the event would
be allowed within its territory, the place where the impact of the propaganda is
actually desired. Without the publicity which releases and repatriations are
designed to generate, the motive for such action by a belligerent withers on the
vine.
In conclusion, while there are both legal and humanitarian bases for the release
and repatriation, or internment in neutral countries, during the course of
hostilities oflongtime, able-bodied prisoners ofwar, this highly laudable purpose
can best be accomplished through resort to the established and recognized
faculties of the Protecting Power and the International Committee of the Red
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Cross, rather than through the use of partisan, ad hoc groups which have
extremely limited public acceptance and recognition.
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necessary for the designation of such a substitute. (For a more detailed discussion of the reservation to Article
10, see text at pp. 182-84.)
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43. Falk, 473-74.
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86. Some evidence of this can found in the fact that with each release of prisoners of war there would be
a great fanfare when the announcement of the proposed release was made, or when the escort group set off
for Hanoi, or when it arrived in Hanoi—and then there would be an unexplained delay of a number of days
while the publicity, of course, continued. For example, in the second 1968 release the delay was "pretty close
to three weeks" (1971 Hearings 222) and in the 1972 release ofwhich Falk gives us a blow-by-blow description
the unexplained delay was from Sept. 17 to 24 (Falk, 466). While it is true that a Gallup poll conducted in
Feb. 1970 revealed that a majority ofAmericans did not believe the glowing statements made by the members
of the escort groups upon their return to the United States, a surprising number of Americans apparently did
believe them—and even if the number had been much smaller, the propaganda value to the DRV far
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87. Actually, it is probable that no criteria were used. See note 50 supra. In the July-Aug. 1968 release the
three pilots released had been prisoners ofwar for only four to seven months. Note 47 supra. Concerning the
selection of these three individuals, one witness before the House Subcommittee testified:
When Thompson, Low and Carpenter were brought together at the time of their release, they tried
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take good care of their prisoners'."
1971 Hearings 387.
Weapons of Warfare
Law and Responsibility in Warfare 153 (Peter D. Trooboffed., 1975)
Any analysis of the legality of using lachrymatories, napalm, and herbicides
(defoliants) should not, in my view, be confined to determining their
status under the 1 925 Geneva Protocol and customary international law. As I
have urged elsewhere, we should concern ourselves with the future, notjust the
past. I will, therefore, attempt here not only to examine the existing law
regarding these weapons, but also to look ahead to what this country's policy
should be toward their use in armed conflicts.
Lachrymatories
3CS , the modern-day lachrymatory or tear gas , is a sensory irritant that harasses
and incapacitates by causing a copious flow of tears. While it may sometimes
cause irritation, and even blistering, of the skin and, occasionally, nausea and
vomiting, the symptoms will usually quickly disappear when the victim is
A
removed from the contaminated area. The incapacity caused by tear gas is said
to be "a temporary, reversible disability with few, if any, permanent effects.""
It is used by most of the police forces of the world for domestic riot-control
purposes. Its great advantage over older tear gases, and others currendy available
such as CN, is the speed with which it incapacitates—about five seconds after
exposure. CS is, of course, only a modern version of tear gas, which has long
been available in other forms.
Strangely enough, it may truthfully be said that the United States introduced
the use ofCS in hostilities in Vietnam for humanitarian reasons. One ofthe first
uses ofCS, in September 1965, actually accomplished this purpose. A Viet Cong
force was holed up in a tunnel. The United States commander believed that
there were also quite a few civilian noncombatants, women, and children in the
tunnel. He decided to use CS and succeeded in flushing out about four hundred
people, including seventeen armed Viet Cong, without inflicting any injuries
"7
or causing any deaths. A second use ofCS that might be termed "humanitarian"
was in helicopter missions to remove the wounded from the field ofcombat and
to rescue downed fliers. In these cases the surrounding area was saturated with
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CS in order to hold down small-arms fire against the helicopter during the course
of its pickup mission.
However, CS proved so effective for these purposes that its use was quickly
extended to include numerous methods of delivery, both by air and on the
ground, and many types of combat operations. Among the combat uses in




Defending perimeters (to repulse attacks on outposts and other fortified areas);
2. Covering the removal of troops by helicopter (an extension to defensive
combat operations of the original humanitarian purpose of removing the
wounded and rescuing downed fliers); and
3. Responding to the ambush of convoys (the ambushing troops, who, being
unseen, were not good targets for small arms, were frustrated by the use of
CS covering wide areas on both sides of the road).
Offensive operations:
1. Flushing the enemy from tunnels, caves, bunkers, fortifications, etc. (this
considerably reduced the number of friendly casualties);
2. Covering the landing oftroops by helicopter (an extension to offensive combat
operations of the original humanitarian purpose);
3. Contaminating an area and thus denying its use to the enemy (while CS is not
particularly persistent, during dry spells it can be stirred up by the movement
of a vehicle for some period of time); and
4. Reconnoitering enemy troop positions (CS forced concealed troops to reveal
their position).
Thus we find CS not being employed for humanitarian purposes to reduce
the number of casualties, particularly of noncombatants. Instead, it was being
used in conjunction with small-arms and artillery fire and with high-explosive
and antipersonnel bombs. The individual driven from his place of safety by the
tear gas thus became the victim ofthe conventional weapon. One commentator
believes that developing these uses for tear gas, far from having a humanitarian
result, actually increased the number of casualties among noncombatants. He
concludes that tear gas forced noncombatants from cover, exposing them to
weapons from which they would otherwise have been protected.
Was there anything illegal about the use of these combat procedures? Only
if there is some norm of international law, either contractual or customary,
prohibiting the use of tear gas in international armed conflict. The questions that
then arise are: Do the prohibitions of the 1925 Geneva Protocol include a ban
on the use ofincapacitating gases, such as tear gas? And, ifso, has this ban become
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a pan of customary international law, binding on nations such as the United
States that were not parties to the Protocol during the hostilities?
On both of these questions there is a sharp difference of opinion among the
writers. There are those who believe that, because of the discrepancy in wording
between the English and French versions of the Protocol, or for other reasons,
12
tear eases such as CS are not included in the treatv ban. There are others who
are iust as certain that they are.
Even if one assumes that tear gases are included within the prohibitions of
the Protocol, that, of course, merely establishes a contractual ban. It does not
necessarily mean that there was a norm of customary international law binding
on the United States, then not yet a party to the Protocol. There is just as
sharp a division of thought among the experts as to whether there is a norm of
customary international law prohibiting the use oftear gas in international armed
conflict. The positions taken in the writings on the customary law raise three
questions that, in my view, remain unanswered.
1. If the Protocol itself is so indefinite that many articles have been written
interpreting it both as banning the use of tear gas in international armed conflict
and as not covering incapacitating gases such as tear gas, how can it be said to
constitute the basis for, or represent the codification of, a norm of customary
international law on the subject?
2. If there is a norm of customary international law banning the use of
incapacitating gases, such as tear gas, in international armed conflict, what is the
significance of the many reservations to the Protocol making the ratifications
applicable only with respect to other parties to the Protocol? Are the resenting
states not saying that they are free from any ban on the use of any gas, including
incapacitating gases, in hostilities with nonparties? If they are not saying that,
what are thev saving; in the reservations":
16 17
3. ^v%Tiat do writers such as Lauterpacht and Stone ' mean when they say
that the prohibition on the use of gas (which would presumably include tear
gases) is binding upon "practically all States"? How can a rule of customary
international law be binding only on practically all states?
Setting aside the unresolved legal problems, what are the practicalities that
have motivated nations and international lawyers to find that international law.
bv treatv and bv rule of custom, prohibits the use in international armed conflict
-18
of a comparatively harmless gas such as CS? The answer appears to be that
there exists a well-founded fear that unless all gases, including the incapacitating
gases, are considered barred, nations will build up their production capabilities
and their reserves and these will not be limited to incapacitating gases. ' This
20
did, of course, occur." Furthermore, it is feared that if some gases are not
included in the ban, it will be difficult, if not impossible, to draw a clear line
21
between the lawful and the unlawful. If tear gases are allowed because of their
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nonpermanent effect, why not, for example, a psychochemical that gives the
victim temporary hallucinations, or a gas that painlessly immobilizes the victim
for a number of hours? Finally, there exists the fear that any use of gas, even an
agent that is generally admitted to be only temporarily incapacitating, will
inevitably escalate into more extensive gas warfare. We have seen that the use
ofCS in Vietnam started out with a narrow humanitarian purpose and expanded
into a major operational combat weapon. While the escalation fortunately did
not go any farther, that possibility was always present.
On the basis of the available materials, I am frankly unable to say that the
United States was bound during the Vietnam War by any rule of international
law prohibiting the use of tear gas in international armed conflict. I am
convinced, however, that morally and politically the United States would be
well advised to adopt and follow a policy of self-denial. This country should
adopt a policy of no first use of tear gas just as it has announced such a policy
23
for other gases. While the original use of CS in Vietnam may have had a
humanitarian basis, the varied combat uses subsequently adopted were actually
antihumanitarian in nature and result. The United States has isolated itself
politically in this area. It has also created the possibility that the use of tear gas
in some future conflict will gradually escalate into full-fledged gas warfare. The
advantages derived from the use of tear gas in Vietnam, even assuming that such
use was completely in accordance with international law, were not worth the
price that had to be paid.
Napalm
Fire has, of course, been used as a weapon since time immemorial. Military
forces relied heavily on flamethrowers during World War I and even more so
during World War II. Similarly, magnesium and white-phosphorous fire bombs
were widely employed during World War II both in Europe and in the Far East.
Napalm was first developed and used during World War II. At no time
during either world war did a substantial or authoritative voice challenge the
legality of using fire as a weapon in international armed conflict. When napalm
was used extensively for the first time, in Korea, cries of outrage were heard.
But these protests came almost exclusively from the side whose troops were
receiving it and were unable to reciprocate in kind. During the Vietnam War
these protests grew in volume, and they had support from elements throughout
the world.
Napalm is a gelled gasoline. The word itself is an acronym for the two
ingredients that were thought to constitute the thickener that is added to the
gasoline to produce the gel. ' It is an extremely effective weapon and
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undoubtedly the most valuable incendiary now available. Napalm is greatly
feared, and its use causes far more panic than other weapons.
For these reasons, the United Nations Group of Consultant Experts on
Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons stated that napalm should
be classified with high-explosive weapons, rather than with asphyxiating or
poisonous gases. Resolution XXIII of the International Conference on
Human Rights, adopted in Tehran on 12 May 1968, contained a preambulary
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clause classifying napalm bombing with chemical warfare. This portion of the
resolution was omitted from General Assembly Resolution 2444 (XXIII), which
resulted from the Tehran conference.
In a report to the International Conference ofthe Red Cross, held in Istanbul
in 1969, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) noted that
napalm is a weapon that "can be very effective, while remaining precise in its
consequences"; and that "napalm and incendiary weapons in general are not
specifically prohibited by any rule of international law.'" Some members of
the Group ofExperts convened by the ICRC expressed the opinion that napalm
falls within the coverage of the 1925 Protocol because it can cause asphyxia by
air deprivation. Others "considered such an assimilation difficult" and concluded... 29
that it is the use to which the weapon is put that determines its legality. Napalm
has also been condemned as causing unnecessary suffering in violation of the
1907 Hague Regulations.
I do not believe that, at present, there is any rule of international law that
prohibits the use of napalm upon selected targets, but there is, as I have argued
previously, a strong humanitarian basis for urging total prohibition. However,
as a practical matter, a meaningful agreement probably will not be reached to
ban a weapon as effective as napalm has proved itself to be. As an alternative, I
concur in the proposal that the Secretary-General of the United Nations have
prepared, with the assistance of qualified consultant experts, a report on napalm
similar to the one on chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons. Such
a report would examine whether it is necessary to limit or prohibit the use of
napalm in international armed conflict. If either ofthese types ofaction is agreed
upon, the report would serve as a basis for drafting an international convention
on napalm.
Herbicides (Defoliants)
Herbicides (defoliants) are agricultural chemicals that poison or desiccate the
leaves of plants, causing them either to lose their leaves or to die. When
herbicides cause leaf fall, whether they kill the plant or not, they are known as
defoliants. While the first actual use ofherbicides in armed conflict was probably
during the Vietnam War, they are far from a new weapon. In 1945 the United
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States had already developed herbicides known as LN agents, which were stated
to be effective against plants, but not injurious to animals or humans. Some
consideration was given to their use against the gardens that supplied food to
the Japanese military on Pacific islands that the Allied forces bypassed in their
advance towardJapan. But no such action was actually taken. Herbicides have,
of course, had considerable use as weed-control agents.
As in the case of CS, the passage of time brought about a major change in
the nature of the use of herbicides in Vietnam. While the original use was to
defoliate jungle growths in order to open up to view enemy infiltration routes,
a number ofother uses were soon found. Crop destruction subsequently assumed
some importance, although it never displaced defoliation as the primary use.
By 1 968 the extent of the use of herbicides was limited only by the availability




Defoliating enemy infiltration routes—to open them to view;
2. Defoliating friendly base perimeters—to prevent sneak attacks;
3. Defoliating lines of communication, including river banks—to prevent
ambushes;
4. Defoliating enemy base areas—to make his troops move; and
5. Destroying crops—to make the enemy divert his combat efforts to food
37
procurement and supply.
Once again, there is a sharp division of opinion among the experts on the
applicability of the 1925 Geneva Protocol to herbicides. Some believe that the
Protocol includes a ban on antiplant chemicals. They concede that the evidence
38
to support this finding is comparatively weak. Their strongest argument is not
the legislative history, which they heavily rely upon. It is rather the practical,
not legal, point that, as in the case ofincapacitating gases, it is impossible to draw
a clear line between what is prohibited and what is not. As a result, unless nations
39
consider all herbicides as banned, the possibility of escalation is ever present.
Other writers find no prohibition in the 1925 Geneva Protocol or in
. 40
customary international law against the use ofherbicides. They are particularly
certain of this conclusion if defoliation has a valid military purpose and if crop
destruction is limited to crops destined for consumption by the military. It is,
perhaps, appropriate to note two arguments that have been advanced in support
of this basic thesis. The validity of each has been attacked.
The first is that because herbicides are widely used domestically to control
weeds and other unwanted vegetation, the Protocol (and, presumably,
customary international law) cannot possibly have been intended to apply to
them. * This argument is correctly met with the response that evidence of
domestic use is irrelevant for these purposes. * There is nothing to prevent
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nations from banning the use as a weapon in international armed conflict of
chemicals that may be permitted within the boundaries of many of these same
nations. On the other hand, the weakness of this particular argument
concerning domestic use of herbicides may not be relied upon to support the
view that herbicides are within the reach of the Protocol or of customary
international law.
The second argument sometimes advanced against Protocol coverage of
herbicides is that it could not have been intended to prohibit the use ofherbicides
because their military use was unknown in 1925. This is challenged as being of
no legal significance if the prohibition falls within the objectives that the parties
4S
were attempting to achieve by the Protocol. A similar reply was advanced
long ago with respect to Protocol coverage ofnuclear weapons. I had difficulty
in accepting this view in the context of nuclear weapons. It is equally difficult
to support it in this context. The acceptance of such an interpretation could
virtually convert a treaty prohibiting the use of certain gases in international
armed conflict into a treaty banning war. Salutary as this result might be, I scarcely
believe that a legaljustification can be found for it. And, ofcourse, ifthe Protocol
is inapplicable, it cannot represent the codification of a norm of customary
international law outlawing herbicides.
One of the major practical arguments advanced against the use of herbicides
is ecological in character. The report ofthe United Nations group ofconsultant
experts stated that there had been no scientific evaluation of the long-term
ecological changes caused by herbicide spraying. They were able to estimate
that twenty years will be needed to regenerate the mangrove forests along the
river banks in Vietnam. Another scientist warns that "when we intervene in
the ecology of a region on a massive scale we may set in motion an irreversible
chain of events." ' One nonscientist writer in the field coined the word
"ecocide" in asserting that a recent scientific study indicated that permanent
damage had been done to "future generations [in Southeast Asia] and the very
49
nature of the earth."
The United States heeded the admonitions of the environmentalists and
substantially phased out its herbicide-spraying program in Vietnam. When it did
so, it sought acceptable substitutes that would accomplish the same missions.
Two seemingly noncontroversial methods were adopted: plows that tore up the
vegetation along roads and trails to reduce ambushes, and concussion bombs
that, by exploding horizontally, destroyed vegetation without cratering. The
environmentalists, concerned only with their "thing," attacked the use of these
new technologies. Perhaps they will soon make the side effects of war so
unpopular that they will succeed where the statesman and the international
lawyer have long labored in vain—they will make it impossible for wars to be
fought by denying all weapons to their military forces.
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I am inclined to conclude that international law does not prohibit the use of
herbicides so long as such use does not violate any of the general norms of the
laws of war. This means that the destruction caused by herbicides must have a
valid military purpose and that a food crop that is sprayed has to be identifiable
as being grown for the use ofthe military. However, this is a weapon the ultimate
effects of which are not now really predictable. It is one that may cause a
complete upsetting of the life cycle of a treated area. Ultimately, the use ofsuch
a weapon may be as destructive to mankind as a nuclear or biological war. It
appears not only that the United States was well advised to phase out its use of
this weapon, but also that it should cut off the supply to South Vietnam in order
to eliminate completely the use ofherbicides in that country. With its ratification
of the Geneva Protocol of 1925, the United States has now taken the first step
by voluntarily renouncing the first use of herbicides, with certain minor
exceptions.
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Addendum
At the time that this article was written in 1970, the United States, after half
a century, had finally ratified the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol although it was not
yet in force for this country. However, many ofthe questions oflaw with respect
to the use of the weapons referred to in the basic article continue to exist.
Discussions of some of the developments in these matters will be found in the
articles entided "Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Weapons" and
"Prohibitions and Restrictions on the Use of Conventional Weapons" in the
present collection.
In 1976 the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted the Convention
on the Prohibition ofMilitary or any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification
(better known as the ENMOD Convention). This Convention entered into force
on 5 October 1978. The United States is a Party.

The Falklands Crisis and
the Laws of War
The Falklands War: Lessonsfor Strategy, Diplomacy and
International Law 64 (Alberto R. Coll and Anthony C. Arend eds., 1985)
One week before the Argentine surrender at Port Stanley, the
well-respected British news journal, The Economist, published an article
captioned "War Laws—Made To Be Broken." After discussing a number of
provisions of the laws of war which the writer, obviously not an expert in the
field, thought had been violated during the course of the hostilities, he ended
up with this alarming conclusion: "These, and no doubt other matters not yet
to appear, will be the subject of anguished inquiry, once the fighting ends."
Despite such contentions, the laws of war were more widely observed in the
Falklands crisis than in any other conflict since World War II. This essay will
analyze several law-of-war problems that arose during the hostilities, and will
illustrate the degree to which both belligerents succeeded in observing legal
norms of combat without any significant military disadvantage.
Maritime Exclusion Zone
The Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands began on 2 April 1982. Great
Britain broke off diplomatic relations that same day; but it was not until 7 April
1982, five days later, that Great Britain took its first real retaliatory step,
announcing that as from 12 April 1982 it was establishing a "maritime exclusion
zone" 200 miles around the Falkland Islands, and that any Argentine warships
and naval auxiliaries thereafter within that zone "will be treated as hostile and
are liable to be attacked by British forces." On the following day Argentina
responded by establishing a 200-mile defense zone off its coast and around the
Falklands.
When the British announcement was made the impression was given, and it
was generally understood, that the British nuclear submarine Superb was on
* The facts presented in this essay were drawn primarily from Christopher Dobson,
THE FALKLANDS CONFLICT (1982), and from press reports contained in such
publications as THE ECONOMIST, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, TIME, the NEW
YORK TIMES, and others for the period of 1 April to 1 July 1982.
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station in that area and this was undoubtedly the major reason for the failure of
the Argentine fleet to emerge from its base at Puerto Belgrano, south ofBuenos
Aires. There were later complaints that the press, as well as the Argentines, had
been intentionally misled when it was discovered that the Superb was at its base
in Scotland. However, this was a perfectly valid and successful piece of
"disinformation" by the British.
Since the 1856 Declaration of Paris it has been a settled rule of maritime
warfare that a blockade, in order to be binding, must be effective; that is, the
blockading belligerent must be able to enforce its announced blockade. The
British declaration was not really a blockade, as merchant ships and neutral vessels
were not barred from the exclusion zone; it only applied to enemy naval vessels.
It was, therefore, nothing more than a gratuitous warning to the Argentine naval
forces. A state of armed conflict certainly existed between Argentina and Great
Britain and, hence, the armed forces of each, including naval vessels, were, apart
from some limitations not here applicable, subject to attack wherever found. In
any event, if, by disinformation, a belligerent can convince the enemy (and
neutrals) that there is an effective blockade in existence, then there is an effective
blockade.
On 23 April the British informed the Argentine government that "any
approach on the part of Argentine warships, submarines, naval auxiliaries or
military aircraft which would amount to a threat to interfere with the mission
of British forces in the South Adantic would encounter the appropriate
response." At the same time it stated that "all Argentine vessels, including
merchant vessels or fishing vessels apparently engaged in surveillance of or
intelligence gathering activities against British forces in the South Adantic, would
also be regarded as hostile." Then on 30 April the British extended their maritime
exclusion zone to include "any ships and any aircraft" found therein. This was
now a true blockade—and, presumably, there were now British submarines on
station in the area prepared to enforce the declaration. So far as is known, only
one Argentine support ship, the Formosa, managed thereafter to reach the
Falkland Islands. A number of military cargo aircraft were also successful in
reaching their destination before the British carriers arrived in the area. It is
interesting to note that sometime after the hostilities had ended a United Press
International dispatch from Buenos Aires quoted an Argentine general as saying
that the British air and sea blockade "was a success, a total success."
On 2 May the Argentine cruiser, General Belgrano, was sunk by a British
submarine with a loss of almost 400 lives. The exact location of the Belgrano at
the time of the attack has not been officially disclosed, but there have been
suggestions that it was about 35 miles outside the maritime exclusion zone.
Certainly, a cruiser of a belligerent has no right to consider itselfimmune from
enemy attack because it is on the high seas beyond the range of a proclaimed
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maritime exclusion zone. Great Britain justified its action by pointing out that
the cruiser was a threat to its picket ships, frigates, and destroyers, and that it had
previously advised the Argentine government ofthe establishment ofa defensive
zone around units of the British fleet which the Belgrano had disregarded.
Sympathy for the Argentine loss, and the feeling that the British had somehow
been "unfair," were quickly dissipated when, two days later, on 4 May anExocet
missile fired by an Argentine plane hit and sank the British destroyer Sheffield
with a loss of about twenty lives.
On 7 May the British extended their war zone to 12 miles off the Argentine
coast. This blockade was completely effective, made so by the Argentine fear
that if its fleet sortied from its base it would be the victim of the British nuclear
submarines which were now, beyond any doubt, patrolling the waters off the
coast of Argentina outside the twelve-mile limit. However, on 1 5 May the
Soviet Ambassador in London advised the British government that the Soviet
Union considered the British blockade to be unlawful because it "arbitrarily
proclaimed(ed) vast expanses of the high seas closed to ships and craft of other
countries," citing the 1958 Convention on the High Seas as the basis for its
claim. Of course, a blockade always denies the use of part of the high seas to
other countries. While the Soviet Union might have questioned the extent of
the blockaded area as excessive, if the blockade was effective (and there seems
little doubt that it was), it was a valid blockade under the 1856 Declaration of
Paris, to which Russia was one of the original parties.
Fishing Vessels
In 1900 the United States Supreme Court held that by customary
international law fishing vessels were exempt from seizure by enemy naval forces
in time ofwar. In 1907 this rule was incorporated into the Hague Convention
No. XI. Article 3 (1) of that Convention says, in part, that "[vjessels used
exclusively for fishing along the coast . . . are exempt from capture." Paragraph
2 of that same article goes on to qualify that provision by stating that "[t]hey
cease to be exempt as soon as they take any part whatsoever in hostilities." As
we have already seen, on 23 April 1982 the British government informed the
Argentine government that, among other things, "fishing vessels apparently
engaged in surveillance or intelligence gathering activities" would be regarded
as hostile. This statement was really unnecessary as it was merely another
declaration of the British intention to apply existing law.
On 9 May 1982 the Argentine fishing vessel Narwal was attacked by British
forces and was so severely damaged that she sank on the following day. At the
time of the attack she was about 60-70 miles within the British maritime
exclusion zone, shadowing British fleet units. According to one report: "She
was not armed but she was a spy ship with an Argentine Navy Lieutenant
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Commander on board sending back information about the [British] fleet's
movements."" The Argentines have not denied that allegation. That being so,
the Narwal had lost her immunity and was legally subject to the treatment which
she received.
Hospital Ships
Shordy after hostilities in the Falklands began, the British government
requisitioned the SS Uganda, a vessel previously used for education cruises for
schoolchildren, converting it into a hospital ship. There were allegations that en
route to the South Adantic the Uganda carried combat troops. Ifsuch allegations
are true, this was a violation of articles 30 (2) and 33 of the Second Geneva
Convention of 1949 on the treatment of sick and wounded sailors. While extra
medical personnel may be carried on hospital ships, combat troops may not be.
The fact that after the combat troops were debarked the vessel was used
exclusively for proper purposes does not change the situation. When a hospital
ship is used for improper purposes it ceases permanendy to be entided to the
immunity granted to such ships. During both World Wars there were numerous
claims of the misuse of hospital ships and rejection of their subsequent
entidement to immunity. It appears that such claims are inevitable and that, all
too often, they will be justified.
The Economist (5 June 1982, p. 20) asserted that by bringing the Uganda into
Falkland Sound at night to pick up wounded and shipwrecked Argentine soldiers
the British "may have breached" the provision that hospital ships must "be
situated in such a manner that attacks against military objectives cannot imperil
their safety." The reporter or editor who wrote that article was obviously not
very familiar with the laws of war. He cited the First Geneva Convention of
1949, which is concerned with land warfare, not sea warfare; and the provision
he quoted relates to the placement of medical establishments and units on land,
not to hospital ships. Article 18 (1) of the Second Convention makes it
mandatory that " [ a]fter each engagement, Parties to the conflict shall, without
delay, take all possible measures to search for and collect the shipwrecked,
wounded and sick." This is presumably what the Uganda was doing in the Sound,
and it is one of the humanitarian functions of every hospital ship.
Incendiary Weapons
Among the Argentine material captured by the British on the Falkland Islands
was a large supply of napalm, one of the most effective incendiary weapons in
military arsenals. This caused a great deal ofcritical comment in the British press.
Actually, even under the provisions of Protocol III of the still unratified 1980
Conventional Weapons Convention, incendiaries such as napalm are not
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outlawed, only their mode of use is restricted; and since those restrictions are all
directed towards the protection of civilians, it does not appear that they would
have been violated by Argentine use against British combat troops.
Protecting Powers
Diplomatic relations between Argentina and Great Britain were broken off
on 2 April 1982, immediately after the news of the Argentine landings on the
Falklands reached London. Shortly thereafter Great Britain requested the Swiss
government to act as its Protecting Power vis-a-vis Argentina, presumably
pursuant to Common Article 8/8/8/9 of the four 1949 Geneva Conventions,
while the Argentine government requested Brazil to act in that capacity on its
behalf. Even though they performed no major functions in the military area,
this is of extreme importance in view of the fact that it was the first clear-cut
instance of the use of Protecting Powers since World War II, despite the
innumerable international armed conflicts which have occurred in the interim.
There were, for example, no Protecting Powers in either Korea or Vietnam,
and there do not appear to be any in the Iran-Iraq War.
Civilians
Civilians presented on the whole a physical rather than a legal problem.
However, there were a number of rules of the laws of war which came into
play. When resistance at Port Stanley ended on 2 April, Governor Rex Hunt
(in full ceremonial dress with a white-plumed Napoleon-style hat), his wife, and
his family were escorted to an Argentine Air Force plane and flown to
Montevideo, Uruguay. The British Antarctic Survey Team's civilian scientists,
based at Grytviken, on South Georgia, were also repatriated by the Argentines
after a short delay. LADE, the airline which had been operated by the Argentine
Air Force between Port Stanley and Commodoro Pdvadavia, in South
Argentina, continued to fly after the Argentine takeover. While eighty to one
hundred British subjects who were living on the islands as civilian employees of
the British government elected to avail themselves of this method of departure
with their families, only twenty-one "Kelpers" so elected; and when members
of the Anglo-Argentine community in Argentina proposed that a neutral ship
be sent to the islands to evacuate the 300 children to the mainland, it was the
Falkland Islanders, not the Argentine government, who rejected the proposal.
Article 35(1) of the Fourth Geneva convention of 1949 authorizes the
departure of protected persons (civilians) from the territory of a party to the
conflict. On the basis of the Argentine claim of sovereignty over the Falkland
Islands and their dependencies, this article would have been applicable.
However, if we adopt the thesis of British sovereignty, then the departure of
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those who left the islands was an act of grace by Argentina since article 48 of
that Convention, relating to occupied territory, only requires the Occupying
Power to permit the departure of protected persons who are not nationals of
the power whose territory is occupied—and all but thirty of the Falkland
Islanders and other residents were British nationals. (The other thirty were
Argentines.) One British subject, William Luxton, was deported, probably
because he was considered to be a subversive influence; several others were
apparently placed in a detention center at Fox Bay. Article 41 (1) of the Fourth
Convention states that the only measures ofcontrol which the Occupying Power
may adopt with respect to protected persons are assigned residence and
internment. Deportation is specifically prohibited by article 49 (1) of the
Convention but it may be assumed that Mr. Luxton preferred it to internment.
Article 42 (1) of the Convention authorizes internment if the security of the
Occupying Power makes it necessary—a decision which, of course, is a
subjective one made by that power. Accordingly, the action of the Argentines
in this respect was within the purview of and in accordance with the provisions
of the Convention.
There were estimated to be 17,000 British passport-holders in Argentina
when hostilities commenced on 2 April 1982. The Argentine government
announced that it would guarantee the safety of these individuals. Nevertheless,
on 5 April the British government broadcast a radio message recommending
that they leave the country. How many did so is unknown but there is no
evidence that the Argentine government made any effort to prevent them from
exercising the right granted to them by article 35 of the Fourth Convention,
mentioned above, to leave the territory of a party to the conflict.
Argentina claimed in a television broadcast that the British were guilty of
"indiscriminate bombing" ofPort Stanley as a result ofwhich two civilians were
killed and four were wounded. Inasmuch as more than 10,000 members of the
Argentine military forces were crowded into the area of that small town (normal
population: 1,050), with somewhere between 250 and 600 civilians who had
remained in their homes, the civilian casualties appear to have been remarkably
light. Certainly, the British bombardment and bombing of the Argentine
personnel and positions in Port Stanley cannot be said to have violated any
provision of the 1907 Hague Regulations on Land Warfare, 1907 Hague
Convention No. IX on Naval Bombardment, or the as-yet inapplicable 1977
Protocol I. The residents of Port Stanley were British nationals and were the
persons on whose behalf the British forces had traveled 8,000 miles to fight and
there is no reason to believe that the British commanders did not exercise the
utmost caution on their behalf. Thus, when, on 13 June 1982, the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) proposed the creation of a "neutral zone"
for the protection of the civilians still in Port Stanley, the British immediately
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agreed. The Argentines did so on the following day and the ICRC announced
that it had arranged for such a zone.
Prisoners of War
Article 13 (1) of the Third Geneva Convention of 1949 provides that
;
'[p]risoners ofwar must at all times be humanely treated." Although there were
undoubtedly individual cases in which this provision was violated during the
hostilities in the Falkland Islands, on the whole the treatment of prisoners of
war, first by the Argentines and later by the British, more closely resembled the
Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5 than either World War I, World War II, Korea,
or Vietnam. In this respect, as in others, the war was fought as a "gendemen's
war." Thus, although article 118 of the Third Convention merely requires the
release and repatriation ofprisoners ofwar "without delay after the cessation of
active hostilities," the Royal Marines captured on both the Falkland Islands and
on South Georgia were repatriated almost immediately by the Argentines. So
also were two Royal Air Force technicians captured at the airfield at Port Stanley,
men who were able to provide the British with valuable intelligence
information.
When the British began to take prisoners of war, first on South Georgia and
then on the Falkland Islands, they followed the pattern established by the
Argentines of promptly repatriating them. In fact, the practice was so regular
and so prompt that it aroused the ire of the Royal Navy when the entire crew
of the Argentine submarine Santa Fe, captured by the British at South Georgia,
was quickly returned to Argentina. As one report stated, "to give the Argentines
A
back a fully trained crew of submarine specialists seemed the height of folly."
We have seen that article 118 of the Third Convention requires the
repatriation of prisoners of war "without delay after the cessation of active
hostilities." Despite this clear provision, India held Pakistani prisoners ofwar for
over two years after the complete cessation of active hostilities, from December
1971 to March-April 1974, allegedly because there was no guarantee that
hostilities would not break out again, but actually as political hostages in an effort
to compel Pakistan to recognize Bangladesh. Contrary to the procedure followed
by India, which flagrantly violated the Convention provision, Great Britain
began the repatriation ofArgentina prisoners ofwar immediately after the final
surrender of the Argentine forces on the Falklands. At first the British sought to
obtain a statement from Argentina acknowledging the cessation of active
hostilities. Even though such an acknowledgment was not forthcoming, the
British quickly repatriated over 10,000 prisoners of war, retaining about 550
officers, including the Argentine commander on the Falklands, General
Menendez. Within a month, despite the Argentine government's refusal to
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admit to a complete cessation of hostilities, the remaining prisoners ofwar were
returned by the British.
There were some instances in which it has been suggested that the provisions
of the Third Convention may have been violated. When the Royal Marines at
Port Stanley surrendered they were required to He on the ground, face down,
under guard while they were being searched for weapons. Photographs were
made of that scene. It has been implied that the taking of those photographs
violated article 13(2) of the Convention which requires that prisoners ofwar be
protected against "insults and public curiosity." Inasmuch as hundreds of
photographs have been taken and published in every war of the moment of
surrender, hands held high in the air, and full-faced, with no complaints by the
belligerents, and inasmuch as it is impossible to recognize any particular
individual in the Falklands picture, there is at least a reasonable doubt that the
photograph violated article 13 (2) of the Convention.
One Argentine naval sub-officer was shot and killed while a prisoner of war,
while apparently attempting to sabotage the captured submarine Santa Fe. The
British immediately informed the Argentine government ofthe incident through
the medium of the International Committee of the Red Cross and instituted a
Court of Inquiry, presumably pursuant to article 121 of the Third Convention.
The Argentine government was advised of the result reached by that court,
which exonerated the British guard, and apparendy it was satisfied that justice
was done.
As in all modern armed conflicts, land mines were used in the Falklands in
great profusion; at the end of hostilities, their removal became a major problem.
Article 7 of Protocol II to the as yet unratified 1980 Conventional Weapons
Convention contains provisions for the recording of the location of minefields.
Apparently, as is not unusual in modern warfare, this was not done in many
instances by the Argentines, with the result that the locating and removal of the
numerous buried mines became a slow, painstaking, and dangerous procedure.
After World War II large numbers ofcaptured German soldiers were retained
in France for the purpose of removing mines, and a substantial number were
killed or injured in the process. As a result, article 52(1) ofthe Third Convention
specifically provides that only prisoners of war who volunteer for the task may
be employed on labor which is of a dangerous nature, and the third paragraph
of that article provides that the removal of "mines and similar devices" is to be
considered dangerous. It has been asserted that captured Argentine soldiers were
"ordered" to clear minefields near Goose Green. If this was so, it constituted a
clear violation of the provisions of the Convention. If they were volunteers, it
did not.
Article 117 of the Third Convention provides that "[n]o repatriated person
may be employed on active military service." While the meaning of this phrase
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is subject to numerous interpretations there can be no doubt that it precludes
the use of repatriated personnel in actual combat. There are charges that some
Royal Marines, captured by the Argentines on South Georgia and repatriated
to Great Britain, were subsequently included in the British Task Force. If this
was so, it was a violation of the provisions of the Convention.
One interesting episode occurred with respect to prisoners of war. When
Captain Alfredo Astiz, the commander of the Argentine forces on South
Georgia, surrendered to the British forces on 22 April 1982, he and the
commander ofthe Santa Fe, the Argentine submarine which had been captured
that morning, were entertained at dinner by the British officers. Subsequently,
it was alleged that Captain Astiz was the infamous "Captain Death," one of the
most sadistic of the government's interrogators during the suppression of the
guerrilla movement in Argentina some years before. Sweden wanted to question
him concerning eyewitness reports that he had shot a young Swedish girl. France
wanted to question him concerning the disappearance oftwo French nuns. This
raised an interesting question oflaw. The offenses were alleged to have occurred
in Argentina long before the beginning of the hostilities between Argentina and
Great Britain. Assuming that they constituted violations ofarticle 3 ofthe Fourth
Convention, dealing with non-international armed conflicts, can a Detaining
Power in a subsequent international armed conflict turn over a prisoner ofwar
to a third state, a party to the Conventions, for possible trial and punishment?
The British answered that question in the negative, rejecting the Swedish and
French requests. Whether that decision was correct remains an open question.
After being taken to Great Britain, where he was subjected to what has been
described as a "token" interrogation, Captain Astiz was repatriated.
Mercenaries
One of the most difficult problems which confronted the Diplomatic
Conference drafting the 1977 Protocol I involved proposals seeking to eliminate
the use ofmercenaries. Under the definition now contained in article 47 of that
instrument, one ofthe requirements for categorizing an individual as a mercenary
is that he "is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the desire for
private gain and, in fact, is promised by or on behalf of a Party to the conflict,
material compensation substantially in excess of that promised or paid to
combatants of similar ranks and functions in the armed forces of that Party."
The Gurkha Rifles have been part of the British Army for well over 100
years. They are recruited from an ethnic group which lives in what is now Nepal.
During World War II there were 100 battalions ofGurkhas in the British Army;
today there are five such battalions. When it became known that the 7th Gurkha
Pdfles was being sent to the Falklands, Argentina protested to Nepal. Whether
that protest was based on the allegation that the Gurkhas were serving the British
21 2 Levle on the Law of War
as mercenaries, or was made merely because they were Nepalese citizens, is not
known. The Gurkhas are certainly motivated by the desire for private gain. They
serve the required number of years, and then retire in Nepal as relatively
prosperous citizens. However, inasmuch as they receive a considerably smaller
pay than do British soldiers, it is doubtful that they come within the definition
of mercenaries.
Neutrals and Neutrality
Prior to World War II, during hostilities there was a dichotomy under which
all states in the world community were either belligerents or neutrals, with
well-established rules applicable to each status. At various times in the course of
World War II, Italy and Spain, and perhaps others, announced that they were
"non-belligerents." That term can be defined best by saying: "I hope that you
win, and I will do everything I can to help you, except fight." During the
Anglo-Argentine hostilities in the Falkland Islands, the United States did not
officially use the term "non-belligerent," but that was undoubtedly its status.
After Secretary Haig failed in his peacemaking efforts, the United States
announced its support of Great Britain which included a willingness to supply
any military aid short of direct involvement ofAmerican combat forces. On 29
April 1982 the United States Senate adopted a resolution in which it declared
that "the United States cannot stand neutral." Five days later, on 4 May, the
United States House of Representatives adopted a similar resolution in which
it expressed "full diplomatic support of Great Britain in its efforts to uphold the
rule of law." In the course of the war the United States furnished the British
with a secure method of communication with its nuclear submarines in the war
zone, weather information, aviation fuel, use ofthe airfield on Ascension Island,
ammunition and missiles, and KC-135 tanker planes. A request for AWACS
was refused because it would have involved American airmen in the hostilities.
Whether the United States acted in accordance with the rules ofneutrality which
existed prior to World War II is, at the very least, questionable.
There was speculation that, despite the strong anticommunist stance of the
Argentine junta, it was receiving aid ofvarious kinds from the Soviet Union. It
can be assumed that if the Soviet Union considered the granting of such aid to
be in its own interests, it would not have found it impossible to overlook the
ideological differences. The USSR abstained on, but did not veto, United
Nations Resolution 502, calling for Argentina to withdraw its forces from the
Falkland Islands. The Soviets also employed surface vessels and planes from
Angola and Cuba for surveillance of the British Task Force as it sailed towards
the South Adantic. This, however, may have been routine since Soviet ships
and planes do this with respect to all naval movements ofWestern powers; there
is no hard evidence that the USSR passed the information so obtained to the
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Argentines. In fact, it has been suggested, with a good deal of reason, that had
the Soviet Union been doing so the Narwal would never have been sent on the
suicidal spy mission in which it was engaged when it was sunk by the British.
Implications for the Laws of War
In some important respects, the Falklands crisis offers much hope for the
continued viability of the laws of war. Despite the intense nationalistic rivalries
underlying it, the conflict illustrates that states can wage conventional warfare
in compliance with the laws of war without thereby giving adversaries a
substantial military advantage. But, on the other hand, one must be mindful of
the peculiar qualities of the Falklands War that made it possible for the laws of
war to exert their restraining influence. First, this was a limited war, fought for
limited ends with limited means. For both parties the end was quite
specific—control of a particular territory. This was not an abstract, hazy goal,
but rather a concrete, easily recognizable objective. The means, too, were
limited. The adversaries restricted their operations to the disputed territory, and
refrained from military actions against the enemy's homeland; had it not been
conducted otherwise, the war would have been much more violent and
destructive and could have released the kind of political frenzy and hatred that
weaken the observance of the laws of war. Second, the adversaries, despite
obvious differences in political regimes, saw themselves as members of the same
civilization, and shared many cultural affinities and bonds—some stretching over
centuries. This helps to explain why the war was in many respects a "gendemen's
war." Third, the conflict was brief. It is difficult to predict how well the laws of
war would have been observed had this been a protracted struggle, filled with
the usual weariness and mounting frustration against the enemy. It is an open
question whether further conflicts that lack all these special characteristics will
have as encouraging a record on the observance of the laws of war as did the
Falklands War of 1982.
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XI
Criminality in the Law of War
1 International Criminal Law 233 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1986)
There are two completely different aspects of the subject of criminality in
the law of war insofar as prisoners of war are concerned—offenses
committed before capture (pre—capture offenses or war crimes); and offenses
committed after capture (post—capture offenses). Many of the rules applicable
are similar or identical, but some are different. The two aspects of the problem
are certainly worthy of separate treatment. They will be so treated and in the
order mentioned.
Pre—capture Offenses (War Crimes)
Historical
By offenses committed before capture we normally refer to violations of the
law ofwar committed against the nationals, civilian or military, or the property,
of the Capturing Power or of one of its allies. Despite a rather widespread
misunderstanding on the subject, there was nothing new about the war crimes
trials conducted after World War II except their numbers and the broad range
of the offenses charged. One author has given considerable publicity to a case
which occurred in 1474 in which an ad hoc international tribunal tried one Peter
von Hagenbach for various crimes committed while he was in command of
what might be termed a military occupation, although the war was yet to come.
Hagenbach pleaded that he had only obeyed the orders of his master, the Duke
of Burgundy. His defense was rejected, he was found guilty, and he was
executed.
After the termination of hostilities in the American Civil War (1861-1865),
a conflict which had most of the characteristics of an international war, the
Federal authorities conducted a number of trials of individuals for offenses
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committed against Union prisoners of war during the course of the conflict.
During the pacification of the Philippines which followed the acquisition of
those islands by the United States as a result ofthe Spanish-American War (1 898)
,
a number ofAmerican officers were tried by American Army courts-martial for
violations of the law of war. (This is another area where there is a good deal
21 6 Levie on the Law of War
of misunderstanding. While these men were tried for violations of specific
provisions of the American Army's "Articles of War," the offenses for which
they were tried were also violations ofthe law ofwar and their trials would have
been denominated "war crimes trials" if they had been tried by an enemy, or
an international court.) And at about this same period the British Army not only
tried some of its own personnel for violations of the law of war committed
during the hostilities in the Boer War (1899-1902), but the Treaty of
Vereeniging (1902) which ended that conflict specifically provided for British
courts-martial for certain Boers who had allegedly committed acts "contrary to
the usages of war."
After the end of World War I a "Commission on the Responsibility of the
Authors of the War and on the Enforcement of Penalties" created by the
Versailles Peace Conference recommended criminal prosecution for all persons,
without distinction of rank, "who have been guilty of offenses against the laws
and customs of war or the laws of humanity." The Peace Conference
implemented that recommendation with Articles 228-230 of the Treaty of
Versailles by which Germany recognized the right ofthe Allies to conduct trials
for violations of the laws and customs of war and promised to hand over the
individuals requested for trial by a requesting Ally. Public opinion prevented a
weak German government from complying with those provisions and
agreement was reached for trials to be conducted by the Supreme Court of
Leipzig. The results of the twelve trials which were conducted were so
unsatisfactory to the former Allies that they dropped the matter. This episode
convinced most students of the problem that the Versailles solution to the
problem was not a viable one. (The so-called "war crimes trials" conducted by
the Federal Republic of Germany itself since the end of World War II do not
disprove that conclusion. For the most part they have involved the trials of
Germans for offenses against Germans, where no nationalism is involved; and
when they were begun sufficient time had elapsed for a change ofpublic attitude
and a cooling of wartime patriotism.)
Codification
All that has been mentioned up to this point was in the realm ofthe customary
law of war. In a 1906 Convention for the protection of the wounded and sick
there was a provision by which the Parties agreed, if their laws were then
insufficient, to seek from their legislatures
"the necessary measures to repress, in time of war, individual acts of robbery or
ill treatment of the sick and wounded of the armies, as well as to punish, as
usurpations of military insignia, the wrongful use of the flag and brassard of the
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Red Cross by military persons or private individuals not protected by the present
convention."
This was, of course, a call for national legislation to provide for the
punishment of certain specific war crimes. Little was done to implement this
provision; but the 1929 version of this Convention went even further when the
Parties agreed therein to seek from their legislatures
"the necessary measures for the repression in time of war of any act contrary to
the provisions of the present Convention."
(For some reason there was no comparable provision in the prisoner-of-war
convention drafted at the same time by the same Diplomatic Conference.)
The first real international codification in this area, if such it can be called,
was the 1945 London Charter drafted and signed by France, Great Britain, the
Soviet Union, and the United States, to which 19 other states subsequently
1
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adhered. It was, of course the basis for the Nuremberg Trial. A number ofthe
other war crimes trials in Germany which followed World War II were based
on an adaptation ofthe London Charter by the four Powers governing occupied
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Germany, issued either jointly or severally. However, most of the several
thousand war crimes trials which followed World War II, both in Europe and
in the Pacific, were based on the customary law ofwar and were conducted by
courts established by individual states. It was not until the drafting of the four
1949 Geneva Conventions for the Protection ofWar Victims that we find true
codification in this area ofinternational law. Those Conventions contained two
articles which, with appropriate and understandable differences, were common
to all of them. The articles contained in the 1949 Third (Prisoners-of-War)
Convention read as follows:
Article 129
The High Contracting Parties undertake to enact any legislation necessary to
provide effective penal sanctions for persons committing, or ordering to be
committed, any of the grave breaches of the present Convention defined in the
following Article.
Each High Contracting Party shall be under the obligation to search for persons
alleged to have committed, or to have ordered to be committed, such grave
breaches, and shall bring such persons, regardless of their nationality, before its
own courts. It may also, if it prefers, and in accordance with the provisions of its
own legislation, hand such persons over for trial to another High Contracting
Party concerned, provided such High Contracting Party has made out a primafacie
case.
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Each High Contracting Parties shall take measures necessary for the suppression
of all acts contrary to the provisions of the present Convention other than the
grave breaches defined in the following article.
In all circumstances, the accused persons shall benefit by safeguards of proper
trial and defense, which shall not be less favourable than those provided by Article
105 and those following of the present Convention.
Article 130
Grave breaches to which the preceding Article relates shall be those involving
any of the following acts, if committed against persons or property protected by
the Convention: wilful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including biological
experiments, wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health,
compelling a prisoner ofwar to serve in the forces of a hostile Power, or wilfully
depriving a prisoner of war of the rights of fair and regular trial prescribed in this
Convention.
Ifyou analyze the provisions ofthese two articles you will find that the Parties
to these Conventions have:
a. specifically established a number of substantive penal offenses which they have
characterized as "grave breaches" of the Conventions;
b. agreed to universal jurisdiction (of Parties to the Conventions) over those
offenses;
c. indicated that trials for "grave breaches" ofthe Conventions will be conducted
by national courts;
d. agreed that they will either themselves try any accused found in their territory
or will extradite that accused to any other Party concerned who makes out a prima
facie case (aut dedere aut punire); and
e. guaranteed a fair trial for any person accused ofhaving committed such a grave
breach.
The procedural rules relating to the trials and punishment of prisoners ofwar
contained in the 1949 Third (Prisoner-of-War) Convention, set forth in some
detail below in the discussion of post-capture offenses, would be equally
applicable with respect to pre-capture offenses. However, it is probably
appropriate to mention here that although Article 85 of the 1949 Third Geneva
Convention provides that prisoners of war prosecuted for pre-capture offenses
"retain, even if convicted, the benefits of the present Convention," a number
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of states have made reservations to that article, insisting upon the right to treat
such individuals as common criminals after they have been finally convicted and
while they serve their sentences.
In 1977 a Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions was signed which
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elaborated considerably on the provisions quoted above. Articles 11, 75(2),
and 85 of this Protocol repeat many of the offenses listed in the 1949 Geneva
Conventions. They also add to the list contained in the Conventions a number
ofoffenses which cannot be considered as being established penal offenses; rather,
they are offenses more closely related to the conduct of war. These offenses
include such matters as making the civilian population the object of attack; or
the launching of an attack against an installation known to contain dangerous
forces, such as a nuclear generating plant; or attacking an undefended locality;
or attacking an individual who is hors de combat; etc.
Although the Diplomatic Conference which drafted this Protocol was unable
to reach agreement on the question of the defense of "superior orders," it did
agree on provisions making superiors responsible for the acts of a subordinate
"if they knew, or had information which should have enabled them to conclude
in the circumstances at the time, that he was committing or was going to commit
such a breach and if they did not take all feasible measures within their power to
prevent or repress the breach."
(Article 86(2))
It also agreed on provisions making it the duty of a commander who is aware
that persons under his control
"are going to cornrnit or have committed a breach of the Conventions or of this
Protocol, to initiate such steps as are necessary to prevent such violations of the
Conventions or this Protocol, and, where appropriate, to initiate disciplinary or
penal action against violators thereof." (Article 87(3)).
Presumably, should the commander fail to comply with the foregoing provisions
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of Article 87(3), he would be punishable under Article 86(2), above.
Article 88 of the 1977 Protocol I is entitled "Mutual assistance in criminal
matters;" and Article 89 is entided "Co-operation." As is not unusual in this
area, where politics determine policy, these articles express pious statements
rather than positive rules:
"The High Contracting Parties shall afford one another the greatest measure of
assistance in connection with criminal proceedings in respect of grave breaches;"
(Article 88(1)).
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"... when circumstances permit, the High Contracting Parties shall co-operate
in the matter of extradition;" (Article 88(2)).
"... The provisions of the preceding paragraphs shall not, however, affect the
obligations arising from the provisions of any other treaty of a bilateral or
multilateral nature which governs or will govern the whole or part of the subject
of mutual assistance in criminal matters;" (Article 88(3)).
"... the High Contracting Parties undertake to act, joindy or individually, in
co-operation with the United Nations." (Article 89).
On the other hand, Article 75 of the 1977 Protocol I, entitled "Fundamental
guarantees," does affirmatively set forth the whole gamut ofprotections to which
a person charged with an offense "related to the armed conflict" or "arising out
of the hostilities" is to be afforded. Thus, he is entided to be informed of the
reason for his arrest. He is to be tried by "an impartial and regularly constituted
court respecting the generally recognized principles of regular judicial
procedure;" and those "generally recognized principles of regular judicial
procedure" are enumerated at length. Suffice to say that if they are applied by
a truly impartial court (if any court trying enemy military or civilian personnel
in time of war can be such!), no accused could complain that he had not had a
fair trial.
Mercenaries
There is one aspect of the 1977 Protocol I which requires special
mention. Article 47 of that document defines the term "mercenary" and
provides that
A mercenary shall not have the right to be a combatant or a prisoner of war.
The drafting ofsuch a provision and its inclusion in the 1977 Protocol I was,
of course, a matter within the discretion of the Diplomatic Conference.
However, what is bothersome is that all attempts to provide in that article that
if the individual alleged to be a mercenary was tried as an illegal combatant, he
would be entitled to proper trial safeguards, to the "Fundamental guarantees"
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ofArticle 75 ofthe Protocol, a privilege accorded to the members ofliberation
movements who fail to comply with certain provisions of the Protocol and thus
become, in effect, illegal combatants. Numerous aspects of the trial of the
mercenaries in Angola appear to warrant considerable pessimism with respect
to the fairness of the trials that these individuals will receive.
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Conclusion
Apart from the weakness of the provisions calling for international
cooperation in the prosecution ofpre-capture offenses, including the extradition
of persons charged with such offenses, the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the
1977 Protocol I establish a number of substantive offenses and provide for the
trials of persons accused of having committed those offenses, at the same time
granting them all of the safeguards necessary to assure a fair trial. Any problems
which may arise in the future with respect to the trial and punishment ofpersons
alleged to have committed war crimes will not be because of a lack of applicable
law, substantive or procedural, but because such law is disregarded or because
of the improper manner in which it is applied.
Post-Capture Offenses
Introduction
There has never been any question but that a Detaining Power has the right
to try enemy personnel in its hands for offenses committed during the period of
internment. The problems which have arisen in this regard are usually
concerned with the actions of the Detaining Power in making penal offenses
out of acts committed by prisoners of war, when the same acts would not be
penal offenses if committed by its own personnel; in trying enemy personnel
before specially constituted "hanging" courts; in denying to enemy personnel
the safeguards of trial accorded to its own personnel; and in adjudging sentences
against enemy personnel in excess of the sentences which could be adjudged
against its own personnel found guilty of committing the same acts.
When the matter of a convention on prisoners ofwar was under review after
World War I, the Xth International Conference ofthe Red Cross recommended
that "An international code of disciplinary and penal sanctions applicable to
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prisoners of war should be included in this Convention." That
recommendation suffered the not-unusual fate of attempts to expand the
international criminal law field—it was not accepted by the subsequent
conferences on the subject. However, over the course of the years the offenses
committed during the period of detention for which prisoners of war may be
punished, and the procedures by which they may be punished for those offenses,
have become highly institutionalized and, if there is compliance with the
provisions of the latest and currendy applicable set of rules in this regard, those
contained in the 1949 Third (Prisoner-of-War) Convention, there should be
no valid cause for complaint either by the person convicted and punished, or
by his Protecting Power, or by his Power of Origin.
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Substantive Offenses
The Convention has reached a very simple solution to the problem of the
specific substantive offenses for which prisoners of war may be punished:
1. Article 82(1) of the 1949 Third Convention makes them subject to the
"laws, regulations and orders in force in the armed forces of the
Detaining Power" and authorizes the Detaining Power to take
appropriate action for violations of those laws, regulations and orders.
2. Article 82(2) of that Convention provides that ifany law, regulation or
order of the Detaining Power makes an act committed by a prisoner of
war punishable when that same act committed by a member of its own
forces would not be punishable, the maximum allowable punishment
is to be disciplinary, not penal, in nature.
By this means the Convention has, with respect to penal matters, equated the
prisoner of war to the member of the armed forces of the Detaining Power. It
has, moreover, accepted the fact that there will necessarily be some special rules
of conduct promulgated by the Detaining Power which will be uniquely
applicable to prisoners of war—but it has placed severe limitations on the
punishment which may be imposed for violations of those special rules of
conduct.
Procedural Rules
General: a. A prisoner ofwar must be tried by the same court, either military
or civilian, that would try a member ofthe armed forces ofthe Detaining Power
for the particular offense charged (Article 84(1));
b. The trial court must be one which affords the prisoner-of-war accused
"the essential guarantees of independence and impartiality as generally
recognized" (Article 84(2));
c. Double jeopardy (non bis in idem) is specifically prohibited (Article 86);
d. The penalty assessed against a prisoner ofwar may not exceed that provided
for in respect of members of the armed forces of the Detaining Power (Article
87(1)).
Disciplinary sanctions: a. This is a type ofpunishment for minor offenses
which may be imposed administratively by the camp commander or his delegate
(Article 96(2)). There is probably an equivalent type of administrative
punishment in the armed forces of most nations;
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b. The accused must be advised of the charge and must be given an
opportunity to defend himself (Article 96(4));
c. The allowable punishments are limited to a monetary fine, discontinuance
ofany privileges normally allowed by the Detaining Power above those granted
by the Convention, fatigue duties not exceeding two hours daily, and a
maximum of 30 days confinement (Articles 89 and 90(2));
d. The punishment must not be inhuman, brutal or dangerous to the health
(Article 89(3));
e. There are a number ofprovisions establishing norms for any confinement
awarded as a disciplinary punishment (Articles 88, 97 and 98);
f. It is here that violations of the offenses unique to prisoners of war
mentioned above will be punished; for example, there are several provisions
with respect to attempted escapes which, when unsuccessful, are punishable by
disciplinary sanctions only (Articles 91-94, inclusive).
Judicial proceedings: a. The offense for which a prisoner of war is to be
tried must have been such in the law ofthe Detaining Power or in international
law at the time of its commission (no ex postfacto laws) (Article 99(1)). Logically,
this provision should have been in the general provisions, with the prohibition
against double jeopardy;
b. Lists of the offenses punishable by the death sentence must be exchanged
as soon as possible after the outbreak of hostilities and additions to those lists
may not be thereafter made without the agreement of the two belligerents
involved (Article 100); and when a death sentence is adjudged, it may not be
executed until six months after notice of its imposition has been given to the
Protecting Power (Article 101);
c. Mental or physical coercion in order to extort a confession is specifically
prohibited (Article 99(2));
d. The Protecting Power must be notified ofan impending trial three weeks
in advance (Article 104(1)) and must, except in rare cases involving state security,
be permitted to attend the trial (Article 105(5)); proof of the notification is
jurisdictional (Article 104(4));
e. The accused is entided to particulars of the charge and other documents
in a language which he understands; to be represented by counsel of his own
choice, or one provided by the Protecting Power, or one provided by the
Detaining Power; to confer with counsel freely and privately; to confer with
and to call witnesses; to have the services of an interpreter (Article 105); and to
have a full opportunity to present his defense (Article 99(3));
f. The punishment which may be imposed upon conviction is limited to that
which could be imposed upon a member of the armed forces of the Detaining
Power convicted of the same offense (Article 87(1));
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g. The accused is entitled to the same rights of appeal as a member of the
armed forces of the Detaining Power (Article 106);
h. There are a number of provisions establishing norms for any confinement
adjudged by the court (Articles 88 and 108).
Conclusion
Under the able guidance of the International Committee of the Red Cross,
in the course of drafting the 1949 Third Convention the 1949 Diplomatic
Conference modernized the provisions of the 1929 Geneva Prisoner-of-War
Convention with respect to the trial and punishment of prisoners of war for
offenses committed while in that status. Although there has, fortunately, been
no occasion to test the application of these provisions on a wide scale they do
appear to ensure fair and just treatment for prisoners of war accused of
post-capture offenses. Once again, it may be stated that any problems which
may arise will not be because of a lack of applicable law, substantive or
procedural, but because such law is disregarded or because of the improper
manner in which it is applied.
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Criminality in The Law of War
Addendum
After the end of World War II in 1945 the victorious Allied Powers
established International Military Tribunals for the trials of the major German
and Japanese war criminals, as well as many other tribunals and military
commissions for the trials of other persons who were deemed guilty of having
violated the law of war. Hundreds ofsuch trials were conducted. (Probably the
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last of those trials were those of Klaus Barbie, decided on 4 July 1987, and of
Paul Touvier, decided on 20 April 1994, both by French Cours d'Assises. In
October 1 997 proceedings were instituted in a Bordeaux court charging Maurice
Papon, once a member of post-war French cabinets, with responsiblity for the
deaths of 1,090 French Jews during World War II.)
Despite the many international wars which have taken place since 1945 and
the many violations of the law of war which have been committed during the
course of those conflicts, there has not been a single war crimes trial arising out
of violations of the law of war which had occurred during those conflicts. (The
United States tried William Calley and others for violations of the law ofwar at
My Lai, in Vietnam, but at the time these were not considered to be true war
crimes trials because the United States was trying its own personnel. Why this
should make a difference is difficult to understand.)
For subsequent developments in this area, see The Statute of the International
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: A Comparison with the Past and a Look at the
Future (page xx hereof) and War Crimes in the Persian Gulf in the present
collection. In August 1996 the Congress enacted, and on 21 August 1996 the
President approved, the War Crimes Act of 1996, an amendment to Tide 18 of
the United States Code, which reads as follows:
Chapter 118—WAR CRIMES
§2401. War crimes
(a) OFFENSE. Whoever, whether inside or outside the United States,
commits a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions, in any of the circumstances
described in subsection (b), shall be fined under this tide or imprisoned for life or
any term of years, or both, and if death results to the victim, shall also be subject
to the penalty of death.
(b) CIRCUMSTANCES. The circumstances referred to in subsection (a) are
that the person committing such breach or the victim of such breach is a member
of the Armed Forces of the United States or a national of the United States (as
defined in section 101 of the Immigration and Nationality Act).
(c) DEFINITIONS. As used in this section, the term 'grave breach of the
Geneva Conventions' means conduct defined as a grave breach in any of the
international conventions relating to the laws of warfare signed at Geneva 12
August 1949 or any protocol to any such convention, to which the United States
is a party.
Under this statute the Calley Case would now be considered to be a war crimes
case.
XII
Means and Methods of Combat at Sea
14 SyracuseJournal of International Law and Commerce 121 (1988)
It is strange indeed that an individual whose only military experience has been
with land forces and who has only once been aboard a warship (and that was
to be present at a ceremony where the ashes of a deceased naval officer were
strewn at sea) should be asked to present a paper on the subject of "Means and
Methods of Combat at Sea" to this Round Table. In view of the fact that there
are a great number of naval experts present, I cannot even believe that it was
intended to be a case of the blind leading the blind! If this had been scheduled
to be the first paper delivered I would have assumed that the organizers of this
Round Table were motivated by the desire to lay a groundwork in this area at
the lowest possible technical level and then work up to the more esoteric
problems. However, in view of the sequence of the programming, that
explanation likewise seems to be ruled out. Fortunately I am in a position to
state without fear of challenge that because of limitations of time and space, I
will only be able to specify the modern methods or means ofconducting warfare
at sea with respect to which there appear to be legal problems, without
attempting to offer any solutions to those problems.
It will be recalled that the Final Act of the 1907 Hague Peace Conference
included the statement ofa wish that its successor conference prepare regulations
relative to the laws and customs of naval warfare. Of course, because of the
outbreak of World War I, that conference never took place and the series of
Hague Peace Conferences was brought to an end. Subsequent efforts to fill the
lacunae in the law ofnaval warfare through conventional means, such as the 1909
Declaration ofLondon, were, for one reason or another, unsuccessful, with the
result that, apart from the much-disregarded 1936 London Proces-Verbal on
submarine warfare, the law of naval warfare consists basically of the 1856
Declaration of Paris, the several conventions on the subject adopted in 1907,
the 1949 Second Geneva Convention, and customary international law.
The 1977 Protocol I
An important preliminary question concerns the extent, if any, to which
Article 49 of the 1977 Protocol I makes the provisions of that Protocol
applicable to warfare at sea. It unquestionably applies to naval bombardments of
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land targets, the subject of the 1907 Hague Convention IX Concerning
Bombardment by Naval Forces in Time of War. Does it also apply generally
to other methods and means of conducting warfare at sea? One commentator,
Dr. Elmar Rauch, asserts with considerable vigor that this protocol "regulates
the conduct of hostilities and the pertinent treaty provisions apply to any land,
air, or sea warfare." Another commentator, Professor Frits Kalshoven, is equally
categorical in asserting that "[t]his goes to show once again that the Diplomatic
Conference, carefully avoided taking up, in particular, the matter of naval
warfare proper."
When Dr. Rauch presented his thesis to a Committee of the International
Society for Military Law and the Law ofWar at Garmisch in September 1985,
it generated considerable controversy. At the risk of oversimplification, I shall
quote the two paragraphs ofthe article ofthe Protocol relied upon by Dr. Rauch
and a very small part of the relevant activities at the Diplomatic Conference and
then let you draw your own conclusions:
Article 49-Definition of attacks and scope of application
3. The provisions of this Section apply to any land, air or sea warfare which may
affect the civilian population, individual civilians or civilian objects on land. They
further apply to all attacks from the sea or from the air against objectives on land
but do not otherwise affect the rules of international law applicable in armed
conflict at sea or in the air.
4. The provisions of this Section are additional to the rules concerning
humanitarian protection contained in the Fourth Convention, particularly in Part
II thereof, and in other international agreements binding upon the High
Contracting Parties, as well as to other rules of international law relating to the
protection of civilians and civilian objects on land, at sea or in the air against the
effects of hostilities.
When Article 49, then draft Article 44, was being discussed in the Working
Group of Committee III of the Diplomatic Conference, the words "on land"
at the end of what is now the first sentence of paragraph 3 were the subject of
considerable debate. The following statement with respect thereto is contained
in the report of the Working Group:
Discussions in the Working Group showed almost complete agreement that it
would be both difficult and undesirable in the time available to try to review and
revise the laws applicable to armed conflict at sea and in the air. Moreover, it was
clear that we should be careful not to revise that body oflaw inadvertendy through
this article. The solution was found by combining the ICRC text with a sentence
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which stated clearly that, except for attacks against objectives on land, the law
applicable to armed conflict at sea or in the air is unaffected.
Several delegates wish it recorded that they remain dissatisfied with this draft.
They object to the phrase 'on land' in the first sentence and to the second sentence
as a whole. These delegates would prefer to have this section ofthe Protocol affect
the law applicable to the conduct ofwarfare at sea or in the air to the extent that
provisions of this Section would be more favorable to civilians than the existing
law.
The additional sentence referred to is, of course, the second sentence in
Paragraph 3 (then paragraph 1). At the meeting of Committee III which took
place immediately after the submission of that report, the following occurred:
The term 'on land' was adopted by 56 votes to one, with 7 abstentions. The part
of the second sentence beginning with 'but do not' . . . and ending with ... 'or
in the air' was adopted by 56 votes to one, with nine abstentions.
Paragraph 1 ofArticle 44 was adopted by 60 votes to none, with 7 abstentions.
The Report of Committee III, Second Session, adopted the wording of the
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report of the Working Group almost verbatim and the Plenary Meeting
adopted the article without discussion. I now ask you: did the Diplomatic
Conference make the provisions of the 1977 Protocol I generally applicable to
warfare at sea?
Blockade
For centuries a naval blockade for the purpose of cutting off supplies to the
enemy, like a land siege, has been an accepted method of conducting naval
warfare and the supplies so cut off have frequently included foodstuffs. This has
been true whether foodstuffs have been considered to be absolute contraband,
conditional contraband, or not contraband. The unratified 1909 Declaration of
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London (which itself stated that it corresponded with generally recognized
principles of international law) listed foodstuffs as conditional contraband. The
imposition of the "long distance" blockade by the United Kingdom during
World War I was intended to bring Germany to its knees by starving the civilian
population and it is alleged to have caused the deaths by malnutrition of half a
million German noncombatants. When, during the last year of World War
II, the United States instituted a blockade ofJapan primarily by mining the waters
around that country, it actually called the mining program "Operation
Starvation."
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Article 3 of the Resolution of the General Assembly on the Question of
Defining Aggression includes in its list of acts qualifying as acts of aggression,
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"regardless of a declaration of war": "(c) The blockade of the ports or coasts
of a State by the armed forces of another State."
One well-known commentator on the subject has stated:
The 'blockade of the ports or coasts' of another State was another listed
indicator of aggression, but what precisely constituted a 'blockade . . . was
deliberately left vague.'
Does this provision of the resolution purport to constitute an attempt to
eliminate the blockade completely, as a method of conducting warfare at sea?
Does this mean that even after there is no question but that hostilities have
erupted between two or more nations and after the Security Council has been
unable to obtain a cease fire, and the two sides are attacking each other wherever
they are in contact and are bombing each other wherever targets are available,
the imposition of a blockade by one of the participants in the dispute would be
an act of aggression? Did the Committee which drafted the definition of
aggression consider that, among other things, it was recommending a material
change in the law of warfare at sea? Or was the banning of blockades a
prohibition on the use of this type of force to bring pressure to bear on a nation
during peacetime, such as that used by Germany, Great Britain, and Italy against
Venezuela in 1902?
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Article 54(1) of the 1977 Protocol I states: "Starvation of civilians as a
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method of warfare is prohibited." Does this mean that naval blockades may
no longer prevent foodstuffs from reaching enemy ports? The 1975 Report of
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the Committee charged with this matter by the Diplomatic Conference stated:
"The fact that the paragraph [Article 54(1)] does not change the law of naval
blockade is made clear by Article 44, paragraph 1 [Article 49(3)]."
The Australian delegation was even more specific in its explanation of its
vote. It said:
The Australian delegation wishes to place on record its view that Article 48 [now
Article 54] does not prevent military operations intended to control and regulate
the production and distribution of foodstuffs to the civilian population, and that
it does not affect existing legal rule concerning the right of military forces to
requisition foodstuffs. Moreover, in the view ofmy delegation, nothing in Article
48 direcdy or indirecdy affects existing rules concerning naval blockade.
Dr. Rauch disagrees with the foregoing interpretations ofArticle 54(1) ofthe
1977 Protocol I, taking the position that under that provision of the Protocol
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there is an absolute prohibition of a naval blockade of foodstuffs. It remains
to be seen how belligerents will interpret it.
Mine Warfare
The only conventional law with respect to the subject ofmine warfare at sea
is the 1907 Hague Convention No. VIII Relative to the Laying of Automatic
Submarine Contact Mines. Inasmuch as that Convention repeatedly refers to
"automatic contact mines," there is a dispute on the question of its applicability
to the modern "influence mines" (magnetic, pressure, acoustic, etc.), which do
not require contact with the target in order to explode. Some commentators
believe that the Convention is equally applicable to the various influence
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mines. Others believe that the wording ofthe Convention is so restrictive that
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mines other than those specified are not subject to its provisions. Professor
O'Connell has taken the position that while influence mines are not specifically
covered by the Convention, the practice ofbelligerents has been such as to bring
them within its purview. Influence mines are frequendy bottom or ground
mines, which He on the seabed unmoored. If the Convention is applicable to
them, the question which arises is whether, under Article 1(1) of the
Convention, they must disarm themselves one hour after they have been
planted—a requirement which would make them practically useless. In view of
the validity of the dispute, this appears to be one area where new laws with
respect to the conduct of warfare at sea might prove useful.
During the drafting ofthe 1907 Hague Convention No. VIII the Netherlands
sought to have included therein a provision which would have prohibited the
laying ofmines barring passage through a strait connecting two open seas. This
proposal was rejected and all that was done in this regard was to include in the
Commission report a statement that there was no intention to change the law
relating to straits without stating what that law was. During both World Wars
straits were mined, and with such success that it is deemed unlikely that any
restriction on this practice would be acceptable to most nations now or in the
foreseeable future.
One comparatively recent development in naval weapons systems is the
"torpedo mine." It is an anti-submarine weapons system consisting of a torpedo
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inserted into a mine casing. It is deployed like an ordinary mine in deep water
in the vicinity ofroutes traveled by enemy submarines. It has the ability to detect
and classify submarine targets while surface ships will pass over it without
triggering the torpedo. At the present time it is moored but suggestions have
been made that it be used as a bottom or ground mine, buried in the seabed for
concealment purposes, and not moored. Two legal problems would then arise
with respect to this weapon: first, it might be argued that under the provisions
of Article 1(1) of the 1907 Hague Convention No. VIII such a weapon should
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disarm itself one hour after being deployed. On the other hand, it is actually
unarmed and inactive while lying on the seabed; the torpedo only becomes
activated, armed, and sent on its way when it receives the signal of the approach
of a target—a submarine. The second problem is that under Article 1(3) of the
Convention a torpedo which misses its mark must become harmless. When
released, the encapsulated torpedo would be no different from any other
torpedo. Presumably the fact that it would sink to the bottom of the sea at the
end of an unsuccessful run would meet the Convention's requirement although
it is probable that all torpedoes can be and are programmed to disarm themselves
when they miss their target.
One final aspect of mine warfare is worthy of mention. In 1972 the Seabed
Arms Control Treaty came into effect. This Treaty prohibits emplacing or
emplanting any nuclear weapons or any other types of weapons of mass
destruction on the seabed beyond a twelve-mile coastal zone. The same
restriction exists as to any facilities for storing, testing, or using such weapons.
The coastal State, whether belligerent or neutral, may emplace or emplant any
type of mine, conventional or nuclear, within its twelve-mile zone, subject,
presumably, to notification, and, in appropriate cases, to the right of innocent
passage. Other States are limited to the employing or emplanting ofconventional
mines beyond the twelve-mile zone. A belligerent may, of course, lay
conventional mines within the territorial waters of its enemy provided that it is
not the "sole object" of such mines to intercept commercial vessels. May it lay
nuclear mines in those waters subject only to that same limitation?
The Natural Environment
There is one aspect of the conduct of war at sea to which little attention has
been paid and which could prove catastrophic for mankind—that is, the effect
ofsuch warfare on the natural environment. What will happen to the live natural
resources of the sea if supertankers carrying hundreds of thousands of tons of
crude oil are torpedoed and sunk? Or ifoff-shore pumping facilities are attacked
and left discharging their product into the sea? What will happen to those natural
resources and to mankind itself ifnuclear submarines and other nuclear warships
are destroyed by shells, missiles, mines, or torpedoes? Or if a warship, surface or
submarine, carrying weapons with nuclear warheads is so destroyed? While there
are "fail-safe" devices intended to protect against harm arising from these two
latter eventualities, not only will there be instances where they cannot operate,
but events have demonstrated the undependability of such devices. I have no
solution for this problem nor, unfortunately, can I envision any rules in this
regard which would be generally acceptable to states. Even if the provisions
of the 1977 Protocol I are deemed to be applicable to warfare at sea, it does not
appear that its Articles 35 and 55 thereof will solve the problem. For example,
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no torpedo mine is programmed in such a way as to limit its attacks to
conventional submarines. And with the desperate need for oil of every
belligerent during wartime, no nation can realistically be expected to provide
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in its rules of engagement a prohibition against attacks on tankers.
Missiles
The development and use of missiles with conventional warheads, such as
Exocet, should not create any major legal problems. As in land warfare, they are
nothing more than modern artillery, even when they are used over the horizon.
Of course, ifmissiles from the sea are used against land targets their use is subject
to the provisions of the 1907 Hague Convention No. IX Concerning
Bombardment by Naval Forces in Time ofWar and the 1977 Protocol 1.
However, ifthey are used against targets at sea they are subject to no prohibitions
or restrictions not imposed on the use of a warship's guns. One commentator,
writing in 1972, questioned whether naval surface-to-surface missiles were
"sufficiently discriminating to ensure that the distinction between military targets
on the one hand, and civilian and neutral targets on the other, can be
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maintained." However, while a missile, like any other projectile, may hit an
innocent victim and thus create an international incident, this would not appear
to affect the legal status of missiles as a means of conducting warfare at sea.
Exclusion Zones
Naval warfare may take place anywhere that ships may sail except in the
territorial seas or internal waters of neutral states. This, of course, includes the
high seas. The right of neutral vessels and aircraft to use the high seas, even
during wartime, cannot be denied—but, legally or illegally, certain limitations
have frequendy been placed on that right by belligerents. One such limitation
which has had many names is probably now best known as an "exclusion zone."
One commentator, Commander Fenrick, has defined this term as follows:
An exclusion zone, also referred to as a military area, barred area, war zone or
operational zone, is an area of water and superadjacent air space in which a party
to an armed conflict purports to exercise control and to which it denies access to
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ships and aircraft without permission.
Exclusion zones, under various names, were notified in both World Wars,
frequendy under the guise of reprisals. After World War II the International
Military Tribunal (IMT) at Nuremberg found German Admiral Doenitz guilty
of a violation of the 1936 London Proces-Verbal (Protocol I) holding:
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The order of Doenitz to sink neutral ships without warning when within these
[operational] zones was, therefore, in the opinion of the Tribunal, a violation of
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the protocol.
It will be noted that the Tribunal referred only to the sinking without warning
of neutral ships within these zones. The effect of such an order directed solely at
enemy merchant vessels is left unstated. During the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas
War the establishment of exclusion zones proliferated with the British
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announcing four and the Argentines announcing three. The most extensive
such zone announced by the British was its Total Exclusion Zone (TEZ) of 28
April 1982, effective 30 April 1982. The core of that announcement was to the
effect that:
Any ship and any aircraft, whether military or civilian, which is found within the
zone without authority from the Ministry ofDefence in London will be regarded
as operating in support of the illegal occupation [of the Falkland Islands] and will
therefore be regarded as hostile and will be liable to be attacked by British forces.
So far as is known, the Soviet Union was the only neutral to protest this
action—perhaps out of pique because a British spokesman had made reference
to "Soviet spy ships trailing the British forces inside the Zone."
Exclusion zones of a sort have been announced by both Iran and Iraq in their
long-running war.
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That complicated situation, with both sides in violation of
international law at least as frequently as they are in compliance with it, is better
not used either as a precedent or as an indication of the practice of states.
In his study of exclusion zones Commander Fenrick makes the following
proposal:
It is suggested that if belligerents use exclusion zones they should publicly declare
the existence, location and duration of the zones, what is excluded from the zone,
and the sanctions likely to be imposed on ships or aircraft entering the zone without
permission, and also provide enough lead time before the zone comes into effect
to allow ships to clear the area.
Doesn't that sound very much like a blockade?
I pose the following questions: Are exclusion zones a legal method of
conducting warfare at sea? If not, are there any possible limiting factors which
could make them legal?
Submarine Warfare
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Part IV of the 1930 London Naval Treaty contains two rules with respect
to the method of conducting submarine warfare: first, they must conform to the
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rules applicable to surface vessels: and, second, except in certain limited and
specified cases, they are prohibited from sinking a merchant vessel without first
having placed passengers, crew, and ship's papers in a place of safety—which
does not include the ship's boats unless in proximity to land or another vessel.
There were eleven parties to these provisions, including France, Italy, Japan, the
United Kingdom, and the United States. The provisions were repeated in the
1936 Proces-Verbal ' to which thirty-seven additional States, including
Germany and the Soviet Union, had acceded prior to the outbreak of World
War II.
As we have already seen, the International Military Tribunal (IMT) found
that, while in command of the German submarine force during World War II,
Admiral Doenitz had issued orders which violated the provisions of the 1936
Proces-Verbal. However, the Tribunal did not assess punishment for this offense
because of evidence that both the British and the United States navies had
followed substantially similar procedures. In other words, three of the major
naval Powers of the time had completely disregarded the provisions of the law
of naval warfare restricting the methods of conducting submarine warfare. The
Tribunal apparently considered that, despite this, the 1936 Proces-Verbal
continued to be binding international law of naval warfare. Can it really be
believed that in any future conflict involving naval powers, submarine warfare
will be conducted in a manner other than it was in World War II? Can it be
believed that the reiteration of the provisions on the conduct of submarine
warfare in a new treaty, or the drafting of new restrictive provisions on this
method of conducting naval warfare, would be other than a useless gesture?
Conclusions
The methods and means ofconducting warfare at sea that have been developed
since the end ofWorld War II are unquestionably numerous. For some, no new
conventional law is necessary. For a few, it would probably be helpful to have new
conventional law to replace the customary law which has evolved or the complete
lack of law governing their use. For still others, the likelihood of agreement on a
viable solution appears to be completely unattainable. It is believed that more harm
than good could result from the drafting by the large majority of non-maritime
powers, and the attempted imposition on the maritime powers, ofprohibitions and
restrictions on methods and means of conducting warfare at sea which the latter
powers would refuse to accept.
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XIII
The Status of Belligerent Personnel
"Splashed" and Rescued by a Neutral
in the Persian Gulf Area
*
31 VirginiaJournal of International Law 611 (1991)
When a neutral country such as the United States has a rather sizeable
naval force in a confined area for the protection of vessels flying its
flag, it is inevitable that components of that force will, at times, find themselves
in armed confrontation with ships and military aircraft of belligerents in that
area. In the Iran-Iraq war, ships and military aircraft frequendy attacked the
tankers that the U.S. Navy had been sent to the Persian Gulf to protect, or even
attacked components ofthe U.S. Navy itself. There are several discrete examples
ofjust such confrontations.
On August 10, 1987, a U.S. Navy fighter plane fired two missiles at an Iranian
plane which had violated the "bubble" announced by the Navy as a measure of
self-protection. And on August 25, 1987, a U.S. destroyer fired across the bows
of two small unidentified vessels which were approaching the tankers that the
destroyer was escorting. On April, 18, 1988, in retaliation for the damaging of
an American warship, United States armed forces attacked and destroyed two
Iranian oil platforms (which were also used as anti-aircraft platforms) and U.S.
naval vessels engaged in a subsequent encounter with Iranian vessels, all ofwhich
resulted in heavy Iranian casualties. However, as the individuals on the platforms
were given warning of the attacks which were about to take place, and Iranian
tugboats were permitted to engage in rescue work without impediment by the
U.S. forces, no Iranians were rescued from the sea by the latter.
The first two incidents terminated with no damages, no casualties and no
individuals in custody. The third incident terminated with both Iranian casualties
and "splashed" personnel, but again with no individuals in custody. The question
these examples pose concerns the status of the members of the crews of such
ships or aircraft when they are disabled, sunk or shot down by the U.S. forces
* This article is a revision of remarks delivered at the 82nd Annual Meeting of the
American Society of International Law Panel on Neutrality, the Rights ofShipping and
the Use of Force in the Persian GulfWar, 23 April 1988. See Levie, Remarks, 82 Proc.
Am. SOC'Y INTL L. 597 (1988).
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while they are engaged in such attacks, or while they are committing other illegal
acts against U.S. flagged merchant shipping, or warships, or planes, and when
they are thereafter rescued from the sea by those forces. I refer to "ships" rather
than "warships" because there exists a considerable question regarding the status
of some of the Iranian warships involved.
Article 14 of the 1910 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules with
Respect to Assistance and Salvage at Sea states that it does not apply to "ships
at war." However, article 11(1) of the same Convention provides that:
Every master is bound, so far as he can do so without serious danger to his
vessel, her crew and passengers, to render assistance to everybody, even though an
enemy, found at sea in danger of being lost.
This humanitarian rule should be and in fact was complied with by the U.S.
naval forces in the Persian Gulf. For example, an Iraqi pilot whose plane had
been shot down by the Iranians was rescued from the sea by a component of
the U.S. naval forces. Shortly thereafter he was turned over to the Iraqi
authorities. On the night of September 21-22, 1987, an Iranian vessel, later
identified as the Iran Ajr, was observed by a U.S. Army helicopter equipped with
night-vision sensors to be laying mines in the Gulf in the vicinity of U.S. naval
vessels and an anchorage used by them and the tankers they were there to protect.
When the minelayer disregarded the radio orders ofthe helicopter to discontinue
its minelaying activity, the helicopter opened fire on the Iranian vessel and
rendered it dead in the water. Twenty-six Iranian seamen and three bodies
were subsequendy rescued from the sea by a component of the U.S. naval
forces. Similarly, on October 8, 1987, when a U.S. helicopter flying over the
waters of the Persian Gulfwas fired upon by a gunboat, it returned the fire. Four
wounded Iranians and the bodies of two others were recovered from the sea by
7
a component of the U.S. naval forces. Were the individuals who were rescued
after these incidents prisoners ofwar? While the question is moot at the moment
as all of the individuals were quickly repatriated through the agency of the
government of Oman, it is one which may require a hard decision at some time
in the future.
Common article 2 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions Relative to the
Treatment ofWar Victims is the article concerned with the circumstances under
9
which those Conventions are to be applied. It provides that:
[T]he present Convention shall apply in all cases of declared war or of any other
armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting
Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them.
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A number ofyears ago the International Committee ofthe Red Cross (ICRC)
produced lengthy, and what have subsequently become authoritative,
commentaries with respect to each of the four 1949 Geneva Conventions. Each
of these commentaries contains a substantially identical statement with respect
to common article 2. The pertinent portions of the Commentary on the 1949
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners ofWar state that:
Any difference arising between two States and leading to the intervention of
members of the armed forces is an armed conflict within the meaning of Article
2, even if one of the Parties denies the existence of a state of war. It makes no
difference how long the conflict lasts, how much slaughter takes place, or how
numerous are the participating forces; it suffices for the armed forces ofone Power
to have captured adversaries falling within the scope of Article 4. Even if there
has been no righting, the fact that persons covered by the Convention are detained is
sufficientfor its application. The number of persons captured in such circumstances
is, of course, immaterial.
This will be an acceptable interpretation of the provisions ofcommon article
2 in the great majority of cases. However, in some respects, and under some
circumstances, it may be too all-encompassing. When Major Arthur D.
Nicholson of the United States Army was shot and killed by a Russian soldier
in the Potsdam area on March 25, 1985, and his sergeant-driver was held prisoner
at gunpoint for a number of hours, he certainly constituted a person "covered
by the Convention" who was "detained." But was there an "armed conflict"
between the Soviet Union and the United States? Were the provisions of the
Prisoner-of-War Convention applicable to the sergeant? When Lieutenant
Robert 0. Goodman of the United States Navy was shot down by the Syrian
Army on December 4, 1983, and was taken into custody by the Syrians and held
for one month before being released, once again there was certainly a person
"covered by the Convention" who was "detained." But was there an "armed
conflict" between Syria and the United States? Were the provisions of the
Prisoner-of-War Convention applicable to the lieutenant? The original
announcements made by both U.S. officials and the Syrians appeared to assume
that he was a prisoner-of-war. However, the United States appeared to have
changed its position. President Reagan later stated: "I don't know how you have
a prisoner ofwar when there is no declared war between nations. I don't think
that makes you eligible for the Geneva Accords."
Although an isolated incident of the use of force between two nations may
be considered by one or both of them to be indicative of the existence of an
armed conflict between them, usually the nations involved will wish to keep
their options open and will not consider that such an incident has initiated an
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armed conflict—unless the very purpose of the incident was to serve as a basis
for such a claim.
The first question to be decided, then, is whether there is an armed conflict
between the parties. The ICRC takes the position that such incidents as those
which occurred in the Persian Gulf in September and October 1987 constitute
17
armed conflict and bring the Convention into play. I do not agree with that
conclusion. But even assuming arguendo that the ICRC position is correct, this
alone will not always solve the problem.
Article 4 of the 1949 Geneva Prisoner-of-War Convention specifies the
categories of persons who are entitled to the status of prisoners of war. First
among these categories are "[m] embers of the armed forces of a Party to the
conflict as well as militias or volunteer corps forming part of such armed
forces." The Iranians who were recovered from the sea by the U.S. Navy on
September 22, 1987, were apparently members ofthe Iranian navy and the vessel
was an Iranian warship. ' If there was an armed conflict and if the
Prisoner-of-War Convention was applicable, they would unquestionably come
within the coverage of the quoted provision and would be entided to the
protection afforded by the Convention.
Suppose, however, that they had been members of the "Revolutionary
Guards"—the individuals who appear to compose the crews of the so-called
"gunboats" which attack any and every ship found in the Persian Gulf, without
. 20
regard to the flag that it flies or the cargo that it carries. Do such individuals
fall within the category of persons entided to prisoner-of-war status when they
are rescued by U.S. naval forces from the waters of the Persian Gulf into which
they have been precipitated by action of those same armed forces? Or are they
illegal combatants who are not entitled to the benefits of that status? While we
really know very little about the organization of the Revolutionary Guards, it
would appear that they are, at a minimum, members of a militia or volunteer
corps forming part of the Iranian armed forces. Under these circumstances, and
under the ICRC interpretation of the Convention provision, they, too, are
entitled to the status of prisoners of war if they fall into the hands of another
power during a period ofarmed conflict. It is very possible that they have been
guilty ofviolations ofinternational law inasmuch as they have, without warning,
attacked unarmed, neutral vessels. But this does not affect their entitlement to
prisoner-of-war status. It only means that they could be subjected to trial and
punishment for their illegal acts—an unlikely event.
My conclusion, then, is that occasional incidents do not constitute a state of
war, or even ofarmed conflict, ifthere is a difference, between the United States
and Iran or Iraq. Therefore, none of the Iranians who have been, or who are
likely to be, "splashed" and rescued by United States forces in the Persian Gulf
have been, or will be, entided to prisoner-of-war status. It must be borne in
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mind, however, that a decision that there is no armed conflict and that an
individual is, therefore, not entided to prisoner-of-war status only means that
he is not entided to the protection of all of the specific provisions of the 1949
Geneva Prisoner-of-War Convention. It does not mean that he is unreservedly
at the mercy of the power in whose custody he finds himself. He is still entitled
to all ofthe protection ofgeneral humanitarian law. For example, he must receive
any necessary medical care, he may not be denied adequate food and water, he
may not be tortured or otherwise maltreated, he may not be treated as a hostage,
etc.
One final aspect of the problem is worthy of mention. It is not beyond the
realm ofpossibility that some American military personnel serving in the Persian
Gulf will, in the future, fall into the power of the Iranian regime. It will
undoubtedly be recalled that the holding of hostages is not an unknown
phenomenon to that regime. It is devoutly to be hoped that the precedent that
the United States has established of immediate repatriation will contribute to
making it politically inexpedient for Iran to hold such American personnel as
hostages, as might otherwise have occurred.
Addendum
Even disregarding the perennial Arab-Israeli controversies, during the past
decade international crisis has followed international crisis in the Middle East in
general, and in the Persian Gulf in particular. Iran and Iraq fought a bloody war
from 1980 to 1988, a war which necessitated the establishment of a naval
presence in that area by halfa dozen nations in order to protect neutral merchant
shipping. During 1984, the mystery of the mines in the Red Sea posed grave
difficulties for Egypt and its Suez Canal and necessitated a multilateral force to
clear the mines from the sea. During the 1980s there was rarely a moment when
the internecine conflict in Lebanon was not costing lives, with international
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interventions on a number of occasions. Then, on 2 August 1990, less than
two years after the Iran-Iraq conflict had come to an inconclusive halt, Iraq,
under Saddam Hussein, invaded, occupied, and annexed its neighbor, Kuwait,
bringing down upon its head the wrath of the great majority of the members of
the international community, including most of the fifteen members of the
Security Council of the United Nations. Military forces from thirty nations
concentrated in Saudi Arabia and when non-military actions such as economic
blockades proved ineffective in inducing Saddam Hussein to recognize the error
of his actions, the Security Council authorized Kuwait and its cooperating
"coalition" states "to use all necessary means to uphold and implement
Resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions" if Iraq had not
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complied with the mentioned resolutions by 15 January 1991. ' This was, of
244 Levie on the Law of War
course, a euphemistic way of authorizing the use of armed force while avoiding
the need for any unpalatable words.
Aerial bombardment began shortly after the deadline. Inevitably, coalition
planes were shot down and crew members became prisoners ofwar ofthe Iraqis.
In this instance there was no question with respect to the applicability of the
1949 Geneva Prisoner-of-War Convention. Although Iraq became a party to
this Convention in 1956, she paid as little attention to its provisions in this
conflict as she had during the Iran-Iraq War. In the other direction there was
a fairly substantial number of Iraqis who elected to become prisoners of war
rather than fight for Saddam Hussein. The ground war started late in February
and within a matter of days the number of Iraqi prisoners ofwar in the custody
of the members of the coalition reached the tens of thousands. Delegates of
the ICRC immediately began visiting these prisoners of war, a process which
thereafter continued without interruption.
When Iraq capitulated and agreed to comply with the provisions of the
previous Security Council resolutions, Security Council Resolution 686 (1991),
set forth the requirements to be imposed on Iraq in order to warrant a cease fire.
The resolution contained the following provision:
3. Further demand that Iraq:
(c) Arrange for immediate access to and release of all prisoners of war
under the auspices of the International Committee of the Red Cross and return
the remains of any deceased personnel of the forces ofKuwait and the Member
States cooperating with Kuwait pursuant to resolution 678 (1990). . . .
On March 6, 1991, Iraq released thirty-five prisoners of war, asserting that
27
that was all she held. ' Shortly thereafter the coalition commenced the
incremental repatriation ofthe Iraqi prisoners ofwar who had expressed a desire
for repatriation. That process was to continue until all Iraqi prisoners of war
who desired repatriation were back in Iraq.
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Introduction
Chapter 10 of The Commander's Handbook on the Law ofNaval Operations
is concerned with nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. While the
extent that the use of these weapons, other than nuclear, will impinge on naval
warfare (except in connection with naval surface and naval air bombardment of
land objectives, riverine operations, etc.) is probably fairly limited, the draftsmen
of the Handbook have deemed it appropriate to include a full chapter on these
subjects—and righdy so. In addition to discussing the evolution and present
status of the applicable rules of the international law ofwar with respect to each
ofthose categories ofweapons, this commentary will discuss the extent to which
those rules affect naval warfare qua naval warfare and the extent to which they
affect the operations of naval units against objectives on land.
Nuclear Weapons
When the first atom bomb exploded over Hiroshima on August 6, 1945, it
began a new (and perilous) era for the planet Earth. It also began a controversy
which has yet to be resolved to the satisfaction of a great many people.
Not unexpectedly, sometime after the facts with respect to the nature of the
atom bomb and the extent of the casualties and damage inflicted at Hiroshima
and Nagasaki became generally known, an issue was raised as to the legality or
illegality of the use of the atom bomb—and, subsequently, the same issue was,
ofcourse, raised as to the use of its far more powerful and devastating successors.
In the discussion which follows it must be borne in mind that while there are a
2
number ofconventions placing various types ofrestrictions on nuclear weapons,
3
there is no convention which specifically outlaws their use. In light of the
complete failure of all of the practically endless efforts undertaken since 1945 to
accomplish this result, to argue that the use of such weapons is prohibited by
inference derived from the provisions of international agreements dating from
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1868, from 1899, or from 1907, appears to be the equivalent of tilting at
windmills. In view of the foregoing this writer concurs with the statement
contained in the Handbook to the effect that, "There are no rules of customary
or conventional international law prohibiting nations from employing nuclear
A
weapons in armed conflict." Nevertheless, a brief analysis of the arguments pro
and con appears to be warranted.
The 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time ofWar,
of Explosive Projectiles Under 400 Grammes Weight contained a number of
humanitarian preambular clauses:
That the only legitimate object which States should endeavour to accomplish
during war is to weaken the military forces of the enemy;
That for this purpose it is sufficient to disable the greatest possible number of
men;
That this object would be exceeded by the employment ofarms which uselessly
aggravate the sufferings of disabled men, or render their death inevitable;
That the employment of such arms would, therefore, be contrary to the laws
of humanity.
During the course of the drafting ofwhat became the 1899 Hague Convention
(II) With Respect to the Laws and Customs ofWar on Land and its annexed
Regulations, several provisions were included which have often been cited as
affecting the subject under discussion. These provisions were:
Art. 22. The right ofbelligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy are not
unlimited.
Art. 23. In addition to the prohibitions provided by special Conventions, it is
especially forbidden:
(a) To employ poison or poisoned weapons; . . .
(e) To employ arms, projectiles, or material of a nature to cause superfluous
injury; . . .
The cognate provisions of the 1907 Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the
Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annexed Regulations are essentially
identical with those quoted above.
Realizing, however, that these and the other provisions that were to be
included in the Regulations could not possibly cover all of the contingencies that
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might arise during the course of a war, the Russian representative at the 1899
Peace Conference, Martens, a noted international lawyer, proposed, and the
Conference agreed, that a paragraph be included in the preamble which would
read:
Until a more complete code ofthe laws ofwar is issued, the High Contracting
Parties think it right to declare that in cases not included in the Regulations
adopted by them, populations and belligerents remain under the protection and
empire of the principles of international law, as they result from the usages
established between civilized nations, from the laws of humanity, and the
requirements of the public conscience.
Assuming that these preambular provisions are law-making in nature, a
number of questions arise. Did the use of the atomic bombs in 1945 weaken
the miHtary forces of the enemy? Did it uselessly aggravate the sufferings of
disabled men, or render their death inevitable? Did it exceed the limits which
a belligerent may adopt as a means of injuring the enemy? Did it constitute the
use of "poison"? Did it represent the employment of a weapon "calculated to
cause unnecessary suffering"? Did it constitute a failure to give the populations
and belligerents "the protection and empire of the principles of international
law, as they result from the usages established between civilized nations, from
the laws ofhumanity, and the requirements of the public conscience" to which
they were entitled? And, most important, if one or more of these questions is
answered in the affirmative, does the particular principle apply if the alternative
would have resulted in a million American military casualties and an even greater
number ofJapanese casualties, military and civilian? In other words, was the
principle of proportionality applicable? While all of those questions have been
posed here with respect to Hiroshima and Nagasaki, they will likewise have to
be asked—and answered—before any future use of nuclear weapons.
Literally hundreds of books and articles have been written on both sides of
the questions posed and it is doubtful that any proponent of either side of the
argument has been successful in convincing anyone who disagrees with his
position that it is correct and that the other person's position is incorrect. The
present writer does not propose to draw himself into that quagmire. Suffice it
to say that nuclear weapons are with us and at the present time there does not
appear to be any possibility that they will disappear, at least in the foreseeable
future. Under those circumstances we can only hope that neither side will make
the mistake of using them and thus bring an end to civilization, and to life itself,
on this planet.
There is, of course, an area of nuclear warfare in which navies would play an
important role. A preemptive first strike by one side might possibly eliminate
much of the other side's land-based nuclear deterrent force—but it could not
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reach the deployed naval-based force, the submarines of which are the
ever-mobile carriers of nuclear ballistic missiles. Thus, this potential naval
retaliatory force, maintained by both parties involved in the eyeball-to-eyeball
confrontation which has more or less existed since shortly after the end ofWorld
War II, is a major factor in the policy of deterrence. Moreover, the strength and
speed of these nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed submarines are reputedly
such that there are experts who believe that they can only be destroyed by nuclear
weapons, such as nuclear-armed depth charges or nuclear-armed torpedoes. If
such is the case, the use ofthese latter nuclear weapons becomes almost inevitable
as during a period of active hostilities, whether we call it war or armed conflict,
no nation and no navy is going to permit enemy nuclear-powered submarines
armed with nuclear ballistic missiles to roam the seas unchallenged.
One problem which arises is whether successful conventional-weapons
attacks on nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed submarines (and surface vessels)
would adversely affect the waters of the oceans and the air of the atmosphere.
While the United States has lost two nuclear submarines with no such adverse
effects, this is far from conclusive as the two crews would probably have shut
down the nuclear reactors and any nuclear weapons aboard the submarines
would not have been armed; accordingly, the amount of radioactivity released
by each of those vessels would have been minimal. How much environmental
damage would be caused by the sinking ofa nuclear armed and nuclear-powered
submarine with its reactor in operation appears to be a relative unknown.
Moreover, should a war reach the nuclear stage, it is a virtual certainty that any
naval engagement would include the use of nuclear weapons against the
opposing enemy fleets. When this occurs the extent of the contamination of the
oceans and of the atmosphere is incalculable as nuclear explosions would be
taking place both in the atmosphere and in the water and nuclear-powered ships
would be sunk with their reactors in operation. Of course, should a war reach
the nuclear stage, such matters would be a small, and comparatively unimportant,
part of the overall picture.
The ballistic missiles carried by nuclear-powered submarines, referred to
above, would, of course, if used, be directed against objectives on land. It is
doubtful, but not inconceivable, that in a nuclear war a naval bombardment of
objectives on land might include nuclear-armed shells and missiles. However,
should a war reach that stage, the results of any such bombardment would be
miniscule compared to the results that could be expected from landbased nuclear
ballistic missiles, from the nuclear ballistic missiles released from below the
surface of the seas, and from the nuclear weapons dropped from the air.
It is probably necessary to conclude that if and when an armed conflict
approaches the nuclear stage, law will play a very small role in determining the
actions of the belligerents.
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Chemical Weapons
Chemical warfare agents have been defined as "chemical substances, whether
gaseous, liquid, or solid, which might be employed because of their direct toxic
1
1
effects on man, animals and plants."
The earliest formal international attempt to prohibit the use of chemicals in
warfare occurred at the 1899 Hague Peace Conference which drafted and
adopted a Declaration stating, "The Contracting Parties agree to abstain from
the use of projectiles the sole object ofwhich is the diffusion of asphyxiating or
12
deleterious gases." This Declaration was ofunlimited duration. All ofthe major
European Powers, including France, Germany, Russia, and the United
Kingdom, signed and ratified it. The United States neither signed nor ratified
it.
The 1899 Declaration was in force during World War I. Despite this,
Germany used gas against the Russians in Poland in January 1915. The gas was
delivered by artillery shells but, because ofthe sub-zero weather, had little effect
13
and the incident passed almost unnoticed. The first major, and
well-documented, use of gas occurred in France, on April 22, 1915, when the
Germans opened containers ofcompressed chlorine, permitting a favoring wind
1
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to blow the gas towards the Allied Ypres salient. The success of the operation
far exceeded expectations and before the war was brought to an end more
than three years later many other chemical weapons were being used by both
sides and were being delivered by artillery, mortars, projectors, etc. The Treaty
of Versailles, which legally terminated World War I as between Germany and
the Allies, contained the following provision:
Art. 171. The use of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and all analogous
liquids, materials or devices being prohibited, their manufacture and importation
are stricdy forbidden in Germany.
The same applies to materials specially intended for the manufacture, storage
and use of the said products or devices.
The 1922 Washington Conference on the Limitation of Armaments,
consisting of representatives of France, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and
the United States, drafted a treaty which was primarily concerned with
submarine warfare but which included the following provisions:
Art. 5. The use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and all
analogous liquids, materials or devices, having been jusdy condemned by the
general opinion of the civilized world and a prohibition of such use having been
declared in treaties to which a majority of the civilized Powers are parties,
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The signatory Powers, to the end that this prohibition shall be universally
accepted as a part of international law binding alike the conscience and practice
of nations, declare their assent to such prohibition, agree to be bound thereby as
between themselves and invite all other civilized nations to adhere thereto.
To become effective this treaty required the ratification of all of the participants
in the Conference. France refused to ratify it because of objections to some of
the provisions with respect to submarine warfare. Accordingly, the treaty never
entered into force. However, three years later another conference, this one
concerned with international trade in weapons and ammunition, drafted the
1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating,
Poisonous or Other Gases, and ofBacteriological Methods ofWarfare. While
much of its wording was taken almost verbatim from the prior draftings, its
importance warrants the setting forth of its operative provisions in their entirety:
Whereas the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of all
analogous liquids, materials or devices, has been jusdy condemned by the general
opinion of the civilized world; and
Whereas the prohibition of such use has been declared in Treaties to which
the majority of Powers of the world are Parties; and
To the end that this prohibition shall be universally accepted as a part of
International Law, binding alike the conscience and the practice of nations;
Declare:
That the High Contracting Parties, so far as they are not already Parties to
Treaties prohibiting such use, accept this prohibition, agree to extend this
prohibition to the use ofbacteriological methods ofwarfare and agree to be bound
as between themselves according to the terms of this declaration.
Strange to relate, while the United States had ratified the Washington Treaty,
with its provision prohibiting the use of poisonous gases, just two years earlier,
and was the chief proponent of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, it did not ratify the
latter until 50 years later, in 1975!
Many of the states which have ratified the 1925 Geneva Protocol have done
so with a so-called "first use" reservation. Typical of those reservations is that
of the United Kingdom: "The said Protocol shall cease to be binding on His
Britannic Majesty toward any Power at enmity with him whose armed forces,
or the armed forces of whose allies, fail to respect the prohibitions laid down in
20
the Protocol."' It does not appear that this "first use" reservation has ever been
invoked despite the not-infrequent use of the prohibited gases. For example,
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Italy, a party to the Protocol (as was Ethiopia), admittedly used poison gas in its
1935-1936 war with Ethiopia. Japan, although a party to the 1899 Declaration,
did not ratify the Protocol until after World War II. On June 5, 1942, President
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Roosevelt warned the Japanese against the use ofpoisonous gas. While at that
time Japan denied using such gas in China, it has never officially denied such
use since the end of the war. Egypt, a Party to the 1925 Protocol (as was the
Yemen Arab Republic), is alleged to have used gas in the civil war in Yemen.
Iraq, also a party to the Protocol (as is Iran), has been accused of using gas in its
recent war with Iran. In none of these cases is there evidence of retaliation in
kind, probably because the victim of the gas attack was not in possession of a
stock of chemical weapons.
During World War II Hider on occasion considered the use of chemical
weapons against England. However, he apparendy realized, or his military
advisers were able to convince him, that Germany's opponents were well able
to reply in kind and that, in the long run, the use of such weapons would be
self-defeating to Germany. On June 5, 1943, President Roosevelt warned
Germany that the use ofchemical weapons by any Axis country against any one
ofthe United Nations would result in "swift retaliation in kind," specifying that
the targets would be "munition centers, seaports, and other military objectives
throughout the whole extent of the territory ofsuch Axis country.'" With the
possible exception ofJapanese use in China, chemical weapons were not used
by any belligerent during World War II.
The General Assembly of the United Nations has adopted a number of
27
resolutions on the subject of chemical warfare. A resolution adopted in 1968,
among other things, requested the Secretary-General to prepare, with the
assistance of experts, a report on chemical and bacteriological (biological)
weapons. This report, which was submitted to the General Assembly in 1969,
found that "because of the scale and intensity ofthe potential effects of their use,
they are considered as w
the following statement:
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eapons of mass destruction." The report contained
The general conclusion of the report can thus be summed up in a few lines.
Were these weapons ever to be used on a large scale in war, no one could predict
how enduring the effects would be, and how they would affect the structure of
30
society and the environment in which we live.
Upon the receipt of that report the General Assembly adopted a resolution to
the effect that the 1925 Geneva Protocol "embodies the generally recognized
rules of international law prohibiting the use in international armed conflict of
all biological and chemical methods of warfare." Of course, this merely
represented the political judgment of those nations which voted in favor of the
resolution.
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The need to maintain a supply of chemical weapons for use in retaliation
against a violator of the provisions of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, or any other
"first user," has created the longtime problem of finding a safe method for the
disposition of overage gas, with leaky containers adding to the difficulties of the
possessor. One technical advance in this field, the so-called "binary" gases, will
considerably alleviate this problem. These gases consist of two non-toxic
chemicals which only become toxic when mixed, an action which is
accomplished while, for example, an artillery shell is in flight. A representative
of the Chemical Corps ofthe United States Army listed the advantages ofbinary
weapons as including "improved safety during production, transportation and
storage; no requirement for high-cost toxic production facilities; and simplified
low-cost demilitarization procedures."
A number of problems have arisen with respect to the interpretation of the
1925 Geneva Protocol. One such problem is whether it includes within its
prohibitions the use ofsmoke, sometimes a major weapon in naval warfare, and
the use of riot control agents, such as lachrymatories, or tear gas. The argument
against the use of smoke, that it at least temporarily incapacitates due to a type
of asphyxia, is weak and is not very frequently advanced. Originally the British
interpreted the provisions of the 1925 Geneva Protocol as covering
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lachrymatories. However, deeming it an essential weapon for use in Northern
Ireland, in 1970 the British Government took the position that "CS and other
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such gases" were not prohibited by the 1925 Geneva Protocol. Practically all
governments use lachrymatories domestically for the suppression ofsuch events
as riots and other civil disturbances. Nevertheless, the propriety of their use in
armed conflict remains a matter of dispute.
A further problem of interpretation is whether the Protocol includes within
its prohibitions the use of herbicides. This problem arose during World War II
when the question was raised as to whether it would be in accordance with
international law to use "crop-destroying chemicals" on the gardens being
grown by Japanese units located on by-passed islands of the Pacific. Although
the Judge Advocate General of the Army found no legal impediment to such
action, no action was taken, probably because it would have been a waste of
resources. During the hostilities in Vietnam herbicides were used extensively,
both for crop destruction and as a defoliant. When the issue was raised in the
Senate during the consideration by that body of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, the
General Counsel of the Department of Defense arrived at the same conclusion
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the Army had reached in 1945. ' Nevertheless, as will be noted below, the
United States has renounced the first use of herbicides except for certain
38
extremely limited purposes.
Another such problem of interpretation is whether incendiary weapons are
within the prohibitions of the Protocol. The United States has long taken the
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position that there is no rule ofinternational law prohibiting the use ofincendiary
weapons. At a conference of experts convened in 1969 by the International
Committee of the Red Cross, some of the experts were of the opinion that the
use ofincendiary weapons, and particularly napalm, was prohibited by the 1925
Geneva Protocol because, by burning the oxygen, it "causes a sort ofasphyxia."
Others took the position that incendiary weapons were not prohibited but were
subject to "discriminating" use. The ICRC concluded that "more extensive
studies should be made of the consequences of incendiary weapons in order to
reach a clear legal solution as to their employment." The U.N. Report with
respect to chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, published that same
year, contains the following relevant statement:
We also recognize that there is a dividing line between chemical agents of
warfare, in the sense in which we use the terms, and incendiary substances, such
as napalm and smoke, which exercise their effects through fire, temporary
deprivation of air or reduced visibility. We regard the latter as weapons which are
better classified with high explosives than with the substances with which we are
concerned. They are therefore not dealt with further in this report.
Studies were subsequently made by a group of experts appointed by the
Secretary-General of the United Nations, by the Stockholm Peace Research
Institute (SIPRI), and by the ICRC itself in 1973, in 1974, and in 1976; and
probably by other organizations and institutions. The U.N. experts found it
appropriate "to bring to the attention of the General Assembly the necessity of
working out measures for the prohibition of the use, production, development
and stockpiling ofnapalm and other incendiary weapons" — a clear indication
of their understanding that there was no such prohibition then extant. The
author of the SIPRI report stated that "there was never any positive indication
that the intention ofthe [1925] Geneva Protocol was to prohibit incendiaries."
The ICRC studies were inconclusive. Finally, the subject was discussed by
the Ad Hoc Committee on Conventional Weapons of the Diplomatic
Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International
45
Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts and the Diplomatic
Conference adopted a resolution in which it recommended the convening of a
conference to draft agreements on certain conventional weapons. Such a
conference was held in 1980 and resulted in, among others, a Protocol on
Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use ofIncendiary Weapons. This Protocol
does not prohibit the use of incendiaries; it merely places certain restrictions on
the manner in which they may be used. The sum total to be derived from the
foregoing survey is, of course, that incendiary weapons do not come within the
purview of the prohibitions of the 1925 Geneva Protocol or, for that matter, of
any other international agreement on the law of war.
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The 1980 Protocol provides that it is prohibited "to make the civilian
population, individual civilians or civilian objects the object of attack by
incendiary weapons." (Of course, the law ofwar generally prohibits such attacks
by any weapon!) Such a prohibition, and the accompanying restrictions on the
use of air-delivered and other types of incendiary weapons intended to
implement that prohibition, would obviously have no effect on naval
engagements at sea. However, they would be applicable with respect to naval
bombardments ofland targets, either by warships or by aircraft, and with respect
to the use of incendiaries by marines ashore.
Now let us see where the United States stands generally on the question of
chemical warfare. It has already been mentioned that the United States did not
ratify the 1899 Declaration and that the 1925 Geneva Protocol was not ratified
by it until 1975. During that 50-year interim period the position of the United
States with respect to chemical warfare was well summed up in the predecessor
to the Handbook, which contained the following statement:
The United States is not a party to any treaty now in force that prohibits or
restricts the use in warfare ofpoisonous or asphyxiating gases or ofbacteriological
weapons. Although the use of such weapons frequently has been condemned by
states, including the United States, it remains doubtful that, in the absence ofa specific
restriction established by treaty a state legally is prohibited at presentfrom resorting to their
use. However, it is clear that the use of poisonous gas or bacteriological weapons
may be considered justified against an enemy who first resorts to the use of these
rr ,-.48weapons, [rootnotes omitted)
The United States has almost uniformly taken the position that there is no
customary law prohibiting the use of these weapons. During the hostilities in
Vietnam the United States used two controversial types of chemical weapons -
tear gas and herbicides. Tear gas was originally used for humanitarian
purposes but its utility as a non-lethal gas quickly became apparent and it was
widely used for a number of purposes.
4
' This created considerable discussion
both in the United States and elsewhere in the world with the result that on
November 25,1969, President Nixon issued a statement in which he said that
he was resubmitting the 1925 Geneva Protocol to the Senate for its advice and
consent to ratification and that the United States "Reaffirms its oft-repeated
renunciation of the first use of lethal chemical weapons" and "Extends this
renunciation to the first use of incapacitating chemicals."
After extensive hearings and further commitments by the Executive Branch,
the Senate gave its advice and consent to the ratification of the 1925 Geneva
Protocol and President Ford ratified it on January 22, 1975. The ratification
was deposited, and the Protocol became binding on the United States, on April
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10, 1975. On April 8, 1975, President Ford signed Executive Order 11,850
which provides:
The United States renounces, as a matter of national policy, first use of
herbicides in war except use, under regulations applicable to their domestic use,
for control of vegetation within U.S. bases and installations or around their
immediate defensive perimeters, and first use of riot control agents in war except
in defensive military modes to save lives such as:
(a) Use of riot control agents in riot control situations in areas under direct and
distinct U.S. military control, to include controlling rioting prisoners of war.
(b) Use of riot control agents in situations in which civilians are used to mask
or screen attacks and civilian casualties can be reduced or avoided.
(c) Use of riot control agents in rescue missions in remotely isolated areas, of
downed aircrews and passengers, and escaping prisoners.
(d) Use of riot control agents in rear echelon areas outside the zone of
immediate combat to protect convoys from civil disturbances, terrorists and
paramilitary organizations.
Fortunately, since the issuance of that Executive Order, the United States has
not been involved in any armed conflict which would make its application
appropriate. However, the Handbook, issued in 1987, further illuminates the
United States position with respect to the use of chemical weapons. It will be
recalled that its predecessor, The Law of Naval Warfare, stated that it would be
difficult to hold that use of such weapons was prohibited by customary
international law. In a complete turnabout, the Handbook says:
The United States considers the prohibition against first use of lethal and
incapacitating chemical weapons to be part of customary international law and,
therefore, binding on all nations whether or not they are parties to the 1925 Gas
Protocol.
It will be interesting to record the reactions to this position of states which are
still not parties to the 1925 Protocol and which have not committed themselves
58
in the General Assembly of the United Nations.
As we shall see, there is in existence a Convention which supplements the
1925 Geneva Protocol by prohibiting the development, production, and
stockpiling ofbiological agents and their delivery weapons. Although separate
proposals made in 1 962 by both the Soviet Union and the United States included
similar provisions with respect to chemical weapons, both the United
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Kingdom and the United States later insisted on separating chemical weapons
from the others. As a result, despite fairly continuous efforts, the only restriction
on chemical weapons at the present time is the 1925 Geneva Protocol which
prohibits use only.
In 1984 then Vice President Bush went to Geneva to attend a meeting of the
Conference on Disarmament (CD) and to table a United States proposal which
sought to accomplish for chemical weapons what had already been accomplished
for biological weapons. It has since been under consideration in the CD, which
subsequendy drafted and studied a 1 987 revision. InJanuary 1 989 a conference
hosted by the French Government in Paris adopted a resolution calling for
reaffirmation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol and stressed "the necessity of
concluding, at an early date, a convention on the prohibition of the
development, production, stockpiling and use of all chemical weapons and on
their destruction." In July 1989 the United States and the Soviet Union
reached agreement on the key remaining issues and currendy (December
1989) the CD is working on a May 1989 version with changes made up to
15 October 1989. In view of the insistence of the United States on
"anywhere-anytime" inspections, it is ofinterest to know that the Soviet Union
has agreed to permit "surprise inspections" and that it is now the United States
which has a problem in this respect in view of the Fourth Amendment to the
Constitution, prohibiting "unreasonable searches and seizures."
The wheels of diplomacy grind slowly (witness the years of discussion of the
1982 U.N. Law of the Sea Convention and of the 1977 Protocols ), so there
is still the possibility that in the not-too-distant future there will be agreement
on a Convention which will prohibit the development, production and
stockpiling of chemical agents and their delivery systems, as well as providing




Bacteriological (biological) weapons have been defined as "living
organisms, whatever their nature, or infective material derived from them, which
are intended to cause disease or death in man, animals or plants, and which
depend for their effects on their ability to multiply in the person, animal or plant
attacked." International restrictions on the use of biological weapons present
far fewer legal problems than do those on the use of chemical weapons. In fact,
the legal situation is so clear that the major problem is, once again, that of
ensuring compliance.
It will be recalled that by the declaration contained in the 1925 Geneva
Protocol the Parties agreed "to extend the prohibition [against the use of
poisonous gas] to the use of bacteriological methods of warfare." ' The League
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ofNations Disarmament Conference discussed the matter and attempted, albeit
unsuccessfully, to draft a treaty which would have prohibited the production
and stockpiling of both chemical and biological weapons. During World War
II considerable scientific research was done on biological weapons. However,
no such weapons were used by either side, with one possible exception. The
Soviet Union has long contended that during World War II the Japanese had a
unit called "Bacteriological Detachment 731" located at Harbin in China and
that this unit had conducted bacteriological experiments on several thousand
Chinese, Koreans, Russians, and, perhaps, Americans. When the war ended,
many of the senior officers of this unit were taken into Soviet custody and in
December 1949 twelve of them were tried by a Soviet court at Khabarovsk,
were found guilty ofengaging in bacteriological warfare, and received sentences
of confinement in a labor correction camp for terms varying from two to
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twenty-five years. In 1982 the Japanese Government acknowledged that such
a unit had existed during the war. Assuming that the Soviet charges are correct,
it would appear that the activities of the Japanese unit never passed the
experimental stage, that it never reached the stage of actual use of biologicals
against enemy military forces as a weapon of war.
In 1962 the Soviet Union tabled at the meeting of the Eighteen Nation
Disarmament Committee (ENDC) a proposal for general and complete
disarmament which included the following provision: "The prohibition, and
destruction of all stockpiles, and the cessation of the production of all kinds of
weapons of mass destruction, including atomic, hydrogen, chemical, biological
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and radiological weapons."
A few weeks later the United States submitted its counterproposal with a
provision which called for "Elimination of all stockpiles of nuclear, chemical,
bacteriological, and other weapons of mass destruction and cessation of the
production of such weapons."
In view of the close similarity of the two proposals, it would seem that
agreement with respect at least to chemical and biological weapons could have
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been quickly attained. However, such was not the case. There were those
who took the position that chemical and biological weapons should not bejoined
in the same treaty as there was experience with chemical weapons, but none
with biologicals. While the relevance of this argument is far from clear, it was
sufficient to delay the affirmative action which might otherwise have been taken.
Finally, in 1969 the United Kingdom submitted a proposal which called for a
complete ban on "microbial or other biological agents," but made no mention
ofchemical weapons. When, in 1971 , the United States and the Soviet Union
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tabled identical drafts relating to biologicals only, the result was a foregone
conclusion. Using that draft as a working document the Conference of the
Committee on Disarmament (CCD, which had replaced ENDC) produced a
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Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their
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Destruction. Its most important provision states:
Art. 1. Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never in any
circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile, or otherwise acquire or retain:
(1) Microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or
method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for
prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes;
(2) Weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or
toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict.
It also contains provisions requiring each State Party to destroy all of the items
specified in Article 1 within nine months of the Convention coming into force
(presumably, for the State concerned); and an undertaking not to transfer to any
recipient, or to encourage the manufacture of, any of the prohibited items.
It is thus evident that States Parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol and to the
1972 Bacteriological Convention are prohibited from developing, manufacturing,
stockpiling, acquiring, retaining, or using biological weapons In view ofthe coverage
of the Convention, nations have not made "first use" reservations. The two
international agreements were intended to, and should eliminate biologicals
from the arsenals of all such Parties and should mean that in any future war, large
or small, limited or unlimited, conventional or unconventional, biologicals
would not be a factor. Unfortunately, events have already demonstrated that
these expectations will not be met.
A catastrophe occurred in Sverdlovsk in the Soviet Union in 1980 in which
more than 1,000 people died as a result of what appears to have been anthrax
poisoning, although Soviet officials claimed that the deaths had been caused by
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meat contaminated by hoof-and-mouth disease. In addition, the United States
has contended that the Soviet Union, either direcdy or through surrogates, has
used biological (as well as chemical) weapons in Southeast Asia and in
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Afghanistan. ' If, as is generally believed, the Sverdlovsk incident involved
anthrax, and if, as the United States contends, biologicals have been used by the
Vietnamese in Kampuchea and Laos and by the Soviet Union in Afghanistan,
then the Soviet Union is manufacturing and using biologicals contrary to the
provisions of the two agreements to which it is a party. Unfortunately, the 1925
Geneva Protocol contains no provision for verification and the only provision
for verification contained in the 1 972 Convention is a meaningless one providing
for resort to the Security Council.
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The predecessor to the Handbook, published at a time when the United States
was not a party to the 1925 Geneva Protocol and when the 1972 Bacteriological
Convention had not yet been drafted, stated:
The United States is not a party to any treaty now in force that prohibits or
restricts the use in warfare . . . of bacteriological weapons. Although the use of
such weapons frequendy has been condemned by states, including the United
States, it remains doubtful that, in the absence of a specific restriction established
by treaty, a state legally is prohibited at present from resorting to their use.
[Footnotes omitted.]
This was probably a fair statement ofthe United States position until November
25, 1969, when President Nixon, on behalfofthe United States, renounced the
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use of biological weapons by this country. Three months later he included
toxins in this renunciation. " Then this country became a party to the 1972
Bacteriological Convention and in 1975 it finally ratified the 1925 Geneva
Protocol with its ban on the use of biologicals. Once again, however, it appears
that the Handbook may be going too far when it asserts:
The United States considers the prohibition against the use of biological
weapons during armed conflict to be part of customary international law and
thereby binding on all nations whether or not they are parties to the 1925 Gas
Protocol or the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention.
Can it be that while at a particular point in time a principle may not necessarily
be a binding rule of customary international law, it becomes such as soon as the
United States ratifies a treaty containing that principle? Certainly, the United
States did not consider itself bound by any rule of customary international law
prohibiting the use ofbiologicals when it issued its military manuals in 1955 and
1956; nor did it consider itself so bound at any time thereafter, even when (and
until) President Nixon made his 1969 and 1970 statements unilaterally
renouncing the use of biologicals and toxins. Would the 50 or more nations
which are not parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol and the 50 or more nations
which are not parties to the 1972 Bacteriological Convention agree with the
quoted statement? Or is this statement, and the similar one with respect to
chemical weapons quoted above, inserted in order to convince non-parties that
they might just as well ratify the agreements as they are bound by them in any
event?
In view ofthe mobility ofnaval forces, it has always been considered unlikely,
but not impossible, that naval vessels at sea will have to meet the problem of
defending themselves against an attack using biological (or chemical) weapons.
Should such an attack occur, for example by guided missiles which succeed in
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penetrating the vessel's defenses and dispense the lethal item, the attack would
have a devastating effect because air-intake systems would quickly disseminate
it throughout the interior of the vessel, or because concurrent high-explosive
ordnance would have pierced the shell of the ship. Items such as masks, special
clothing, etc., available for the protection ofthe individual members ofthe crew,
would greatly impede the functioning of the crew, even if there was time to
don them. In addition, naval vessels, naval guns and naval aircraft might well be
among the weapons systems used for the delivery of biologicals against land
targets, should biologicals ever be used in wartime. Thus, in a field trial, a ship
sailing 1 6 kilometers offshore travelled a distance of 260 kilometers parallel to
the coastline discharging a harmless powder. The resulting aerosol covered an
area of over 75,000 square kilometers. Had the material disseminated been a
biological "depending on the organism and its degree of hardiness, areas from
5,000 to 20,000 square kilometers could have been effectively attacked, infecting
a high proportion of unprotected people in the area."
Conclusions
There is no law in force, conventional or customary, which prohibits the use
of nuclear weapons. However, there can be no winners, but only losers, no
victors, but only vanquished, in the event of a nuclear war. Whether or not a
war in which nuclear powers are involved becomes a nuclear war will depend
upon the wisdom and leadership of the political leaders of those powers and
upon the extent to which the desire to win the war outweighs a reluctance to
bring disaster not only upon the enemy, but also upon their own people and
upon the peoples of neutral nations.
Chemical and biological weapons, like nuclear weapons, are weapons ofmass
destruction. Once released they are beyond the control of the user and, like
nuclear weapons, their effects can come back to haunt the user. The use of
certain chemicals can have widespread, long-lasting, and severe consequences
for the environment and for the populations. This is even more true with respect
to the use of many biologicals. The use of either of these types of weapons is
prohibited by an international agreement to which more than two-thirds of the
nations of the world community are parties. The very existence of biological
weapons is prohibited by an international agreement with a similar amount of
participation. Hopefully, there will, in due course, be an identical prohibition
with respect to chemical weapons.
In view of the tremendous lethal and destructive capabilities of nuclear,
chemical, and biological weapons one might almost regret our inability to
turn the clock back to the nineteenth century, when nuclear, chemical, and
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Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Weapons
Addendum
In 1971 there was drafted a Treaty on the Prohibition ofthe Emplacement ofNuclear
Weapons and Other Weapons ofMass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor
and the Subsoil Thereof. The United States is a Party to this Treaty.
In 1972 the United Nations Committee on Disarmament drafted a Convention
on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction which was approved by the
General Assembly of the United Nations. The United States has ratified this
Convention, as have the great majority of other States. All types of
bacteriological and biological weapons are now completely banned and each
State is given nine months from the date of the entry into force of the
Convention within which to destroy all such weapons in its stockpile.
(Presumably this means nine months after the Convention enters into force for
a particular country.) The Convention itself entered into force on 26 March
1975. As is not unusual, Iraq is believed to continue to possess such weapons
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and has placed constant difficulties in the way of the United Nations inspectors
who have attempted to ascertain whether it is complying with the terms of the
1991 Security Council Resolution (S.C. Res. 687) requiring their destruction,
as well as that of chemical weapons.
In 1993 the General Assembly of the United Nations approved a Convention
on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical
Weapons and on Their Destruction. This Convention supplements the 1925 Geneva
Gas Protocol which merely prohibited "use." Once again, Iraq is believed to
continue to possess such weapons and has placed constant difficulties in the way
of the United Nations inspectors who have attempted to ascertain whether it is
complying with the terms of Security Council Resolution 687. (The United
States Senate gave its advice and consent to the ratification of this treaty on 24
April 1997, despite the vehement opposition of Senator Jesse Helms, Chairman
of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and President Clinton ratified it
on 25 April 1997. Unfortunately, the ratification includes a number of
"understandings," many of which will not coincide with the interpretations of
other Parties to the Convention.)
On 15 December 1994 the General Assembly ofthe United Nations adopted
a resolution in which it requested the International Court ofJustice to provide
an advisory opinion on the question: "Is the threat or use of nuclear weapons
in any circumstances permitted under international law?" The Court decided
unanimously that "There is in neither customary nor conventional international
law any specific authorization of the threat or use of nuclear weapons" and by
a vote of eleven to three that "There is in neither customary nor conventional
international law any comprehensive and universal prohibition of the threat or
use of nuclear weapons as such." However, a further holding of the Court, on
which the vote was seven to seven, decided by the President's casting vote,
states:
It follows from the above mentioned requirements that the threat or use ofnuclear
weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable
in armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law.
However, in view of the current state of international law, and of the elements
of fact at its disposal, the Court cannot conclude definitively whether the threat
or use ofnuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance
of self-defence, in which the very survival of a State would be at stake.
XV
The Rise and Fall of an Internationally
Codified Denial of the
Defense of Superior Orders
30 Revue De Droit Militaire Et De Droit De La Guerre 183 (1991)
Introduction
As long as there have been trials for violations of the laws and customs of
war, more popularly known as "war crimes trials", the trial tribunals have
been confronted with the defense of "superior orders"—the claim that the
accused did what he did because he was ordered to do so by a superior officer
(or by his Government) and that his refusal to obey the order would have brought
dire consequences upon him. And as along as there have been trials for violations
ofthe laws and customs ofwar the trial tribunals have almost uniformly rejected
that defense. However, since the termination of the major programs of war
crimes trials conducted after World War II there has been an ongoing dispute
as to whether a plea of superior orders should be allowed, or disallowed, and, if
allowed, the criteria to be used as the basis for its application. Does international
action in this area constitute an invasion of the national jurisdiction? Should the
doctrine apply to all war crimes or only to certain specifically named crimes?
Should the illegality of the order received be such that any "reasonable" person
would recognize its invalidity; or should it be such as to be recognized by a
person of"ordinary sense and understanding"; or by a person ofthe "commonest
understanding"? Should it be "illegal on its face"; or "manifestly illegal"; or
l
"palpably illegal"; or of"obvious criminality"? An inability to reach a generally
acceptable consensus on these problems has resulted in the repeated rejection of
attempts to legislate internationally in this area. Consequendy, the continued
existence ofan international rule denying superior orders as a defense to a charge
ofviolating the laws and customs ofwar appears to be in jeopardy—if it has not
already ceased to exist.
More than five centuries ago, when one Peter von Hagenbach was tried by
an "international" tribunal for maltreating, and permitting his subordinates to
maltreat, the inhabitants of the town of Breisach while he was in command of
what might be termed a military occupation (although the war did not begin
270 Levie on the Law of War
until thereafter), his defense was that his actions were in compliance with the
orders of his master, the Duke of Burgundy. Even though complete obedience
to the commands of one's liege lord was a way of life in the fifteenth century,
and even though human life, particularly of civilians, was not respected then as
it is today, von Hagenbach was found guilty and he was sentenced to death.
Similarly, in 1865, at the conclusion of the American Civil War, when
Captain Henry Wirz, the erstwhile Confederate commander of the notorious
prisoner-of-war camp at Andersonville, Georgia, was tried before a federal
Military Commission for the maltreatment ofthe prisoners ofwar in his custody,
one of his defenses was "superior orders." In his personal summation Wirz said:
I think I may also claim as a self-evident proposition that if I, a subaltern officer,
merely obeyed the legal orders of my superiors in the discharge of my official
duties, I cannot be held responsible for the motives that dictated such orders.
Against this claim the prosecutor asserted:
I know that it is urged that during all this time he was acting under General
Winder's orders, and for the purpose of argument I will concede that he was so
acting. A superior officer cannot order a subordinate to do an illegal act, and if a
subordinate obey such an order and disastrous consequences result, the superior
and the subordinate must answer for it. General Winder could no more command
the prisoner to violate the laws of war than could the prisoner do so without
orders. The conclusion is plain, that where such orders exist both are guilty. . . .
And notwithstanding his earnest appeal, made to you in his final statement,
begging that he, a poor subaltern, acting only in obedience to his superior, should
not bear the odium and punishment deserved, with whatever force these cries of
a desperate man, in a desperate and terrible strait, may come to you, there is no
law, no sympathy, no code of morals, that can warrant you in refusing to let him
have all justice, because the lesser and not the greater criminal is on trial.
Wirz was found guilty and he was sentenced to death.
It is interesting to note that in the first (1906) edition of his now famous and
7
standard work on international law, Oppenheim said:
Ifmembers ofthe armed forces commit violations by order oftheir Government,
they are not war criminals and cannot be punished by the enemy; the latter can,
however, resort to reprisals. In case members of forces commit violations ordered
by their commanders, the members may not be punished, for the commanders
are alone responsible, and the latter may, therefore, be punished as war criminals
on their capture by the enemy.
Superior Orders 271
That statement, or one closely resembling it, appeared in the subsequent
editions of Oppenheim's treatise, with its various editors, including the first
edition (the 5th) edited by Lauterpacht. In the next (6th) edition Lauterpacht
reversed himself and in the 7th edition, the last that he edited (and the last
edition of the second volume that has appeared to date), the following rule is
10
set forth:
253. The fact that a rule of warfare has been violated in pursuance of an order
of the belligerent Government or of an individual belligerent commander does
not deprive the act in question of its character as a war crime; neither does it, in
principle, confer upon the perpetrator immunity from punishment by the injured
belligerent. A different view has occasionally been adopted in military manuals,
and by writers, but it is difficult to regard it as expressing a sound legal principle.
Undoubtedly, a Court confronted with the plea of superior orders adduced in
justification of a war crime is bound to take into consideration the fact that
obedience to military orders, not obviously unlawful, is the duty ofevery member
of the armed forces and that the latter cannot, in conditions ofwar discipline, be
expected to weigh scrupulously, the legal merits of the order received; that rules
of warfare are often controversial; and that an act otherwise amounting to a war
crime may have been executed in obedience to orders conceived as a measure of
reprisals. Such circumstances are probably in themselves sufficient to divest the
act of the stigma of a war crime. . . . However, subject to these qualifications, the
question is governed by the major principle that members ofthe armed forces are
bound to obey lawful orders only and that they cannot therefore escape liability
if, in obedience to a command, they commit acts which both violate unchallenged
rules of warfare and outrage the general sentiment of humanity.
The Preliminary Peace Conference which met at Versailles in 1919 to draft
a treaty of peace with Germany at the end of World War II established a
Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of
Penalties with the task ofinquiring into and reporting upon, among other things,
the degree of responsibility for breaches of the laws and customs of war. In its
report the Commission listed thirty-two types of violations of the laws and




We desired to say that civil and military authorities cannot be relieved from
responsibility by the mere fact that a higher authority might have been convicted
of the same offence. It will be for the court to decide whether a plea of superior
orders is sufficient to acquit the person charged from responsibility.
Article 228 of the Treaty of Versailles which actually ended World War I for
many of the belligerents required the German Government to hand over to the
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Allied Governments for trial "all persons accused of having committed an act in
12
violation of the laws and customs of war." In the face of the public opinion
prevailing in Germany at that time no Government could have survived
compliance with such a requirement and so it was subsequendy agreed that the
individuals named would, instead, be tried by the Supreme Court of Leipzig.
The trials were a fiasco; but in one of them, involving the trial of two officers
who had obeyed the order of their commanding officer to fire upon the lifeboats
of a hospital ship which their submarine had torpedoed, the German Court said:
It is true that according to the [German] Military Penal Code, if the execution
of an order in the ordinary course of duty involves such a violation of the law as
is punishable, the superior officer issuing such an order is alone responsible.
However, the subordinate obeying an order is liable to punishment, if it was
known to him that the order of the superior involved the infringement of civil or
military law. This applies in the case of the accused. It is certainly to be urged in
favour of the military subordinates that they are under no obligation to question
the order of their superior officer, and they can count upon its legality. But no
such confidence can be held to exist, if such an order is universally known to
everybody, including the accused, to be without any doubt whatever against the
law.
The accused were found guilty by the Court and were sentenced to
imprisonment for a term of years.
While the 1922 Treaty of Washington never came into force because of the
failure of ratification by France, it is ofinterest to note that Article 3 thereof stated:
The Signatory Powers, desiring to ensure the enforcement ofthe humane rules
of existing law declared by them with respect to attacks upon and the seizure and
destruction ofmerchant ships, further declare that any person in the service ofany
Power who shall violate any of those rules, whether or not such person is under
orders of a governmental superior, shall be deemed to have violated the laws of
war and shall be liable to trial and punishment as if for an act of piracy and may
be brought to trial before the civil or military authorities ofany Power within the
jurisdiction of which he may be found.
Although the inter-war period (1919-1939) was far from free ofinternational
hostilities, the subject of war crimes trials appears to have been raised, or even
written about by the students of the subject, on comparatively few occasions.
World War II and its Aftermath
All during the course of World War II there had been statements made by
the Allies that there would be trials for those major war criminals who had
Superior Orders 273
plunged the world into catastrophic war and for those individuals who had
otherwise violated international law. A private conference of British and
European jurists from occupied countries which met in Cambridge in
November 1941 established a committee to draft rules and procedures to govern
war crimes trials. The sub-committee on superior orders concluded that
generally speaking, the codes oflaw ofthe respective countries recognize the plea
of superior orders to be valid if the order is given by a superior to an inferior
officer, within the course ofhis duty and within his normal competence, provided
the order is not blatandy illegal. The conclusion reached was that each case must
be considered on its own merits, but that the plea is not an automatic defence.
The London International Assembly, established by the League of Nations
Union of Great Britain, adopted a resolution which included the following with
20
respect to the defense of superior orders:
(a) That an order given by a superior to an inferior to commit a crime violating
international law was not in itself a defence, but that the Courts were entided to
consider whether the accused was placed in a 'state of compulsion' to act as
ordered, and acquit him or mitigate the punishment accordingly;
(b) That such exculpating or extenuating circumstances should in all cases be
disregarded in two types of cases: when the act was so obviously heinous that it
could not be committed without revolting the conscience of an average human
being; and when the accused was, at the time of the offence, a member of an
organization whose membership implied the execution of criminal orders.
The United Nations Commission for the Investigation of War Crimes (later the
United Nations War Crimes Commission) was established in London on 20
October 1943 by 17 of the States at war with Germany and Japan. (The Soviet
Union was not represented at this meeting, nor did it later participate in the
21
activities of the Commission.) Its Legal Committee concluded that a general
understanding between the victorious belligerent nations on the subject of
superior orders was desirable and stated that it believed the following rule to be
22
consistent with international law:
The defence of obedience to superior orders shall not constitute a justification
for the commission ofan offence against the laws and customs ofwar, if the order
was so manifesdy contrary to those laws or customs that, taking into account his
rank or position and the circumstances surrounding the commission ofthe offence,
an individual of ordinary understanding would have known that such an order
was illegal.
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This recommendation did not meet with unanimous support and the
Commission's Enforcement Committee eventually recommended that the
23
Commission submit the following statement to the Governments:
The Commission has considered the question of 'superior orders'. It finally
decided to leave out any provision on the subject. . . . The Commission considers
that it is better to leave it to the court itself in each case to decide what weight
should be attached to a plea of superior orders. But the Commission wants to
make it clear that its members unanimously agree that in principle this plea does
not of itself exonerate the offenders.
Finally, in March 1945, the Commission itself adopted the following
position:
Having regard to the fact that many, if not most, of the members States have
legal rules on the subject, some of which have been adopted very recendy, and
that in most cases these rules differ from one another, and to the further
consideration that the question how far obedience to the orders of a superior
exonerates an offender or mitigates the punishment must depend on the
circumstances of the particular case, the Commission does not consider that it can
usefully propound any principle or rule.
The Commission unanimously maintains the view . . . that the mere fact of
having acted in obedience to the orders of a superior does not of itself relieve a
person who has committed a war crime from responsibility.
Early in 1945 the United States prepared a draft of a proposal for an
international military tribunal to try the major German war criminals. Paragraph
11 of that proposal stated:
The fact that a defendant acted pursuant to order of a superior or government
sanction shall not constitute an absolute defense but may be considered either in
defense or in mitigation of punishment if the tribunal before which the charges
are being tried determines that justice so requires.
That proposal was submitted to the representatives of the Provisional French
Government, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom at San Francisco in
April 1945, together with a later draft in which a paragraph concerning trial
procedures contained a sub-paragraph stating that any agreement on the matter
should include a provision which could,
(c) except as the court in its discretion shall deem appropriate in particular cases,
exclude any defense based upon the fact that the accused acted under orders of a
superior officer or pursuant to state or national policy.
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Then, on 14 June 1945, the United States distributed a revision of its draft
proposal, a document which later became the working paper for the London
Conference which met to draft the definitive Charter of the International
27
Military Tribunal. Paragraph 1 5 of that revision stated:
In any trial before an International Military Tribunal the fact that a defendant
acted pursuant to order of a superior or government sanction shall not constitute
a defense per se, but may be considered either in defense or in mitigation of
punishment if the tribunal determines that justice so requires.
In a further Revised Draft submitted by the United States on 30 June 1945,
28
during the course ofthe London Conference, the relevant paragraph now read:
17. The fact that a defendant acted pursuant to order of a superior or to
government sanction shall not constitute a defense per se, but may be considered
in mitigation of punishment if the Tribunal determines that justice so requires.
29A Soviet proposal which was tabled at the Conference on 2July 1 945 stated:
ARTICLE 29
Carrying Out of an Order
The carrying out by the defendant of an order of his superior or government
shall not be considered a reason excluding his responsibility for the crimes set out
in Article 2 of this Statute. In certain cases, when the subordinate acted blindly in
carrying out the orders of this superior, the Tribunal has right to mitigate the
punishment of the defendant.
A drafting subcommittee was then created by the Conference. The provision
which it drafted on the question of superior orders varied litde from that set
30
forth in the last revision proposed by the United States:
8. The fact that the defendant acted pursuant to order of a superior or the
Government sanction shall not free him from responsibility but may be considered
in mitigation of punishment if the Tribunal determines that justice so requires.
In what was apparendy the only real discussion ofsuperior orders which took
place at the London Conference, the following occurred:
General Nikitchenko: In article 7 [8?] of the Charter I do not propose any
change but would like to point out two considerations. Would it be proper really
in speaking of major criminals to speak of them as carrying out some order of a
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superior? This is not a question ofprinciple really, but I wonder if that is necessary
when speaking of major criminals.
Sir David Maxwell Fyfe: There are two points: first, they have already said they
were just doing what Hider said they should do; and secondly, in international
law, certainly in some cases, superior orders were a defense, but in the sixth and
seventh editions of Oppenheim it appears that they aren't a defense. If we don't
make it clear, we may have some trouble on it.
General Nikitchenko: There is a misunderstanding. I wasn't against disallowing
orders of a superior as a defense, but I thought that in regard to major criminals
it would be improper to say that superior orders could be used in mitigation of
punishment.
Sir David Maxwell Fyfe: It seems to me difficult. Suppose someone said, he
was threatened to be shot if he did not carry out Hider's orders. If he wasn't too
important, the Tribunal might let him offwith his life. It seems to be a matter for
the Tribunal.
In one of the German cases on trial which were such a farce after the last war
they did say that superior orders were no defense but could be taken into account
on mitigation. That has been the general rule on superior orders in international
law books.
General Nikitchenko: If the other heads of the delegations consider it best, we
have no intention of pressing it. In general, it should be considered in mitigation;
we think it is proper.
* * * *
Judge Falco: Is it necessary to indicate to the Tribunal the reason for mitigation?
If we say simply that orders are not a defense, it would seem to be left to the
tribunal to say that they may be in mitigation.
MrJustice Jackson: That is about what we proposed originally—not an absolute
defense but a mitigation.
Sir David Maxwell Fyfe: The important part is that it should not be an absolute
defense.
Judge Falco: That is the important part. Must we add that that is the reason for
the Tribunal to consider mitigation?
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With some minor editing the Article 8 set forth above became Article 8 of
the Charter ofthe International Military Tribunal which later sat in Nuremberg.
As finally adopted it stated:
Article 8. The fact that the Defendant acted pursuant to order of his
Government or of a superior shall not free him from responsibility, but may be
considered in mitigation ofpunishment if the Tribunal determines that justice so
requires.
In applying that rule at the Nuremberg Trial the International Military
Tribunal said:
The provisions of this Article are in conformity with the law of all nations.
That a soldier was ordered to kill or torture in violation of the international law
ofwar has never been recognized as a defense to such acts of brutality, though, as
the Charter here provides, the order may be urged in mitigation ofthe punishment.
The true test, which is found in varying degrees in the criminal law ofmost nations,
is not the existence of the order, but whether moral choice was in fact possible.
Another statement in that judgment was to effect that
When they [certain of the defendants] with knowledge of his [Hider's] aims,
gave him their cooperation, they made themselves parties to the plan he had
initiated. They are not to be deemed innocent because Hitler made use of them,
if they knew what they were doing. That they were assigned to their tasks by a
dictator does not absolve them from responsibility for their acts. The relation of
leader and follower does not preclude responsibility here any more than it does
35
in the comparable tyranny of organized domestic crime.
In considering whether the General Staff and the High Command of the
Germany armed forces should be found to be criminal organizations, the
Tribunal said:
Many of these men have made a mockery of the soldier's oath of obedience
to military orders. When it suits their defense they say they had to obey; when
confronted with Hider's brutal crimes, which are shown to have been within their
general knowledge, they say they disobeyed.
On 20 December 1945 the Allied Control Council for Germany, consisting
of military representatives of the Occupying Powers, the same four nations
which had drafted the London Charter of the International Military Tribunal,
promulgated Allied Control Council Law No. 10, setting forth the basis for the
trials in Germany of war criminals other than those to be tried by the
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International Military Tribunal. ' The provisions of Article 11(4) (b) of that Law
with respect to superior orders were substantially the same as those ofthe London
Charter:
The fact that any person acted pursuant to the order of his Government or of
a superior does not free him from responsibility for a crime, but may be considered
in mitigation.
38
In The Hostage Case the Tribunal, convened pursuant to Law No. 10, held:
Implicit obedience to orders ofsuperior officers is almost indispensable to every
military system. But this implies obedience to lawful orders only. If the act done
pursuant to a superior's orders be murder, the production of the order will not
make it any less so. It may mitigate but it cannot justify the order. We are of the
view, however, that if the illegality of the order was not known to the inferior,
and he could not reasonably have been expected to know of its illegality, no
wrongful intent necessary to the commission of a crime exists and the inferior will
be protected. But the general rule is that members of the armed forces are bound
to obey only the lawful orders oftheir commanding officers and they cannot escape
criminal liability by obeying a command which violates international law and
outrages fundamental concepts ofjustice.
In effect, here the Tribunal was saying that if the subordinate did not know
and could not be expected to know that the order was illegal, there was no
criminal intent, no mens rea, and the subordinate would not be guilty. The
opinion in The Einsatsgruppen Case is to the same effect, the Tribunal there having
said:
Those of the defendants who admit participation in the mass killings which are
the subject of this trial, plead that they were under military orders and, therefore,
had no will of their own. As intent is a basic prerequisite to responsibility for
crime, they argue that they are innocent of criminality since they performed the
admitted executions under duress, that is to say, superior orders. The defendants
formed part of a military organization and were, therefore, subject to the rules
which govern soldiers. It is axiomatic that a military man's first duty is to obey. If
the defendants were soldiers and as soldiers responded to the command of their
superiors to kill certain people, how can they be held guilty of crime? That is the
question posed by the defendants. The answer is not a difficult one.
The obedience of a soldier is not the obedience of an automaton. A soldier is
a reasoning agent. He does not respond, and is not expected to respond, like a
piece of machinery. It is a fallacy of wide-spread consumption that a soldier is
required to do everything his superior officer orders him to do.... The fact that a
soldier may not, without incurring unfavorable consequences, refuse to drill,
salute, exercise, reconnoiter, and even go into batde, does not mean that he must
Superior Orders 279
fulfill every demand put to him. In the first place, an order to require obedience
must relate to military duty. An officer may not demand of a soldier, for instance,
that he steal for him. And what the superior officer may not militarily demand of
his subordinate, the subordinate is not required to do. Even if the order refers to
a military subject it must be one which the superior is authorized, under the
circumstances, to give.
The subordinate is bound only to obey the lawful orders of his superior and if
he accepts a criminal order and executes it with a malice of his own, he may not
plead superior orders in mitigation of his offense. If the nature of the ordered act
is manifesdy beyond the scope of the superior's authority, the subordinate may
not plead ignorance to the criminality of the order. If one claims duress in the
execution of an illegal order it must be shown that the harm caused by obeying
the illegal order is not disproportionally greater than the harm which would result
from not obeying the illegal order.
In High Command Case, the Tribunal before which that case was tried quoted
a 1944 statement of Goebbels, the Nazi Propaganda Minister, in which he had
said:
It is not provided in any military law that a soldier in the case of a despicable
crime is exempt from punishment because he passes the responsibility to his
superior, especially if orders ofthe latter are in evident contradiction to all human
morality and every international usage of warfare.
As would be expected, that statement was made in his official capacity as
Minister of Propaganda and referred to alleged acts of Allied troops. It was not
intended as a statement of German military law, nor as an admonition to the
German soldier.
Concerning the act of an intermediate headquarters in passing down to its
subordinate commands an order received from higher headquarters, the Tribunal
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in High Command Case went on to say:
Military commanders in the field with far reaching military responsibilities
cannot be charged under international law with criminal participation in issuing
orders which are not obviously criminal or which they are not shown to have
known to be criminal under international law. Such a commander cannot be
expected to draw fine distinctions and conclusions as to legality in connection
with orders issued by his superiors. He has the right to presume, in the absence
of specific knowledge to the contrary, that the legality of such orders has been
properly determined before their issuance. He cannot be held criminally
responsible for a mere error in judgment as to disputable legal questions.
It is therefore considered that to find a field commander criminally responsible
for the transmittal ofsuch an order, he must have passed the order to the chain of
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command and the order must be one that is criminal on its face, or one which he
is shown to have known was criminal.
In a digest of the laws applied by various courts which conducted war crimes
trials after World War II the United Nations War Crimes Commission said:
The plea of superior orders has been raised by the Defence in war crimes trials
more frequendy than any other. The most common form of the plea consists in
the argument that the accused was ordered to commit the offence by a military
superior and that under military discipline orders must be obeyed. A closely related
argument is that which claims that had the accused not obeyed he would have
been shot or otherwise punished; it is sometimes also maintained in court that
reprisals would have been taken against his family.
It has often been said that an accused is entided under international law to obey
commands which are lawful or which he could not reasonably be expected to
know were unlawful. The question, however, arises whether these commands
must be lawful under municipal law or international law; ... the legality under
municipal law of the accused's acts does not free him from liability to punishment
if those acts constitute war crimes, and it seems to follow that the plea of having
acted upon orders which were legal under municipal law must also fail to constitute
a defence. On the other hand, if the order is legal under international law, it is
difficult to show how an act committed in obedience to it could be illegal under
that system.... The true test in practice is whether an order, illegal under
international law, on which an accused has acted was or must be presumed to
have been known to him to be so illegal, or was obviously so illegal ("illegal on
its face" to use the term employed by the Tribunal in the High Command Trial)
or should have been recognised by him as being so illegal.
The provisions contained in Article 8 ofthe London Charter denying superior
orders as a defense and limiting its application to mitigation ofpunishment were
followed by many of the laws enacted and orders issued after the conclusion of
World War II which were concerned with the trials of violators of the laws and
customs ofwar. Thus, the Charter attached to the Special Proclamation creating
the International Military Tribunalfor the Far East (1MTFE), issued on 19 January
1946 by General Douglas MacArthur as Supreme Commander for the Allied
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Powers (SCAP), included the following provisions:
Article 6. Responsibility ofAccused. Neither the official position, at any time,
of an accused, nor the fact that an accused acted pursuant to order of his
government or of a superior shall, of itself, be sufficient to free such an accused
from responsibility for any crime with which he is charged, but such circumstances
may be considered in mitigation of punishment if the Tribunal determines that
justice so requires.
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None ofthejudges ofthe IMTFE, concurring or dissenting, found it necessary
to advert to the quoted provision of its Charter either in the lengthy judgment
45
or in the other opinions.
As we have already seen, Article 8 ofthe London Charter was also the source
for the cognate provision ofAllied Control Council Law No. 10 and for similar
provisions issued in other occupied territories.
United Nations
On 11 December 1946 the General Assembly of the United Nations
unanimously adopted a resolution the first operative paragraph of which stated
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that the General Assembly:
Affirms the principles of international law recognized by the Charter of the
Nuremberg Tribunal and the judgment of the Tribunal.
Another operative paragraph charged its Committee on Codification (later
changed to the International Law Commission) with the formulation of those
principles, either in the context of a code of offenses against the peace and
security ofmankind or ofan international criminal code. When the International
Law Commission had prepared its first draft in complying with the task assigned
to it of "formulating" the principles of international law recognized in the
London Charter and in the Judgment of the Nuremberg Tribunal, its Principle
IV read as follows:
The fact that a person acted pursuant to order ofhis Government or ofa superior
does not relieve him from responsibility under international law, provided a moral
choice was in fact possible to him.
The overall document received a mixed reception in the Sixth Committee
of the General Assembly, the result of which was the preparation of a draft
49 r
resolution, later adopted by the General Assembly, referring it to member
States for comment, a process which had early evolved in the United Nations
as a method of indefinite postponement.
The following year, in accordance with the directive received from the
General Assembly, the International Law Commission began to work on a Draft
Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind. Article 4 of the first
draft text prepared by the Special Rapporteur, J. Spiropoulos, stated:
The fact that a person charged with a crime defined in this code acted under
the orders of a government or a superior may be taken into consideration either
as a defence or in mitigation of punishment ifjustice so requires.
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This proved unacceptable to the Commission which modified the
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Rapporteur's proposal to read:
The fact that a person charged with an offence defined in this Code acted
pursuant to order of his government or of a superior does not relieve him from
responsibility, provided a moral choice was in fact possible to him.
In its commentary on this Article the Commission said:
Principle IV of the Commission's formulation of the Nuremberg principles,
on the basis of the interpretation given by the Nuremberg Tribunal to article 8
of its Charter, states: "The fact that a person acted pursuant to order of his
Government or of a superior does not relieve him from responsibility under
international law, provided a moral choice was in fact possible to him."
The observations on principle IV, made in the General Assembly during its
fifth session, have been carefully studied; no substantial modification, however,
has been made in the drafting of this article, which is based on a clear enunciation
by the Nuremberg Tribunal. The article lays down the principle that the accused
is responsible only if, in the circumstances, it was possible for him to act contrary
to superior orders.
The International Law Commission's Draft Code did not meet with any
greater acceptance in the General Assembly than had its formulation of the
Nuremberg Principles and the project was shelved for some time. When it was




The fact that a person charged with an offence defined in this Code acted
pursuant to an order of his Government or of a superior does not relieve him of
responsibility in international law if, in the circumstances at the time, it was possible
for him not comply with that order.
This time the Commission's commentary stated:
Since some Governments had criticized the expression 'moral choice', the
Commission decided to replace it by the wording of the new text above.
However, on the recommendation of its Sixth Commission, the General
Assembly postponed all action on the draft Code until a decision had been
reached on the definition of aggression. " This did not occur until 1974 and the
Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind did not reappear
on the agenda of the International Law Commission until 1981. During its 1984
session it once again started to have annual discussions on the subject. Most of
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its time has been spent on the question ofthe offenses to be included and through
1986 the problem of superior orders had not been reached for discussion. As a
result, today, almost forty years later, the efforts of the International Law
Commission to "formulate" the Nuremberg Principles and to draft a code of
offenses against the peace and security ofmankind have still not been successful.
On the same day that it adopted the resolution on the "formulation" of the
Nuremberg Principles and the drafting of a code of offenses, the General
Assembly adopted another resolution which requested the Economic and Social
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Council to draw up a convention on genocide. The Council, in turn,
requested the Secretary-General to collate the comments received and to prepare
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a draft convention on the subject. Article V of his draft provided:
Command of the law or superior orders shall not justify genocide.
No provision on the subject of superior orders appears in the convention as
eventually drafted and adopted.
Other International Efforts to Codify the Rule
We have seen the actions taken by the United Nations General Assembly,
and by its subordinate bodies, concerning the codification ofthe rule with respect
to the non-availability of the defense ofsuperior orders in international criminal
trials. Now let us review the efforts ofother international bodies on this subject.
In 1948 the XVIIth (Stockholm) International Red Cross Conference
recommended that the International Committee ofthe Red Cross (ICRC) draft
provisions for the repression ofbreaches ofthe humanitarian conventions which
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were then in the process of evolution and which ultimately became the four
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1949 Geneva Conventionsfor the Protection of War Victims. The ICRC complied
with that resolution and, with the help of a small group of recognized experts,
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drafted a number ofseparate provisions on the subject, one ofwhich provided:
ARTICLE 40 (a)
The fact that the accused acted in obedience to the orders of a superior or in
pursuance of a law or regulation shall not constitute a valid defence, if the
prosecution can show that in view ofthe circumstances the accused had reasonable
grounds to assume that he was committing a breach of this Convention. In such
a case the punishment may nevertheless be mitigated or remitted, if the
circumstances justify.
With respect to this proposed provision the ICRC said 60
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It establishes, within prescribed limits, the responsibility of offenders; it rejects
the principle, recognized in various military penal codes, that orders received from
a superior exculpate the subordinate who has carried them out.
The text proposed does not, however, go as far as the Declaration of London
of August 8, 1945, which, in the case of 'war crimes', only admitted the plea of
superior orders as a possible extenuating circumstance, the executor of the order
bearing full responsibility.
The suggested text appears to the ICRC to be an acceptable compromise
between obedience to orders,—an essential prerequisite of military
discipline,—and the moral duty to oppose any patent atrocity, such as the massacre
of defenceless women and children.
It should be noted that the onus of proof lies on the prosecution. This is
important in view of the fact that certain legislations called upon the accused to
prove that he was not guilty.
The experts debated whether, even in the case of flagrant participation in such
violations, the threat of death were not sufficient to constitute a legal excuse for
obeying superior orders. No concession of this kind was however made, as every
latitude is left to the judge to mitigate or remit punishment. This power of
discretion seems the best practical solution to the conflict on this point between
English and Continental conceptions of law.
The few bits of legislative history which are available on this subject,
particularly the report of its Special Committee, indicate that the 1949
Diplomatic Conference discarded the forgoing provision on the following
basis:
[N]or could general agreement be reached at this stage regarding the notions
of complicity, attempted violation, duress or legitimate defense or the plea 'by
orders of a superior'. These should be left to the judges who would apply the
national laws.
The Diplomatic Conference is not here to work out international penal law.
Bodies far more competent than we are have tried to do it for years.
As a result, no provision with respect to superior orders appears in the 1949
Geneva Conventions.
In 1971 the ICRC convened a Conference of Government Experts to
consider the drafting of a protocol to the 1949 Geneva Conventions which,
among other things, would remedy some of the defects in those Conventions
which had surfaced over the years. One of the conclusions reached by
Commission IV of that first conference was to the effect that:
556. A number ofshortcomings in the Conventions should be remedied. They
concerned, in particular, the question of superior orders. That problem had not
been provided for in the Conventions, and it was necessary to specify precisely
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under what conditions an accused person could plead that he had received orders
from a superior, as a justification for his commission of an act forbidden by the
Conventions. In order to remedy that deficiency it would be necessary to be
guided by the work ofthe United Nations which itselftook as a basis the principles
laid down by the Nuremberg tribunal.
Apparently the ICRC felt that there was more justification in the decision of
the 1949 Diplomatic Conference than in the recommendation of the 1971
Conference of Government Experts and when it prepared a draft Protocol to
the 1949 Geneva Conventions for consideration by various other preliminary
conferences which it was about to convene, that draft included the following
rather innocuous paragraph in its Article 75:
2. The High Contracting Parties shall determine the procedure to be followed
for all application of the principle under which a subordinate is exempted from
any duty to obey an order which would lead him to commit a grave breach of
the provisions of the Conventions and of the present Protocol.
In its Commentary on that provision the ICRC said:
In particular, it [the ICRC] considered that the basic question ofsuperior orders
should be setded at the national level, in a manner consistent with the guidelines
laid down in the Judgment of the Nuremberg Tribunal, namely, that it should be
possible for soldiers to refuse to obey an order which, if carried out, would
constitute a serious infraction of humanitarian rules. The military regulations of
some countries already contain a provision regarding superior orders and
submission to rank, whereby superiors must only issue orders which conform to
international law and subordinates are relieved from the obligation to obey an
order which would be contrary thereto and which would cause them to commit
a crime or an offence.
The summary of the discussions of this article that took place at the 1972
(Second) Conference ofGovernment Experts, convened by the ICRC to review
and propose changes in the draft Protocol which the ICRC had prepared,
indicates some of the problems that have been encountered in the efforts to
legislate internationally in this area. It states:
4.123. A number of experts approved the introduction of a provision on
superior orders, such as proposed in draft Article 75, § 2 of the ICRC text. . . .
The language of that paragraph did not, however, seem sufficiendy clear and a
number ofamendments were proposed. It was pointed out that attempts had been
made in several national legislations to give a satisfactory formulation ofthe defence
of superior orders, a concept recognized by the Charter and the Judgment of the
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International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg; but so far it had appeared
impossible to find a formula that would really cover all situations and on which
agreement would be general. It would not be right to limit the scope ofthe defence
to grave breaches only (as the 1CRC draft did). According to one expert, it should
be stipulated that the subordinate not merely had the right, but was obliged, to
disobey the unlawful order. Some experts, however, were ofa completely opposite
view and demanded the deletion of the proposed paragraph. They laid emphasis
on the necessity to respect the exigencies of military discipline, and they pointed
out that it would be difficult in time ofarmed conflict to permit soldiers to decide
whether to obey or not. It was equally considered that the approach to this question
should be far more general and that the principles recognized by the Nuremberg
Tribunal, the Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security ofMankind
should be taken into account.
Actually, there were five separate proposals on the subject of superior orders,
none of which was adopted by the Conference. The ICRC thereupon took
it upon itselfto include the following provisions in the Draft Additional Protocol
I prepared by it for use as the Working Document ofthe Diplomatic Conference
which the Swiss Government had already agreed to host beginning in April
1974:
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ARTICLE 77. — Superior orders
1
.
No person shall be punished for refusing to obey an order, ofhis government
or of a superior which, if carried out, would constitute a grave breach of the
provisions of the Conventions or of the present Protocol.
2. The fact of having acted pursuant to an order of his government or of a
superior does not absolve an accused person from penal responsibility if it be
established that, in the circumstances at the time, he should have reasonably known
that he was committing a grave breach of the Conventions or of the present
Protocol and that he had the possibility of refusing to obey the order.
/TO
The ICRC's Commentary on that provision stated:
It was pointed out that this provision might put soldiers in an extremely difficult
position, as they were compelled by military laws and regulations to obey orders
issued to them. That is the reason why it was thought necessary to add to the
sentence "he should have reasonably known that he was committing a grave
breach" the words "and that he had the possibility of refusing to obey the order."
These provisions fared no better in the Diplomatic Conference which drafted
the 1 977 Protocol I than had the comparable provision proposed by the ICRC
in 1949 fared in the earlier Diplomatic Conference. Fortunately for the
researcher, the action on these provisions is better documented than was that of
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its 1949 predecessor. After considerable debate in Committee I during the 1976
and 1977 sessions of the Diplomatic Conference, a roll call vote was taken in
that Committee to make the basic determination as to whether an article on
superior orders should be included in the Protocol which was being drafted.
That roll call resulted in a favorable vote of 34/9/35. To implement that
decision the following article was subsequendy approved by the Committee by
a vote of 38/22/1 5:
Article 77. — Superior orders
1. The High Contracting Parties undertake to ensure that their internal law
penalizing disobedience to orders shall not apply to orders that would constitute
grave breaches of the Conventions and this Protocol.
2. The mere fact of having acted pursuant to an order of an authority or a
superior does not absolve an accused person from penal responsibility, if it be
established that in the circumstances at the time he knew or should have known
that he was committing a grave breach of the Conventions or of this Protocol. It
may, however, be taken into account in mitigation of punishment.
The breadth of the differing views of the various delegations was indicated
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by the fact some twenty-five ofthem found it necessary to explain their votes.
Those explanations fell into three general categories: the proposed article either
did, or did not, draw the necessary balance between compliance with
humanitarian law and military discipline; the proposed article either did, or did
not, draw an adequate distinction between national and international law; and
the proposed article properly, or improperly, limited its coverage to "grave
breaches" of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and of the Protocol. Thereafter,
with a minimum of discussion, the article was taken up by the Plenary Meeting
on 30 May 1977 and resulted in a vote 36/25/25. As the Conference rules
required a two-thirds majority for the inclusion in the 1977 Protocol I, the vote
constituted a rejection of the article on superior orders. (Although abstainers
were not considered as voting, the 36 affirmative votes out of 61 votes cast
amounted to only 59% ofthe total. To have been included in the 1977 Protocol
I, 41 of the 61 votes cast were required.)
Conclusion
There has been no international activity in this area since the rejection by the
Diplomatic Conference in 1977 of the provision adopted by the Committee of
that Conference. The current discussions in the International Law Commission
appear to have completely eliminated any reference to the subject; and the
present author is inclined to believe that even if the Commission were to adopt
a provision, perhaps similar to that contained in its 1954 draft of Code of Offences
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Against the Peace and Security ofMankind, it is doubtful that such a provision would
receive the approval of the Sixth (Legal) Committee of the General Assembly
or that it would be included in any convention submitted to the nations for
adoption. In other words, it appears unlikely that there will be any internationally
"7 A
approved provision on the subject of superior orders in the foreseeable future.
Where does that leave the matter? On two occasions specific proposals for
provisions of major humanitarian conventions on the law of war which would
have placed limitations on the availability of superior orders as a defense have
been rejected by large, representative, Diplomatic Conferences. An organ of the
United Nations eliminated such a proposal from the draft of the Genocide
Convention prepared by its Secretary-General. Two specific proposals drafted
by the International Law Commission which included provisions on the subject
ofsuperior orders have met with less than enthusiasm from the General Assembly
of the United Nations. Although this latter was not necessarily directed against
the proposed provisions with respect to superior orders, but might have been
directed against other parts ofthe documents submitted by the Commission, the
fact remains that in the more than forty years which have elapsed since the
completion of the war crimes trials after World War II, there has been no
successful drafting of such a provision by any international body—and there is
none in sight. Unless applicable national law provides otherwise, any defense
counsel in a future war crimes trial would be professionally derelict if he failed
to assert to the trial court that the rule denying the availability of the defense of
superior orders has been rejected as a rule of international law and that such a
defense is available to an individual charged with the commission of a violation
of the law of war.
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XVI
Submarine Warfare: With Emphasis on the
1 936 London Protocol
The Law ofNaval Warfare: Targeting Enemy Merchant Shipping 28
(Naval War College International Law Studies No. 65,
RichardJ. Grunawalt ed., 1993)
Parti
Early History of the Submarine
Although the idea of a submersible boat dates back at least to the early
seventeenth century, and a number of efforts to perfect such a vessel had
occurred over the subsequent years, it was not until the latter part of the
eighteenth century that realistic attempts began to be made in this respect.
During the American Revolution David Bushnell devised a one-man
submersible known as the American Turtle. Its several attacks against British
warships were, for one reason or another, all unsuccessful. Then in 1 797 Robert
Fulton, who had been demonstrating his version ofthe submersible to the French
Navy, submitted a proposal to the French Directory for the construction and
the use by his "Nautulus Company" of a submarine against the ships of the
British Navy. Paragraph Six of that proposal stated:
And whereas fire Ships or other unusual means of destroying Navies are
Considered Contrary to the Laws of war, and persons taken in such enterprises
are liable to Suffer death, it will be an object of Safety if the Directory give the
Nautulus Company Commissions Specifying that all persons taken in the Nautulus
or Submarine Expedition Shall be treated as Prisoners of War, And in Case of
Violence being offered the Government will Retaliate on the British Prisoners in
a four fold degree.
It can thus be seen that even in its earliest form, and even when it was to be
directed solely against warships, the submarine was a controversial weapon.
Fulton was unable to sell his idea to the French Government. Subsequently, he
was equally unsuccessful in selling it to the British.
From the very beginning of the idea of a vessel that would travel under the
water instead of on the water, it was accepted that if it could be successfully
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developed it would be an asset to small nations, nations which could not afford
large standing navies. It was assumed that, because of its anticipated short range,
it would be used primarily for coastal defense. It is, therefore, not surprising to
find that during the American Civil War the Confederacy developed and built
this type ofvessel to be used against the blockading warships ofthe Union Navy.
It was called a David and altogether the Confederate Navy probably constructed
more than a dozen of them. It was not truly a submersible, because, being
propelled by a steam engine, it had to have a constant source of air. Accordingly,
it moved with its deck awash and an open hatch—not exacdy a recommended
method for safe navigation, and one which resulted in a number of sinkings
during its trials, with the loss of most of the members of the crews. However,
on October 5, 1863, one of these boats attacked and damaged the U.S.S. New
Ironsides. The Confederates also built a true submersible, called the Hunley,
propelled by eight members of the crew turning a crankshaft which ran down
the center for most of the length of the vessel and which was connected to a
propeller. Its claim to fame is that on February 17, 1864 it sank the U.S.S.
Housatonic-znd itself] It may be said that the David and the Hunley ushered in the
era of the submarine in warfare—even though at this point the Confederate
Navy appeared to lose interest in submersibles.
In the quarter century which followed, numerous other inventions were
being developed, and tested, in various countries, particularly in France, a
country which had early exhibited great interest in such a weapon, even though
it had rejected Fulton's proposal. The first really successful submersible, the
forerunner of the submarine of today, was built by John P. Holland, an
Irish-American who, after he had constructed several models, succeeded in
selling the latest version of the Holland to the United States Navy in 1900, the
first that it had acquired. At that same period both the United States Navy and
the Royal Navy placed orders with Holland for the construction and delivery
of additional submarines; while a number of continental nations were placing
similar orders with Holland and other inventors. Even Admiral von Tirpitz,
head of the German Navy, was eventually convinced that the submarine was
o
no longer solely a weapon of coastal defense.
The 1899 Hague Peace Conference
When, on December 30, 1898, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Imperial
Russia issued its proposed agenda for the 1899 Hague Peace Conference, one
item thereof stated:
4. Prohibition of the use in naval battles ofsubmarine or diving torpedo-boats or
of other engines of destruction of the same nature;
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When the matter was discussed in the Second Subcommission of the First
Commission of the Conference on May 31, 1899, the German representative
indicated that "if all the other governments agreed not to adopt vessels of this
kind, Germany would join in this understanding"; and the Italian and Japanese
delegates concurred in that statement; the United States delegate indicated that
his Government "wishes to preserve full liberty ... to use submarine torpedo
boats or not"; the delegate of Austria-Hungary gave his personal opinion that
"this new invention . . . may be used for the defense ofports and roadsteads and
render very important services"; the French delegate stated that "the submarine
torpedo [boat] has an eminendy defensive purpose, and that the right to use it
should therefore not be taken from a country"; the British delegate thought that
"his country would consent to the prohibition in question if all the great Powers
were agreed on this point. It would concern itself little as to what decision the
smaller countries reached"; the Dutch delegate and the delegate ofSweden and
Norway believed that "the submarine torpedo [boat] is a weapon of the weak,
and does not think its use can be prohibited."
In his report the Rapporteur of the Subcommission said
After an exchange of personal views on the question of submarine torpedo boats
which enabled several delegates ... to formulate very clear and precise ideas
regarding the future of this weapon, it is shown that, according to the declarations
made by a majority of the delegates, a prohibition of the boats in question must
be considered as very unlikely, at least for the time being.
His prognostication was confirmed when a vote on the proposal to ban the
submarine was taken in the First Commission and resulted in five votes (Belgium,
Bulgaria, Greece, Persia, and Siam) for the prohibition with reservations; five
votes (Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, and Rumania) for the prohibition
on condition ofunanimity; and nine votes (Austria-Hungary, Denmark, France,
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and Norway, Turkey, and the United
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States) in the negative. Russia, Serbia, and Switzerland abstained. That ended
all efforts to ban the submarine at the 1899 Hague Peace Conference. It should
be borne in mind that at this point in time most naval experts still considered
that the submarine was a weapon to be used for coastal defense, particularly by
13
the smaller and weaker nations which did not have strong navies. Litde or no
consideration was given to the fact that the submarine might be valuable as a
commerce destroyer and on the high seas. Moreover, having failed to ban the
submarine, inexplicably, no attempt was made to obtain even minimum
.14
restnctions on its operations.
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The 1907 Hague Peace Conference
During the period between the Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907,
the major international event in the military area was the Russo-Japanese War
(1904-1905). No submarines participated in this conflict but, as one author has
pointed out, even a few Russian short-range submarines could have done enough
damage to the Japanese to have caused the latter to lift the blockade of Port Arthur
and even a few ofthe longer-ranged ones could have effectively impeded the landing
ofJapanese troops in Korea. At that time, however, neitherJapan nor Russia had
any submarines in their navies. That situation would soon change.
The Russian agenda for the 1907 Second Hague Peace Conference called for
the "framing of a convention relative to the laws and customs of maritime
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warfare," but contained no specific mention of the submarine. ' When the
Fourth Commission of that Conference met for the first time on June 24, 1907,
its President, de Martens of Russia, said: "We must now do for naval warfare
what the Second Commission of the last Peace Conference did for land
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warfare." While the Conference did draft a number of conventions with
respect to war at sea, some good and some not so good, the possibility of drafting
rules with respect to the use of submarines was not even a subject of discussion.
Although there is a tendency on the part of writers to refer to the inability of
both of those Hague Peace Conferences to reach agreement on restrictions on
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the use ofsubmarines, the present author could find only one passing reference
to the subject in the proceedings of the 1907 Conference. During the lengthy
discussion of the United States proposal to exempt all private property from
capture or seizure at sea the Belgian delegate said:
A torpedo-boat or a submarine can annihilate in a few moments a magnificent
vessel representing an enormous outlay and a thousand lives. In 1899 Russia
proposed that the employment of such engines of destruction be given up, just as
the poisoning ofarms and of springs had been prohibited, and most ofthe Powers
seemed ready to adhere to the proposal provided it were accepted unanimously.
But unfortunately I do not now see any indication among us of such an idea.
No further mention ofsubmarines could be found. It will, however, be appropriate
to point out that Article 3 of the 1907 Hague Convention No. VI provided that if
an enemy merchant ship were to be destroyed "provision must be made for the
safety of the persons on board as well as the security of the ship's papers."'
1909 Declaration of London
Article I of this Declaration stated that "the rules contained in the following
Chapters correspond in substance with the generally recognized principles of
international law." As the Declaration was intended to be all-inclusive insofar
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as restrictions on maritime trade during the course of a war were concerned and
as it contained no special rules with respect to submarines, it must be assumed
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that there were at that time still no such rules. That being the case, submarines
would be bound by the general rules applicable to all warships. Customary
international law prescribed that, while a warship could be attacked without
warning, a merchant vessel was a noncombatant which could only be attacked
after warning and which could only be sunk under exceptional circumstances
and then only after the safety of the passengers and crew had been assured.
Although the then Lieutenant Rickover wrote in 1935 that "[i]n its official
correspondence with the United States the German government appears not to
have questioned the American contention that the rules of international law
governing surface men-of-war applied also to the submarine,"' during World
War I Germany actually did take issue with this conclusion. She contended that
she had chosen to use "a new weapon, the use of which had not yet been
regulated by international law and, in doing so, could not and did not violate
any existing rules but only took into account the peculiarity ofthis new weapon,
the submarine boat."' Contrariwise, Lauterpacht took the position that "[t]he
novelty of a weapon does not itself carry with it a legitimate claim to a change
in the existing rules of war." Strange to relate, in a message ofJuly 18, 1916
to the British Ambassador in Washington, the British Foreign Office said: "The
first point to be established is that international law ought not to transfer without
modification to submarines, rules and regulations which work fairly well as
regards surface vessels."
It was during the immediate pre-World War I period that Great Britain made
a decision which was to have far-reaching consequences with respect to the use
of the submarine as a commerce destroyer and the disregarding of the
requirements of warning and of assuring the safety of the passengers and crew.
On March 26, 1913 Winston Churchill, then First Lord of the Admiralty,
announced in Parliament the intention of the British Government to arm its
merchantmen, at the same time asserting that the armaments would be stricdy
defensive and would not change the status of these vessels as noncombatant
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merchant ships, to be distinguished from converted armed merchant cruisers.
As we shall see, this decision had serious consequences in both World Wars,
one being the so-called "unrestricted submarine warfare" and the subsequent
controversy as to whether the provisions of the 1936 London Submarine
Protocol are still binding law.
Part II
World War I (1914-1918)
In World War I the inadequacy of the law of naval warfare with respect to
the protection of merchant vessels proved to be a matter of prime importance
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for both belligerents and neutrals. It may well be said that while the American
Civil War was the beginning of the era of the submarine, it only received full
recognition as a dangerous—and controversial—naval weapon system during
World War I.
On August 6, 1914, just a few days after the outbreak of World War I,
Secretary of State Bryan sent a circular message to the belligerents asking each
if it would be "willing to agree that the laws of naval warfare as laid down by
the Declaration ofLondon of 1909 shall be applicable during the present conflict
in Europe."' Most of the belligerents, including Germany, indicated that they
would comply with the rules set forth in that Declaration, subject to reciprocity.
However, Great Britain's decision to adopt these rules was made "subject to
certain modifications and additions which they adjudge indispensable to the
efficient conduct of their naval operations." As a result of the British position,
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the United States withdrew its suggestion. ' Primary among these British
"modifications and additions" was a vast increase in the list of contraband
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items. Historically, an enemy merchant ship was a noncombatant which could
be stopped, visited, and searched in order to examine her papers and to determine
whether she was carrying contraband, and captured if found to be carrying
contraband, but which could not be attacked, nor destroyed, except under
specific and limited circumstances—and then only after the safety of the persons
aboard had been assured. The lifeboats were not considered to be a place of
safety unless the weather was moderate and land was within a reasonable distance,
or another vessel was available which could take the crew and passengers of the
doomed vessel aboard. For some months after the outbreak of World War I
German submarines were used almost exclusively in the capacity of warship
against warship. The few merchantmen which were sunk by German
submarines during this period had suffered their fate in strict accordance with
the customary law of naval warfare applicable to the sinking of merchant vessels
by surface warships—they had been stopped by a warning shot, visited and
searched, found to have contraband aboard, and the safety of passengers and
crews had been assured before they were sunk. * That procedure was not to
continue.
On November 3, 1914 the British gave notice that "the whole of the North
Sea must be considered a military area."' The British sea blockade ofGermany
was so effective that the German Navy urged the need to counter it by a
declaration of a war zone around the British Isles within which all ships would
be sunk. The Foreign Office opposed such a procedure because ofits anticipated
effect on neutrals and the German Chancellor, Bethmann Hollweg, at first
agreed with the Foreign Office. However, early in 1915 the German
Government determined that it had no alternative but to use the submarine to
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stop the flow of food and essential munitions to the British Isles and on
Submarine Warfare 299
February 4, 1915 the German Admiralty issued a Proclamation declaring the
waters around Great Britain and Ireland, including the entire English Channel,
to be a "war zone" in which, after February 18, 1915, all enemy merchant ships
would be destroyed without assuring the safety of the passengers and crews—in
other words, they would be sunk without warning. The Proclamation added
that, because, on January 31, 1915, the British Admiralty had ordered British
merchant vessels to fly neutral flags, even neutral merchant vessels would be at
risk in the announced zone. A lengthy "Memorial", issued at the same time,
justified the German action as retaliation for British disregard of the provisions
in
of the 1909 Declaration of London and of the 1856 Declaration of Paris and
the British declaration of the North Sea between Scodand and Norway as being
"comprised within the seat ofwar" combined with neutral acceptance of these
British violations. It was thus that first arose a problem which continues to
plague the Governments and navies of the world and students of the law of
maritime warfare to this day—the question of the legality of war zones, under
any of the various names which have been given to such areas of the high seas
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by belligerents.
The German Proclamation caused considerable consternation in the United
States. Robert Lansing, then Counselor of the Department of State, prepared a
reply to the German proclamation which he himself referred to as "sharp." It
described the German intention as "a wanton act unparalleled in naval
warfare." " However, after he had read the accompanying "Memorial" he
relented considerably. Nevertheless, the United States protest may still be
described as "strong." The United States also protested to Great Britain the
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use ofthe American flag by British merchant ships. As neither ofthese protests
accomplished its purpose, the United States proposed that each side should,
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among other things, agree:
That neither will use submarines to attack merchant vessels of any nationality
except to enforce the right of visit and search.
That each will require their respective merchant vessels not to use neutral flags
for the purpose of disguise or ruse de guerre.
Germany accepted this proposal with conditions. Great Britain rejected it on
the ground that the German Proclamation of February 4, 1915 was, "in effect,
a claim to torpedo at sight"; and that submarines did not, and could not, comply
with the well-established rules of maritime warfare, such as bringing merchant
ships before prize courts, sinking them only when extraordinary circumstances
existed, distinguishing between neutral and enemy ships, assuring the safety of
crews, etc. Ofcourse, the British position disregarded the fact that by accepting
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the proposed agreement Germany would have, in effect, consented to give up
any claimed right to "torpedo at sight" with all of its corollaries.
This began a campaign of submarines as commerce destroyers, a campaign
that extended from February 1915 to September 1915, during which period
strong protests were made to the German Government by the Government of
the United States over attacks upon and the sinking ofAmerican merchant vessels
and of other merchant vessels on which American citizens were traveling. The
matter reached a peak with the sinking of the Lusitania on May 7, 1915 as a
result ofwhich over 100 American citizens were lost. The U.S. protest included
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the following statement:
The Government of the United States, therefore, desires to call the attention of
the Imperial German Government with the utmost earnestness to the fact that the
objection to their present method of attack against the trade of their enemies lies
in the practical impossibility of employing submarines in the destruction of
commerce without disregarding those rules of fairness, reason, justice, and
humanity which all modern opinion regards as imperative. It is practically
impossible for the officers ofa submarine to visit a merchantman at sea and examine
her papers and cargo. It is practically impossible for them to make a prize of her;
and, ifthey cannot put a prize crew on board of her, they cannot sink her without
leaving her crew and all on board ofher to the mercy of the sea in her small boats.
After another strong protest by the United States when the Arabic was sunk on
August 19, 1915, with American citizens aboard, German submarines were
ordered not to attack passenger ships without a warning and an opportunity for
the passengers and crew to be taken to a place of safety. As this required the
submarine to come to the surface, an extremely dangerous procedure in a
confined area, all German submarines were soon recalled from the English
Channel. One anonymous author believes that this seven-month period
(February-September 1915) "saw the submarine come ofage as the first modern
weapon to make war a universal scourge, rather than a professional duel between
rival armies and fleets."
Thus, within the first year of World War I the use of the submarine had
generated issues with respect to the arming of merchantmen, the use of false
colors, the establishment of "war zones", the sinking of merchantmen without
warning, and the failure to assure the safety of the passengers and crews. All of
those issues continue to exist; only the latter two were addressed by the 1936
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London Submarine Protocol. The problem of the status of merchantmen
under convoy did not arise until much later in the war.
Disputes with respect to submarine warfare continued to arise and finally, on
April 18, 1916, the United States warned Germany that if the latter intended to
continue "to prosecute relendess and indiscriminate warfare against vessels of
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commerce without regard to what the United States must consider the sacred
and indisputable rules ofinternational law and the universally recognized dictates
of humanity," it would have no choice but to sever diplomatic relations. The
German reply, dated May 4, 1916, notified the United States Government that
the following instructions had been issued to German naval forces:
In accordance with the general principles of visit and search and destruction of
merchant vessels recognized by international law, such vessels, both within and
without the area declared as [a] naval war zone, shall not be sunk without warning
and without saving human lives, unless these ships attempt to escape or offer
resistance.
The following months were comparatively free ofincidents but, understandably,
the success of the U-boats was considerably reduced. Ultimately, the German
Government decided that its only possibility of winning the war, which had
reached a stalemate on land, was to embark on a program of unrestricted
submarine warfare and an announcement of such a policy was suddenly made
on January 31, 1917, to take effect the following day. On February 3, 1917,
the United States severed diplomatic relations with Germany; on March 12,
1917, the United States announced its intention to arm its merchantmen; on
April 2, 1917, in a speech to Congress requesting a declaration of war against
Germany, President Wilson stated: "The intimation [of the German
Government] is conveyed that the armed guards which we have placed on our
merchant ships will be treated as beyond the pale of the law and subject to be
dealt with as pirates would be"; and on April 6, 1917, the United States
declared war on Germany.
Because of the magnitude of the problem created by the arming of
merchantmen during World War I, it is, perhaps, advisable to deal with it at
some length at this point. It is a problem which was and is important to neutrals
as well as belligerents inasmuch as Article 12 of the 1907 Hague Convention
No. XIII, provides that, in general, a warship may only remain in neutral
waters for twenty-four hours. Ifarmed merchantmen are warships, then this rule
applies to them and if they remain in neutral waters beyond the
twenty-four-hour period, they are, under Article 24 of the same Convention,
subject to internment. If they were held to fall within the ambit of those
provisions, their utility as cargo carriers would be completely nullified as none
could accomplish unloading and reloading within that time frame. Germany
demanded that the United States (and other neutrals) apply the provisions of this
Convention to British armed merchantmen. The United States declined to do
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so. It appears that The Netherlands was the only country that so interpreted
and applied the cited provisions of the Hague Convention. One author has
taken the position that "neutrals are not justified in treating an armed merchant
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vessel as an innocent peaceful carrier. By so doing they risk their neutrality."
A major work argues that neutral states "employed the convenient but elusive
and tenuous distinction between 'offensive' and 'defensive' armament" because
of their desire to avoid the need to apply the provisions of the 1907 Hague
Convention No. XIII to armed belligerent merchantmen.
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The provisions of the 1907 Hague Convention No. VII require, among
other things, that merchant vessels converted into warships must be placed under
the direct authority of the State and must have a commander who is "in the
Service of the State and duly commissioned by the competent authorities" and
a crew which is subject to military discipline. When the British ordered the
arming of all of their merchant vessels, many of the captains and other officers
of these vessels held commissions in the Royal Navy Reserves and many of the
vessels were subsequently furnished with Royal Navy gun crews. Nevertheless,
the British Government contended that these vessels were armed solely for
defensive purposes and that, therefore, these facts did not make them armed
auxiliary cruisers. The British were probably correct in contending that the status
of the officers and men did not bring the vessel within the provisions of this
Hague Convention. The vessels were not State vessels and the crews, other than
the gunners, were not subject to military discipline. However, whether the fact
that they were armed removed them from the category ofvessels entitled to the
protections of customary international law is an altogether different question.
It is often believed that the original decision of the British Government to
arm its merchant ships was reached as a measure ofprotection against submarines.
This is not so. In March 1913, when Churchill made his announcement in the
House of Commons, the British were not concerned with submarines, they
were concerned with converted merchant auxiliary cruisers. Thus he said:
There is now good reason to believe that a considerable number of foreign
merchant steamers may be rapidly converted into armed ships by the mounting
of guns. . . . Our food-carrying liners and vessels carrying raw material following
these trade routes would in certain contingencies meet foreign vessels armed and
equipped in the manner described. If the British ships had no armament, they
would be at the mercy of any foreign liner carrying one effective gun and a few
rounds of ammunition. . . . Hostile cruisers, wherever they are found, will be
covered and met by British ships of war, but the proper reply to an armed
merchantman is another merchantman armed in its own defence.
Again, a year later, on March 17, 1914, he said:
The House will expect me to say a few words on the arming of merchant ships.
Much misconception has arisen on this subject. . . . Forty ships have been armed
with two 4.7 guns apiece, and by the end of 1914-1915 seventy ships will have
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been so armed. They are armed solely for defensive purposes. The guns are
mounted in the stern and can only fire on a pursuer. Vessels so armed have nothing
in common with merchant vessels taken over by the Admiralty and converted
into commissioned auxiliary cruisers, nor are these vessels privateers or commerce
destroyers in any sense. They are exclusively ships which carry food to this country.
They are not allowed to fight any ship ofwar. . . . They are, however, thoroughly
capable of self-defence against an enemy's armed merchantmen.
During the years that it was a neutral in World War I, the position of the
United States with respect to armed merchantmen was so ambivalent as to leave
much to be desired. However, as it was one of the main players with respect to
the problem, it will be ofinterest to analyze the permutations and combinations
which were encountered in the negotiations on this subject and the decisions
which were made and unmade.
Within a few days after the beginning ofthe war the British Charge d'Affaires
in Washington called the attention of the Secretary of State to the fact that "a
certain number" ofBritish merchant vessels were armed "solely for the purpose
of defence." Two weeks later, the British Ambassador advised the Secretary
of State that he had been directed to give the United States:
the fullest assurances that British merchant vessels will never be used for purposes
ofattack, that they are merely peaceful traders armed only for purposes ofdefence,
that they will never fire unless first fired upon, and that they will never under any
circumstances attack any vessel.
Despite these assurances, it does not appear that the armed merchantmen used
their guns solely for defense, nor that the British Government expected them
to do so. Thus, confidential instructions to masters of armed merchant vessels
stated:
If a submarine is obviously pursuing a ship by day and it is evident to the master
that she has hostile intentions, the ship pursued should open fire in self-defence,
notwithstanding the submarines [sic] may not have committed a definite hostile
act, such as firing a gun or torpedo.
Any submarine approaching a merchant vessel may be treated as hostile.
Moreover, when they became available, merchant ships were supplied with
depth charges, definitely an offensive weapon.
In justification of the practice of arming merchant ships, and in support of
their contention that this did not remove them from a noncombatant status, the
British frequently referred to the long history ofarmed merchant ships, pointing
out that this had been ordered by Royal Proclamation as early as the seventeenth
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century and that this right had been recognized by Prize Courts during the
Napoleonic Wars. They omitted to mention that this procedure had been
directed against pirates and privateers and that there were no longer pirates on
the well-traveled trade routes which the British ships were traversing and that
privateering had been prohibited by the 1856 Declaration of Paris.
Lauterpacht, while a strong supporter of the right of a belligerent to arm its
merchant ships for defensive purposes, added the following caveat:
At the same time it is clear that the arming of merchant vessels raises problems of
substantial difficulty. In the first place, it is not easy to draw a line of distinction
between offensive and defensive acts. Secondly, the encouragement of even
defensive hostilities on the part of private vessels is fraught with danger inasmuch
as it threatens to undermine the abolition of privateering by the Declaration of
Paris of 1856 [and the distinction?] between commissioned and
non-commissioned vessels. Thirdly, the fact that a merchantman is armed and that
she is entided to resist actual or anticipated attack makes it impossible for enemy
submarines to exercise their right of visit and capture in accordance with
International Law without running the risk of destruction by the superior
armament of the merchant vessel or being rammed by her.
On September 19, 1914 the Department of State issued a memorandum,
prepared by Robert Lansing, entitled "The Status ofArmed Merchant Vessels,"
which provided that, while a merchant vessel might carry armament and
ammunition for defensive purposes without becoming a warship, the presence
of such items aboard would create a presumption that they were for offensive
purposes, a presumption that could be overcome by showing that the vessel
carried its armament for defensive purposes only. The memorandum then
proceeded to list a number of "indications" that the armament would not be
used offensively, including such items as the size and number of the guns, their
location on the vessel, the status of the officers and crew, etc. With one
amendment which provided that the presence of any gun on a merchantman,
no matter what its size, would create the presumption of offensive use, this
memorandum laid down the policy followed by the United States during 1914
and 1915.
OnJanuary 7, 1916, Lansing, now the Secretary ofState, sent a memorandum
to President Wilson in which he pointed out the potential clanger to submarines
of even a small caliber gun on an armed merchantman; that if submarines were
to be required to give warning to merchant vessels, the latter should not be
armed; and that armed merchantmen should, therefore, be treated as not
possessing the immunities of private commercial vessels. President Wilson
concurred with these conclusions and, on January 18, 1916, Lansing circulated
an informal letter to the belligerents in which he set forth the general rules of
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international law and humanity understood to be applicable to noncombatant
merchant vessels during a war. He called attention to the manner in which the
submarine had changed maritime operations and the dangers it faced when
compelled to stop and search an armed merchant vessel on the high seas. He
then said:
Moreover, pirates and sea rovers have been swept from the main trade channels
ofthe seas, and privateering has been abolished. Consequendy, the placing ofguns
on merchantmen at the present day of submarine warfare can be explained only
on the ground of a purpose to render a merchantman superior in force to
submarines and to prevent warning and visit and search by them. An armament,
therefore, on a merchant vessel would seem to have the character of an offensive
armament.
It would, therefore, appear to be a reasonable and reciprocally just arrangement
if it could be agreed by the opposing belligerents that submarines should be caused
to adhere stricdy to the rules of international law in the matter of stopping and
searching merchant vessels, determining their belligerent nationality, and
removing the crews and passengers to places of safety before sinking the vessels as
prizes of war, and that merchant vessels of belligerent nationality should be
prohibited and prevented from carrying any armament whatsoever.
I should add that my Government is impressed with the reasonableness of the
argument that a merchant vessel carrying an armament of any sort, in view of the
character of submarine warfare and the defensive weakness of undersea craft,
should be held to be an auxiliary cruiser and so treated by a neutral as well as by
a belligerent Government, and is seriously considering instructing its officials
accordingly.
If the paragraph last quoted was intended to put pressure on Great Britain to
agree to the basic suggestion, as it undoubtedly was, it did not accomplish its
purpose. While the British Government's adamant opposition to the proposal
of the United States had probably previously been conveyed orally, it was not
until March 23, 1916 that the British Ambassador delivered to the Secretary of
State a memorandum from the British Government setting forth in some detail,
not always relevant, the reasons why that Government believed the proposal to
be pro-German, why it could not rely on a "non-guaranteed German promise",
and why it could not, therefore, accept the proposal made some two months
earlier. It also presented its reasons why it did not consider that the action
mentioned in the last paragraph of the American note would be in accordance
with international law. The Germans also rejected the proposal, asserting that
it was pro-British. ' The British won both battles: they continued to arm their
merchantmen; and these armed merchantmen continued to be treated by the
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United States as ordinary merchant vessels "armed for defense only." On March
25, 1916, just two days after the date of the British memorandum, the
Department of State issued a new "Memorandum on the Status of Armed
Merchant Vessels" which was even more lenient on the subject than the 1914
memorandum had been. Two pertinent paragraphs provided:
The status of an armed merchant vessel as a warship in neutral waters may be
determined, in the absence of documentary proof or conclusive evidence of
previous aggressive conduct, by presumption derived from all the circumstances
of the case.
Merchantmen ofbelligerent nationality, armed only for the purposes ofprotection
against the enemy, are entided to enter and leave neutral ports without hindrance
in the course of legitimate trade.
In passing, it is worthy of note with respect to this problem that when, in
1928, the members of the then Pan American Union drafted a convention on
the subject of maritime neutrality, Article 12(3) provided that the rules relating
to warships would apply to armed merchantmen. The United States ratified the
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Convention with a reservation to that provision.
In conclusion, it might be said that "defensively armed merchant vessels"
were properly so-called in that, unlike auxiliary merchant cruisers, they did not
go searching for enemy vessels; they were not properly so-called in that they
usually opened fire immediately upon sighting a U-boat, before it had taken any
offensive action other than to make its appearance. It should be obvious that the
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present author agrees with the following statement:
The criteria [for determining whether a merchant vessel is participating in the
hostilities] should certainly include, inter alia, any armed merchant vessel and no
consideration should be given to the purported distinction between "defensive"
and "offensive" armament.
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As we shall see, this same problem arose during the course ofWorld War II.
Part III
The Intra-War Period (1919-1939)
The Versailles Treaty
In the course of drafting a suggested basic document for the proposed League
of Nations, to be submitted to the Peace Conference which met at the end of
World War I, President Woodrow Wilson sought comments from David H.
Miller, the Legal Adviser of the American Delegation to the Conference. In his
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comments on Wilson's Second Draft, Miller suggested the inclusion of the
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following provision:
The Contracting Parties agree never to make use of armed submarines in naval
operations, and further agree that they will hereafter build no submarines armed
or capable ofbeing armed and further agree that all submarines now in existence
or under construction shall be dismanded and rendered incapable ofbeing armed
or shall be destroyed.
Wilson did not adopt this suggestion and while Article 191 of the Treaty of
Versailles which ended World War I as between Germany and the Allies,
specifically prohibited "[t]he construction or acquisition ofany submarine, even
for commercial purposes" by Germany, the Covenant of the League of Nations
contained no provision on the subject. As events proved, this provision of the
Treaty, like many of the other provisions thereof, was of litde value.
The 1921-1922 Washington Conference
In 1921 a Conference on the Limitation ofArmament met in Washington.
The conferees represented the five major victorious Powers in World War I:
France, Great Britain (and the Commonwealth countries), Italy, Japan, and the
United States. When the discussion with respect to submarines began, the British
Delegation took the position that "what was required was not merely restrictions
on submarines, but their total and final abolition." The French delegation was,
as it had been in the past, particularly opposed to the banning of the submarine
as an accepted naval weapons system, its delegate saying:
The French Government believes that every method of warfare may or may not
be employed in conformity with the laws of war, and that the inhuman and
barbarous use made of the submarine by a belligerent in the late war is a reason
for condemning that belligerent, but not for condemning the submarine.
It quickly became obvious that the British proposal would not receive the
necessary support. As one commentator on the 1922 Diplomatic Conference
stated: "The British seem to hold that the submarine is an offensive weapon,
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while the others consider that it is a defensive weapon." Elihu Root, one of
the delegates ofthe United States and a former Secretary ofState, then submitted
several proposed resolutions to the Conference. These resolutions may be
considered to have been the genesis of the 1922, 1930, and 1936 codifications
ofthe rules relating to submarine warfare. Resolution I was said to be a statement
ofexisting law, while Resolution II was said to constitute a change in the existing
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law. An examination of the Root Resolutions, as minimally modified by the
Conference, will enable us to determine what the rules of submarine warfare
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were then considered to be and what the representatives of the nations present
considered that they should be, it being an accepted fact that the submarine was
here to stay.
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Root's Resolution I became Articles 1 and 2 of the treaty then in process
of being drafted, with only one major change: the logical addition of a second
condition under which a merchant vessel might be attacked (when it refused
Q9
"to submit to visit and search after warning, or to proceed as directed after seizure') .
As adopted and included in the Treaty which was ultimately drafted, these
articles stated:
Art. 1 . The Signatory Powers declare that among the rules adopted by civilized
nations for the protection of the lives of neutrals and noncombatants at sea in time
of war, the following are to be deemed an established part of international law;
(1) A merchant vessel must be ordered to submit to visit and search to determine
its character before it can be seized.
A merchant vessel must not be attacked unless it refuses to submit to visit and
search after warning, or to proceed as directed after seizure.
A merchant vessel must not be destroyed unless the crew and passengers have
been first placed in safety.
(2) Belligerent submarines are not under any circumstances exempt from the
universal rules above stated; and if a submarine can not capture a vessel in
conformity with these rules the existing law of nations requires it to desist from
attack and from seizure and to permit the merchant vessel to proceed unmolested.
Art. 2. The Signatory Powers invite all other civilized Powers to express their
assent to the foregoing statement of established law so that there may be a clear
public understanding throughout the world of the standards of conduct by which
the public opinion of the world is to pass judgment upon future belligerents.
The provisions of Article 1 have since been accepted as binding rules of the law
ofwar at sea by reiteration in substance in international agreements subsequently
drafted. It will become apparent that they formed the basis for the provisions of
Part IV of the 1930 London Naval Treaty and for those of its offspring, the
1936 London Submarine Protocol.
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There can be no question but that the provisions of Root's Resolution II
represented a major addition to the restrictions on the use of submarines in war
at sea. It condemned the submarine for what a belligerent had done in World
War I. It was adopted as Article 4 of the Treaty with only minor amendments
which did not affect its substantive content. It read:
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Art. 4. The Signatory Powers recognize the practical impossibility of using
submarines as commerce destroyers without violating, as they were violated in
the recent war of 1914-1918, the requirements universally accepted by civilized
nations for the protection of the lives of neutrals and noncombatants, and to the
end that the prohibition of the use ofsubmarines as commerce destroyers shall be
universally accepted as a part of the law of nations, they now accept that
prohibition as henceforth binding as between themselves and they invite all other
nations to adhere thereto.
This Article, outlawing the use of submarines against merchant vessels, even if
they complied with the provisions of Article 1, did not survive as a rule of the
law of war. Had it done so, it would, as Root had indicated, have supplanted
the rules set forth in Article 1 , rules which codified then existing law.
Root's Resolution III was adopted as Article 3 ofthe Treaty with only one
major change. That change was the substitution of the words "rules declared by
them with respect to attacks upon and the seizure and destruction of merchant
ships" for the words "rules declared by them with respect to the prohibition of
the use of submarines in time of war." Under either reading, the provisions
cover violations ofboth Articles 1 and 4 of the Treaty. As Article 3 it now read:
Art. 3. The Signatory Powers, desiring to insure the enforcement of the humane
rules of existing law declared by them with respect to attacks upon and the seizure
and destruction of merchant ships, further declare that any person in the service
of any Power who shall violate any of those rules, whether or not such person is
under orders of a governmental superior, shall be deemed to have violated the
laws ofwar and shall be liable to trial and punishment as if for an act ofpiracy and
may be brought to trial before the civil or military authorities ofany Power within
the jurisdiction ofwhich he may be found.
During the discussion of this Resolution the Japanese delegate asked for an
explanation of the meaning ofthe phrase "punishment as iffor an act ofpiracy."
The ambiguity of the phrase was demonstrated by the fact that the Chairman,
Secretary of State Hughes, said that he assumed that it meant that a violation
should be treated as an act of piracy. Root was quick to indicate that it merely
meant that there would be universal jurisdiction, as in the case of piracy.
Inasmuch as the provision already specifically so provided, there was, in reality,
no need for the reference to piracy which merely caused confusion and antipathy.
Like Article 4, Article 3 has not survived as a separate rule of the law of war.
However, like any other violation of the law ofwar, violations of the provisions
of the customary or conventional law of submarine warfare constitute universal
war crimes and the violator may still "be brought to trial before the civil or
military authorities of any Power within the jurisdiction of which he may be
found"—depending, of course, on the domestic law of that Power. In fact, as
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we shall see, after World War II two German Admirals, Doenitz and Raeder,
were charged with and tried for having allegedly ordered illegal submarine
warfare.
In its final form this 1922 Washington Treaty (which also contained a
provision banning the use ofnoxious gases) included in its Article VI a provision
which stated that it would "take effect on the deposit of all the ratifications."
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Inasmuch as France failed to ratify it, the Treaty never took effect. Perhaps
this was just as well. Admiral William V. Pratt, of the United States Navy, is
quoted as having written, a few days after the Conference ended, that the treaty
was not practical and that it would not work.
This Diplomatic Conference created a Commission ofJurists with the task
of determining the adequacy of certain rules of international law with respect
to the law of war. The Commission produced two sets of rules, one on
wireless telegraphy in time ofwar and one on aerial warfare. Article 6, paragraph
1 , of the former stated
The wireless transmission, by an enemy or neutral vessel or aircraft while being
on or above the high seas, of any military information intended for a belligerent's
immediate use, shall be considered a hostile act exposing the vessel or aircraft to
be fired at;
As the Diplomatic Conference had adjourned sine die before the Commission
completed its work, neither set of rules ever received codified international
status. However, they undoubtedly represented the customary international law
on the subjects and are worthy of and have received considerable attention,
despite their informal status.
Article 1, paragraph 1 of the Inter-American Convention on Maritime
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Neutrality sets forth in considerable detail the rules with respect to the rights
of belligerent warships towards merchant vessels, including a provision that a
ship may not be rendered unnavigable before the crew and passengers have been
placed in safety. Paragraph 2 makes these rules applicable to submarines with
the specific proviso that "[i]f the submarine cannot capture the ship while
observing these rules, it shall not have the right to continue to attack or to destroy
the sh.p."
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The 1930 London Naval Conference
On January 21, 1930 another Conference on the Limitation of Armament
convened, this time in London. It was officially known as the London Naval
Conference of 1930. The participating Powers were the same as those which
had been represented in Washington eight years earlier. At the very first Plenary
Meeting at which the subject of submarines was discussed the British once again
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proposed the abolition of the submarine, this time with the full support of the
United States; and once again this proposal received the support of all of the
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Commonwealth countries, but the opposition of France, Italy, and Japan.
The United States had submitted a proposed resolution calling for the
appointment of a committee to consider (1) the abolition of the submarine; and
(2) regulation of the use of the submarine "through subjecting it to the rules of
war governing the use of surface craft." France had submitted a proposed
resolution "forbidding submarines to act towards merchant ships otherwise than
in strict conformity with the rules, either present or future, to be observed by
107
surface warships." These resolutions were referred to a Committee ofExperts
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and a Committee ofJurists. The latter produced a Declaration which was
approved unanimously by the First Committee and which was approved without
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discussion by the Plenary Meeting. As incorporated into the Treaty, it
read:
Art. 22. The following are accepted as established rules of International Law:
(1) In their action with regard to merchant ships, submarines must conform to
the rules of International Law to which surface vessels are subject.
(2) In particular, except in the case of persistent refusal to stop on being duly
summoned, or of active resistance to visit or search, a warship, whether surface
vessel or submarine, may not sink or render incapable of navigation a merchant
vessel without having first placed the passengers, crew, and ship's papers in a place
of safety. For this purpose the ship's boats are not regarded as a place of safety
unless the safety of the passengers and crew is assured, in the existing sea and
weather conditions, by the proximity of land, or the presence of another vessel
which is in a position to take them aboard.
These rules were, in general, a rephrasing and amplification of the rules which
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had been included in Article 1 ofthe 1 922 Washington Treaty. It is important
to note that while, pursuant to Article 23, the other provisions of the Treaty
ceased to be effective on December 31, 1936, Article 22 was "to remain in force
without limitation of time." Despite the fact that there was a provision for
accession to Part IV of the Treaty by other Powers, no non-Conference Power
ever acceded, perhaps because France and Italy did not ratify these provisions
until 1936.
In addition to drafting the Declaration which became Article 22 ofthe Treaty,
the Committee ofJurists made a statement which bears repeating. It said:
The Committee wishes to place it on record that the expression merchant vessels
where it is employed in the declaration, is not to be understood as including a
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merchant vessel which is at the moment participating in the hostilities in such a
manner as to cause her to lose her right to the immunities of a merchant vessel.
This would certainly include the merchant vessel which, when a submarine
surfaces in its vicinity, immediately opens fire or radios that it has sighted a
submarine, giving its longitude and latitude.
The 1935-1936 London Naval Conference
In 1935 another Diplomatic Conference convened in London to draft a new
treaty limiting naval armament prior to the expiration ofthe 1930 London Naval
Treaty. The 1936 London Submarine Protocol is frequendy associated with
the 1 935-1 936 London Naval Conference and with the Treaty for the Limitation
of Naval Armament that was drafted at that Conference. Its relationship to
that Conference and Treaty is rather tenuous. At the opening session of the
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Conference Stanley Baldwin, the Prime Minister of Great Britain, said:
There is one further point that I should like to mention, because it appears to me
very encouraging for our future deliberations. If it proves impossible to obtain
agreement for the abolition of submarines, it is of vital importance to reach an
agreement which will prevent their misuse. Part IV of the London Naval Treaty
laid down rules for the treatment ofmerchant ships by submarines in time ofwar.
These rules are already in force between the United States, Japan and the members
of the British Commonwealth of Nations. But I am glad to be able to announce,
as a result of the preliminary talks with representatives of other nations, that, once
these rules have been incorporated in an instrument which will be distinct from
the London Naval Treaty, the French and Italian Governments who were unable
to ratify the London Treaty as a whole will be in a position definitely to accept
such an instrument. We hope that this will be the signal for the acceptance of
these rules by all the maritime Powers of the world and that, by this means,
unrestricted submarine warfare may in the future be averted.
However, at the Fifteenth Meeting of the First Committee, held on March 13,
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1936, the French delegate found it necessary to state:
I am surprised not to see on the Agenda a subject on which we appeared all to be
agreed at the opening meeting ofthe Conference and which our First Committee
has not yet examined, namely, the embodiment in the Acts which our Conference
is to draw up of the rules of Part IV of the London Naval Treaty [of 1930],
concerning the use of submarines against merchant vessels.
The British representative pointed out that the two treaties were quite separate
(the Japanese had left the Conference and would not sign the Naval Treaty but
would sign the Submarine Protocol) and that as another text had to be prepared
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they could only hope that the two could be signed at the same time. As a
matter of fact they were not, the Treaty being signed on March 25, 1936, and
the Protocol more than seven months later, on November 6, 1936. On the latter
date it (the Protocol) was signed by the five nations which had participated in
the drafting of both the 1930 and the 1936 London Naval Treaties: France,
Great Britain (and the Commonwealth Nations), Italy, Japan, and the United
States. Other nations were invited to accede to the Protocol and approximately
37 others had done so before World War II erupted, including all of the
European belligerents in that war except Rumania. Japan was a Party, but China
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was not. Germany had acceded on November 23, 1936.
The Nyon Agreements
The Spanish Civil War which began in 1936 was the first such conflict since
the American Civil War in which submarines played a part. Because of their
method of operation, which included attacks on and the sinking of merchant
ships which did not belong to either side in the conflict, a number ofconcerned
nations met at Nyon, Switzerland, in 1937 and drafted the Nyon Agreement.
121
This agreement provided:
II. Any submarine which attacks such a ship [one not belonging to either side
in the conflict] in a manner contrary to the rules referred to in the International
Treaty for the Limitation and Reduction ofNaval Armaments signed in London
on April 22, 1930 and confirmed in the Protocol signed in London on
November 6, 1936, shall be counter-attacked and, if possible, destroyed.
In effect, the Parties to this Agreement were demanding that the contestants in
a civil war comply with the provisions of the 1936 London Submarine
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Protocol. (A Supplementary Agreement, signed three days later, made the
original agreement applicable to surface vessels and aircraft.) Nine European and
Mediterranean States were Parties to these agreements. (Understandably, this
did not include Germany and Italy, both ofwhich were actively supporting the
Franco insurgents who probably controlled all of the submarines involved.)
Shortly thereafter, on 5 October 1937, the Council of the League of Nations
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adopted a Resolution which stated:
(7) Notes that attacks have taken place in violation of the most elementary
dictates of humanity underlying the established rules of international law which
are affirmed, so far as war time is concerned, in Part IV of the Treaty of London
ofApril 22, 1930, rules which have been formally accepted by the great majority
of Governments.
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(8) Declares that all attacks of this kind against any merchant vessels are
repugnant to the conscience of the civilised nations which now find expression
through the Council.
It is strange that the League's Council referred to the 1930 Treaty, which had
only a few ratifications, and not to the 1936 Protocol, which, by this time, had
more than twenty-five ratifications and accessions.
Part IV
World War II and Its Aftermath (1939-1947)
As in the case ofWorld War I, the British Admiralty had prepared for another
conflict by ensuring that many of its merchant ships had been built with
reinforced areas for the mounting of guns and by storing guns to be used for
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arming those ships. Moreover, the 1938 British Defense of Merchant Shipping
Handbook included the following provisions:
As soon as the Master of a merchant ship realises that a ship or aircraft in sight is
an enemy, it is his first and most important duty to report the nature and position
of the enemy by wireless telegraph. Such a report promptly made may be the
means of saving not only the ship herself but many others;. . .
Conditions under which fire may be opened:
(a) Against enemy acting in accordance with International Law—As the
armament is solely for the purpose of self-defence, it must only be used against an
enemy who is clearly attempting to capture or sink the merchant ship. On the
outbreak ofwar it should be assumed that the enemy will act in accordance with
International Law, and fire should therefore not be opened until he has made it
plain that he intends to attempt capture. Once it is clear that resistance will be
necessary if capture is to be averted, fire should be opened immediately.
(b) Against enemy acting in defiance of International Law—If, as the war
progresses, it unfortunately becomes clear that, in defiance of International Law,
the enemy has adopted a policy of attacking merchant ships without warning, it
will then be permissible to open fire on an enemy surface vessel, submarine, or
aircraft, even before she has attacked or demanded surrender, if to do so will
prevent her gaining a favorable position for attacking.
According to a British history ofWorld War II "between the outbreak of the
war and November 4 [1939], thirty-two British and three Allied ships had been
sunk illegally . . .; as many as thirty-three neutral ships had been attacked and at




In his Memoirs, Admiral Doenitz, the Commander of the U-boat arm of the
German Navy for a large part of the war, later the Commander-in-Chief of the
German Navy, and, ultimately, Hider's successor, asserts that these Instructions
were "a contravention ofthe Submarine Agreement." He also indicates his belief
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that the convoy system was contrary to the same Agreement. Neither arming
merchant ships, nor ordering them to send by radio what can only be described
as intelligence information, nor sailing them in convoy under the protection of
warships, were acts contrary to the provisions of the 1936 London Submarine
Protocol—but any of those acts removed the particular merchant ship involved
128
from the limited category of ships protected by that Agreement.
On November 27, 1939 the British Government issued an Order in Council
Restricting Further the Commerce of Germany which was intended, among
other things, to eliminate all German exports. In response to neutral
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complaints of violation of the 1856 Declaration of Paris, the British
Government said in notes to the Dutch and Italian Governments that "the main
basis of their actions is admittedly the right of retaliation the essence of which
is a departure from the ordinary rules as reprisal for illegal action by the
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enemy." This was, of course, an admission by the British that the Order in
Council did, in fact, violate the 1856 Declaration of Paris and a claim that it
was, nevertheless, legal because by definition a reprisal contemplates an illegal
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action by the party undertaking reprisal action.
On May 8, 1940, Churchill, once again First Lord of the Admiralty, stated
to the House ofCommons that the Royal Navy had been instructed that in the
Skagerrak (a narrow arm of the North Sea between Denmark and Norway
leading into the Kattegat and the Baltic Sea) "all German ships by day and all
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ships by night were to be sunk as opportunity served." This action was
frequently referred to by the Germans as a basis for their subsequent actions.
Although the International Military Tribunal found Doenitz guilty of violating
the 1936 London Submarine Protocol by estabHshing operational zones, it listed
Churchill's order as one ground for not assessing punishment against Doenitz
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on the basis of German submarine warfare.
On August 28, 1939, a few days before the outbreak of World War II,
1 36
Germany had issued its Prize Ordinance which included some of the
protections provided by the 1936 London Submarine Protocol. A week later,
on September 3, 1939, Hitler issued Fuehrer's Directive No. 2, which provided
that offensive actions by the German Navy against Great Britain were permissible
but that "warfare against merchant shipping is for the time being to be conducted
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according to the prize regulations, also by submarines." Fuehrer's Directive
No. 4, September 25, 1939, extended this directive to include the French.
The minutes of a conference between Hitler and Admiral Raeder, Chief of
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the Naval Staff, held on September 23, 1939, reveal the following decisions:
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2. The intensification of anti-submarine measures by aircraft and armed
merchant vessels will apparently make it impossible to search British merchantmen
in the future. The Fuehrer approved the proposal that action should be taken
without previous warning against enemy merchant ships definitely identified as
such (with the exception of unmistakable passenger steamers), since it may be
assumed that they are armed.
3. The expression 'submarine warfare' is to be replaced by the expression 'war
against merchant shipping.' The notorious expression 'unrestricted submarine
warfare' is to be avoided. Instead of this, the proclamation ofthe 'siege ofEngland'
is under consideration; such a military system would free us from having to observe
any restrictions whatsoever on account of objections based on International Law.
Fuehrer's Directive No. 5, September 30, 1939, implemented these decisions.
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It provided:
The v/ar against merchant shipping is, on the whole, to be fought according to
prize law, with the following exceptions.
(1) Merchantmen and troopships recognized beyond doubt as hostile may be
attacked without warning.
(2) The same applies to ships sailing without lights in the waters around the
British Isles.
(3) Armed force is to be employed against merchantmen which use their radio
transmitters when stopped.
(4) As before, no attacks are to be made upon passenger vessels or large
steamships as appear to be carrying passengers in large numbers as well as goods.
Even assuming that "hostile" merely meant "enemy," the first part of the first
exception (merchantmen, not armed merchantmen) was a violation of the
Protocol; the second part of that exception (troopships) was valid; the second
exception was probably justified; the third was undoubtedly justified; and
the fourth was intended to avoid incidents such as that of the Lusitania in World
143War I and of the Athenia in World War II.
During World War II Germany contended that its use of the submarine as a
commerce destroyer was a legal reprisal because of such British violations of the
law of naval warfare as arming merchant vessels, ordering them to radio reports
of submarine sightings, ordering them to navigate without lights at night,
ordering them to ram submarines, violations ofthe rules pertaining to blockades,
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etc. Thus, in his Memoirs, Doenitz wrote:
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In the same way Naval High Command reacted only with extreme caution and
step by step to the British measures which I have just described and which
constituted a breach of the London Submarine Agreement. Slowly and one by
one the restrictions on the conduct ofU-boat operations were removed in a series
of orders from Naval High Command—beginning with permission to fire upon
vessels which used their wireless, which sailed without lights and which carried
guns, followed (as a result of the instructions to ram given to British ships) by
permission to attack all vessels identified as hostile and ending with a declaration
of sea areas that would be regarded as operational zones. . . .
It is, then, an established fact that from the very outset the German Naval High
Command painstakingly adhered to the provisions ofinternational law contained
in the London agreements and that it was only step by step, in response to breaches
of these provisions by the enemy, that we allowed ourselves more and more
latitude, until finally, we reached the stage, as it was inevitable that we would,
where the London agreement was abandoned completely and for good.
Actually, there was no need for Germany to place its actions on a reprisal
basis. The British modus operandi constituted their merchant vessels naval
auxiliaries, subject to the same treatment as warships - that of being attacked
without warning immediately upon being sighted. As one author has stated, the
provisions of the 1936 London Submarine Protocol did not extend, and were
not intended to extend, to the "warshiplike merchantmen" of the British
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merchant marine. Many publicists are of the opinion that these, and other,
British procedures changed the status of armed British merchantmen from
noncombatants to combatants, that it integrated them into the British naval
forces, and that the provisions of the 1936 London Submarine Protocol were,
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therefore, no longer applicable to them. The Commander's Handbook on the
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Law ofNaval Operations, issued by the United States Navy in 1987, states:
During World War II the practice ofattacking and sinking enemy merchant vessels
by surface warships, submarines, and military aircraft without prior warning and
without first providing for the safety of passengers and crew was widespread on
both sides. Rationale for these apparent departures from the agreed rules of the
1936 London Protocol varied. Initially, such acts were justified as reprisals against
illegal acts of the enemy. As the war progressed, however, merchant ships were
regularly armed and convoyed, participated in intelligence collection, and were
otherwise incorporated directly or indirectly into the enemy's war-fighting/war
sustaining effort. Consequendy, enemy merchant vessels were widely regarded as
legitimate military targets subject to destruction on sight.
Shortly after the beginning of World War II the United States Congress
enacted a Neutrality Act which, among other things, authorized the President
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to place restrictions "on the use of the ports and territorial waters of the United
States by the submarines or armed merchantmen of a foreign state." It also made
it unlawful for foreign vessels to fly the American flag (a rather difficult provision
to enforce) and authorized the President to designate "combat areas" within
which American flag vessels were forbidden to proceed. A Presidential
Proclamation issued immediately thereafter placed such restrictions on the use
of American ports and territorial waters on submarines, but not on armed
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merchantmen! ' Unlike the situation during World War I, the entrance into
the ports of the United States by armed British merchantmen from the early
days of World War II did not seem to cause the Administration any concern
and was completely uncontrolled. From the very beginning of the war these
vessels were treated as peaceable cargo ships and Borchard's strong protest
appears to have occasioned little comment and no change of policy. This
must be considered as one of the many indications of official American political
policy favoring the British, rather than as a thoughtful interpretation of the
applicable law.
In accordance with the authority granted by the Neutrality Act, President
Roosevelt also issued a Proclamation designating a "combat area" within which
• 153
American flag vessels were forbidden to navigate. " Germany availed itself of
this combat zone and declared its zone, within which all vessels would be sunk
without warning, to coincide with the American zone. During his
cross-examination by Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, the British prosecutor, before
the International Military Tribunal, Doenitz testified:
I have already said that the neutrals had been warned not to cross the combat
zones. If they entered the combat zones, they had to run the risk of suffering
damage, or else stay away. That is what war is. For instance, no consideration
would be shown on land either to a neutral truck convoy bringing ammunition
or supplies to the enemy. It would be fired on in exacdy the same way as an enemy
transport. It is, therefore, quite admissible to turn the seas around the enemy's
country into a combat area. That is the position as I know it in international law,
although I am only a soldier.
Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe: I see.
Doenitz: Strict neutrality would require the avoidance ofcombat areas. Whoever
enters a combat area must take the consequences.
During this cross-examination Doenitz was also asked, "If you sank a neutral
ship which had come into that [declared operational] zone, you considered that
you were absolved from any of your duties under the London Agreement to
look after the safety of the crews?" To this, he replied: "In operational areas I
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am obliged to take care of the survivors after an engagement, if the military
situation permits."
In finding Doenitz guilty of violating the 1936 London Submarine Protocol
by virtue ofthe German establishment of "operational zones," the International
Military Tribunal stated that the conferees in Washington in 1922, in London
in 1930, and in London again in 1936, had had full knowledge of the fact that
"operational zones" (or "war zones," or "exclusion zones," or "combat zones,"
under whatever name one may give to them), had been declared by both sides
during World War I, "[y]et the protocol made no exception" for them. ' It is
of interest to note that there was no mention whatsoever of such zones during
the discussions that accompanied the drafting of the provisions of the 1922
Washington Treaty, nor of those of the 1930 London Naval Treaty which
became the 1936 London Submarine Protocol; and that there were no
discussions whatsoever involved in the drafting of the Protocol itself. Would it
not be just as logical to interpret all this as indicating that there was no intention
on the part of the draftsmen of those agreements to legislate with respect to this
problem, which went far beyond submarine warfare in the scope of its
application, that there was no desire or authority on their part to establish rules
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in an area which did not relate exclusively to submarine warfare? Moreover,
while the Tribunal found Doenitz not guilty ofwaging unrestricted submarine
warfare on what amounted to a tu quoque defense, it failed to find him not guilty
of the use of operational zones on that same basis despite undisputed evidence
that the British practice in this respect was identical with, and had preceded, that
of the Germans.
There is one aspect of submarine warfare which appears to warrant mention
even though there can be no question as to the criminal liability of any person
engaged in it: the murder ofthe shipwrecked crews and passengers ofships which
have been sunk. This problem arose during World War II because ofan incident
involving the Laconia, a British ship which was sunk in September 1942 by a
German submarine which then discovered that a large number of Italian
prisoners of war had been among those on board. The submarine took in tow
several lifeboats (as it happened, the occupants of the lifeboats included a
substantial number of members of the British crew), with a large Red Cross
displayed, and sent a message, in English in the clear, asking for assistance in the
rescue efforts, promising to take no aggressive action against any vessel coming
to render assistance as long as none was taken against his U-boat. Unfortunately,
the only response was by an American bomber which attacked and damaged
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the U-boat, causing it to cast the lifeboats adrift and to submerge. " When this
was reported to Doenitz he issued the so-called "Laconia Order" which
provided:
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(1) No attempt of any kind must be made at rescuing members of ships sunk,
and this includes picking up persons in the water and putting them in lifeboats,
righting capsized lifeboats, and handing over food and water. Rescue runs counter
to the rudimentary demands of warfare for the destruction of enemy ships and
crews.
(2) Orders for bringing back captains and chief engineers still apply.
(3) Rescue the shipwrecked only if their statements would be of importance
for your boat.
(4) Be harsh, having in mind that the enemy has no regard for women and
children in his bombing attacks on German cities.
At Nuremberg the British prosecutor contended that this was an order to destroy
any survivors of the ships sunk by German submarines, contending that this had
long been German submarine policy. Evidence was adduced of a conversation
between Hitler and Oshima, the Japanese Ambassador to Germany, which the
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International Military Tribunal for the Far East reported as follows:
OSHIMA had a conference with Hitler on January 3, 1942. Hider explained his
policy of submarine warfare, which he was conducting against Allied shipping,
and said that although the United States might build ships very quickly, her chief
problem would be the personnel shortage since the training of seafaring personnel
took a long time. Hider explained that he had given orders for his submarines to
surface after torpedoing merchant ships and to shoot up the lifeboats, so that the
word would get around that most seamen were lost in torpedoings and the United
States would have difficulty in recruiting new crews. OSHIMA, in replying to
Hitler, approved this statement ofpolicy and stated that theJapanese would follow
this method of waging submarine warfare.
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Concerning this matter the International Military Tribunal said:
It is also asserted that the German U-boat arm not only did not carry out the
warning and rescue provisions of the protocol but that Doenitz deliberately
ordered the killing of the survivors of shipwrecked vessels, whether enemy or
neutral. The prosecution has introduced much evidence surrounding two orders
of Doenitz, war order No. 154, issued in 1939, and the so-called "Laconia" order
of 1942. The defense argues that these orders and the evidence supporting them
do not show such a policy and introduced much evidence to the contrary. The
Tribunal is of the opinion that the evidence does not establish with the certainty
required that Doenitz deliberately ordered the killing of shipwrecked survivors.
The orders were undoubtedly ambiguous, and deserve the strongest censure.
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The evidence further shows that the rescue provisions [ofthe 1936 Protocol] were
not carried out and that the defendant ordered that they should not be carried
out. The argument of the defense is that the security of the submarine is, as the
first rule ofthe sea, paramount to rescue and that the development ofaircraft made
rescue impossible. This may be so, but the protocol is explicit. If the commander
cannot rescue, then under its terms he cannot sink a merchant vessel and should
allow it to pass harmless before his periscope. These orders, then, prove Doentiz
is guilty of a violation of the protocol.
To summarize, in passing upon the charges of illegal submarine warfare made
against German Admiral Doenitz, the International Military Tribunal discussed
and reached decisions on four aspects of the question: 1) waging unrestricted
1 f\ i
submarine warfare (not guilty); 2) the proclamation of operational zones and
the sinking of neutral merchant ships therein (guilty); 3) ordering that the
shipwrecked be killed (not guilty); and 4) failure to rescue the shipwrecked
(guilty). However, because ofthe evidence ofa number ofBritish and American
practices, no sentence was assessed against Doenitz for the foregoing offenses of
which he was found guilty.
What were the reasons for the failure to comply with the rules of customary
international law with respect to submarine warfare during the course ofWorld
War I and for the failure to comply with those rules, as codified in the 1936
London Submarine Protocol, during the course ofWorld War II? One student
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of the problem has answered that question as follows:
The non-observance ofthe rules ofthe Protocol could be explained with the help
of military considerations: impossibility for the aircraft to act in conformity with
the rules, impossibility for the German surface warships to penetrate into and
effectively control the waters surrounding the British Isles, and, as far as submarines
were concerned, the unacceptable risk involved in the procedure of surfacing,
ascertaining the character ofthe ship and cargo, ordering the ship to be abandoned
and waiting until the order was carried out and those on board as well as the papers
and mail were safe in the ship's boats, in an area where the superior enemy forces,
warned with the aid of technical devices like radio and radar or by air
reconnaissance, could arrive on the scene in very little time.
PartV
Post-World War II (1948-to date)
As the footnotes will have indicated, there has been much discussion of the
question of restrictions on submarine warfare and the continued viability of the
1936 London Submarine Protocol since the end of World War II and the
completion of the trial before the International Military Tribunal. However,
unfortunately, there has been no attempt on the part of the international
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community to clarify a very confused situation, something that should be
avoided at all costs in the law of war. The only "official" action which has been
taken in this respect during the past forty or more years is the issuance by the
U.S. Navy of its Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations. That
volume contains the following:
Although the rules of the 1936 London Protocol continue to apply to surface
warships, they must be interpreted in light of current technology, including
satellite communications, over-the-horizon weapons, and antiship missile systems,
as well as the customary practice of belligerents that evolved during and following
World War II. Accordingly, enemy merchant vessels may be attacked and
destroyed by surface warships, either with or without prior warning, in any of the
following circumstances:
1. Actively resisting visit and search or capture;
2. Refusing to stop upon being summoned to do so;
3. Sailing under convoy of enemy warships or enemy military aircraft;
4. If armed;
5. If incorporated into, or assisting in any way, the intelligence system of the
enemy's armed forces;
6. If acting in any capacity as a naval or military auxiliary to an enemy's armed
forces;
7. If integrated into the enemy's war-fighting/war-sustaining effort and
compliance with the rules of the 1936 London Protocol would, under the
circumstances of the specific encounter, subject the surface warship to irnminent
danger or would otherwise preclude mission accomplishment.
In an earlier volume, entitled Law ofNaval Warfare, sub-paragraph 4, above, had
included the additional words "and there is reason to believe that such armament
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has been used, or is intended for use, offensively against an enemy." In
explanation of the deletion of those words, a proposed Annotated Supplement
to the Handbook, which is unofficial and which is still in draft form, states:
In light of modern weapons it is impossible to determine, if it ever was possible,
whether the armament on merchant ships is to be used offensively against an
enemy or merely defensively. It is unrealistic to expect enemy forces to be able
to make that determination. Accordingly, this rule has been modified in this text
from that previously appearing in NWIP 10-2, para. 503b(3).4.
Submarine Warfare 323
In the 1987 volume we find a number of references to submarines and to
submarine warfare. Having stated that "[t]he law of armed conflict imposes
essentially the same rules on submarines as apply to surface warships (a paraphrase
of the first paragraph of the 1936 London Submarine Protocol), the Handbook
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goes on to say:
8.3.1. Interdiction ofEnemy Merchant Shipping by Submarines. The conventional rules
of naval warfare pertaining to submarine operations against enemy merchant
shipping constitute one of the least developed areas of the law of armed conflict.
Although the submarine's effectiveness as a weapons system is dependent upon its
capability to remain submerged (and thereby undetected) and despite its
vulnerability when surfaced, the London Protocol of 1936 makes no distinction
between submarines and surface warships with respect to the interdiction ofenemy
merchant shipping. The London Protocol specifies that except in the case of
persistent refusal to stop when ordered to do so, or in the event ofactive resistance
to capture, a warship, "whether surface or submarine" may not destroy an enemy
merchant vessel "without having first placed passengers, crew, and ship's papers
in a place of safety." The impracticality of imposing upon submarines the same
targeting constraints as burden surface warships is reflected in the practice of
belligerents ofboth sides during World War II when submarines regularly attacked
and destroyed without warning enemy merchant shipping. As in the case of such
attacks by surface warships, this practice was justified either as a reprisal in response
to unlawful acts of the enemy or as a necessary consequence of the arming of
merchant vessels, of convoying, and of the general integration of merchant
shipping into the enemy's war-fighting/war-sustaining effort.
The United States considers that the London Protocol of 1936, coupled with
the customary practice of belligerents during and following World War II,
imposes upon submarines the responsibility to provide for the safety of
passengers, crew, and ship's papers before destruction of an enemy merchant
vessel unless:
1. The enemy merchant vessel refuses to stop when summoned to do so or
otherwise resists capture.
2. The enemy merchant vessel is sailing under armed convoy or is itselfarmed.
3. The enemy merchant vessel is assisting in any way the enemy's military
intelligence system or is acting in any capacity as a naval auxiliary to the enemy's
armed forces.
4. The enemy has integrated its merchant shipping into its warfighting or
war-sustaining effort and compliance with this rule would, under the
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circumstances ofthe specific encounter, subject the submarine to imminent danger
or would otherwise preclude mission accomplishment.
In a learned discussion of this problem which arrives at conclusions closely
resembling those reached by the draftsmen ofthe Handbook, one author states:
Besides the two circumstances mentioned in Article 22 (2) of the London Naval
Treaty of 1930—persistent refusal to stop on being summoned and active
resistance to visit and search—there are other situations in which international law
may allow the attack and destruction of merchant vessels. They include:
i) sailing under convoy of enemy warships or enemy military aircraft.
ii) if armed, and there is reason to believe that such armament has been used,
or is intended for use offensively against an enemy.
iii) if incorporated into, or assisting in any way, the intelligence system of an
enemy's armed forces.
iv) if acting in any capacity as a naval or military auxiliary to an enemy's armed
forces
He immediately points out that "[m]any British writers question the validity of
some of these situations."
Conclusions
Can it be said that, after the experiences of two World Wars, the mandates
ofthe 1936 London Submarine Protocol, codifying customary international law,
are still a valid and binding part of the law of war at sea? The International
Military Tribunal, sitting after the conclusion of those two conflagrations, left
no doubt that in its opinion the provisions of the Protocol had been, during
World War II, and still were, after that conflict, very much alive and binding.
A majority of the writers who have studied the problem are of a similar
opinion. Although it is unquestionably true that a rule of international law
may be changed by evidence of a substantial change in the practice of States, the
failure of one belligerent in World War I to comply with the applicable rules
of customary international law, following which it was severely chastised for its
action and the rules were codified, and the failure of three belligerents in World
War II (Germany, Japan, and the United States), even though they may have
been major maritime Powers, to comply with the provisions of the Protocol
does not forever erase them from the rule book. During World War I all of the
Entente Powers and the United States, both as a neutral and as a Power associated
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with the Entente Powers, insisted that the rules with respect to submarine
warfare, which were then a part of customary international law and are now set
forth in the 1936 London Submarine Protocol, were valid and binding rules.
During the interim between the wars a large number ofthe nations ofthe world,
including in many cases those which later did not comply therewith, accepted
these rules in conventional form in 1922, in 1930, in 1936, and in 1937. The
failure of Germany, Japan, and the United States to comply with those rules
during World War II did not result in their nullification. It must also be borne
in mind that in both World Wars Germany contended that her failure to comply
with the customary or conventional law of submarine warfare was an act of
reprisal, i.e., an admittedly illegal act. The same argument may, perhaps, be made
for the United States inasmuch as a Japanese submarine had already sunk an
American merchantman without warning when the message ordering
unrestricted submarine warfare by the United States Navy, concerning which
Admiral Nimitz testified, was sent. (No evidence could be found that Japan
claimed that her unrestricted submarine warfare was an act of reprisal.)
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Which brings the present author to the following conclusions:
1. While, during World War II, the provisions of the 1936 London
Submarine Protocol were largely not applied, this was frequendy excused by
the particular belligerent, not on the basis that they were no longer a part of the
law of war at sea, but on the basis of reprisals against illegal actions on the part
of the enemy (arming of merchant vessels with guns and depth charges, sailing
them in warship-escorted convoys, ordering the immediate reporting by radio
of submarine sightings, ordering merchant vessels to ram submarines, illegal
mining, illegal expansion of the list ofcontraband, illegal blockades, declarations
of war zones, etc.), in itself a recognition of the continuing validity of those
provisions;
2. The 1936 London Submarine Protocol continues to be a valid and
subsisting part of the law ofwar at sea;
3. Ifthe establishment ofzones (operations zones, war zones, exclusion zones,
combat zones, etc.) is determined to be a legal method of making war at sea,
the application of the rules of the 1936 London Submarine Protocol will be
largely, but not entirely, nullified, at least in the zones so declared;
4. It is highly probable that in any World War III belligerents will again find
reasons why the 1936 London Submarine Protocol should not be applied;
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5. In any future armed conflict of lesser extent than a World War III the
pressure of neutral Powers may be sufficiently strong to cause the belligerents
to comply with the provisions of the 1936 London Submarine Protocol.
One cannot do better than to conclude a study ofthe submarine with a portion
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ofthe final conclusion reached by a noted expert in a book recently published:
The era of the submarine as the predominant weapon of power at sea must
therefore be recognised as having begun. . . . Five hundred years ago, before the
sailing-ship pioneers ventured into great waters, the oceans were an empty place,
the only area of the world's surface in which men did not deploy military force
against each other. In a future war the oceans might appear empty again, swept
clear both of merchant traffic and of the navies which have sought so long to
protect it against predators. Yet the oceans' emptiness will be illusory, for in their
deeps new navies of submarine warships, great and small, will be exacting from
each other the price of admiralty.
Notes
1. Frederick Wagner, Submarine Fighter of the American Revolution: The Story of David Bushnell
56-74 (1963).
2. Quoted in Cynthia O. Philip, Robert Fulton: A Biography 74 (1985). The author states: "He realized
that the submarine would be considered an illegal weapon and that ifhe or any of his crew were taken prisoner
by the British they would be executed as common criminals. The objection to submarine warfare . . . was
that the submarine would attack with unscrupulous stealth." Id. at 75.
3. Admiral Earl St. Vincent, the British First Sea Lord in 1804, is reputed to have said of Fulton's
i
submarine:
Don't look at it, and don't touch it. If we take it up, other nations will; and it will be the greatest
blow at our supremacy on the sea that can be imagined.
R. H. Gibson, The German Submarine War, 1914-1918, (1931).
4. The Union Navy made one attempt to construct a submersible to be used against the Confederate I
iron-clad Merrimac. This boat, the Alligator, was eventually lost, not through enemy action, without ever having
been submerged. Bernard Brodie, Sea Power in the Machine Age 272 (1969).
5. One author says that New Ironsides "did not even need a major dockyard repairjob." Edwin P. Hoyt,
Submarines at War: The History of the American Silent Service 11 (1983); another author says that she was
"out of action for a year." Alex Roland, Underwater Warfare in the Age of Sail 162 (1978).
6. Edwin P. Hoyt, supra note 5, at 10-13. The lessening of the interest of the Confederate Navy in
submersibles may have been due to the difficulty of recruiting crews for what appeared to be suicide missions.
However, it cannot be said that Confederate underwater activities (which included mines, another pioneering
method) ceased. See Roland, supra note 5, at 162, where the following statistics are set forth:
By the end of the war the toll from Confederate underwater warfare was impressive. Damage was
found to have been sustained by forty-three Union vessels, twenty-nine ofwhich were sunk. This was
more damage than was effected by the rest of the Confederate Navy.
It is to be noted that all actions of the Confederate submersibles were directed against Union warships. For a
fairly detailed history of the "David" and the "Hunley", see Milton F. Perry, Infernal Machines: The Story of
Confederate Submarine and Mine Warfare 63-108 (1965).
7. Hoyt, supra note 5, at 15.
8. Edwyn A. Gray, The Killing Time, The U-Boat War, 1914-1918, at 17 (1972).
9. The Reports to The Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907, at 2, 3 (James B. Scott ed., 1917)
10. The Proceedings of the Hague Peace Conference: The Conference of 1899, at 367-368 (James B.
Scott ed., 1920).
11. Id. at 296.
,
Submarine Warfare 327
12. Id. at 299.
13. As late as 1935 the then Lieutenant Rickover wrote: "The submarine is the weapon par excellence
of the weak naval power." Hyman G. Rickover, International Law and the Submarine, 61 U S Nav Inst Proc
1213, 1224 (September 1935).
'
'
14. A 1917 Grotius Society Committee pointed out that until World War I "the employment [of
submarines] as commerce destroyers was not seriously considered." Report of a Committee of the Grotius
Society, The Legal Status of Submarines, 14 Trans. Grot. Soc. 155 (1929) [hereinafter Grotius Committee
Report]. A later author said: "Perhaps the major flaw in the naval thinking of the years preceding World War
I was the apparent lack of appreciation of the economic facet of naval warfare." William H Barnes Submarine
Warfare and International Law, 2 World Polity 121, 132 (1960). The effectiveness of the British blockade of
Germany early in World War I was undoubtedly a major reason for the decision of Germany to retaliate in
the only way open to it, by the employment of the submarine as a commerce destroyer. Gray, supra note 8,
15. Bernard Brodie, supra note 4, at 287.
16. In 1901 France had 6 submarines, Italy 2, the United States 1 , and Great Britain none- while in 1907
France had 49, Great Britain 39, Russia 13, the United States 10, Italy 7, Japan 5, and Germanv 2 Barnes
supra note 14, at 121, 127-128. By 1914 Great Britain had 76 (with 20 under construction), France had 70
(23), the United States had 29 (21), Germany had 27 (12), Russia had 25 (18), and Italy had 18 (2). Id., at
17. The Proceedings of the Hague Peace Conferences: The Conference of 1907, at 1 (James B Scott
ed., 3 vols. "1", i.e. 1921) [hereinafter Scott, Proceedings].
18. 3 id. at 741. That Commission had drafted the 1899 Hague Convention No. II with Respect to the
Laws and Customs ofWar on Land and its attached Regulations, signed at The Hague 29 July 1899 32 Stat
1803; 1 Am. J. Int'l. L. (Supp.1907) 129; The Laws ofArmed Conflicts 63 (Dietrich Schindler andJiri Toman
eds., 3d ed., 1988) [hereinafter Schindler/Toman]. This Convention was readopted with only a few minor
changes as the 1907 Hague Convention No. IV, signed at The Hague, 18 October 1907, 36 Stat. 2227- 2 Am
J. Int'l. L. (Supp. 1908) 90; Schindler/Toman, supra, and still constitutes a major portion of the conventional
law ofwar on land.
19. See, for example, Pietro Verri, Commentary on the 1913 Oxford Manual on Naval Warfare The Law
of Naval Warfare 329, 331 (N. Ronzitti ed., 1988).
20. 3 Scott, Proceedings, supra note 17, at 792-793.
21. 1907 Hague Convention No. VI Relating to the Status ofEnemy Merchant Ships at the Outbreak
of Hostilities, signed at the Hague, 19 October 1907, 2 Am. J. Int'l. L. (Supp. 1908) 127; Schindler/Toman
supra note 18, at 791. The United States is not a Party to this Convention.
22. 1909 London Declaration Concerning the Laws of Naval Warfare, signed at London 26 February
1909, 3 Am. J. Int'l. L. 179, 186 (Supp. 1909); Schindler/Toman, supra note 18, at 843. After an adverse vote
in the British House of Lords, this Declaration received no ratifications and never became effective. One
author has written
For belligerents [in World War I] the Declaration ofLondon proved a remarkably flexible weapon
the more so because it was unratified. Since the London Conference had maintained the fiction that
it was not writing new law, but declaring law, it was easy to use the declaration. Since it was unratified
it was simple to announce interpretations by proclamation, or ignore it.
Calvin D. Davis, The United States and the Second Hague Conference 343 (1975).
23. The 1913 Oxford Manual on the Law of Naval Warfare Governing The Relations Between Belligerents
Resolutions ofthe Institute of International Law 174 (James B. Scott ed., 1913); Schindler/Toman, supra note
18, at 857), while perhaps even more extensive in its coverage than the 1909 Declaration of London, supra
note 22, likewise contained no mention of the submarine.
24. It is worthy of note that the provision in this regard contained in Article 50 of the 1909 Declaration
ofLondon, supra note 22, applied only to neutral merchant vessels and that there are no comparable provisions
relating to enemy merchant vessels. Perhaps this was because of the provision of the 1907 Hague Convention
No. VI. See supra text accompanying note 21.
25. Hyman G. Rickover, supra note 13, at 1217.
26. For. Rel. 198, 199 (Supp. 1916); 10 Am.
J. Int'l. L. 178, 179 (Spec. Supp. 1916).
27. 2 Lassa Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise 469 (Hersch Lauterpacht ed 7th ed 1952)
[hereinafter Lauterpacht's Oppenheim]. Another British writer concluded that "the introduction of the
submarine does not call for the making of new laws for naval warfare, but demands the rigid application of
those hitherto accepted." A. Pearce Higgins, Submarine Warfare, 1 Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. 149, 164 (1920-1921)
However, an expert in the field of the law of war has written:
328 Levie on the Law of War
So in our own times, Professor Lauterpacht and the late Professor Oppenheim, Dr. Colombos and
the late Professor Higgins and other Anglo-American publicists have regarded air and submarine craft
as interlopers in naval warfare, which must play the game according to surface rules, or not at all, with
no ground of complaint if the rules forbid their effective use. It is not believed that this is an adequate
approach either for understanding the present state of international practice, or for moulding future
practice.
Julius Stone, Legal Controls of International Conflict 603-604 (2d imp., 1959).
28. For. Rel. 768, 769 (Supp. 1916).
29. 50 Pari. Deb., H.C. (5th serv.) 1750 (1913). The 1907 Hague Convention No. VII Relating to the
Conversion of Merchant Ships into War-Ships, 2 Am. J. Int'l. L. 133 (Supp. 1908); Schindler/Toman, supra
note 19, at 797; 100 B.F.S.P. 377 had covered some, but not all, of the problems connected with such
conversions, which created warships sometimes referred to as "armed merchant cruisers" and sometimes as
"auxiliary cruisers." In particular, it had not solved the problem as to where such conversions could be
accomplished.
30. For. Rel. 216 (Supp. 1914); 9 Am. J. Int'l. L. I (Spec. Supp. 1915).
31. For. Rel. 216-220 (Supp. 1914); 9 Am. J. Int'l. L. 1-6 (Spec. Supp. 1915).
32. For. Rel. 257-258 (Supp. 1914); 9 Am. J. Int'l. L. 7-8 (Spec. Supp. 1915).
33. Although food and clothing remained on the conditional contraband list, as Lauterpacht pointed out
this was "a distinction without a difference" as, contrary to the provisions of the 1909 Declaration ofLondon,
supra note 22, British prize courts applied the doctrine ofcontinuous voyage to items ofconditional contraband.
Hersch Lauterpacht, The Problem of the Revision of the Laws of War, 29 Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. 360, 375 (1952).
Concerning problems with respect to contraband during World War 1, see H. Reason Pyke, The Law of
Contraband ofWar 178-190 (1915).
34. On 5 September 1914, the British light cruiser Pathfinder became the first victim of a submarine's
torpedo in World War I. As some indication of the naivete of the time with respect to submarines, on 22
September 1914a German submarine sank another British cruiser, the Aboukir—and then sank two more such
cruisers, the Hogue and the Cressy, which engaged in rescuing the crew of the first one, in complete disregard
of the possible presence of the submarine. R.H. Gibson, supra note 3, at 6-7.
35. On 20 October 1914 a German U-boat sank the Glitra, a small merchant vessel, the first such to be
sunk during World War I. This was accomplished in the manner prescribed for surface vessels and occasioned
no outcry. Brodie, supra note 4, at 302.
36. For. Rel. 463, 464 (Supp. 1914); 11 Am. J. Int'l. L. 14, 15 (Spec. Supp. 1917).
37. Daniel P. O'Connell, International Law and Contemporary Naval Operations, 44 Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. 19,
46 (1970).
38. For. Rel. 94 (Supp. 1915); 9 Am. J. Int'l. L. 83-84 (Spec. Supp. 1915).
39. Declaration Respecting Maritime Law, signed at Paris, 16 April 1856, 1 Am. J. Int'l. L. 89 (Supp.
1907); 115 Perry C.T.S. 1 (1969); Schindler/Toman, supra note 18, at 787. One of the provisions of this
Declaration, which the British were allegedly disregarding, stated: "The neutral flag covers enemy's goods,
with the exception of contraband of war." Of course, the British would have denied any violation of the
Declaration as they had included practically every conceivable item on their revised lists of contraband! For
variously stated reasons, the United States is not a Party to this Declaration but can probably be said to recognize
the applicability of its provisions.
40. For. Rel. 96-98 (Supp. 1915); 9 Am. J. Int'l. L. 84-85 (Spec. Supp. 1915). A memorandum to
German U-boat commanders issued at the same time said:
The first consideration is the safety of the U-boat. Rising to the surface to examine a ship must be
avoided for the boat's safety, because, apart from the danger of a possible surprise attack by enemy
ships, there is no guarantee that one is not dealing with an enemy ship even if it bears the distinguishing
marks of a neutral.... Its destruction will therefore be justified unless other attendant circumstances
indicate its neutrality.
Bernard Brodie, supra note 4, at 304.
41. While, for a complete overview of the problem of submarine warfare against merchantmen, it will
be necessary to refer to the use of "operational zones," the question of their legality is beyond the scope of
this article. The reader interested in this subject is referred to the definitive discussion thereof in Maritime War
Zones and Exclusion Zones by L.F.E. Goldie, 64 International Law Studies 156 (1991). See abo W.J. Fenrick,
77ie Exclusion Zone Device in the Law of Naval Warfare, 1986 Can. Y.B. Int'l L. 91. At this point it will suffice
to say that "[tjhe German operational area may be justified as a legitimate reprisal to the British one." William
T. Mallison, Jr., Submarines in General and Limited Wars, Studies in the Law of Naval Warfare (1966).
42. 5 Ray S. Baker, Woodrow Wilson, Life and Letters 247, 250-251 (1935) [hereinafter Baker].
Submarine Warfare 329
43. For. Rel. 98-100 (Supp. 1915); 9 Am. J. Int'l. L. 86-88 (Spec. Supp. 1915). The United States note
said, in part:
To declare or exercise a right to attack any vessel entering a prescribed area without first certainly
determining its belligerent nationality and the contraband character of the cargo would be an act so
unprecedented in naval warfare that this Government is reluctant to believe that the Imperial
Government of Germany contemplates it as possible. The suspicion that enemy ships are using neutral
flags improperly can create no presumption that all ships traversing a prescribed area are subject to the
same suspicion. It is to determine exactly such questions that this Government understands the right
of visit and search to have been recognized.
44. For. Rel. 100-101 (Supp. 1915); 9 Am. J. Int'l. L. 88-89 (Spec. Supp. 1915).
45. For. Rel. 119-120 (Supp. 1915); 9 Am. J. Int'l. L. 97-98 (Spec. Supp. 1915).
46. For. Rel. 127-128 (Supp. 1915); 9 Am. J. Int'l. L. 99, 101, 106 (Spec. Supp. 1915).
47. For. Rel. 393 (Supp. 1915); 9 Am. J. Int'l. L. 129, 131 (Spec. Supp. 1915). It will be noted that this
protest repeated many of the arguments which had been advanced by the British in rejecting the proposal
made by the United States.
48. For. Rel. 530-531 (Supp. 1915); 10 Am. J. Int'l. L. 166 (Spec. Supp. 1916). One author construes
this decision as:
a significant admission by Germany that the right of unarmed belligerent merchantmen were
recognized by international law, and that the duty with respect to warning and the saving of human
life was as applicable to the submarine as to the surface warship.
Horace B. Robertson, Jr., Submarine Warfare,]AG. J. 3 (November 1956).
49. Submarines 14 (1983).
50. Proces-Verbal Relating to the Rules of Submarine Warfare Set Forth in Part IV of the Treaty of
London of22 April 1930, signed at London, November 6, 1936, 3 Treaties and Other International Agreements
of the United States of America, 1776-1949, at 298 (Charles I. Bevans ed.) [hereinafter Bevans]; 31 Am. J.
Int'l. L. 137 (Supp. 1937); 173 L.N.T.S. 353; 140 B.F.S.P. 300; Schindler/Toman, supra note 18, at 883.
Although it is officially a "Proces-Verbal," it is generally referred to as a "Protocol."
51. For. Rel. 232-234 (Supp. 1916); 10 Am. J. Int'l. L. 185, 190 (Spec. Supp. 1916).
52. For. Rel. 257, 259 (Supp. 1916); 10 Am. J. Int'l. L. 195, 198 (Spec. Supp. 1916).
53. For. Rel. 100 (Supp. I, 1917); 11 Am. J. Int'l. L. 332, 333 (Spec. Supp. 1917). One well-regarded
expert in this field concluded that "in international law Germany had a good case. She failed to exploit it
effectively in neutral eyes and eventually roused the neutrals to anger." O'Connell, supra note 37, at 48.
54. For. Rel. 106 (Supp. 1, 1917); 11 Am. J. Int'l. L. 335-337 (Spec. Supp. 1917).
55. For. Rel. 171 (Supp. I, 1917); 11 Am. J. Int'l. L. 344-345 (Spec. Supp. 1917). The "Armed Ship
Bill" passed the House by a lopsided margin but was successfully filibustered in the Senate. President Wilson
then decided to exercise his authority as Commander-in-Chief to direct the Navy to furnish American
merchantmen with guns and gun crews. Robert Lansing, War Memoirs of Robert Lansing 224-225 (1970
ed.).
56. For. Rel. 195, 197 (Supp. I, 1917); 11 Am. J. Int'l. L. 350, 352 (Spec. Supp. 1917).
57. 1907 Hague Convention No. XIII Concerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval
War, signed at The Hague, October 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2415; T.S. 545; 2 Am. J. Int'l. L. 202 (Supp. 1908);
100 B.F.S.P. 448; Schindler/Toman, supra note 18, at 951.
58. For. Rel. 613 (Supp. 1914); 9 Am. J. Int'l. L. 238-239 (Spec. Supp. 1915).
59. The Dutch reply to a British protest, stated:
The observation of a strict neutrality obliges them to place in the category of vessels assimilated to
belligerent warships those merchant vessels ofthe belligerent parties that are provided with an armament
and that consequently would be capable of committing acts of war.
Brit. Pari. Papers, Misc., No. 14 (1917) Cd 8690, quoted in International Law Situations, 1930, at 14.
60. Edwin Borchard, Armed Merchantmen, 34 Am. J. Int'l. L. 107, 111 (1940).
61. Myres S. McDougal & Florentino Feliciano, Law and Minimum World Public Order 565 n. 117
(1962). The authors also point out that:
The construction of this "right to resist" urged by the same writers and by the British Government
was singularly liberal. Attack was said to include the attempt to capture, and the attempt to capture
included the attempt to exercise visit and search. In net effect, an armed merchantman was, under this
view, entitled to start firing upon being sighted and approached by an enemy force.
62. See supra note 29.
63. See supra text accompanying note 29.
64. 50 Pari. Deb., H.C. 1750 (5th ser. 1913). It will be noted that Churchill spoke of a British "armed
merchantman" meeting a foreign "armed merchantman." Actually, he was undoubtedly referring to a foreign
330 Levie on the Law of War
"armed merchant cruiser." Moreover, he continued to fail to make this verbal distinction. On June 11, 1913,
during a question period, he was asked: "Is it not a fact that these ships are armed for defence only and not
for attack?" to which he replied: "Surely these ships will be quite valueless for the purpose of attacking armed
vessels of any kind. What they are serviceable for is to defend themselves against the attack of another vessel
of their own standing." 53 id. at 1599 (1913). (The question was undoubtedly "planted"!)
65. 59 id. at 1925 (1914). The extent of this operation is indicated by the fact that by the end of the war
4,139 merchant ships had been armed. Bernard Brodie, supra note 4, at 319. During World War I Germany
had no "armed merchantmen" although it did have some "commissioned auxiliary cruisers"; and the guns to
which Churchill referred were very much used against "ships of war" inasmuch as they were used against
submarines. In a memorandum of October 13, 1914, the German Government stated that the purpose of the
armament on the merchantmen was for armed resistance against German cruisers and that "[s]uch resistance
is contrary to international law because a merchant vessel is not permitted to defend itself against a war vessel."
(The issue of the right of such armed vessels to remain in neutral ports more than twenty-four hours was also
raised.) For. Rel. 613 (Supp. 1914); 10 Am. J. Int'l. L. 321 (Spec. Supp. 1916).
66. For. Rel. 598 (Supp. 1914); 9 Am. J. Int'l. L. 223 (Spec. Supp. 1915). The British Privy Council
has held that "it must be recollected that defence is not confined to taking to one's heels or even resuming a
blow, but, in the jargon of strategy, may consist in an offensive-defensive, or in plain words in hitting first."
International Law Situations, 1930, at 6, 8. And as one author stated: "[I]f a surprise shell which sent down a
submarine and its crew had been fired in self-defence, the pity is that the drowning men would be unable to
detect its difference from an offensive shell." Kenkichi Mori, The Submarine in War 86 (1931) [hereinafter
Mori].
67. For. Rel. 604 (Supp. 1914); 9 Am. J. Int'l. L. 230 (Spec. Supp. 1915). In view of the provisions of
the 1907 Hague Convention No. XIII, supra note 57, the British Ambassador also stated that "His Majesty's
Government hold the view that it is not in accordance with neutrality and international law to detain in neutral
ports merchant ships armed with purely defensive armaments." For. Rel. 606 (Supp. 1914); 9 Am. J. Int'l. L.
231 (Spec. Supp. 1915).
68. For. Rel. 196 (Supp. 1916); 10 Am. J. Int'l. L. 332 (Spec. Supp. 1916).
69. 10 Am. J. Int'l. L. 339, 340 (Spec. Supp. 1916). On a number of occasions the United States called
attention to the use of guns on merchant ships for offensive purposes. See, e.g., For. Rel. 849-850 (Supp.
1915).
70. The same procedure was followed in World War II. 13 International Military Tribunal, Trial of
Major War Criminals 258 (1947) [hereinafter T.M.W.C.].
71. For. Rel. 607, 608 (Supp. 1914); 9 Am. J. Int'l. L. 232 (Spec. Supp. 1915).
72. See supra note 39.
73. Lauterpacht's Oppenheim, supra note 27, at 469. Elsewhere he states that: "An overwhelming weight
of authority recognized that their defensive armament in no way altered the legal status of these vessels." Id.
at 468. While this is probably true as to most British writers on the subject, it is probably not true in general.
See, e.g., infra note 74, and the Borchard article cited supra in note 60.
74. For. Rel. 611-612 (Supp. 1914); 9 Am. J. Int'l. L. 234-235 (Spec. Supp. 1915). Secretary of State
Bryan disagreed with this memorandum and in a letter to President Wilson he argued that "the character of
the vessel is determined, not by whether she resists or not, but by whether she is armed or not . . . the fact
that she is armed raises the presumption that she will use her arms." Baker, supra note 42, at 354. John Bassett
Moore, one of the deans of international law in the United States, said of Secretary Bryan's position that "it
was obviously founded in law and common sense." John B. Moore, Fifty Years of International Law, 50 Harv.
L. Rev. 395, 439 (1937).
75. For. Rel. 749 (Supp. 1916).
76. Robert Lansing, supra note 55, at 100-101.
77. For. Rel. 146-148 (Supp. 1916); 10 Am. J. Int'l. L. 310,312-313 (Spec. Supp. 1916). Ofthe problem
created by permitting merchant vessels to be armed and yet considering them to be noncombatants, while
requiring the submarine to comply with the law applicable to surface warships, one expert in the law of
submarine warfare has written:
It soon became apparent [in World War I] that even a British armed merchant ship sailing alone
presented a very real military danger to German submarines which attempted to comply with traditional
law. The predictable result of the new situation was that consideration of military necessity, as well as
simply self-preservation, led to the submarine remaining submerged and making torpedo attacks
without warning.
William T. Mallison, Jr., supra note 41 , at 107. A similar conclusion was reached by a number ofother students
of the problem. See, e.g., the Grotius Committee Report, supra note 14, at 155; Hyman G. Rickover, supra
Submarine Warfare 331
note 13, at 1223: Alex A. Kerr, International Law and the Future OfSubmarine Warfare, 81 U.S. Nav. Inst. Proc.
1105, 1109 (October 1955).
78. For. Rel. 21 1 (Supp. 1916); 10 Am. J. Int'l. L. 336 (Spec. Supp. 1916). The other Allied Governments
answered in the same vein.
79. In his Memoirs, Lansing, although strongly pro-British, said:
Briefly, the British Government wished international law enforced when they believed that it
worked to the advantage ofGreat Britain and wished the law modified when the change would benefit
Great Britain.
Robert Lansing, supra note 55, at 111. The German response was a memorandum of 10 February 1916 in
which it was stated that armed merchantmen were not entitled to the status ofpeaceable vessels ofcommerce
and that German naval vessels were receiving orders "to treat such vessels as belligerents." For. Rel. 163-165
(Supp. 1916); 10 Am. J. Int'l. L. 314-318 (Spec. Supp. 1916).
80. For. Rel. 244-248 (Supp. 1916); 10 Am. J. Int'l. L.367, 369-370 (Spec. Supp. 1916). The vacillation
of the United States on this matter and its ultimate improper decision was pointed out with vigor by Borchard
when the same problem arose in the early years ofWorld War II. He termed the March 1916 memorandum
a "humiliating retreat." Edwin Borchard, supra note 60, at 107. But see Mori, supra note 66, at 86-87. Another
expert in the field asserted that it "represented a return to a pro-Allied policy in the guise of a return to
traditional law." William T. Mallison, Jr., supra note 41, at 111.
81. Inter-American Convention on Maritime Neutrality, signed at Havana, February 20, 1928, 47 Stat.
1989; T.S. 845; 2 Bevans, supra note 50, at 721. (There are only eight Parties to this Convention, all of the
major Latin-American nations having failed to ratify it.) Article 2 of the Harvard Research in International
Law, Rights and Duties ofNeutral States in Naval and Aerial War, 33 Am. J. Int'l. L. 167, 224 (Spec. Supp. 1939)
provides that belligerent merchant vessels "shall, if armed for defense or offense, be assimilated to warships."
See also Articles 28 and 55 ofthat document. However, Article 3 (2) ofthe Scandinavian Declaration Regarding
Similar Rules of Neutrality, signed at Stockholm, May 27, 1938, 188 L.N.T.S. 295, 32 Am. J. Int'l. L. 141
(Supp. 1938) states:
2. Access to [Danish] ports or to [Danish] territorial waters is likewise prohibited to armed merchant
ships of the belligerents if the armament is destined to ends other than their own defense.
82. William T. Mallison, Jr., supra note 41, at 120.
83. It will have been noted that no mention has been made ofthe famous "Q-ships." These were warships
disguised as unarmed merchant ships and were undoubtedly another reason why Germany elected to
discontinue the practice of having a submarine surface and warn during the course ofWorld War I. Id. at 67.
84. 2 David H. Miller, The Drafting of the Covenant 65, 74 (1928).
85. Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers, of the One Part, and Germany, of the
Other Part, signed at Versailles, June 28, 1919, 2 Bevans, supra note 50, at 43, 127; 112 B.F.S.P. 1, 94; 225
Perry C.T.S. 188, 276. (The United States did not ratify this Treaty because of the Senate's objections to the
Convenant of the League of Nations which was a part thereof. However, Article 191 (in Part V) was carried
over into the Treaty Between the United States and Germany for the Establishment of Friendly Relations,
signed at Berlin, August 25, 1921, 42 Stat. 1939; T.S. 658; 114 B.F.S.P. 828.)
86. Within a few years of Versailles the German Navy was able to arrange to retain its expertise in the
submarine field through the use of Dutch and Spanish connections. Erich Raeder, My Life 138-139 (1960);
Francis L. Carsten, The Reichwehr and Politics 1918-1933, at 242-244 (1966); John Keegan, The Price of
Admiralty 221 (1989).
87. Conference on the Limitation ofArmament, Washington, November 12, 1921 - February 6, 1922,
at 467 (1922) [hereinafter 1922 Washington Conference].
88. Id. at 486.
89. Yamato Ichihashi, The Washington Conference and After: A Historical Survey 81 (1928). World
War I had already demonstrated the correctness of the British position and World War II confirmed it.
90. 1922 Washington Conference, supra note 87, at 610.
91. Mat 596.
92. During the course of the discussion, the Italian representative stated that his delegation understood
the term "merchant vessel" to refer to unarmed merchant vessels. Id. at 688. He adhered to this definition
despite remonstrances from the British delegate. Id. at 690, 692. The Soviet text International Law 438 (F.I.
Kozhevnikov ed., n.d.) indicates that the 1936 Protocol applies only to "unarmed merchantmen."
93. Treaty between the United States ofAmerica, the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan Relating
to the Use of Submarines and Noxious Gases in Warfare, signed at Washington, February 6, 1922, supra note
87, at 1605; 16 Am. J. Int'l. L. 57 (Supp. 1922); Schindler/Toman, supra note 18, at 789. It must be emphasized
that this Treaty never became effective. It required the unanimous acceptance of the drafting States and France
refused to ratify it. Nevertheless, both the 1930 London Naval Treaty, infra note 94, and the 1936 London
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Naval Treaty, infra note 116, refer to the 1922 Washington Treaty as though it were an effective international
agreement.
94. Limitation and Reduction of Naval Armament (London Naval Treaty), signed at London, April 22,
1930, 46 Stat. 2858; T.S. 830; 2 Bevans, supra note 50, at 1055; 112 L.N.T.S. 65; 132 B.F.S.P. 603.
95. See supra note 50.
96. 1922 Washington Conference, supra note 87, at 596.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 728. He added: "The peculiarity about piracy was that, though the act was done on the high
seas and not under the jurisdiction ofany particular country, nevertheless it could be punished by any country."
Unfortunately, he had previously stated that the Conference was "competent to declare that those who violated
the laws of war were guilty of acts of piracy." Id. at 720. Most commentators seem to have reached the
conclusion that Hughes did. See, e.g., Herbert A. Smith, The Law and Custom of the Sea 93 n.3 (3rd ed.,
1959) where the statement is made that "[t]he Washington text was objectionable by reason of provision that
submarine officers who broke the rule should be treated as pirates." See also infra note 121.
99. One author calls attention to this by asserting that "the stipulation [in Article VI] dispels any
misapprehension that the instrument would be obligatory as between the nations which have ratified it."
Kenkichi Mori, supra note 66, at 118. But see supra note 93. In Mallison, supra note 41 at 43, the conclusion
is reached that "the submarine came out of the Washington Conference with undiminished status as a lawful
combatant."
100. Lawrence H. Douglas, The Submarine and the Washington Conference of 1921, 26 Nav. War Coll. Rev.
86, 92 (March-April 1974); reprinted in 62 International Law Studies 479, 488 (Richard B. Lillich & John N.
Moore, eds., 1980).
101. 1922 Washington Conference, supra note 87, at 814, 816; 2 Bevans, supra note 50, at 346.
102. Rules Concerning the Control of Wireless Telegraphy in Time ofWar, 32 Am. J. Int'l. L. 2 (Supp.
1938); General Collection ofthe Laws and Customs ofWar 819, 821 (M. Deltenre ed., 1943). In his testimony
before the International Military Tribunal after World War II, German Admiral Doenitz pointed out that
reference to this provision was contained in a footnote to the German Prize Ordinance. 13 T.M.W.C., supra
note 70, at 361. (Actually, it was in Article 39 (iii) of the Ordinance.)
103. In O'Connell, supra note 37, at 19, the author apparently takes the position that using a ship's radio
to announce the appearance of a submarine and giving its location does not affect the ship's status as he calls
the decision to sink vessels which follow that procedure a "dilution of Germany's standards" of submarine
warfare.
104. See supra note 81.
105. The International Military Tribunal paraphrased this provision by stating that "[i]f the commander
cannot rescue, then under its [the 1936 Protocol's] terms he cannot sink a merchant vessel and should allow
it to pass harmless before his periscope." 1 T.M.W.C., supra note 70, at 313; Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression:
Opinion and Judgement 140 (1947) [hereinafter Nazi Conspiracy].
106. Documents of the London Naval Conference, 1930, at 187-202 (1930) [hereinafter 1930 London
Conference].
107. Id. at 411.
108. Id. at 444.
109. Id. at 238.
110. See supra note 94.
111. In a criticism of these provisions (as reaffd in the 1936 London Submarine Protocol), one author has
written:
[T]he Protocol was much like an elegant carpet thrown over a littered and soiled passage, for it
attempted reform with one sweeping gesture, while what was called for was a thorough airing and
meticulous renovation of the laws governing submarine conduct. In essence the London Protocol was
the product of an idealistic era which trusted in glib moralizing to right past wrongs and prevent future
digressions.
Barnes supra note 14, at 189. However, another author takes the position that while the 1922 Washington
Conference was influenced by the "spirit ofVersailles," in the 1930 agreement "the tone ofmoral disapproval
is wanting." Hyman G. Rickover, supra note 13, at 1220 and 1221.
112. See supra text accompanying note 93.
113. 1930 London Conference, supra note 106, at 443. Both the 1922 and the 1930 provisions have been
properly criticized because "they attempt a regulation of submarine warfare without at the same time
considering the question of the armed merchantman; yet the two problems are intimately connected."
Rickover, supra note 13, at 1221.
114. See supra text accompanying note 102.
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115. See supra note 50.
116. Treaty on the Limitation of Armament (Second London Naval Treaty), signed at London, March
25, 1936, 50 Stat. 1363; T.S. 919; 3 Bevans, supra note 50, at 257; 140 B.F.S.P. 243.
117. Documents of the London Naval Conference 1935, at 54 (1936) [hereinafter 1935 London
Conference]. Prime Minister Baldwin's statement was confirmed by the French representative in his opening
address. Id. at 63.
118. Id. at 741-742 and 104.
119. Id. at 742-743. For a discussion in depth of the background of the 1935 London Naval Conference,
and its inevitable failure, see Stephen E. Pelz, Race to Pearl Harbor (1974).
120. 140 B.F.S.P. 300, 302. It is believed that Hitler did this as a political gesture and against the advice
of his naval advisers. It is, perhaps, appropriate to note that when World War II began, the United Kingdom
and France both took the position that these rules applied to aircraft as well as to surface warships and
submarines. 1 For. Rel. 547-48 (1939).
121. The Nyon Agreement, signed at Nyon, Switzerland, Sept 14, 1937, 181 L.N.T.S. 137; 33 Am. J.
Int'l. L. 550 (Supp. 1939); Schindler/Toman, supra note 18, at 887. The Preamble stated that the submarine
attacks were "contrary to the most elementary dictates of humanity, which should be justly treated as acts of
piracy." Thus, although the 1922 Washington Treaty, supra note 93, had never become effective, its provisions
continued to be noted—and misinterpreted.
122. Antonio Cassese, The Spanish Civil War and the Development of Customary Law Concerning Internal
Armed Conflicts, Current Problems of International Law 287, 295-96 (A. Cassese ed., 1975).
123. League ofNations, OfFicialJournal, December 1937, at 945-46; 33 Am. J. Int'l. L. 551 (Supp. 1939).
124. Bernard Brodie, supra note 4, at 341. He also states that by the spring of 1939 over 9,000 officers of
the British merchant marine had received instruction in gunnery and in convoy tactics. The statistics in 1
Stephen W. Roskill, The War at Sea, 1939-1945, at 22 (1954) [hereinafter Roskill], disclose that by the end
of 1940 some 3,400 ships had been fitted with low-angle guns for protection against submarines and some
20,000 members of the Royal Navy had been trained to use these "defensive" armaments, as well as a large
number of the members of the merchant crews.
125. 40 T.M.W.C., supra note 70, at 88-89. The British moved to the implementation of paragraph (b)
on 13 June, 1940. Id. at 90. It will be observed that the Handbook assumed that a merchant vessel had a right
to use its arms to resist visit and search and capture by an enemy warship—an action that Churchill had once
said a merchant vessel had no rights to take. See supra text accompanying note 65.
126. 1 William M. Medlicott, The Economic Blockade 113 (1952). On the other hand, it is reported
that until late in 1943 the primary objectives ofBritish submarines were the enemy's surface warships. 1 Roskill,
supra note 124, at 334. However, restrictions on attacks by British submarines on enemy merchant shipping
were relaxed in Norwegian waters in 1940, id. at 172, and were removed in the Mediterranean on February
5, 1941, id. at 439.
127. Karl Doenitz, Memoirs: Ten Years and Twenty Days 35 (1959). For a discussion of the Battle of
the Atlantic and of the convoy system, see Keegan, supra note 86, at 213-65.
128. See infra text accompanying note 149, concerning the convoying of neutral merchant ships. See Frits
Kalshoven, Belligerent Reprisals 139 (1971) where the following appears:
On the other hand, neutral merchant vessels on their way to or from Great Britain in this period
gradually took to sailing under the protection ofthe British navy and air force. Attacks on such escorted
vessels could not be considered unlawful; by the voluntary acceptance of direct armed protection of
one of the belligerents, the vessels in question assumed the character of legitimate objectives for the
armed attacks of the other belligerent.
Afortiori, the same rule would apply to belligerent merchant vessels in convoy. Concerning neutral merchant
vessels in a convoy escorted by neutral warships, see Articles 61 and 62 of the 1909 Declaration of London,
supra note 22, which sets forth the customary rule in this respect. See also Article 64a, Harvard Research, supra
note 81, at 653 and Kyriakides v. Germany, 8 Recueil des Decisions des Tribuneaux Arbitraux Mixtes 349,
summarized in the Harvard Research at 679. In S.S. Hall, Submarine Warfare, 5 Trans. Grot. Soc. 82, 89 (1920),
the author, a Rear Admiral in the Royal Navy, stated that merchantmen in convoys "appear to lose their
non-combatant standing" and that "from the day we [the British] adopted the convoy system the German
submarine campaign became legitimate."
129. Order in Council Restricting Further the Commerce of Germany, November 27, 1939, Stat. R. &
O. 1939, no. 1709. For a full discussion of the contents of this Order and its effect, see Frits Kalshoven, supra
note 128, at 1 18-19. For the reaction of the United States, see the U.S. note British Blockade ofGerman Exports,
1 Dep't St. Bull. 651 (No. 24, December 9, 1939).
130. See supra note 39.
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131. Cmd. 6191, 1940, at 5 (as quoted in Kalshovcn, supra note 128, at 143). The preamble of the Order
in Council asserted violations by Germany of, among others, the 1936 London Submarine Protocol, supra
note 50. One expert in this field points out that at this stage German exports were Government controlled
and that probably the provision of the 1856 Declaration of Paris, supra note 39, did not apply "to the public
interests of the enemy State." Kalshoven, supra note 128, at 143. (A typographical error substituting "to" for
"not" in the original text was corrected by letter from the author, May 25, 1989.)
132. Kalshoven, supra note 128, at 33.
133. 360 Pari. Deb., H.C., 5th Ser., colt 1351. (There has been considerable discussion as to whether
Churchill (and the International Military Tribunal) said, and meant, "night" or "sight"). See, eg., 10 Digest of
International Law 663-64 (M. Whiteman ed., 1968). The Parliamentary reporter recorded it as "night" which
in the context of the sentence, is much more logical than "sight": otherwise the sentence would read "all
German ships by day and all ships by sight").
1 34. "This order went far beyond anything contained in German orders, since it meant that in these waters
from then onward neutral ships sailing with full lights would also be sunk by British submarines." Doenitz,
supra note 127, at 59.
135. 1 T.M.W.C., supra note 70, at 313; Nazi Conspiracy, supra note 105, at 140.
136. German Prize Ordinance, August 28,1939, at 149B.F.S.P. 663. After providing that ships in convoy
had no protection (Article 32), that forcible resistance could be overcome by force (Article 36), and that the
use of the wireless constituted assistance to the enemy (Article 39), the Ordinance stated, in Article 74:
(1) The destruction of vessels in accordance with articles 72 (enemy) and 73 (neutral) is only
permissible if the passengers, the crew and the ship's papers are placed in safety before destruction.
(2) The ship's boats are not deemed to be a place of safety unless under the prevailing conditions
of the sea and weather the safety of the passengers and the crew is assured by the proximity of land or
by the presence of another vessel which is capable of taking them on board.
48. The contents of this article correspond to the London Rules of Submarine Warfare (printed
in the annex). (Note in original.)
The German Navy had proposed a "prohibited area" which would, in effect, have been a "free fire" zone
but this proposal was apparendy rejected at that time. 7 Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945,
at 546, Series D (1956).
137. 7 Fuehrer's Directive No. 2, Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945, at 548, Series D
(1956).
138. Fuehrer's Directive No. 4, Fuehrer's Directives for the Conduct of the War 53, 54 (1947). A British
historian asserts that these decisions "were not issued in any altruistic spirit but in the hope that after Poland
had been crushed, Britain and France—and especially the latter—would make peace. As soon as it was realised
that this hope was vain, removal of the restrictions on the methods of waging war at sea started." 1 Roskill,
supra note 124, at 103. He is undoubtedly correct.
139. 1 Fuehrer Conferences on Matters Dealing with the German Navy 9 (1947).
140. 8 Fuehrer's Directive No. 5, Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945, at 176, 177, Series
D (1954). Fuehrer's Directive No. 7, October 18, 1939, id. at 316, authorized the Navy to "attack enemy
passenger ships which are in a convoy or sailing without lights."
141. In his cross-examination before the International Military Tribunal, Doenitz stated:
If a merchant ship sails without lights, it must run the risk of being taken for a warship, because at
night it is not possible to distinguish between a merchant ship and a warship. At the time the order
was issued, it concerned an operational area in which blacked-out troop transports were traveling from
England to France.
13 T.M.W.C., supra note 70, at 357.
142. See supra notes 102 and 103. See also Doenitz's testimony before the International Military Tribunal,
13 T.M.W.C, supra note 70, at 253.
143. The Athenia, a passenger vessel, had been torpedoed without warning by a German U-boat on
September 4, 1939. The Germans denied that its sinking had resulted from the action of a German U-boat
and accused Churchill ofhaving ordered a British submarine to sink the vessel in order to stir up feeling against
Germany. When German officials learned that the Athenia had, indeed, been the victim of a German torpedo
they continued to deny this and it was not until after the war had ended that the truth was learned. 1 T.M.W.C,
supra note 70, at 316; Nazi Conspiracy, supra note 105, at 143.
144. In 2 George Schwarzenberger, International Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals
433 (1968), the following apt statement appears:
It is always possible to maintain legal continuity on this issue [warfare at sea] by explaining the
departures from the traditional law by way of reprisals and counter-reprisals. At least in the relations
between the belligerents, this type of argument can claim a modicum of formal validity. In substance,
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however, reasoning on these lines merely hides a breakdown of the law and the resumption by
belligerents at sea of an almost complete freedom of action.
145. Karl Doenitz, supra note 127, at 58-59. The International Military Tribunal had found more or less
to the same effect. 1 T.M.W.C., supra note 70, at 311-12; Nazi Conspiracy, supra note 105, at 138-139.
Compare the enumeration of events leading to unrestricted warfare by Germany during World War II which
appears in 1 Roskill, supra note 124, at 103-104.
146. In Mallison, supra note 41, at 66-67, the author takes the position that "the actual British blockade
methods [such as including food on the list ofcontraband] also provided adequatejustification for the submarine
operational zones as a legitimate reprisal."
147. Frits Kalshoven, supra note 128, at 128. In his testimony before the International Military Tribunal
Doenitz said:
It is a matter of course that if a ship has a gun on board she will use it. It would have been a
one-sided obligation if the submarine, in a suicidal way, were then to wait until the other ship fired
the first shot. That is a reciprocal agreement, and one cannot in any circumstances expect the submarine
to wait until it gets hit first. And as I have said before, in practice the steamers used their guns as soon
as they came within range.
13 T.M.W.C, supra note 70, at 360.
148. See, e.g., Edwin I. Nwogugu, Submarine Warfare, The Law of Naval Warfare 358-59 (N. Ronzitti
ed., 1988) [hereinafter Nwogugu]. See also Robert W. Tucker, 50 International Law Studies 68 (1957). There
does not appear to have been any dispute that merchant vessels, armed or unarmed, sailing in a convoy under
the protection of warships, were beyond the ambit of the Protocol, even though the British did attempt to
entice neutral ships into their convoys by claiming that such action "affords neutral merchant vessels greater
protection and does not signify a breach of neutrality" and the Germans disagreed. 8 Documents on German
Foreign Policy, 1918-1945, at 319-20, Series D (1954).
149. U.S. Department of the Navy, The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations
(NWP 9), 1987, para. 8.2.2.2. [hereinafter Commander's Handbook].
150. Joint Resolution to Preserve the Neutrality and Peace of the United States etc., November 4, 1939,
54 Stat. 4; 34 Am. J. Int'l. L. 44, 51 (Supp. 1940).
151. Presidential Proclamation of November 4, 1939, Use of Ports or Territorial Waters of the United States
by Submarines of Foreign Belligerent States, 54 Stat. 2672 (1939); 1 Dep't St. Bull. 456 (No. 19, November 4,
1939); International Law Situations 1939, at 48 (Paul S. Wild ed., 1940).
152. Edwin Borchard, supra note 60, at 107. He pointed out that these ships were far more powerful than
their World War I predecessors as they carried four six-inch guns, mounted fore and aft. See supra text
accompaning note 65.
153. Presidential Proclamation ofNovember 4, 1939, Definition of Combat Areas, 54 Stat. 2673 (1939); 1
Dep't St. Bull. 454-55 (No. 19, November 4, 1939); 1939 International Law Situations, supra note 151, at
146. Germany urged other neutrals to designate a similar zone.
154. 13 T.M.W.C, supra note 70, at 365. One author goes even further, asserting that: "There is no
logical difference between the merchant ship on the one hand and the railroad train or the factory on the
other." Alex A. Kerr, supra note 77, at 1108.
155. 13 T.M.W.C, supra note 70, at 367. Later answers indicated that he was referring to the provisions
ofArticle 16 of the 1907 Hague Convention No. X for the Adaptation to Maritime Warfare of the Principles
of the Geneva Convention, signed at The Hague, October 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2371; 2 Am. J. Int'l. L. 153
(Supp. 1908); Schindler/Toman, supra note 18, at 313.
156. 1 T.M.W.C. supra note 70, at 312-13; Nazi Conspiracy, supra note 105, at 139.
157. Another argument criticizing the Tribunal's logic on this matter will be found in Mallison, supra
note 41, at 80, where the author points out:
There is no indication that the Tribunal gave careful consideration to the alternative interpretation
that the Protocol was inapplicable in operational areas since there was no international agreement on
this subject. Such an interpretation was advanced by Kranzbuhler [Doenitz's defense attorney] and it
is at the very least as plausible as the interpretation selected by the Tribunal. It is more plausible if the
operational area is evaluated as too important to be dealt with by implication.
The authors of two post-war studies of submarine warfare both recommend the affirmative legalization of
"war zones" or "operational zones." Alex A. Kerr, supra note 77, at 1 109; and Barnes, supra note 14, at 197-98.
158. See, e.g., the testimony of Admiral Gerhard Wagner, 13 T.M.W.C. supra note 70, at 453. See also
supra the text accompanying note 36.
159. 13 T.M.W.C. supra note 70, at 281-95; James McMillan, Five Men at Nuremberg 181-85 (1985).
160. 35 T.M.W.C. supra note 70, at 270.
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161. Judgment of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, November 4-12, 1948, at 1072-73
(mimeo, n.d.) [hereinafter Judgment]; 1 The Tokyo Judgment 412 (B.V.A. Roling & C.F. Ruter eds., 1977)
[hereinafter The Tokyo Judgment]. It was definitely implemented by the Japanese. Judgment, 1073-74; The
Tokyo Judgment, supra.
162. 1 T.M.W.C., supra note 70, at 313; Nazi Conspiracy, supra note 105, at 139-40. Concerning the
Laconia order, one analysis states:
The ambiguity of the order apparently was considered to stem from an uncertainty as to whether
its intent was only to forbid submarine commanders from making any attempt to rescue survivors or
was intended to enjoin them deliberately to kill survivors. The International Military Tribunal seemed
to have been of the opinion that if the former interpretation was intended the order was a lawful one.
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The 1977 Protocol I and The United States
38 Saint Louis University LawJournal 469 (1993)
The failure of previous United States Administrations to send the 1977
Protocol I to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification by the
President was both a political and a military decision. Accordingly, it is possible,
but unlikely, that different action will be taken by the Clinton Administration.
Why, then, does the United States object to the provisions of this law-of-war
treaty, the purpose of the drafting ofwhich was to fill in the lacunae which had
admittedly been found to exist in the Regulations Attached to the 1907 Hague
Convention No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land (1907 Hague
Regulations on Land Warfare) and in the four 1949 Geneva Conventions? True,
the United States has stated that it considers itselfbound by the rules contained
in the 1977 Protocol I which, represent customary international law—but only to
the extent that they reflect customary international law as determined by United
States legal advisers.
A review of the provisions of the 1977 Protocol /labeled as objectionable by
officials of the United States in informal presentations will quickly demonstrate
that there are actually no overpowering reasons to object to the vast majority of
those provisions. The finding ofa need for two dozen or more reservations and
two dozen or more understandings (as reported to have been demanded by the
Joint Chiefs of Staff) can only have resulted from "nitpicking." While there
are unquestionably some really objectionable provisions, these could very easily
be taken care of at the time of ratification. Other provisions may not be worded
exacdy as the United States would have desired, but this is not a valid reason for
a reservation or an understanding unless the objectionable wording results in an
ambiguous or unintended or unwanted meaning—and such instances are rare.
President Reagan's statement in his message to the Senate that "Protocol I is
fundamentally and irreconcilably flawed" was a gross overstatement ofthe facts,
resulting from overreaction to a very small group of provisions on one subject
which, concededly, were flawed.
Because the document containing the specific objections to the 1977 Protocol
/registered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff is still classified, we must have recourse
to other sources in order to ascertain what at least some of those objections may
be. This information we have, to an abbreviated extent, in the letter from the
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Secretary ofState to the President submitting the 1977 Protocol //for transmission
to the Senate, and in more detail in presentations made at various meetings by
representatives of the Department of State and of the Department of Defense.
Presumably, the objections stated by these officials are the major reasons for the
non-ratification of the Protocol by the United States.
To begin at the beginning, certainly the Preamble of the 1977 Protocol lis
clear and concise and leaves nothing to interpretation. After three paragraphs
which, in sum, point out that the fact that the international community has
drafted rules applicable during the course of international armed conflict in no
manner legitimizes aggression or the threat or use of force, there appears a
substantive provision which states that such rules
must be applied in all circumstances to all persons who are protected by those
instruments, without any adverse distinction based on the nature or origin of the armed
TO
conflict or on the causes espoused by or attributed to the Parties to the conflict.
The importance of this statement cannot be overemphasized as it definitely lays
to rest the "just war" doctrine espoused by some nations, including, particularly,
a number ofThird World nations as well as the nations which were Communist
at that time period, under which the humanitarian law ofwar would be binding
upon the "aggressor," always the enemy, while it would not be binding upon
the victim of aggression, always oneself. The United States has expressed no
objection to the Preamble which, in fact, states a proposition to which the United
States has long adhered: that the provisions of the humanitarian law of war are
equally applicable to both sides in any international conflict, no matter what the
cause alleged.
The United States objects strongly and, in the opinion ofthis author, properly
so, to Article 1(4) of 1977 Protocol I. In addition to being objectionable in
itself, that article lays the foundation for other objectionable provisions of the
Protocol. The troublesome material in Article 1(4) reads as follows:
The situations referred to in the preceding paragraph include armed conflicts in
which people are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and
against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination. ..."
Obviously, this provision refers to civil conflicts, i.e., internal conflicts, which
have always heretofore been considered to be governed by national law, not
international law, except insofar as Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva
Conventions may be said to govern civil conflicts—something that rebels have
heretofore steadfasdy denied, or disregarded. Moreover, as we shall see, with its
implementation by Article 44(3), the provision places members of so-called
national liberation movements in a status superior to that of all other
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combatants—exactly the end sought by its progenitors, but scarcely one
acceptable to nations which believe that all legal combatants should be protected
equally.
Article 9 of the 1874 Project ofan International Declaration Concerning the Laws
and Customs of War established four requirements for an individual to be
considered a legal combatant: He must (1) be commanded by a person
responsible for his subordinates; (2) wear a fixed distinctive emblem recognizable
at a distance; (3) carry his arms openly; and (4) conduct military operations in
14
accordance with the laws and customs of war. These requirements were
restated in Article 1 of the Regulations Attached to the 1899 Hague Convention No.
II with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land (1899 Hague Regulations
1 s
on Land Warfare); they were stated again in Article 1 of the 1907 Hague
Regulations on Land Warfare; they were incorporated by reference in Article
1(1) of the 1929 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War
(1929 Geneva Prisoner of War Convention); and they were again restated in the
first three 1949 Geneva Conventions. Despite this continuous acceptance of
these four requirements by the international community for over a century, the
1977 Diplomatic Conference saw fit to discard them for the sole purpose of
giving additional protection to members of national liberation movements.
Article 43(1) of the 1977 Protocol I follows the foregoing historical precedent
to the extent that it requires the armed forces of a party to a conflict to have a
responsible commander and to enforce the law of war, even if that party does
not recognize the government or authority of the adverse party. However,
Article 44(3), which implements the objectionable Article 1(4) of the Protocol,
has the effect ofrelieving members ofnational liberation movements from those
requirements, as well as from others. It is here that the main United States.... 19
objection to the Protocol lies—and, admittedly, not without justification.
In a lengthy analysis of these provisions written some years ago, this author
concluded:
To summarize, paragraph 3 of Article 44 requires combatants (as defined in
Article 43) to distinguish themselves from the civilian population "while they are
engaged in an attack or in a military operation preparatory to an attack." They
will fulfill that requirement if they carry their arms openly (a) during an actual
military engagement and (b) when visible to the enemy while in the course of a
military deployment preliminary to an attack. This appears to mean that these
combatants may merge with the crowd, weapons concealed, until they are about
to attack, at which time they move out of the crowd, disclose their weapons, and
begin their attack.
There seems little doubt but that the provisions of paragraph 3 of Article 44
20
will increase the dangers to the civilian population.
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Paragraph 4 of Article 44 provides that even if an individual fails to meet the
limited requirements just mentioned and is, therefore, not entided to prisoner
ofwar status, he is entided to all of the protection available to a prisoner of war,
including those relating to any trial and punishment. With this there can be no
quarrel. It merely ensures what any civilized nation would certainly provide: fair
treatment of the captured person prior to trial for his alleged criminal acts and
a trial with all the safeguards required for such a trial to be fair.
The United States also seems to object to the provisions of Article 44(2) of
the 1977 Protocol /which provide, in effect, that a combatant who has violated
22
the law ofwar is nevertheless entided to prisoner ofwar status ifcaptured. But
there is nothing novel about that provision. Article 85 ofthe 1949 Third Geneva
Convention, to which the United States is a party, as is practically every other
member of the international community, specifically provides that prisoners of
war prosecuted for pre-capture offenses (violations of the law of war) "shall
23
retain, even if convicted, the benefits of the present Convention." There is
no basis for the statement that this paragraph ofthe Protocol provides that "once
a group qualifies as a national liberation movement protected by article 1(4), no
conduct by members of the group can lead to the loss of its status as a protected
organization." No place in the Protocol will there be found any provision for
"qualifying" a group. Like Article 85 of the 1949 Third Geneva Convention,
Article 44(2) of the 1977 Protocol I merely provides that pre-capture violations
of the law of war will not affect an individual's right to the status of being a
prisoner of war—it does not prevent his captor from trying him and, if he is
convicted, from punishing him for any pre-capture violation ofthe law ofwar.
Moreover, rather surprisingly, that paragraph excepts from its coverage those
individuals who have not complied with the provisions ofArticle 44(3) and (4).
This means that the member of the national liberation movement who fails to
carry his arms openly during a military engagement or during a military
deployment prior to an attack is not entided to prisoner ofwar status. (However,
under Article 44(4) he is, nevertheless, entided to all the protections to which
a prisoner of war is entided, so this appears to be a distinction without a
difference.)
In his presentation, the Legal Adviser of the Department of State emphasized
his position that the provisions just cited have the effect of "granting terrorist
groups protection as combatants.'" There is no basis for such reasoning.
Terrorists do not engage in "war" or in "armed conflict" as those terms are
understood in either national or international law. They engage in isolated
criminal acts. Terrorists do not have "an internal disciplinary system which, inter
alia, shall enforce compliance with the rules of international law applicable in
armed conflict" as required by Article 43(1). Any law is anathema to them.
Terrorists do not participate in the "military engagement" or in the "military
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deployment" specified in Article 44(3). They engage in hit-and-run or blind
operations primarily against the civilian population. While members of
national liberation movements may, and frequendy do, engage in acts of
terrorism, when they do so and are thereafter captured they may legally be
compelled to answer for such criminal acts, just as the uniformed soldier who
commits the identical acts may be compelled to answer for his criminal acts.
Terrorists may claim that they are entitled to prisoner of war status when.27
captured, but their claims are rarely, if ever, recognized. Statements to be
28
found in the opinion of the United States District Court in the Lopez case,
the only relevant case of those cited by the Legal Adviser, are typical of the
findings to be expected from courts on this issue. The court there said:
There is no evidence in the record that defendant was a member ofan organized
military force which had a tribunal established for punishing violations ofthe rules
and regulations of that force. To the extent that defendant is a member of any
organization, this court can take judicial notice of the fact that that organization
exists at least in part for the purpose of violating criminal statutes of the United
States and that therefore such violations would conform to rather than violate the
rules and principles of that organization.... There is no logic to the argument that
an organization can be created for the purpose of violating the laws of this nation
and overthrowing its government and at the same time declare its members to be
exempt from prosecution for violation of the criminal laws of that same country,
29
the United States of America.
With the changes that have occurred in the political world since 1977, it is
doubtful that many states which are party to the Protocol would find it necessary
to take issue with a reservation to those few paragraphs of the Protocol
mentioned above ifsuch reservation were made by the United States at the time
of ratification. Moreover, if a few parties did object and announced that they
would not consider themselves bound by the Protocol vis-a-vis the United
States, such action would be of little moment—and the United States would be
in a better position with respect to the vast majority of parties and no worse off
with respect to the few objectors. Of course, politically such an action would
be a clear rebuff to the national liberation movements which have uncontrolled
terrorist wings. But these are now few in number and the United States could
30
live with that.
Part II of the 1977 Protocol lis entitled "Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked"
31
and does not appear to present any problems for the United States. However,
in Part III, "Methods and Means of Warfare; Combatant and Prisoner ofWar
Status," objections are encountered, in addition to those already mentioned in
connection with the discussion ofArticles 1(4) and 44. Some of these objections
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present real problems, while others do not. The first objection relates to the
provisions of Article 35(3), which state:
3. It is prohibited to employ methods or means of warfare which are intended, or
may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural
32
environment.
As to this provision, an official of the United States has said that it is "too broad
33
and ambiguous and is not a part of customary law."' If it is truly ambiguous,
certainly action should be taken to remove any ambiguity. But is it ambiguous?
The United States and the larger part of the international community are parties
to the Environmental Modification Convention which includes the following
provision:
1. Each State Party to this Convention undertakes not to engage in military or
any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques having
widespread, long-lasting or severe effects as the means of destruction, damage or
injury to any other State Party.
In the first place, it should be noted that this latter provision, accepted by the
United States, is drafted in the disjunctive, and is, therefore, even broader than
that contained in Article 35(3) of the 1977 Protocol, which is drafted in the
conjunctive. In the second place, when this provision was drafted, the drafting
conference included "understandings" with respect to each of the three
descriptive adjectives used. They said:
It is the understanding ofthe Committee that, for the purposes ofthis Convention,
the terms "widespread," "long-lasting" and "severe" shall be interpreted as
follows:
(a) "widespread": encompassing an area on the scale of several hundred square
kilometres;
(b) "long-lasting": lasting for a period of months, or approximately a season;
(c) "severe": involving serious or significant disruption or harm to human life,
natural and economic resources or other assets.
While, of course, the understandings refer to those words as used in the
Environmental Modification Convention, it would be extremely difficult for any
state which is a party to the 1977 Protocol I to assert that the words so defined
had a different meaning in the Protocol; and it is rare, indeed, for the
international community to have the benefit of agreed definitions of words of
art included in an international convention. The conclusion is inescapable that
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the United States has no valid reason for objecting to the substance or to the
wording of Article 35(3) of the 1911 Protocol I.
The next provision to which objection is made is Article 39(2) which states:
2. It is prohibited to make use ofthe flags or military emblems, insignia or uniforms
of adverse Parties while engaging in attacks or in order to shield, favour, protect
37
or impede military operations.
Concerning this provision the statement is made that "we [the United States]
do not support the prohibition in article 39 of the use of enemy emblems and
uniforms during military operations." To say that the objection to this
provision by the United States is astonishing is an understatement. The following
has been the official policy of the United States since as long ago as 1863:
63. Troops who fight in the uniform of their enemies, without any plain, striking,
and uniform mark of distinction of their own, can expect no quarter.
65. The use ofthe enemy's national standard, flag, or other emblem ofnationality,
for the purpose of deceiving the enemy in battle, is an act of perfidy by which
39
they lose all claim to the protection of the laws of war.
Article 23 (f ) ofboth the 1899 and the 1901 Hague Regulations on Land Warfare
prohibits "the improper use" of the enemy uniform or insignia, and a current
field manual of the United States Army interprets that term as meaning that "[i]t
is certainly forbidden to employ them in combat, but their use at other times is.41
not forbidden." Wearing enemy uniforms "while engaging in attacks" would
unquestionably fall within that manual's prohibition; and war crimes trials for
the use ofenemy uniforms in non-battle military operations were conducted in
42 43
wars prior to World War I and in World War II. Finally, as noted above,
one of the four requirements to be a legal combatant has uniformly been "the
44
wearing of a fixed distinctive emblem, recognizable at a distance"; and the
removal of that requirement by Article 44(3) of the 1911 Protocoll is one of the
major objections voiced by the United States to that instrument.
The next provision of the 1911 Protocol I to which objection is expressed is
Article 47, which, in effect, denies humanitarian protection to most mercenaries.
Why the United States should take up the cudgel on behalf of mercenaries is
somewhat of a mystery, unless it fears that attempts might be made to place
foreign military advisers and technicians in the category of mercenaries, despite
the fact that they do not fall within the definition ofmercenaries set forth in that
article. Moreover, there is a general belief, apparendy entertained even by its
sponsor, Nigeria, that the article will have little, if any, effect. ' The objection
made by the United States is apparently not directed at the substance of the
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provision, or from a desire to protect mercenaries, but at the fact that it is another
instance of politicizing the 1977 Protocol I in favor of national liberation
48
movements. This provision of 1977 Protocol /is, of course, the other side of
the coin with respect to national liberation movements: full protection to
members ofnational liberation movements no matter to what extent they violate
the law of war; no protection to those who oppose national liberation
movements even if they comply with the law of war.
Objection is made to Article 51 (6) which prohibits attacks against the civilian
population by way of reprisal. While there is much to be said for the use of
reprisals as a method of compelling the adverse party who is violating the
humanitarian law of war to return to compliance with that law, there is also
much to be said in favor of prohibiting reprisals against certain categories of
individuals, including the civilian population. The United States is a party to the
1 929 Geneva Prisoner ofWar Convention, Article 2(3) ofwhich prohibits reprisals
against prisoners of war; and it is a party to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the
first three ofwhich include provisions prohibiting reprisals against the wounded
and sick on land, against the wounded, sick and shipwrecked at sea, and
52 -53
against prisoners ofwar. Article 33 of the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention,
prohibits reprisals against persons protected by that convention, all ofwhom are
members of civilian populations but whose categories are limited in number
(primarily the civilian populations of occupied territories), and, in particular,
does not include the civilian populations of the belligerents in their home
territories. There does not appear to be any great difference between the
wounded and sick and prisoners of war and the civilian population. All three
categories are persons who are no longer, or were never, combatants. However,
the United States' position would appear to be based on the belief that only the
fear of the reprisal bombing of its own civilian population might serve as a basis
for dissuading an enemy from bombing the civilian population of the United
States—and there is considerable merit to that belief. The bombing of civilian
populations in Europe by both sides during World War II, claimed by both sides
to be reprisals, caused innumerable deaths and created devastation which
probably contributed to extending the duration of the hostilities. Here, mixed
military-humanitarian reasons might well warrant a reservation to this provision.
(It is worthy of note that no other objection was voiced to Article 51, paragraph
2 of which prohibits making the civilian population the subject of attack or the
threat of attack, and paragraphs 4 and 5 ofwhich prohibit indiscriminate attacks,
including target area bombing.)
For military reasons the United States objects to the provisions of Article
56(1), which prohibits attacks on
1977 Protocol I 347
[w]orks or installations containing dangerous forces, namely dams, dykes and
nuclear electrical generating stations, . . . if such attack may cause the release of
55
dangerous forces and consequent severe losses among the civilian population.
The Legal Adviser ofthe Department ofState has indicated his beliefthat "under
this article, civilian losses are not to be balanced against the military value of the
target."' In other words, it is his position that this provision disregards the
longstanding principle of proportionality and prohibits the attack if there are to
be "severe" civilian losses no matter how important the target may be from a
57
military point of view. Accepting this as a valid possible construction of the
provision, the United States could, upon ratification, merely "understand" that,
as in other applicable cases, the principle of proportionality would apply in
balancing the "severe" losses against the military advantage.
The Legal Adviser of the Department of State further points out that during
the drafting of this provision a United States representative had called attention
59
to the difference between this prohibition and current international law. The
statement made by the United States representative indicated that his primary
concern and the main thrust of his argument was not that the progress of
international humanitarian law was removing from the category of military
objectives installations which had previously been within that category, a
procedure that has occurred with some degree of regularity during the past
century (medical and religious personnel and units, military hospitals, hospital
ships, civilian hospitals, medical aircraft, museums, places of worship, and
cultural objects have all received this special protection), but that these specially
protected installations might be used "as a cover to obtain military advantage."
One cannot help but conclude that the military decision to object to this
provision may well be based on the experience in North Vietnam where, when
it became apparent that for humanitarian reasons the United States would not
bomb the dikes, these became havens for reserve fuel supplies and anti-aircraft
artillery weapons. While Article 56(2) attempts to eliminate this problem by
setting forth with particularity the circumstances which will result in the
cessation of the special protection, it must be admitted that there are some
loopholes in that paragraph of which a lawless belligerent could avail itself.
However, the adverse party could also take advantage of the language of these
provisions as a legal basis for asserting that the known facts warrant the cessation
of the special protection accorded to these objects. (One objection made to
Article 56(2) is to the distinction between the stated manner in which a dam or
dike loses its protection and the stated manner in which a nuclear power plant
loses it protection. Understandably, in view of its projected effect, the latter
is more restrictive.)
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The United States complains that Article 5 (Protecting Powers) and Article
90 (International Fact-Finding Commission) do not go far enough because in
both cases the consent of the parties to the conflict is required and all of the
Communist countries have been adamant in refusing to allow any foreign or
international body to operate or investigate on their territories. " This was a
valid complaint when made, but is it still valid? And although Article 5 does not
go as far as one might have wished, it does go a bit further in the right direction
than its predecessors in the 1949 Geneva Conventions. ' The provisions ofArticle
90 for an International Fact-Finding Commission are novel and offer great
potential even though the "non-law-abiding" nations will unquestionably
decline to permit the Commission to function in their territories. Once again,
although Article 90 does not go as far as one might have wished by making the
competence of the Commission compulsory for all parties, it does represent a
considerable advance in the methods ofenforcing the humanitarian law ofwar.
Moreover, it has been so successful that already more than the required twenty
parties have filed the requisite statement recognizing the competence of the
Commission, and the Commission has been established.
It is believed that from the foregoing it can be seen that the few valid
objections of the United States to the 1977 Protocol I do not justify the refusal
by the executive branch to send it to the Senate for its advice and consent to
ratification. Rather than dozens of reservations and understandings, only a very
few are required in order for the United States to remove from the Protocol,
insofar as it is concerned, those provisions which it considers as politicizing that
instrument, as well as the few provisions for which there are valid military
objections. The United States can then join the more than one hundred other
members of the international community who are already parties to the 1977
Protocol I.
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U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention]. These Conventions are also reprinted in
Schindler & Toman, supra note 1, at 373, 401, 423, and 495, respectively. See generally Levie, Terrorism,
supra note 1
.
4. Michael J. Matheson, The United States Position on the Relation of Customary International Law to the
1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 2 Am. U.J. Intl L. & Pol'Y 419, 420 (1987). In his
presentation, Matheson, Deputy Legal Adviser ofthe Department ofState, specifically affirmed that the United
States "supported" the following articles: 5, 10, 11, 12-20, 21-23, 24-31, 32, 33, 34, 35(1)(2), 37, 38, 44 (a
few parts), 45, 51 (except paragraph 6), 52, 54, 57-60, 62, 63, 70, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80-85, and 86-89.
Specific objections were stated with respect to Articles 1(4), 35(3), 39(2), 47, 55, and 56 by Matheson and
other government officials. There is a passing mention ofArticle 90. No mention is made of the other articles
of the Protocol.
5. See Howard Levie, Pros and Cons of the 1977 Protocol I, 19 Akron L. Rev. 537 (1986) [hereinafter
Levie, Pros and Cons] (discussing some of the "good" and "bad" provisions of 1977 Protocol I).
6. A good example of "nit-picking" is the objection made to Article 16, that it "establishes such a high
level of protection for medical activities that it would protect the operation of clandestine hospitals in guerrilla
warfare situations." Burras M. Carnahan, Customary International Law Relative to the Conduct of Hostilities and
the Protection of Civilian Population in International Armed Conflict, 2 Am. U.J. Intl L. & Pol'Y 505, 509 (1987)
[hereinafter Carnahan, Customary International Law]. In other words, the doctor who treats a sick or wounded
guerrilla should be considered as having committed an illegal act; and the wounded or sick guerrilla patient
should not enjoy the protection of the confidentiality of the physician-patient relationship which is otherwise
universally applied, even with respect to the most vicious criminal.
7. President's Message to the Senate Transmitting Protocol II, 1987 Pub. Papers 88. This message was
unusual in that it set forth the reasons why an international convention signed by the United States (the 1977
Protocol I) was not being sent to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification. Nevertheless, it "invite[d]
an expression of the sense of the Senate that it shares this view." Id. To date the Senate has not accepted the
invitation, nor has it acted on the 1977 Protocol II.
8. Abraham D. Sofaer, The Position of the United States on Current Law of War Agreements, 2 Am. U. J.
Intl L. & Pol'Y 460 (1987) [hereinafter Sofaer, Position]. Judge Sofaer, Legal Advisor to the U.S. Department
of State also wrote the following article: Abraham D. Sofaer, Agora: The U.S. Decision Not to Ratify Protocol I
to the Geneva Conventions on the Protection of War Victims (Cont'd), 82 Am. J. Intl L. 784 (1988) [hereinafter
Sofaer, Agora]. For the presentation made by Michael J. Matheson, Deputy Legal Adviser of the Department
of State, see Matheson, supra note 4. For the presentation made by Douglas J. Feith, the Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Negotiations Policy, see Douglas J. Feith, Protocol I: Moving Humanitarian Law
Backwards, 19 AKRON L. Rev. 531 (1986) [hereinafter Feith]. Feith had previously published the following
article: Douglas J. Feith, Law in the Service of Terrorism
—The Strange Case ofthe Additional Protocol, 1 National
Interest 36 (Fall 1985). For some of the remarks made by Lieutenant Colonel Burras M. Carnahan, USAF,
a legal officer on the Staffof the Joint Chiefs of Staff, see Carnahan, Customary International Law, supra note 6;
see also Burras M. Carnahan, Additional Protocol I: A Military View, 19 Akron L. Rev. 543 (1986) (this article
includes a disclaimer statement).
9. Articles in support of the 1977 Protocol /include, among others, one by Ambassador George Aldrich,
the head of the United States Delegation at the Diplomatic Conference, see George Aldrich, New Lifefor the
Laws of War, 75 Am. J. INTL L. 764 (1981); one by Waldemar A. Solf, a member of the U.S. Delegation, see
Waldemar A. Solf, A Response to DouglasJ. Feith's Law in the Service of Terror—The Strange Case ofthe Additional
Protocol, 20 Akron L. PvEV. 261 (1986); and one by Hans-Peter Gasser, Legal Adviser to the Directorate,
International Committee of the Red Cross, see Hans-Peter Gasser, An Appealfor Ratification by the United States,
81 Am.
J. Intl L. 912 (1987). Regarding the latter article, Abraham Sofaer states that Gasser assumes "that
the United States is somehow obligated to ratify or accede to 1977 Protocol /simply because it was adopted
by the Geneva Conference." Sofaer, Agora, supra note 8, at 784. However, no facts or arguments are presented
which support that conclusion.
10. 1977 Protocol I, supra note 1, preamble, 16 I.L.M. at 1391 (emphasis added).
11. This matter is mentioned here, despite the fact that the Preamble is not the subject of objection by
the United States, because it is occasionally hinted by opponents to ratification of the 1977 Protocol I that some
of its provisions condone the just war doctrine. See, e.g., Feith, supra note 8, at 532.
12. No objection is stated to Article 1(1), (2), and (3). Paragraphs (1) and (3) of that article merely restate
provisions ofthe 1949 Geneva Conventions, see supra note 3, and paragraph (2) restates the DeMartens Clause
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which originated in the Preamble to the 1899 Hague Convention No. 11 with Respect to the Laws and
Customs of War on Land, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803; see also 1 Bevans, supra note 2, at 247; Schindler &
Toman, supra note 1, at 63; Levie, Terrorism, supra note 1, at 17, 152, 366, 457, 492.
13. The United States has ratified the International Convention Against the Taking ofHostages, Dec. 17,
1979, T.I.A.S. No. 11,081, at 2-3, 18 I.L.M. 1456. See also Levie, Terrorism, supra note 1, at 247, 306.
Article 12 of this Convention states:
[T]he present Convention shall not apply to an act ofhostage-taking committed in the course ofarmed
conflicts as defined in the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Protocols thereto, including armed
conflicts mentioned in article 1, paragraph 4 of Additional Protocol I of 1977 ....
Id. at 10. In other words, the United States has agreed that the doctrine of aut punire, aut dedire (punish or
extradite) contained in that Convention will not apply to members of national liberation movements who
take hostages, leaving that problem to the provisions ofthe 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1977 Additional
Protocols. See supra notes 1,3. Article 147 ofthe 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention makes the taking ofhostages
a grave breach of that instrument with no exclusions. See supra note 3.
14. August 27, 1874, 65 British Foreign and State Papers 1005 [hereinafter 1874 Declaration of
Brussels]; see also Levie, TERRORISM, supra note 1, at 17, 444; Schindler & Toman, supra note 1, at 28; 1 The
Law of War: A Documentary History 194 (L. Friedman ed., 1972) [hereinafter Friedman]. Obviously,
the uniformed member of the armed forces of a nation normally meets all of these requirements. On occasion,
as an individual he will fail to meet the fourth requirement, and this will warrant his trial and punishment by
his own force, if it is well-disciplined, or by the enemy, if he is thereafter captured.
15. See supra note 12.
16. See supra note 2.
17. July 27, 1929, 47 Stat. 2021, T.S. No. 846 [hereinafter 1929 Geneva Prisoner ofWar Convention];
see abo 2 Bevans, supra note 2, at 932; 118 L.N.T.S. 343; 27 Am. J. Intl. L. (Supp.) 59 (1933); Schindler &
Toman, supra note 1, at 339; see generally Levie, TERRORISM, supra note 1.
18. See 1949 First Geneva Convention, supra note 3, art. 13(2); 1949 Second Geneva Convention, supra
note 3, art. 13(2); 1949 Third Geneva Convention, supra note 3, art. 4(2).
19. Strangely, the United States delegation voted in favor of Article 44 in its totality in Committee HI.
15 Official Rjecords, supra note 1, at 155; 2 Howard S. Levie, Protection of War Victims 485, 486
(1980) [hereinafter Levie, Protection]. The United States delegation later gave an explanation of its vote.
15 Official Records, supra note 1, at 169, 179; 2 Levie, Protection, id., at 505-06.
20. Howard S. Levie, Prisoners of War Under the 1977 Protocol I, 23 Akron L. Rev. 55, 64 (1989).
21. The United States "supports" Article 75 of the 1977 Protocol I, which sets forth the "Fundamental
Guarantees" to which a person in the custody of the adverse party is entided. Matheson, supra note 4, at
427-28.
22. Sofaer, Position, supra note 8, at 465-66.
23. The cited provisions of both of these instruments are international actions intended to establish an
international rule contrary to the rule enunciated in the case of In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1946),
which held that the provisions for the trial of prisoners of war set forth in the 1929 Geneva Prisoner ofWar
Convention, see supra note 17, only applied to post-capture offenses. The Soviet Union and all of the other
Communist states of the time made a reservation to Article 85 of the 1949 Third Geneva Convention, see supra
note 3, under which the individual ceased to have those benefits once he had been finally convicted.
24. Of course, the individual who has prisoner ofwar status will have to be tried by the court that would
be authorized to try members of the captor's armed forces—usually a court-martial—but that should present
no great problem; and the terrorist, who has no military standing, would continue to be tried by civilian courts.
See infra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
25. Sofaer, Position, supra note 8, at 467. Douglas J. Feith, then the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Negotiations Policy, Department of Defense, labelled the 1977 Protocol I "a pro-terrorist treaty that calls
itself humanitarian law." Feith, supra note 8, at 534. This is because of two paragraphs of two articles of a
convention containing ninety-one substantive articles, many ofwhich include numerous numbered paragraphs!
26. Article 51(2) of the 1977 Protocol I provides:
The civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be the object of attack. Acts
or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population
are prohibited.
1977 Protocol I, supra note 1, art. 51(2), 16 I.L.M. at 1413. This provision prohibits the main activity of
terrorists—the time bomb left in public places.
27. The cases cited by Sofaer, Position, supra note 8, at 465 n.136, merely indicate that when captured
some terrorists claim that they are entitled to prisoner of war status—a claim not sustained by the courts.
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Manuel Noriega asserted and was granted prisoner of war status by the United States, but he surrendered
during the course of armed conflict in Panama.
28. United States v. Oscar Lopez, No. 80 CR 736-4 (N.D. 111. July 14, 1981) (LEXIS, Genfed library,
Dist file).
29. Id.
30. Fear has been expressed that the position of the United States would be viewed as "imperialist," or
"racist." Sofaer, Position, supra note 8, at 470. While it would undoubtedly be so denominated by a few nations,
it is extremely doubtful that this would have a momentous effect in the present era.
31. See, e.g., Matheson, supra note 4, at 423-24; but see supra note 6.
32. For some reason the Diplomatic Conference elected to include in the 1977 Protocol /provisions for
the protection of the natural environment in two separate articles, Article 35(3) and Article 55(1). While the
two provisions are worded somewhat differently, their substance and intent are the same. See 1977 Protocol I,
supra note 1, art. 35(3), 55(1), 16 I.L.M. at 1408, 1415. Matheson refers to, but does not discuss, Article 55(1)
in his presentation, perhaps because he considers the criticism ofArticle 35(3) to be equally applicable to Article
55(1). See Matheson, supra note 4, at 424.
33. Matheson, supra note 4, at 424. It is interesting to note that the wording of that paragraph was based
on a proposal made by the Rapporteur of Committee III, who was the head of the United States Delegation,
2 Levie, Protection, supra note 19, at 271, and that the United States delegation made no objection to the
paragraph either after it was adopted in Committee III, 14 OFFICIAL Records, supra note 1, at 408-14; 2
Levie, Protection, supra note 19, at 273-75, or after it was adopted by the Plenary Meeting, 6 Official
Records, supra note 1, at 99-101, 113-18; 2 Levie, Protection, supra note 19, at 277-80. Presumably, he
had been authorized to propose this wording.
34. Convention on the Prohibition ofMilitary or Any Other Hostile Use ofEnvironmental Modification
Techniques, Dec. 10, 1976, 31 U.S.T. 333, 16 I.L.M. 88; see also Schindler & Toman, supra note 1, at 163;
Levie, TERRORISM, supra note 1 , at 1 90, 299. In signing the Convention in Geneva on May 18,1 977, Secretary
of State Vance pointed out that the United States believed that "it is wise to outlaw what is commonly called
'environmental warfare' before it has a real chance to be developed significandy for military purposes, with
potentially disastrous consequences." Statement by Secretary of State Vance at the Signing of the Convention
on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques, May
18, 1977, in 1977 Documents on Disarmament 326, 327 (1977).
35. Draft Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental
Modification Techniques, Sept. 2, 1976, in 1976 Documents on Disarmament 577, 582 (1976).
36. It is probably these provisions that are sometimes claimed to have the potential of being interpreted
as an unacceptable limitation on the use of nuclear weapons. If the United States fears this interpretation, it
need only repeat on ratification the understanding that it stated at the time ofsigning: "[T]he rules established
by this protocol were not intended to have any effect on and do not regulate or prohibit the use of nuclear
weapons." Schindler & Toman, supra note 1, at 718. The United Kingdom stated a similar understanding. Id.
37. 1977 Protocol I, supra note 1, art. 39(2), 16 I.L.M. at 1409.
38. Matheson, supra note 4, at 425.
39. General Orders No. 100, Apr. 24, 1863, Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United
States in the Field (also known as the Lieber Code), reprinted in Schindler & Toman, supra note 1, at 3, 12,
and in Friedman, supra note 14, at 170.
40. See supra notes 2, 12.
41. 27-10 U.S. Army Field Manual ^ 54 (1956). The British manual, The Law of War on Land ^
320 (1958), is to the same effect. Of course, a spy has always been in violation of the law ofwar when caught
behind enemy lines in the enemy's uniform.
42. Coleman Phillipson, International Law and the Great War 208 (1915).
43. United Nations War Crimes Commission, History of the United Nations War Crimes
Commission 490-91 (1948). Although the accused in the war crimes trial of Otto Skorzeny, see National
Archives, RG 338, File M1217, Roll 1; United Nations War Crimes Commission, 9 L. Rep. of Trials
OF War Criminals 90 (1948), were acquitted of entering into combat while wearing American uniforms, a
number of other members ofSkorzeny 's unit who were captured by American units while wearing American
uniforms during the Battle of the Bulge were immediately tried by court-martial, convicted of spying, and
executed. Maximilian Koessler, International Law on Use of Enemy Uniforms as a Stratagem and the Acquittal in
the Skorzeny Case, 24 Mo. L. Rev. 16, 29-30 (1959).
44. See Friedman, supra note 14; see also text accompanying notes 14-18, supra.
45. It should not be overlooked that Article 39(3) specifically exempts espionage and armed conflict at
sea from the scope of the quoted provision. See 1977 Protocol I, supra note 1, art. 39(3), 16 I.L.M. at 1409.
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46. International Committee of the Red Cross, Commentary on the Additional Protocols
U 1806 (Yves Sandoz ct al. cds., 1987).
47. There are a number of General Assembly resolutions dealing with mercenaries. The last well-publicized
trial of mercenaries as illegal combatants was that held in Angola in June 1976. See Mike J. Hoover, Notes, The
Laws q/"War and the Angolan Trial of Mercenaries: Death to the Dogs of War, 9 Case W. Res. J. INT'L L. 323 (1977).
The provisions of Article 47(2) (b) of the 7977 Protocol I, see 7977 Protocol I, supra note 1, art. 47(2)(b), 16 I.L.M.
at 1412, require that to be a mercenary the individual must have taken direct part in the hostilities, something
which several of the accused who were convicted in the Angolan trial had not done.
48. Sofaer, Position, supra note 8, at 469.
49. See supra note 17.
50. 1949 First Geneva Convention, supra note 3, art. 46.
51. 1949 Second Geneva Convention, supra note 3, art. 47.
52. 1949 Third Geneva Convention, supra note 3, art. 13, ^ 3.
53. See supra note 3.
54. Article 20 of the 1977 Protocol I prohibits reprisals against the persons and objects protected by Part
II of the Protocol (wounded, sick, shipwrecked, medical units and personnel, and medical transportation);
Article 52(1) prohibits reprisals against civilian objects; Article 53(c) prohibits reprisals against cultural objects
and places ofworship; Article 54(4) prohibits reprisals against objects indispensable to the survival ofthe civilian
population; Article 55(2) prohibits reprisals against the natural environment; and Article 56(4) prohibits reprisals
against works or installations containing dangerous forces. See generally 1977 Protocol I, supra note 1. No
objection was raised in the presentations made by the officials of the United States to any of these provisions.
See supra notes 4, 8.
55. 1977 Protocol I, supra note 1, art. 56(1), 16 I.L.M. at 1415.
56. Sofaer, Position, supra note 8, at 468.
57. It should be noted that Article 57(2)(a)(iii), concerning reaching decisions to attack, refers to civilian
losses "which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated"; and
that Article 85 (3) (c), concerning the specific attacks referred to in the article quoted in the text, makes such
an attack a grave breach of the Protocol only if it "will cause excessive loss of life, injury to civilians or damage
to civilian objects, as defined in Article 57, paragraph 2(a)(iii)." See Protocol, supra note 1, art. 85(3)(c), 16
I.L.M. at 1430. Both of these provisions are applications of the rule of proportionality
.
58. Frankly speaking, this author has never been able to understand how the balancing of civilian losses
versus military advantage is to be accomplished. Is the bombing of a battalion of tanks found in a residential
I
area justified if the civilian casualties will be in the range of 50? 100? 500? 1,000? How does one decide?
Suppose that they are the only tanks available to support an impending enemy attack or to be used against an
impending friendly attack. Does that increase the number ofjustified civilian casualties? If so, to what extent?
59. Sofaer, Position, supra note 8, at 468 n.146.
60. 14 Official Records, supra note 1, at 151, 158 TJ 39; 3 Levie, Protection, supra note 19, at 281,
284.
61. Camahan, Customary International Law, supra note 6, at 506; Sofaer, Position, supra note 8, at 468.
62. Sofaer, Position, supra note 8, at 469-70. The present author has also taken the position that it is
unfortunate that these provisions are not mandatory. Levie, Pros and Cons, supra note 5, at 541-42. The United
States apparently does not object to these articles, but only to their failure to include provisions which would
have ensured their effectiveness in all relevant cases. The United States affirmatively "supports" Article 5. See
supra note 4.
63. See Articles 8-10 common to the first three 1949 Geneva Conventions, supra note 3, and Articles 9-11
of the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 3.
64. During the hostilities in Korea (1950-1953), the North Koreans alleged that the United States was
using bacteriological weapons. The United States denied the charge and proposed an investigation by the
World Health Organization and the International Committee of the Red Cross. The North Koreans refused
to allow such an investigation to be made but had one conducted by other Communists who, naturally, found
that the allegations were true. However, probably having decided that the conclusions of its own investigative
body were not receiving the desired publicity and acceptance, the North Koreans dropped the matter. Such
an investigation would now be a function of the Fact-Finding Commission, but only if its competence has
been accepted, generally or specially.
65. 31 Intl Rev. Red Cross 411 (1991). When Poland filed a declaration on October 2, 1992,
recognizing the competence of the Commission, it was the thirty-second party to do so. 32 INT'L Rev. Red
Cross 606 (1993).
66. The United Kingdom had no difficulty in setting forth ten understandings at the time of signing the
7 977 Protocol I. Schindler & Toman, supra note 1, at 717-18.
XVIII
Prohibitions and Restrictions on
the Use of Conventional Weapons
68 SaintJohn's University Law Review 643 (1994)
In 1980, a Diplomatic Conference convened by the General Assembly of the
United Nations in Geneva was successful in drafting a Convention on
Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons
Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate
Effects ("Conventional Weapons Convention"). Three Protocols, each relating
to a specific weapon or group of weapons, were attached. The Conventional
Weapons Convention was opened for signature at the United Nations
Headquarters in New York on April 10, 1981. The United States did not sign
it until April 8, 1982, and since then has ratified only the Convention and two
of the Protocols. The Conventional Weapons Convention and its Protocols
received the necessary twenty ratifications and accessions by June 2, 1983, and
5
entered into force six months later on December 2, 1983.
The purposes of this Article are (1) to determine why these instruments were
considered necessary; (2) to analyze the provisions ofthe Convention and ofthe
three Protocols; and (3) to ascertain in what manner ratification will be in the
best interests of the United States.
Introduction
As long ago as 1868, the Preamble of the Declaration of St. Petersburg set
forth a number of "limits at which the necessities of war ought to yield to the
7 . . .
requirements of humanity." These limits included the following:
That the progress of civilization should have the effect of alleviating as much as
possible the calamities of war;
That the only legitimate objects which States should endeavour to accomplish
during war is to weaken the military forces of the enemy;
That for this purpose it is sufficient to disable the greatest possible number ofmen;
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That this object would be exceeded by the employment of arms which uselessly
aggravate the sufferings of disabled men, or render their deaths inevitable; [and]
That the employment of such arms would, therefore, be contrary to the laws of
humanity.
Articles 22 and 23(e) of the Regulations Attached to the 1899 Hague
Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs ofWar on Land, and
the same articles of the Regulations Attached to the 1907 Hague Convention
(IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs ofWar on Land, include the following
humanitarian rules:
Article 22: The right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not
unlimited.
Article 23 (e): In addition to the prohibitions provided by special Conventions,
12
it is especially prohibited [or forbidden] : To employ arms, projectiles, or material
13
of a nature [calculated] to cause unnecessary suffering.
Unfortunately, despite the vast increase in the nature and lethality of weapons
which occurred during the course of the subsequent seven decades, the only
international agreement prohibiting or restricting specific conventional weapons
which became effective during that period was the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol,
prohibiting the use of asphyxiating gases and bacteriological weapons.
Prior to the Diplomatic Conference that took place in Geneva between 1974
and 1977, the work of which culminated in two additions to the four 1949
17 18
Geneva Conventions (only one of which will concern this Article ), the
International Committee of the Red Cross ("ICRC") had sponsored a number
of preliminary conferences, the last ofwhich was a Conference of Government
Experts that met in 1972. Although those conferences were concerned with the
reaffirmation and development of international humanitarian law applicable in
armed conflicts, and not with prohibitions or restrictions on the use of specific
conventional weapons, at the conclusion of the 1972 conference a group of the
government experts suggested that the ICRC should arrange a special meeting
to consult with legal, military, and medical experts on the question of express
prohibitions or limitations ofthe use ofsuch conventional weapons as may cause... 19
unnecessary suffering or be indiscriminate in their effect.
Complying with this suggestion, the ICRC convened meetings of a selected
group of experts in March and June 1973. These meetings of experts did not
attempt to formulate concrete proposals, but sought merely to document the
20
weapons which required consideration. Five categories of weapons were
classified as causing unnecessary suffering or being indiscriminate in their effects:
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1) small-calibre projectiles; 2) blast and fragmentation weapons; 3) time-delay
weapons (land mines and booby traps); 4) incendiary weapons; and 5) potential
weapons development. It will be found that these experts chose well and that
the weapons in these five categories continued to constitute the subject of
discussions in the various subsequent conferences on this matter, up to and
including the conference that drafted the Conventional Weapons Convention
and Protocols which were the ultimate result of these labors,
i The Diplomatic Conference that met in Geneva for the first time on February
20, 1974 (and did not complete its work untilJune 10, 1977), established an Ad
Hoc Committee on Conventional Weapons, whose terms of reference called
23
for it to "discuss weapons without making any substantive or drafting decisions.
This Committee functioned throughout the four sessions of the Diplomatic
24 i
Conference. While the Ad Hoc Committee made no substantive
recommendations, during the final Plenary Meetings the Diplomatic
Conference adopted a resolution recommending that a conference be held not
later than 1979 to reach "agreements on prohibitions or restrictions on the use
of specific weapons."
The General Assembly of the United Nations took note of that resolution
and adopted its own resolution, convening in 1979 a United Nations conference
on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of specific conventional weapons.
Preparatory conferences met in 1978 and 1979, and the Conventional Weapons
Conference met for the first time in Geneva from September 10, 1979, to
September 28, 1979. The Conference met again from September 15, 1980, to
October 10, 1980. At this latter session it completed the drafting of a
Conventional Weapons Convention and three Protocols annexed to that
27
Convention. This Article will focus on the meaning and intent of the
Conventional Weapons Convention and its Protocols in order to determine
whether there are valid reasons for the United States and other major military
nations to ratify such instruments which advance the humanitarian law ofwar
—
instruments that, moreover, such nations played a major role in drafting.
I. The Conventional Weapons Convention
The Conventional Weapons Convention itself may truly be termed an
^umbrella" convention. It contains no substantive humanitarian provisions,
those being the subject matter of the three Protocols which are annexed to it.
It has several provisions, however, that are either controversial or unusual.
Article 1 makes the Conventional Weapons Convention and its annexed
Protocols applicable in accordance with the provisions of Article 2 of the 1949
28
Geneva Conventions. This is certainly not a controversial provision, although
it would have been preferable to restate the article itselfin full, a practice followed
elsewhere in the Conventional Weapons Convention and its Protocols. It then
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proceeds to make them applicable in "any situation described in paragraph 4 of
Article 1 of Additional Protocol I to these Conventions."* This provision of
the 1977 Additional Protocol I, making an international law-of-war convention
applicable in conflicts involving national liberation movements (theretofore
considered to be internal in nature), is one of the major reasons why the United
States has not ratified this latter instrument. Although the present author agrees
with the objection of the United States to this provision in the 1977 Additional
Protocol I, primarily because it was the basis for Article 44(3) of that Protocol
which removed the historic requirements for distinguishing legal combatants
from members of national liberation movements, the latter provision has no
effect on the Conventional Weapons Convention or its Protocols. There is no
question here of hiding one's personal weapons from view, concealing oneself
among civilians preparatory to an attack, or wearing no visible distinguishing
insignia. Anyone whose State or "authority" has agreed to be bound by any of
these Protocols who thereafter violates the humanitarian provisions thereof will
be guilty of a war crime, whether he be a uniformed soldier in an international
or civil war, a rebel in a civil war, or a member ofa national liberation movement
31
in hostilities against the colonial power. While ratifying the Conventional
Weapons Convention, the United States could easily express its displeasure with
32
this provision by way of an understanding or, as France has done, by making
a specific reservation.
Article 2 is concerned with the relation of the Conventional Weapons
Convention and its Protocols to other international agreements, affirming that
they do not detract "from other obligations imposed upon the High Contracting
Parties by international humanitarian law applicable in armed conflict." This
provision appears to be superfluous inasmuch as there is nothing in these
instruments which could possibly have that effect. If anything, they "add to,"
34
they do not "detract from" other obligations.
Article 3 (Signature) is a part of the standard boilerplate of international
agreements, as are Articles 5 (Entry into force), 6 (Dissemination), 9
(Denunciation), 10 (Depositary), and 11 (Authentic texts). Naturally, some of
these articles contain variations from the standard to meet the particular
circumstances of the Conventional Weapons Convention.
Article 4 (Ratification, acceptance, approval or accession) begins in the
standard fashion, but paragraph 3 requires discussion. It provides:
Expressions of consent to be bound by any of the Protocols annexed to this
Convention shall be optional for each State, provided that at the time ofthe deposit
of its instrument of ratification, acceptance, or approval of this Convention or of
accession thereto, that State shall notify the depositary of its consent to be bound
by any two or more of these Protocols.
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Apparently, the United States construes this provision as authorizing reservations
and understandings. At the time of signing, the United States said:
In addition, the United States ofcourse reserves the right, at the time ofratification,
to exercise the option provided by Article 4(3) of the Convention, and to make
statements of understanding and/or reservations, to the extent that it may deem
necessary to ensure that the Convention and its Protocols conform to humanitarian
37
and military requirements.
Inasmuch as the Convention contains no prohibition against reservations or
understandings, it is somewhat difficult to understand why the United States
considered it necessary to announce its construction ofArticle 4(3) as specifically
granting that right.
Furthermore, paragraph 3 contains a rather unusual provision in that when a
State becomes a Party to the Conventional Weapons Convention "that State
shall notify the depositary of its consent to be bound by any two or more of these
Protocols." There was thought to be good reason for this provision. As shall be
noted, the 1980 Protocol I, concerned with nondetectable fragments, was
completely noncontroversial, and it could be expected that many States might
ratify the Conventional Weapons Convention and Protocol I only. Article 4
compels States to give more consideration to the other two Protocols, and thus,
it prevents States from ratifying only the Conventional Weapons Convention
and Protocol I and thereafter claiming the status ofParties to the Convention.
In addition to a provision rejecting the general participation (si omnes) doctrine
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contained in Article 7(1), Article 7 contains a number ofother provisions with
respect to treaty relations between the Parties. Unfortunately, not content with
the provision addressing national liberation movements (termed an "authority")
contained in Article 1, the Conference found it necessary to include further
lengthy special provisions on this subject in Article 7(4), in an attempt to link
the Conventional Weapons Convention with the four 1949 Geneva
Conventions and the 1977 Additional Protocol 1.
4 The 1949 Geneva
Conventions and the 1977 Additional Protocol I are completely irrelevant to
the Conventional Weapons Convention and its Protocols. Those instruments
do not contain prohibitions or restrictions on the use of specific conventional
weapons. Clearly, these special provisions were another attempt to secure for
national liberation movements the benefits of all of the humanitarian law ofwar
upon an undertaking by an "authority" that is rarely able to control the activities
ofthe members ofits movement and that uses the civilian population as a military
objective rather than as something to be protected. France, like the United States,
is not a Party to the 1977 Additional Protocol I and had no difficulty in making
a reservation to Article 7(4)(b) of the 1980 Convention. " There is no reason
why the United States should not make a similar reservation, if it is so minded.
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Moreover, it is of interest that, while Common Article 3(4) of the 1949 Geneva
Conventions (with respect to armed conflicts not of an international character)
and Article 4 ofthe 1977 Additional Protocol I both provide that the application
of those instruments does not affect the legal status of the Parties, no such
provision was included in the Conventional Weapons Convention.
Notably, one subject that is missing from the Conventional Weapons
Convention that is probably more important in a humanitarian law-of-war treaty
than in most types of treaties (other than a disarmament treaty) is the question
ofverification. Efforts to include such a provision were strongly and successfully
resisted.
II. 1980 Protocol I
49The 1980 Protocol on Non-Detectable Fragments ("Protocol I") is a single
sentence which provides that "[i]t is prohibited to use any weapon the primary
effects of which is to injure by fragments which in the human body escape
detection by X-rays."' This Protocol was directed primarily against weapons
made of such materials as glass and plastic. The United States had become a
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cosponsor of the proposal for this Protocol, which was adopted unanimously.
One of the U.S. Delegates attributed the unanimity "in part to the fact that no
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one seems to have had any serious military interest in such a weapon."'
Accordingly, the United States is justified in ratifying this Protocol.
III. 1980 Protocol II
The 1980 Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines,
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Booby Traps and Other Devices ("Protocol II") ' is concerned with the
"time-delay" weapons referred to by the 1973 Conference of Government
Experts. Such weapons include: 1) anti-vehicle and antipersonnel land mines,
hand-buried or delivered by aircraft, artillery, or naval guns; 2) booby traps;
and 3) other devices. While the 1980 Protocol II was more controversial than
Protocol I, it was without question of greater importance.
Article 1 of the 1980 Protocol II, entitled Material Scope of Application,
makes clear that its subject matter is limited to the use of the aforementioned
weapons on land only ("including mines laid to interdict beaches, waterway
crossings or river crossings") and that it "does not apply to the use of anti-ship
mines at sea or in inland waterways."' Although there appears to have been
little controversy involved in the drafting of this article, its importance cannot
be overestimated.
Article 2, entitled Definitions, defines "mine," "booby-traps," and "other
devices." It provides:
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1. "Mine" means any munition placed under, on or near the ground or other
surface area and designed to be detonated or exploded by the presence, proximity
or contact of a person or vehicle, and "remotely delivered mine" means any
mine . . . delivered by artillery, rocket, mortar or similar means or dropped from
an aircraft.
2. "Booby-trap" means any device or material which is designed, constructed or
adapted to kill or injure and which functions unexpectedly when a person disturbs
or approaches an apparently harmless object or performs an apparendy safe act.
3. "Other device" means manually-emplaced munitions and devices designed to
kill, injure or damage and which are actuated by remote control or automatically
after a lapse of time.
Inasmuch as this definition of "other devices" contains no examples and, unlike
the procedure followed with respect to the other weapons covered by this
Protocol, no additional article deals exclusively with "other devices," it is likely
that there will be controversy regarding exactly which weapons were the
intended target of this provision.
Article 2(4), defining "military objective," appears to have engendered no
controversy. It reads:
"Military objective" means, so far as objects are concerned, any object which by
its nature, location, purpose or use makes an effective contribution to military
action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the
circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.
Article 2(5) was essentially unnecessary, as its content follows from Article
2(4). It defines "civilian objects" as "all objects which are not military objectives
as defined in paragraph 4."
Finally, Article 2(6) defines "recording" as "a physical, administrative and
technical operation designed to obtain, for the purpose of registration in the
official records, all available information facilitating the location of minefields,
mines and booby-traps."
Articles 3, 4, and 5 of the 1980 Protocol II set forth general restrictions on
the use of all of the weapons covered by the Protocol: mines, booby-traps, and
other devices. The main objective of their provisions is to protect both the
civilian population and individual civilians from the effects of these weapons.
There appears to be very little in their provisions that could be considered
controversial. The provision ofArticle 4 requiring "the posting ofwarning signs"
and "the issue ofwarnings" ofthe location ofmine fields, however, is somewhat
unrealistic. " To a large degree, the value of mines is that the progress of an
attacking force is slowed up by the need to search for, locate, and neutralize
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minefields and individual mines. This advantage is lost ifthe minelayer is obliged
to make public to all, which necessarily includes the enemy, the location of
mines that have been laid. Moreover, the provisions of Article 5 presume an
accuracy for remotely-delivered mines which may be incorrect. While the
requirement for a self-actuating or remotely-controlled mechanism which
renders a mine harmless (mechanisms which have long been employed on sea
mines) would, in general, be a protection for the civilian population, one might
wonder whether the safety of civilians is jeopardized when that mechanism is
one which causes the mine to destroy itself by exploding without warning.
Article 6 of the 1980 Protocol II, establishing prohibitions on the use of
CO
booby-traps, is a very important provision for the protection of civilians,
particularly children. It provides:
1. Without prejudice to the rules ofinternational law applicable in armed conflict
relating to treachery and perfidy, it is prohibited in all circumstances to use:
(a) any booby-trap in the form ofan apparendy harmless portable object which
is specifically designed and constructed to contain explosive material and to
detonate when it is disturbed or approached, or
(b) booby-traps which are in any way attached to or associated with: (i)
internationally recognized protective emblems, signs or signals; (ii) sick, wounded
or dead persons; (iii) burial or cremation sites or graves; (iv) medical facilities,
medical equipment, medical supplies or medical transportation; (v) children's toys
or other portable objects or products specifically designed for the feeding, health,
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hygiene, clothing or education of children; (vi) food or drink; (vii) kitchen
utensils or appliances except in military establishments, military locations or
military supply depots; (viii) objects clearly of a religious nature; (ix) historic
monuments, works of art or places of worship which constitute the cultural or
spiritual heritage of peoples; (x) animals or their carcasses.
2. It is prohibited in all circumstances to use any booby-trap which is designed to
cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering.
Introducing Article 6(1) with the phrase "Without prejudice to the rules of
international law . . . relating to treachery and perfidy" was an unfortunate
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decision. Despicable as many booby-traps have been, they have not generally
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heretofore been considered to be either treacherous or perfidious. Obviously,
it was not intended that this Protocol would declare all booby-traps treacherous
and perfidious. Had that been the intention, the lengthy enumeration would
have been unnecessary. Notwithstanding, the quoted phrase will
unquestionably be used, on occasion, as the basis for an argument that any
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particular booby-trap is both treacherous and perfidious and, therefore, a
violation of the law of war.
Article 7 of the 1980 Protocol II amplifies the definition of "recording"
contained in Article 2. It includes some of the provisions which were
exceedingly difficult to draft, primarily because of the technical problems
involved. In addition, there was strong support for a provision requiring the
exchange of full information between belligerents concerning the location of
minefields immediately upon the cessation ofhostilities. Nevertheless, paragraph
(3)(a)(i) of Article 7, requiring the belligerents "to take all necessary and
appropriate measures" to protect civilians immediately after the cessation of
hostilities, represents a compromise reached because a number ofnations were
unwilling to require a belligerent, some ofwhose territory might still be occupied
at the time of the cessation of hostilities, to make available to the occupier the
location ofminefields which might become valuable in the event that there was
a resumption of hostilities. However, under sub-paragraphs (3) (a) (ii) and (iii) of
that article, where there is no occupied territory, or where troops occupying
enemy territory have withdrawn therefrom, there is no discretion involved
—
records of minefields and booby-trapped areas must be made available to the
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other Party and to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. ' It is
appropriate to point out here that, based on a proposal made by Morocco, there
is a Technical Annex to Protocol II containing guidelines on recording which
are to be "taken into account." With regard to the Technical Annex the
United States has said:
(1) its provisions are not mandatory or uniformly applicable in all circumstances,
but only "guidelines" which are to be "taken into account"; (2) the items of
information listed in the Annex are of a sufficiently general character so as to be
operationally practicable and to provide sufficient flexibility; (3) the Annex relates
solely to information needed to establish the location of minefields and does not
require disclosure oftechnical characteristics ofthe mines used; and (4) the addition
ofthe Annex provides the assurance that the recording obligations ofthe Protocol
would in any event be satisfied if the items of information Listed in the Annex
are recorded.
In view of the many, many casualties caused by mines after the cessation of
hostilities, particularly among civilians, there should be no relaxation ofthe rules
governing the maintenance ofcomplete records with respect to mines laid during
the course of hostilities and the availability of those records to all concerned at
the earliest possible date.
Article 8 of Protocol II deals with the protection of United Nations forces
and missions from the minefields, mines, and areas of booby-traps established
by the belligerent parties prior to the arrival of a United Nations peacekeeping,
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observation, or other similar mission. Its provisions appear to be completely
reasonable and noncontroversial. When United Nations peacekeeping or
observation forces are involved, extensive protection from minefields and
booby-traps (removal, other measures, and providing the necessary information)
is required; when a United Nations mission is involved, the belligerent party
must provide it with protection from those weapons.
Finally, Article 9 deals with the very important subject of international
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cooperation in the removal of minefields, mines, and booby-traps. At the end
of World War II an international organization was established for the removal
OS
of sea mines, but the failure to take any concerted international action with
respect to land mines and booby-traps resulted in accidental deaths and injuries
to innocent civilians for many years thereafter.
To summarize, while the 1980 Protocol II is not a perfecdy drafted
international agreement, there is nothing objectionable in its contents that, if
deemed necessary, cannot be taken care of with simple statements of
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understanding. There does not appear to be any reason why the United States
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should not accept it.
IV. 1980 Protocol III
The 1980 Protocol on Prohibitions and Restrictions on the Use ofIncendiary
90 •
Weapons ("Protocol III") is unquestionably the most controversial ofthe three
Protocols. The early opposition of the United States to prohibitions or
restrictions on the battlefield use of incendiary weapons was used by the Soviet
delegation "to foster the impression in most quarters that this was the basic
obstacle to a successful conclusion of the Conference." Undoubtedly, it is the
implications of this Protocol, rather than its content, that make the United States
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reluctant to ratify the Conventional Weapons Convention. Despite the fact
that Protocol III contains no prohibition or restriction on the use of napalm
(other than the general prohibitions and restrictions on the use of incendiary
weapons) or on the use of any incendiary weapons against combatants, and
despite the fact that the negotiating history is to the contrary, it may be
considered inevitable that, when the occasion arises, the claim will be advanced
that both of these are banned by Protocol III.
Article 1 of Protocol III sets forth a series of definitions. It is particularly
notable that while the definition of incendiary weapons includes the
enumeration "flame throwers, fougasses, shells, rockets, grenades, mines, bombs
and other containers of incendiary substances," it also enumerates what are not
such weapons: "illuminants, tracers, smoke or signalling systems . . . munitions
designed to combine penetration, blast or fragmentation effects with an
additional incendiary effect . . . and similar combined effects munitions."
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Protocol III has only one other article. Drafting it was probably one of the
most difficult tasks that the Conference and its organs encountered. One major
issue had been resolved by excluding combined-effects munitions ("CEMs")
from the ambit of the term "incendiary weapons." Although the word
"napalm" was heard again and again during the discussions conducted with
• i • 97
respect to this Protocol and was included in a number of proposals, nowhere
in Protocol III will one find that word used. This issue was resolved by
eliminating all mention of napalm, thus permitting its use against combatants
but not against civilians or civilian objects, which are protected against all
incendiary attacks.
Article 2 is of such importance that it warrants complete quotation:
1. It is prohibited in all circumstances to make the civilian population as such,
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individual civilians or civilian objects the object ofattack by incendiary weapons.
2. It is prohibited in all circumstances to make any military objective located
within a concentration of civilians the object of attack by air-delivered incendiary
weapons.
3. It is further prohibited to make any military objective located within a
concentration of civilians the object of attack by means of incendiary weapons
other than air-delivered incendiary weapons, except when such military objective
is clearly separated from the concentration of civilians and all feasible precautions
are taken with a view to limiting the incendiary effects to the military objective
and to avoiding, and in any event to minimizing, incidental loss of civilian life,
injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects.
4. It is prohibited to make forests or other kinds ofplant cover the object ofattack
by incendiary weapons except when such natural elements are used to cover,
conceal or camouflage combatants or other military objectives, or are themselves
military objectives.
The prohibition contained in the second paragraph perhaps encompasses too
much. It encourages the establishment of military objectives which are valid
military targets within cities, towns, and villages, (all concentrations of civilians)
thus immunizing the military objective from attack by air-delivered incendiary
weapons, perhaps the only appropriate means of attack. The drafters would
have been better advised to use the provisions of Article 57 (2) (a) of the 1977
Additional Protocol I as the basis for the provisions of this paragraph.
However, this is a problem which could be readily corrected by a reservation,
or even by an understanding.
The insertion of the phrase "other than air-delivered incendiary weapons"
in paragraph 3 of this article was unnecessary and renders the provision
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ambiguous. It was probably meant to indicate that this paragraph was intended
to cover all the possibilities not covered by paragraph 2 of the same article.
However, this phrase could validly be construed to mean that under the stated
circumstances (a military objective within a concentration of civilians) attacks
by all types of incendiary weapons, except by ("other than" by) air-delivered
incendiary weapons are prohibited—even though (or perhaps because) that
procedure had been specifically prohibited by the previous paragraph. Was it
intended thereby to exempt from the prohibition contained in the previous
paragraph air-delivered incendiaries under the circumstances set forth in the
"except" clause? Or was it intended thereby to exclude air-delivered incendiaries
from the "except" clause itself? These are but a few of the interpretations to
which that phrase lends itself. Any acceptance of Protocol III should include an
understanding that clearly sets forth what the use of that phrase is believed to
have been intended to accomplish.
To summarize, as far as it goes, the 1980 Protocol III is an extremely
humanitarian agreement which contains nothing irreparable of either a political
or a military nature that warrants the refusal ofthe United States and other major
military powers to accept it.
Epilogue
When the United States signed the 1980 Conventional Weapons Convention
in 1982 it stated:
The United States Government welcomes the adoption of this Convention, and
hopes that all States will give the most serious consideration to ratification or
accession. We believe that the Convention represents a positive step forward in
efforts to minimize injury or damage to the civilian population in time of armed
conflict. Our signature of this Convention reflects the general willingness of the
United States to adopt practical and reasonable provisions concerning the conduct
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of military operations, for the purpose of protecting noncombatants.
More than a decade later, on March 21, 1994, the Secretary of State
transmitted that Convention and Protocols I and II to the President with a
recommendation for ratification by the United States with the four following
conditions:
1. The United States considers that the fourth paragraph of the Preamble to the
present Convention, which reproduces the subject of provisions of Article 35,
Paragraph 3 and Article 55, Paragraph 1 of Additional Protocol I [to the 1949
Geneva Conventions], applies only to [sjtates which have accepted those
provisions;
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2. The United States declares, with reference to the scope of application defined
in Article 1 of the present Convention, that it will apply the provisions of the
present Convention to all armed conflicts referred to in Articles 2 and 3 common
to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949;
3. The United States declares that Article 7, Paragraph 4(b) of the present
Convention will have no effect; and
4. The United States understands that Article 6, Paragraph 1(a) of Protocol II to
the present Convention does not prohibit the adaptation of other objects for use
as booby-traps.
The President transmitted the 1980 Conventional Weapons Convention and its
Protocols I and II to the Senate on May 12, 1994, recommending that the Senate
give its advice and consent to their ratification subject to the above stated
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conditions. He deferred action on Protocol III pending further examination
1 06
concerning its acceptability from a military point of view. On March 24,
1995, the Senate gave its advice and consent to the ratification of the
107
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finding that the Conventional Weapons Convention is not a supplement to the 1977 Additional Protocol I.
Id. at 265. Another commentator states that "[t]he purpose of this Article is to exclude the a contrario line of
argument whose adherents might claim that anything not specifically prohibited in the Convention is allowed.
"
A.P.V. Rogers, A Commentary on the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and
Other Devices, 26 Mil. L. & L. War Rev. 185, 188 (1987).
35. 1980 Final Act, supra note 1, app. A, arts. 3, 5, 6, 9-11.
36. 1980 Final Act, supra note 1, app. A, art. 4.
37. Multilateral Treaties, supra note 33, at 832, 835, reprinted in Shindler & Toman, supra note 1,
at 192, 196.
38. Perhaps the United States was making two separate statements: one setting forth its intent to exercise
the option of not ratifying all three protocols, and another reserving the right to make statements of
understandings and/or reservations. Indeed, if this were so, the U.S. could have made its intent much
clearer—e.g., by the use of a semi-colon instead of a comma after the words "article 4(3) of the Convention."
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39. 1980 Final Act, supra note 1, app. A art. 4 (emphasis added).
40. The United States had suggested mandatory acceptance of all three Protocols. 1980 Report of the
United States Delegation to the Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain
Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects
13 [hereinafter 1980 Report of the United States Delegation]. The actions of States in ratifying or acceding
to the 1980 Conventional Weapons Convention would seem to indicate that the fear which engendered this
provision was unwarranted. As ofJanuary 1 , 1 992, thirty-one States had ratified or acceded to the Convention.
Multilateral Treaties, supra note 33, at 832-33. Every State had also ratified or acceded to all three
Protocols, with the exception of Bonin, which did not approve 1980 Protocol II, and France, which did not
ratify 1980 Protocol III. Id.
41. This provision, contained in Article 7, is similar to the provisions of Common Article 2(3) of the
1949 Geneva Conventions. See supra note 17. It continues the practice of reversing the procedure contained
in the 1907 Hague Conventions which were not effective i(any single belligerent was not a Party to a particular
Convention—a provision erroneously applied by Justice Pal in his dissent in the trial before the International
Military Tribunal for the Far East. See Howard S. Levie, Terrorism in War: The Law of War Crimes
152 (1993).
42. The provisions adopted were actually mild compared to those sought by the African group ofnations.
Interestingly, the United States did not object to these provisions at the Conventional Weapons Conference.
Instead, the United States insisted that the Convention only apply to internal conflicts if the "authority" of
the liberation movement "had accepted and applied the rules of warfare which already apply to States as a
result of various international agreements." 1980 Report of The United States Delegation, supra note 40, at
14. This meant that an "authority" could not take advantage of the Convention unless it had accepted and
applied certain rules of warfare concerning, among other things, the treatment of prisoners and the protection
of noncombatants." Id.
43. It is suggested that it would have been more appropriate merely to make the Conventional Weapons
Convention and the Protocols, which were previously approved by the State involved in the conflict, applicable
when the "authority" had agreed to accept and apply them.
44. The Assistant Director of the ICRC's Department of Principles ofLaw, Yves Sandoz, has stated that
the Conventional Weapons Convention and its Protocols "are valuable, or rather indispensable, supplements
to the 1977 Protocols." Yves Sandoz, A New Step Forward in International Law: Prohibitions or Restrictions on the
Use of Certain Conventional Weapons, 21 INT'L Rev. Red CROSS 3, 16 (Jan.-Feb. 1981). Absent in the
Conventional Weapons Convention is a provision similar to Article 1(3) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I,
specifically stating that it supplements the 1949 Geneva Conventions. While the Convention and its Protocols
supplement the 1977 Additional Protocol I in the sense that they contain law-of-war provisions not contained
in that Protocol, they are completely independent and have no other relationship thereto. States can be Parties
to the Conventional Weapons Convention and some or all of its Protocols without being Parties to the 1977
Additional Protocol I. States cannot be Parties to the 1977 Additional Protocol I without being Parties to the
1949 Geneva Conventions. See 1977 Additional Protocol I, supra note 13, art. 92.
45. Upon signing the Conventional Weapons Convention, France made a reservation stating:
[A]s regards the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, the declaration of acceptance and application
provided for in article 7, paragraph 4(b), of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions . . . will
have no effects other than those provided for in article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions, in so
far as that article is applicable.
Multilateral Treaties, supra note 33, at 833-34, 20 1.L.M. at 1287 (1981), reprinted in Schindler & Toman,
supra note 1 , at 193-94. Once again, no Party is known to have taken exception to France's reservation. Article
3 common to the Geneva Conventions sets forth rules applicable in wars "not of an international
character"—i.e. civil wars.
46. Indeed, the Senate made such a reservation when it ratified the Convention. S. Res. 4568, 104th
Cong., 1st Sess., 141 Cong. Rec. 4568 (1996).
47. Upon signing the Convention, France made an interpretive statement that the application of the
Convention would have no effect on the legal status of the parties to the conflict. Multilateral Treaties,
supra note 33, at 833, 20 I.L.M. at 1287 (1981), reprinted in Schindler & Toman, supra note 1, at 193.
48. France, Italy, the United States, and the People's Republic of China made statements deprecating
this omission upon signing the Conventional Weapons Convention. Multilateral Treaties, supra note 33,
at 833-35, reprinted in Schindler & Toman, supra note 1, at 192-96.
49. Protocol I Annexed to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain
Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects,
1980 Final Act, supra note 1, app. B, 19 I.L.M. 1523, 1529 (1980), reprinted in Schindler & Toman, supra note
1, at 185 thereinafter "Protocol I"].
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50. Id.
51. 1979 Report of the United States Delegation to the United Nations Conference on Prohibitions or
Restrictions of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious
or to have Indiscriminate Effects 5 [hereinafter 1979 Report of the United States Delegation]. The 1980
Report ofthe United States Delegation, supra note 40, at 5, states: "The proposal does not, however, preclude
nonmetallic casing materials or other parts or components which are not designed as the primary wounding
mechanism."
52. Matheson, Remarks, 1979 Proc. A.S.I.L. 156, 157. See also W.J. Fenrick, The Law ofArmed Conflict:
The CUSHIE Weapons Treaty, 11 CAN. DEF. Q. 25 (Summer 1981). The then Major Fenrick states flatly
that this Protocol "bans a weapon which does not exist." Id. at 27. He also explains that "CUSHIE is an
unofficial Canadian acronym derived from the words 'Causing Unnecessary Suffering or Having Indiscriminate
Effects'."/^. at30n.2.
53. Protocol II Annexed to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain
Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects,
1980 Final Act, supra note 1, app. C, 19 I.L.M. 1523, 1529 (1980), reprinted in Schindler & Toman, supra note
1, at 177, 185 [hereinafter "Protocol II"].
54. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. The 1956 Draft Rules are the source of many of the
provisions ofboth Protocol II and Protocol III. Draft Rules for the Limitation of the Dangers Incurred by the
Civilian Population in Time ofWar (2d Ed. 1958), reprinted in Schindler & Toman, supra note 1, at 251.
55. It is important to note that while land mines are primarily a defensive mechanism intended to impede
enemy movement, the infliction of casualties being an incidental result, such mines are now also used
offensively. Burrus M. Carnahan, The Law ofLand Mine Warfare: Protocol II to the United Nations Convention on
Certain Conventional Weapons, 22 Mil. L. & L. War Rev. 117, 120-22 (1983) (citing Lucerne Conference,
supra note 24, at 229).
56. Protocol II, 1980 Final Act supra note 1, app. C, 19 I.L.M. at 1529, reprinted in Schindler & Toman,
supra note 1, at 185. It is unfortunate, that advantage was not taken of the opportunity to draft international
legislation restricting the use of sea mines, particularly on the high seas, restrictions which are long overdue.
See Howard S. Levie, Mine Warfare at Sea 52-53 (1992).
57. Despite the fact that Article 49(3) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I, supra note 13, specifically states
that the provisions of that Section apply "to all attacks from the sea . . . against objectives on land but do not
otherwise affect the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict at sea," (emphasis added), one author has
found that the provisions of the Section "apply to all acts of naval warfare which may affect the civilian
population." Rauch, The Protocol Additionalto the Geneva Conventions: Repercussions on the
Law of Naval Warfare 57-60 (1984). The quoted provisions should preclude any such contention with
respect to the 1980 Protocol II.
58. 1980 Final Act, supra note 1, 19 I.L.M. at 1530, reprinted in Schindler & Toman, supra note 1, at 180.
59. Id. One commentator hazards the opinion that in the future most land mines will be laid by aircraft,
rockets, or artillery. Carnahan, supra note 55, at 123.
60. 1980 Final Act, supra note 1, 19 I.L.M. at 1530, reprinted in Schindler & Toman, supra note 1, at 180.
61 . Id. This provision appears to consider as being inhumane manually-emplaced "other devices" which
include exactly the mechanisms which are required in remotely-delivered mines. See supra text accompanying
note 59. The logic of the distinction is difficult to understand.
62. 1980 Final Act, supra note 1,19 I.L.M. at 1530, reprinted in Schindler & Toman, supra note 1, at 185.
This provision obviously had as its basic source paragraph 2 of the Resolution adopted by the Institute of
International Law in 1969, entitled The Distinction Between Military Objectives and Non-Military Objects In General
and Particularly the Problems Associated With Weapons ofMass Destruction, 66 Am.J.Intl. L. 470, 470-71 (1972),
reprinted in Schindler & Toman, supra note 1, at 265. Its immediate source was Article 52(2) of the 1977
Additional Protocol I, supra note 13.
63. 1977 Additional Protocol I, supra note 13, art. 52(1).
64. See Rogers, supra note 34, at 187. One commentator, a member of the United Kingdom Delegation
at the Conventional Weapons Conference states: "The Conference was concerned, therefore, with finding
ways of protecting the innocent from the dangers of mines and booby traps while at the same time preserving
this important means of self-defence." Id.
65. 1980 Final Act, supra note 1, 19 I.L.M. at 1531(1980), reprinted in Schindler & Toman, supra note 1,
at 186.
66. Rogers, supra note 34, at 193 (labeling provision as "merely hortatory").
67. These various mechanisms are frequently used when the armed force which delivers the mines from
a remote source anticipates that its troops will need to traverse the mined area in the near future.
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68. 1980 Final Act, supra note 1, app. C, art. 6(l)(b)(v), 19 I.L.M. at 1532 (1980), reprinted in Schindler
& Toman, supra note 1, at 187.
69. See Rogers, supra note 34, at 1 99. With respect to this provision: "There is no reason why booby-traps
should not be prefabricated so long as they are not in the shape of a harmless, portable object. What the
Conference had in mind to prohibit were booby-traps made to look like watches, cameras, pens or other
attractive items. It did not prohibit the booby-trapping of existing attractive items." Id. In other words, a
belligerent may booby-trap a camera, but it may not manufacture booby-traps which appear to be cameras.
70. The Working Group proposal referred solely to "children's toys." A/CONF.95/3, Annex II, at 9;
1979 Report of the United States Delegation, supra note 51, app. D. The Committee of the Whole added
the rest of item l(b)(v), probably having in mind events in Afghanistan where the booby-trapping of objects
intended for children's care caused coundess children to be killed or maimed.
71. 1980 Final Act, supra note 1, app. C, art. 6, 19 I.L.M. at 1532 (1980), reprinted in Schindler & Toman,
supra note 1, at 187.
72. Id.
73. During World War II the Germans were particularly adept at preparing booby-traps; but no German
was tried on the charge that such an act was treacherous or perfidious and a violation of the law of war.
74. An example of a booby-trap that would be legal, even under the 1980 Protocol II, is one made as
part of a land mine which would cause the mine to explode if attempts were made to move it or to deactivate
it before its own internal mechanism causes it to deactivate or self-destruct. These would not fall within the
definition of "other devices." 1980 Final Act, supra note 1, app. C, art. 3(1)(C), 19 I.L.M. at 1530 (1980),
reprinted in Schindler & Toman, supra note 1, at 185. The Germans used such booby-traps in their sea mines
and in various types of aerial bombs dropped on Great Britain during World War II, and no charge was ever
made that such action had been treacherous or perfidious.
75. Article 37 of the 1977 Additional Protocol I states "[a]cts inviting the confidence of an adversary . . .
shall constitute perfidy." 1977 Additional Protocol I, supra note 13, art. 37, 16 I.L.M. at 1409 (1977), reprinted
in Schindler & Toman, supra note 1. The rare cases in which a booby-trap might be used in connection with
such an invitation are certainly covered in Article 6(1) of Protocol II.
76. 1980 Final Act, supra note 1, app. C, art. 7, 19 I.L.M. at 1532-33 (1980), reprinted in Schindler &
Toman, supra note 1, at 187-88.
77. 1980 Report of The United States Delegation, supra note 40, at 6-7.
78. Id.
79. Id. During the 1982 conflict in the Falklands (Malvinas) the Argentines sowed plastic mines
indiscriminately and without recording their locations. This resulted in many casualties occurring after the
cessation of hostilities. V. Adams, The Falklands Conflict 60 (1988).
80. 1979 Conference Report, supra note 22, at 22-23. Morocco was plagued with explosions ofWorld
War II mines and booby-traps for many years after the termination ofthat conflict, as were other North African
countries. Cf. G.A. Res. 35/71, U.N. GAOR 2d Comm, 35th Sess., 83rd plen. mtg., U.N. Doc.
A/35/592/Add.4 (1980), reprinted in 19 Djonovich, supra note 26, at 311 (recognizing that most developing
countries exposed to wars waged by colonial powers suffer loss of life and property as a result of mines).
81. 1980 Report of the United States Delegation, supra note 40, at 7-8.
82. See, e.g., Cauderay, Anti-Personnel Mines, 33 Intl Rev. Red Cross 273 (JulyAugust 1993). See also
Arms Project of Human Rights Watch, Landmines: A Deadly Legacy, passim (1993).
83. 1980 Final Act, supra note 1, app. C, art. 8, 19 I.L.M. at 1533 (1980), reprinted in Shindler & Toman,
supra note 1, at 188.
84. See L.C. Green, The Contemporary Law of Armed Conflict 133 (1993). Following the Gulf
War, military personnel, under the auspices of the Security Council resolutions, sustained severe casualties
during cleaning operations as Iraq failed to keep proper records of the locations of minefields. Id. Negligence
in keeping such records also resulted in numerous injuries to civilians after the cessation of hostilities in
Cambodia and the Falklands. Id.
85. 1980 Final Act, supra note 1 , app. C, art. 9, 19 I.L.M. at 1534 (1980), reprinted in Shindler & Toman,
supra note 1, at 188.
86. International Agreement for the Clearance of Mines in European Waters, Nov. 22, 1945, reprinted
in 3 Bevans, supra note 9, at 1322. Following World War II, German prisoners of war were used to remove
land mines laid by the Germans in France. This resulted in a number of casualties. Because of that experience,
Article 52(1) of the 1949 Third Geneva Convention provides that prisoners of war may not be compelled to
undertake dangerous labor and specifically states that the removal of mines falls within this category. See Third
Geneva Convention, supra note 17, at art. 52(1)(3). During the Falklands (Malvinas) War it was alleged that
the British were violating this provision. Howard S. Levie, The Falklands Crisis and the Laws of War, in The
Falklands War: Lessons for Strategy, Diplomacy and International Law 64, 73 (Alberto R. Coll
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& Anthony C. Arend, eds., 1985). Investigation revealed that Argentine prisoners ofwar had volunteered to
mark a stock ofArgentine mines which had been stored at a location close to their prisoner-of-war camp.
87. Carnahan, supra note 55, at 126, cites three post-World War II treaties containing provisions with
respect to the removal of land mines: Agreement Between the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations
Command, on the One Hand, and the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the
Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, on the Other Hand, Concerning a Military Armistice in
Korea, Panmunjom, Korea, July 27, 1953, art. II(13(a), 4 U.S.T. 235, T.I.A.S. No. 2782, reprinted in 4 Major
Peace Treaties of Modern History 2657 (Fred L. Israel, ed. 1967-1980) [hereinafter Israel] (calling for
removal of all minefields by the commander of the side whose forces emplaced them); Agreement on Ending
the War and Restoring Peace in Viet-Nam: Protocol Concerning the Cease-fire in South Viet-Nam and the
Joint Military Commission, Paris, Jan. 27, 1973, art. 5, 24 U.S.T. 38, pt.l., 39; T.I.A.S. No. 7542, reprinted
in 5 Israel 92, 93 (requiring each party to do its utmost to complete removal or deactivation of all mine-fields
and traps within fifteen days after cease fire); Appendix to Annex I of the Treaty of Peace Between the Arab
Republic of Egypt and the State of Israel, Washington, March 26, 1979, art. VI(4), 18 I.L.M. 362, 382-83,
reprinted in 5 Israel 331, 349 (agreeing that Israel will make efforts to destroy or remove minefields in areas
from which it withdraws).
88. See S. Res. 4568, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., 141 CONG. Rec. 4568 (1996) (ratifying Protocol II with
understanding concerning Article 6(1)). But see Rauch, supra note 34, at 286-287 (stating that provisions of
1977 Additional Protocol I and of 1980 Protocol II relating to mines are incompatible). It is submitted that
Rauch's conclusion is based on an overly critical analysis. Nevertheless, this would not present a problem to
a country such as the United States which has not ratified, and apparently does not intend to ratify, the 1977
Additional Protocol I.
89. See 1980 Report ofthe United States Delegation, supra note 40, at 8 ("The U.S. Delegation supported
the adoption of this Protocol in the belief that it would substantially reduce collateral injury and damage to
civilian populations, and would require other armed forces to observe the kind ofprudent and orderly practices
in the employment of mines which U.S. forces already observe.").
90. Protocol III Annexed to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain
Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects,
Geneva, Oct. 10, 1980, 1980 Final Act, supra note 1, app. D, 19 I.L.M. 1534, reprinted in Schindler & Toman,
supra note 1, at 190 [hereinafter "Protocol III"].
91. 1980 Report of the United States Delegation, supra note 40, at 9.
92. Of course, the United States could do as France has already done: ratify the Convention, but accept
only Protocols I and II. However, this is certainly not a procedure to be recommended.
93. SeeSandoz, supra note 44, at 13 (supporting notion that emphasis was placed on danger that incendiary
weapons present to civilians).
94. 1980 Final Act, supra note 1, app. D, art. 1., 19 I.L.M. at 1534, reprinted in Schindler & Toman, supra
note 1, at 190.
95. It is interesting to note that the Draft Protocol prepared by the 1979 Conference Working Group
on Incendiary Weapons included an alternative proposal which read simply: "It is prohibited to use incendiary
weapons." 1979 Conference Report, supra note 22, at 29.
96. See 1980 Final Act, supra note 1, app. D, 19 I.L.M. at 1534, reprinted in Schindler & Toman, supra
note 1, at 190.
97. See, e.g., Working Group's Draft Protocol, 1979 Conference Report, supra note 22, at 28; see also
the proposal by Australia and the Netherlands, supra note 22, at 33.
98. 1980 Final Act, supra note 1, app. D, art. 2, 19 I.L.M. at 1534, reprinted in Schindler & Toman, supra
note 1, at 190. It has also been strongly urged that the use of incendiaries against combatants be prohibited.
See, e.g., the proposals by the Soviet Union, Indonesia, Nigeria, and Jordan, 1979 Conference Report, supra
note 22, at 31.
99. This will mean that there will be no more fire-bombing of cities such as Tokyo, Dresden, etc., in
some of which more civilian lives were lost than at Hiroshima or Nagasaki.
100. Beginning with the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of
Environmental Techniques, Geneva, May 18, 1977, 31 U.S.T. 333, 167 I.L.M. 88, reprinted in Schindler &
Toman, supra note 1, at 163; continuing with the 1977 Additional Protocol I, supra note 13, at arts. 35(3) and
55; and now with the Protocol III, supra note 90, the draftsmen of law-of-war conventions have taken a few
small steps towards the protection of the natural environment from the havoc of war.
101. During the Vietnamese conflict, when the North Vietnamese became aware of the fact that a large
area around Hanoi was "off-limits" for attacks by American aircraft, that area became the major collection
area for military supplies.
372 Levie on the Law of War
102. That provision of the 1977 Additional Protocol I sets forth the precautions which must be taken
when a military objective is to be attacked and includes the taking of all feasible precautions to minimize
civilian casualties. See 1977 Additional Protocol, supra note 13, at art. 57(2).
103. Multilateral Treaties, supra note 33, at 833, 835, reprinted in Schindler & Toman, supra note 1,
at 196.
104. S. Treaty Doc. No. 25, 103d cong., 2d Sess. (1994) reprinted in 88 Am. J. Intl L. 748, 751 (1994).
105. 88 Am. J. Intl L. 749 (1994).
106. Id. At 748. "Further examination" when 14 years have elapsed since that Protocol was drafted!
107. S. Res. 4568, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., 141 Cong. Rec. 4568 (1995).
Prohibitions and Restrictions
On The Use of Conventional Weapons
Addendum
Protocol II to the 1980 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of
Certain Conventional Weapons which may be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to
have Indiscriminate Effects is entitled Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use
ofMines, Booby Traps and Other Devices. While it contains a number of valuable
provisions for the protection of civilians, its provisions were considered
inadequate and it is estimated that there are, today, close to 100,000,000 land
mines buried in countries around the world and that every day a number of
innocent civilians are accidently killed or maimed by such weapons. Their value
for both defensive and offensive purposes makes it difficult to convince the
representatives of governments that they should be banned. One solution is to
require that all land mines become inert after a specified period of time. In May
1996 an amended Protocol was drafted, which requires that they be detectable,
and self-destructable or self-deactivating. Also, they must be removed at the
cessation of hostilities. Perhaps another solution is to require that all land mines
be so constructed that they will only explode when subjected to a pressure of a
set number of pounds, one which will exceed the weight of an individual or a
civilian automobile. (At the same time a Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons
(Protocol IV) was drafted placing restrictions on the use of laser weapons
specifically designed to blind.)
XIX
Violations of Human Rights in Time of War
As War Crimes
24 Israel Yearbook on Human Rights 119 (1995)
There is a tendency to consider the term "human rights" as being solely
applicable to the peacetime protection of those rights and to consider the
term "humanitarian law" as being applicable to the protection of human rights
afforded by the law of war in time of war. Without doubt, the humanitarian
law ofwar includes much of the law which, in time ofpeace, would be termed
human rights; and there is no reason why they should not continue to bear that
title in time ofwar. However, it must be borne in mind that although all of the
law of war is humanitarian, not all of the humanitarian law of war involves
human rights. For example, while the provision of the law of war prohibiting
the use ofdumdum bullets is unquestionably a humanitarian rule, it can scarcely
be considered to be a human right.
In drafting the 1945 London Charter, the instrument that created the
International Military Tribunal which tried the major war criminals at
Nuremberg, the draftsman included two provisions defining acts constituting
violations of the humanitarian law ofwar and violations ofhuman rights in time
of war. Those provisions read as follows:
Article 6(b). War Crimes. Namely, violations of the laws or customs of war. Such
violations shall include, but shall not be limited to, murder, ill-treatment or
deportation to slave labor or for any other purpose of civilian population of or in
occupied territory, murder or ill-treatment of prisoners ofwar or persons on the
seas, killing ofhostages, plunder ofpublic or private property, wanton destruction
of cities, towns, or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity.
Article 6(c). Crimes against humanity . Namely, murder, extermination, enslavement,
deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population,
before or during the war or persecutions on political, racial or religious
grounds...whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where
perpetrated.
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The provisions of Article 5(b) and 5(c) of the Charter of the International
Military Tribunal for the Far East which tried the major Japanese war criminals
at Tokyo were substantially similar.
The contention was frequendy advanced that the provisions of Article 6(c)
concerning Crimes against Humanity, and others like them, created new
humanitarian rules, new war crimes, and were, therefore, ex postfacto laws. This
contention was uniformly rejected by the tribunals. In the case of United States
v. Otto Ohlendorf, better known as The Einsatzgruppen case, the Military Tribunal
stated:
Although the Nuernberg trials represent the first time that international tribunals
have adjudicated crimes against humanity as an international offence, this does
not . . . mean that a new offence has been added to the list of transgressions of
man. Nuernberg has only demonstrated how humanity can be defended in court,
and it is inconceivable that with this precedent extant, the law ofhumanity should
ever lack for a tribunal.
In view of the judicial precedents and the numerous subsequent actions of the
international community recognizing crimes against humanity as a wartime
offence under international law, the contention that crimes against humanity
are not well-established violations of the humanitarian law of war now has no
merit whatsoever.
A major example of a wartime violation of human rights occurred during
World War I when the Imperial German Government caused the deportation
from their homes in Belgium and France of a total of approximately 100,000
men, women and children, to be used as forced labour in Germany. This practice
was discontinued, and many ofthe deportees were repatriated when the Imperial
German Government responded to neutral indignation at this patent violation
"7
of human rights. During World War II, the Nazis relendessly followed the
same practice, but on a far greater scale, with an estimated total of 12,000,000
persons moved from their various home countries to Nazi Germany to perform
forced labour, for the most part in munitions factories. In this instance, there
were comparatively few neutral nations to express their indignation and, in any
event, it is doubtful that such action on their part would have had any effect on
Hitler's Nazi Government. The comparatively small percentage of deported
persons who survived the extreme ill-treatment that they uniformly received
were forced to remain in Germany as virtual slaves until rescued by Allied
advances or until the German surrender. The prohibition of this practice has
now been codified in Article 49 of the 1949 Geneva Convention (IV) Relative
Q
to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, the first paragraph of
which states:
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Individual or mass forcible transfers, as well as deportations of protected persons
from occupied territory to the territory of the Occupying Power or to that ofany
10
other country, occupied or not, are prohibited, regardless of their motive.
While theJapanese also engaged in this practice ofdeportation offoreign civilians
to Japan for labour purposes, they did so on a much smaller scale.
One major violation of human rights that occurred in Nazi Germany prior
to, and on a greatly increased scale, during World War II, was the incarceration
of individuals, both German and foreign, citizens of both friendly and enemy
countries, in concentration camps, to which they were sent at the whim of the
Gestapo, the SS and the other Nazi security organizations. No judicial
proceedings were involved in these actions, either before or during the
imprisonment. There was no way to challenge the action, no way to obtain a
hearing before an impartialjudge. This was obviously a gross violation ofhuman
rights both in time of peace and in time of war. Moreover, some of these
concentration camps were basically extermination camps, places that were set
up for the sole purpose ofexterminating inmates on a wholesale scale, individuals
whose only offences were that they were merely suspected of less than 100
percent support of the Nazi government, or they were Jews, or gypsies, or
citizens of a foreign nation, even though the latter might have been a German
12
ally. For example, it is known that between four million and six million
individuals were exterminated by the use of gas at the camp established by the
13
Nazis in Auschwitz, Poland. Exterminations on a large scale also took place
at concentration camps located at Belsen (tried by the British), at
Buchenwald and Dachau (tried by the United States), at Natzweiler (tried
17
by the French), etc.
Another Nazi practice which was unquestionably a violation ofhuman rights
and which was conducted against both Germans and foreigners, was
euthanasia—the killing of persons who were terminally or mentally ill—the
individuals whom Hitler called "useless eaters." Based upon the evidence
submitted to it, the International Military Tribunal estimated that some 275,000
18
individuals had been killed in this manner. Allied war crimes tribunals tried a
19
number ofcases involving this blatant violation ofhuman rights; and long after
World War II had come to an end, the Federal Republic ofGermany succeeded
in obtaining the extradition for trial of several individuals, including medical
• 20
doctors, charged with this offence.
A number of the post-World War II trials in Europe involved the use of
enemy personnel for purposes of medical experiments, many of which
completely lacked any merit and practically all ofwhich resulted in the death of
the victims. Such a use of defenceless persons was certainly a violation of
human rights and of the humanitarian law of war. At least one such case was
376 Levie on the Law of War
22
tried by the United States in Japan. ' In addition, the Soviet Union tried a
number of members of the Japanese Army on the charge that they had used
human beings (Chinese, Russian, and, perhaps, American) to test the efficacy
23
of bacteriological weapons.
Two other Nazi practices that constituted violations of human rights, based
on orders emanating direcdy from Hider, were the so-called Night and Fog
Decree and the Terrorist and Sabotage Decree. ' Under the former, the death
penalty was to be applicable for all acts committed by non-Germans against the
German State or its authorities in occupied territory. Such cases were to be tried
in the occupied territory in which they had occurred only if it was probable that
a death sentence would be adjudged. Otherwise the accused persons were to be
taken to Germany where they were quickly executed without trial or, in rare
cases, sent to a concentration camp. Inquiries concerning such persons were to
be answered with the statement that "the state of the proceeding did not allow
further information," thus keeping the families in ignorance concerning the
status of the accused persons, the great majority ofwhom did not live to return
to their homes. This procedure was inhumane and was a gross violation ofhuman
rights and of the humanitarian law of war.
The second practice mentioned was based on the Terrorist and Sabotage Decree.
This decree provided that with respect to all acts of violence by non-Germans
directed against German personnel or installations in occupied territory, the
offenders were to be overpowered on the spot (this meant they were to be
killed) . Ifnot apprehended until later, they were to be turned over to the Security
Police (again, this meant that they were to be killed). No judicial proceedings
to determine guilt were to take place. Death could result from the mere whim
of the occupation authorities. Again, this procedure was inhumane and a gross
violation of human rights and of the humanitarian law of war. (It is interesting
to know that as a humanitarian gesture, women who did not themselves
participate in such attacks were only to be given assigned work—and children
were to be spared!)
If we consider, as we undoubtedly should, that many of the humanitarian
protections to which prisoners of war are entided, under both the customary
and conventional laws of war, are human rights, then these were human rights
that were violated on a vast scale by the Germans, by the Soviet Union and by
the Japanese. Probably in excess ofone million Soviet prisoners ofwar died from
maltreatment in the hands of the Nazis; and approximately a similar number of
German prisoners ofwar never returned from Soviet custody. Strange to relate,
the Nazis substantially complied with the humanitarian law ofwar with respect
to British and American prisoners of war, perhaps because they knew that
German prisoners of war held by Great Britain and the United States were
receiving appropriate humane treatment. There was no such reciprocity on the
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part of the Japanese, where violations of the humanitarian law of war for the
protection of prisoners of war were standard procedure. In this respect, it is
worthy of note that while only four percent of the Americans known to have
been in German custody died in captivity, more than 27 percent of the
Americans known to have been in Japanese custody did not survive.
With the possible exception of the Falklands (Malvinas) War between the
Argentine and Great Britain, incidents involving the denial of human rights
and of the humanitarian law of war to enemy civilians and captured enemy
personnel have occurred in every international conflict since the end ofWorld
War II. This despite the post-war war crimes trials, one ofthe purposes ofwhich
was to establish a precedent beyond dispute that such offences would not go
unpunished. However, a number of those conflicts ended in negotiated
settlements, that included a requirement for the return of all prisoners of war.
That provision necessarily resulted in the repatriation of even those who had
been identified as having committed offences, including violations of human
rights and ofthe humanitarian law ofwar, for which they should have been tried
and, if convicted, sentenced to appropriate punishment. Similarly, the leaders
ofthe authoritarian governments which initiated these wars and frequendy made
violations of human rights a basic element of State policy during such conflicts
have gone unpunished. This was true as to one or both of these factors in Korea
(1950-53), in Vietnam (1965-72), in the India-Pakistan War (1972), in the
Iran-Iraq War (1980-88) and in the Gulf Crisis (1990-91).
In Korea, the United Nations Command had identified and was prepared to
try some 200 North Koreans and Chinese Communists charged with violations
ofthe humanitarian law ofwar applicable to prisoners ofwar as well as violations
of the human rights of South Korean civilians. Because of the provisions of the
Armistice Agreement, all of these individuals were repatriated and went
unpunished.
In Vietnam, there were innumerable instances of violations of the
humanitarian law ofwar and innumerable instances ofviolations ofhuman rights.
For example, captured American soldiers and airmen who were wounded
received no medical treatment, they were subjected to solitary confinement,
confined in prisons, and paraded before hostile crowds, the members of which
were permitted and encouraged to assault them with sticks and stones. These
were all violations of the humanitarian law of war by the North Vietnamese.
Moreover, the Viet Cong executed innocent prisoners ofwar in reprisal for the
execution after trial ofViet Cong terrorists, one ofwhom had been captured in
Saigon while still in possession of a bomb set to explode just five minutes later.
These gross violations of the humanitarian law ofwar by the North Vietnamese
and by the Viet Cong received little or no publicity. Unfortunately, the only
case that received widespread publicity was the slaughter of a group of
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Vietnamese men, women and children by American soldiers, also a gross
violation of human rights. Regrettably, because of unwarranted political
interference only two trials by court-martial for this incident took place. While
the major culprit, one Lieutenant William L. Calley, was convicted of murder
by a United States Army court-martial and was sentenced to be punished, his
29
punishment was manifestly inadequate for the offence committed.
In the December 1972 India-Pakistan conflict, India charged the Pakistani
Army with having committed genocide in what was then East Pakistan (now
Bangladesh) during an attempt to suppress a revolt in that area. In 1974, India
agreed to repatriate the more than 90,000 Pakistani prisoners ofwar whom they
still detained, despite the fact that there had long since been a cessation of active
hostilities between the two countries. However, it withheld 195 of them for
trial by Bangladesh for the crime ofgenocide. Pakistan brought an action against
India in the International Court ofjustice, pointing out that both countries were
parties to the Genocide Convention, Article 6 of which provides that
jurisdiction to conduct trials for violations thereof is limited to the sovereign in
whose territory the alleged genocide had occurred (in this case Pakistan) or to
an international criminal court (an institution that does not yet exist). By
agreement, the 195 prisoners ofwar were eventually repatriated to Pakistan and
the action in the International Court ofjustice was discontinued. No trial was
conducted by Pakistan. Without intending any criticism ofPakistan, and without
passing judgment on the guilt or innocence of any of the 195 Pakistanis singled
out by India for trial, this is indicative of the limitations of the Genocide
Convention. In most instances, genocide is and will be government sponsored
so that, lacking an international criminal court, unless the offence is committed
on foreign territory, there will be no punishment of the offending persons. As
already noted, during World War II, the Nazis maintained "extermination
camps" for the killing of Jews, gypsies, and other persons considered to be
"asocial", not only in Germany, but also in Poland and in the Soviet Union.
Had the Genocide Convention been in effect at that time, only the subsequent
German governments would have been competent to try those accused who
had committed their offences in concentration camps located on German
territory.
Concerning the maltreatment ofprisoners ofwar by both sides in the Iran-Iraq
War, a Special Mission dispatched to those countries by the Secretary-General
of the United Nations found that
harsh treatment and violence in the camps [in both countries] were far from
uncommon. POWs provided a large volume of infomiation about their physical
ill-treatment, by such means as whipping, beating with truncheons or cables,
simultaneous blows on both ears, electric shocks, assaults on sexual organs and
kicks often inflicted in parts of the body where POWs had suffered wounds.
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Physical violence appeared to be particularly common in POW camps in Iraq.
We also received reports of collective punishment measures, such as lengthy
confinement and deprivation of food and water. . .
These actions were, of course, gross violations of the humanitarian law of war,
specifically ofvarious provisions of the 1949 Geneva Convention (III) Relative
to the Treatment of Prisoners ofWar.
Another violation of the humanitarian law of war which occurred in both
Iran and Iraq is worthy of note. Thus, the United Nations Special Mission said:
[W]e also heard allegations of religious pressure on non-Moslem POWs and of
conversions to Islam by some Christian POWs. While we were not able to
ascertain whether these conversions had taken place under duress, we could not
but notice the atmosphere of missionary zeal that permeated some camps.
If these conversions occurred as a result of duress, as they very probably did, this
was contrary to the freedom of religion provisions of Article 34 of Geneva
Convention (III) and constituted a violation of human rights and of the
humanitarian law of war.
One other statement made by the United Nations Special Mission in its report
bears repeating:
Having noted that numerous POWs have spent three or more years in detention,
we feel compelled to pose the question: is not prolonged captivity in itselfinhuman
treatment?
During World War II, some prisoners of war spent as many as five years in
captivity. During Vietnam, some prisoners ofwar spent as many as seven years
in captivity. During the Iran-Iraq conflict, there were undoubtedly prisoners of
war on both sides who spent similar lengthy periods in prisoner-of-war camps.
These were not criminals serving a well-deserved punishment, but persons who
had fought on behalf of their country. Whether their country fights as an
aggressor or in defence of its territory and existence, there should be some
method ofsecuring the release and repatriation ofprisoners ofwar more humane
than awaiting the cessation of active hostilities. Perhaps we should return to
the processes of exchange and parole, which have not been used on a major
scale since the American Civil War of more than a century and a quarter ago.
However, if this is to be done, it must be accomplished by an international
agreement such as the 1949 Geneva Conventions, negotiated in time of peace.
Such a treaty must be complete in itself, as it is extremely difficult, and sometimes
impossible, to secure agreements between opposing belligerents during the
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course of hostilities.
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The 1990-91 Gulf Crisis quickly disclosed that the two-year period which
had elapsed since the end of hostilities in the Iran-Iraq War had not brought
about any change in the attitude of Saddam Hussein's Iraq with respect to
compliance with the humanitarian law ofwar in general and with human rights
in particular. From 2 August 1990, the very first day of Iraq's invasion ofKuwait,
violations by Iraq of the humanitarian law ofwar and ofhuman rights occurred
on a massive scale.
At the time of the Iraqi invasion, the members of the civilian population of
Kuwait and foreigners in Kuwait were considered "protected persons" within
38
the meaning of Article 4(1) of the 1949 Geneva Convention (IV). Thousands
of Kuwaiti civilians were murdered and thousands of others were deported to
Iraq. Both of these actions constituted violations of human rights and of the
humanitarian law of war. Under Article 47 of that Convention, their status was
not changed by the announced annexation ofKuwait by Iraq on 8 August 1990,
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which, in any event, was illegal and ineffective. Under Article 35(1) of that
Convention, the foreigners had the right to leave Kuwait. The Iraqi authorities
ordered that they be detained as hostages. This was a violation of the
humanitarian law ofwar and a violation of their human rights. Moreover, Iraq
magnified the violations by placing hostages in military installations, including
chemical weapons factories, in an attempt to immunize those installations from
attack by the United Nations Coalition. This, too, was a violation of the
humanitarian law of war which specifically provides that "[t]he presence of a
protected person may not be used to render certain points or areas immune from.41
military operations." One well-informed author has listed the Iraqi violations
of the humanitarian law of war in part as follows:
* inhumane treatment of protected persons, as prohibited by Article 27 of the
Fourth Geneva Convention, including willful killing and the protection of
women against rape;
* torture and brutality directed against protected persons, as prohibited by Article
32 of the Fourth Geneva Convention;
* the taking of hostages, as prohibited by Article 34 of the Fourth Geneva
Convention;
* mass transfers, detention of protected persons in areas particularly exposed to
the danger ofwar, or transfer of part ofan occupying power's own population
into the territory it occupies, as prohibited by Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva
Convention;
* compelling protected persons to serve in the armed forces of the occupying
power, as prohibited by Article 51 of the Fourth Geneva Convention;
* setting up places of internment in areas particularly exposed to the danger of
42
war, as prohibited by Article 83 of the Fourth Geneva Convention.
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It is apparent from all of the foregoing that, despite the hundreds of provisions
of the codified humanitarian law of war, provisions that establish minimum
standards and provisions that specifically prohibit certain actions, in time ofwar
the humanitarian law of war and the laws establishing human rights are all too
frequendy violated, sometimes by individual behaviour, but perhaps even more
often by national policy. Regrettably, we cannot be overly optimistic in this
regard with respect to the future conflicts with which our planet will
undoubtedly be plagued. However, one great step in the right direction has been
taken by the United Nations Security Council in the case of the rampant
violations of human rights and of the humanitarian law of war committed by
the government and the troops of the former Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Montenegro) in the Republics of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Beginning as early
as September 1991, a series of resolutions has been adopted by the Security
Council with respect to the armed conflict taking place in Bosnia and
Herzegovina. Thus, Resolution 771 contains the following preambular
provision:
Expressing grave alarm at continuing reports of widespread violations of
international humanitarian law occurring within the territory of the former
Yugoslavia and especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina including reports of mass
forcible expulsion and deportation ofcivilians, imprisonment and abuse ofcivilians
in detention centres, deliberate attacks on noncombatants, hospitals and
ambulances, impeding the delivery of food and medical supplies to the civilian
population, and wanton devastation and destruction of property.
Its operative paragraphs include the following:
1. Reaffirms that all parties to the conflict are bound to comply with their
obligations under international humanitarian law and in particular the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and that persons who commit or order the
commission of grave breaches of the Conventions are individually responsible in
respect of such breaches;
2. Strongly condemns any violations of international humanitarian law, including
those involved in the practice of "ethnic cleansing";
5. Calls upon States and, as appropriate, international humanitarian organizations
to collate substantiated information in their possession or submitted to them
relating to the violations of humanitarian law, including grave breaches of the
Geneva Conventions, being committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia
and to make this information available to the Council.
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A resolution adopted on 6 October 1992 went a step further, creating a
Commission of Experts to examine the information submitted pursuant to the
above quoted paragraph 5. The Commission could make its own investigations
and was to provide the Secretary-General with its conclusions with respect to
the evidence of the violations of international humanitarian law committed in
the territory of the former Yugoslavia.
By a resolution adopted on 22 February 1993, the Security Council decided
that
an international tribunal shall be established for the prosecution of persons
responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in
the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991.
This resolution requested the Secretary-General to submit proposals for the
establishment of such an international tribunal. He did so on 3 May 1993 and
by a resolution adopted on 25 May 1993 the Security Council approved the
proposals made by the Secretary-General in his Report, including the proposed
Statute of the International Tribunal attached to that Report.
Article 1 of the Statute establishes the competence of the International
Tribunal "to prosecute persons responsible for serious violations ofinternational
humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since
48
1991." Article 2 gives the Tribunal jurisdiction over "persons committing or
ordering to be committed grave breaches ofthe Geneva Conventions;" Article
3 gives the Tribunal jurisdiction over "persons violating the laws or customs of
war" which include, but are not limited to, those enumerated; Article 4 gives
the Tribunal jurisdiction over genocidal crimes; and Article 5 gives the
Tribunal jurisdiction over crimes against humanity.
While there is no question that major difficulties will be encountered in
obtaining personal jurisdiction over individuals charged with violations of
human rights and of the humanitarian law of war enumerated in the Statute of
the International Tribunal, and in collecting the evidence necessary for their
convictions, the mere fact that such a Statute has been unanimously adopted by
the Security Council augurs well for the future.
In addition to the actions ofthe Security Council with respect to the violations
of the humanitarian law of war by the former Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Montenegro) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, on 20 March 1993 the latter two
States instituted an action against the former in the International Court of
Justice, in which they asked for and obtained provisional measures of relief.
As there was no change in the activities of Serbia and Montenegro, no refraining
from the policy of "ethnic cleansing" (genocide), Bosnia and Herzegovina
returned to the Court seeking additional provisional measures of relief.
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Meanwhile, following the old adage that "the best defence is a good offence,"
Serbia and Montenegro countercharged that Bosnia and Herzegovina are
themselves guilty of genocide, perpetrated against ethnic Serbs in the territory
of the latter two States and, in turn, requested provisional measures of relief.
Unfortunately, there probably is at least some merit to this claim, as the Balkan
ethnic groups have a long history of such actions, and there is litde reason to
believe that today's Bosnian and Herzegovinian Croats and Muslims are radically
different from those who preceded them. However, the Court did not grant
this request.
It is believed that the foregoing summary clearly indicates that the
international community of the twentieth century has, in general, consistently
demonstrated a definite and sincere desire to ensure the protection of human
rights in time of war. However, with all too great frequency, once hostilities
have commenced, the legal protections so humanely granted have tended to be
disregarded, often by nations which made great oratorical gestures during the
course of drafting negotiations, but probably with no intention whatsoever,
should the occasion arise, of complying with the humane provisions that they
so strenuously supported. Nevertheless, the actions taken with respect to the
former Yugoslavia may be interpreted as a small indication that the international
community will no longer tolerate claims to the right ofnon-interference when
a State engages in violations of human rights in time of war.
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the Prosecutor "responsible for the investigation and prosecution of persons responsible for serious violations
of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1 January 1991."
(This same inappropriate language appears in Arts. 2, 3, 4, and 5 of the Statute.)
49. This article is really based on Article 130 of the 1949 Geneva Convention III, supra note 33 and Art.
147 of Geneva Convention IV, supra note 9.
50. This article is based on various provisions ofthe Regulations Annexed to the Hague Convention (No.
IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs ofWar on Land, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277 (1910), 100 Brit. Foreign & St.
386 Levie on the Law of War
Papers 338; 1 Bevans, supra note 3, at 631; 2 Am. J. Int'l L. Supp. 190 (1908); Schindler & Toman, supra note
2, at 63.
51. This article is based on Art. 2 of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide, supra note 30. However, it should be borne in mind that the Statute of the International
Tribunal does not purport to enforce the Genocide Convention direcdy. As we have seen, Art. 6 of that
Convention provides that persons charged with its violation
shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which the act was committed, or
by such international tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect to those Contracting Parties which
shall have accepted its jurisdiction.
The International Court of Justice has held that it has jurisdiction to make decisions "relating to the
interpretation, application or fulfilment" of the Convention, as provided in Art. 9 thereof [1993] I.C.J. Rep.
16, para. 26; ICJ Communique No. 93/28 bis, 13 September 1993, at 9. However, it would not have
jurisdiction to conduct a criminal trial of an individual for a violation of the Convention. (See Art. 34(1) of
the Statute of the Court.)
52. This article is based on Art. 6(c) of the 1945 Charter of the International Military Tribunal (see text
in connection with supra note 3), with the addition of the offences of imprisonment, torture and rape.
53. Art. 29 of the Statute requires States to comply with requests for the arrest and detention of persons
made by the International Tribunal. Unfortunately, any representatives of the new Yugoslavia who negotiate
an end to the hostilities in Bosnia and Herzegovina in which the humanitarian law ofwar has been so frequently
violated will probably be among the individuals who committed or ordered the commission of those
violations—and it can be assumed that they will insist on including in the document ending the hostilities a
provision relieving some or all of the violators of responsibility for their offences. Concerning this problem
generally, see Levie, supra note 5, at 42. Moreover, the Statute, by implication, forbids trials in absentia. See its
Art. 21(4)(d) and the Report of the Secretary-General, supra note 6, para. 101, 32 I.L.M. 1163, 1184.
54. It is worthy of note that not only does Art. 7(2) of the Statute eliminate "Head of State" and "Act of
State" defences, and that Art. 7(3) provides for "command responsibility," provisions that have been generally
accepted in law-of-war conventions, but that Art. 7(4) eliminates "superior orders" as a defence, something
that several diplomatic conferences had declined to do. One cannot help but feel that States vote against a rule
denying the defence of superior orders when it might be applied to their own nationals, but favour it here,
where only nationals of the former Yugoslavia are involved.
55. Case Concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide; I.C.J. Communique No. 93/4, 22 March 1993.
56. Ibid., Order of 8 April 1993, [1993] I.C.J. Rep. 3; 32 I.L.M. 890 (May 1933); I.C.J. Communique
No. 93/9, 8 April 1993, and 93/9 bis, 16 April 1993.
57. I.C.J. Communique No. 93/21, 28 July 1993.
58. I.C.J. Communique No. 93/23, 11 August 1993.
59. I.C.J. Communique No. 93/28, 13 September 1993. The new request by Bosnia and Herzegovina
was, in effect, also denied, the Court holding that what was required was "immediate and effective
implementation" of the provisional measures set forth in its earlier order of 8 April 1993.
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Introduction
uring the two decades that followed the Diplomatic Conference which
drafted the four 1949 Geneva Conventionsfor the Protection of War Victims
there was comparatively little activity directed towards the codification or
extension of the reach of the law of war. The only such activity in the 1950's
was the drafting ofthe 1954 Hague Conventionfor the Protection of Cultural Property
in the Event ofArmed Conflict. This Convention was undoubtedly a response to
the rapacious actions of agents of Hitler and Goering in German-occupied
territories during World War II. Among other things, it specifically prohibits
the pillage of objects of arts and the use of cultural objects for purposes exposing
them to the clangers ofdamage or destruction. The United States has not ratified
this Convention but there are indications that it is tending towards such action
in the foreseeable future.
In 1967 the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities ofStates in the Exploration
and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies was opened
for signature. Article IV(1) of that Treaty prohibits the placing in orbit around
the Earth ofany nuclear weapons or other weapons ofmass destruction or their
installation on any celestial body. The second paragraph of that article, in effect,
demilitarizes the moon and other celestial bodies.
The only other activity in this field in the 1960's was the 1968 Convention on
the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against
Humanity. This Convention was approved by the General Assembly of the
United Nations at a time when it was feared that the criminal statute of
limitations ofthe Federal Republic ofGermany would soon preclude that nation
ofcontinuing its program ofprosecutions for war crimes committed by German
"7
nationals during the course of World War II. It is of interest to note that in
that Convention the definition of "crimes against humanity" was extended with
the specific additions of apartheid and genocide. Once again, the United States
has not ratified this Convention and it would appear that it has no intention of
so doing.
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During the decade ofthe 1970's four conventions were drafted which resulted




1971 Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement ofNuclear Weapons and
Other Weapons ofMass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and
the Subsoil Thereof (better known as the Seabed Convention);
2. 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their
Destruction (better known as the Bacteriological Convention);
3. 1976 Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use
ofEnvironmental Modification Techniques (better known as the ENMOD
11
Convention); and
4. 1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949
and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts
12
(Protocol I) (better known as the 1977 Additional Protocol I).
And while the decade of the 1980's, and the 1990's to date, have not been
so prolific, the importance ofthe few decisions reached during those two periods
cannot be overstated. In 1980 a Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the
Use ofCertain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious
or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (with three Protocols) (better known as the
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Conventional Weapons Convention) was drafted; and in 1993 agreement was
finally reached on a Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production,
Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction. It is with these
latter six Conventions that we will now concern ourselves. It is, perhaps,
appropriate to point out at this time that several of these Conventions were
drafted by the Conference on Disarmament which meets in Geneva on a more
or less permanent basis and under a variety of titles. However, that does not
lessen their impact on the law of war. The various 1907 Hague Conventions
which contain much of the basic codified law ofwar were drafted by a so-called
"Peace Conference"; and many law-of-war conventions, such as the 1925
16 17
Geneva Protocol, the 1936 London Submarine Protocol, etc. were drafted by
disarmament conferences—but this did not lessen their impact on the law of
war.
Seabed Treaty
Article I of the 1971 Seabed Treaty Provides that States Parties thereto
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undertake not to emplant or emplace on the seabed and the ocean floor and in
the subsoil (thereofbeyond the outer limit of a seabed zone) . . . any nuclear
1
8
weapons or any other types ofweapons of mass destruction ....
This prohibition does not apply to the territorial waters of coastal States, but
under Article II it does apply to the "seabed zone" which includes all places
beyond the twelve-mile limit as measured in accordance with the provisions of
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the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone. In effect, the
Seabed Treaty prohibits the laying of nuclear mines or other nuclear weapons
under the waters of the high seas.
Article III ofthis Convention contains the verification provisions. Every State
Party to the Treaty has "the right to verify through observation" the activities
on the seabed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereofof every other State
Party "provided that observation does not interfere with such activities"; and a
State Party may, if it deems it necessary, refer the matter to the Security Council
of the United Nations. Inasmuch as such activities will necessarily be taking
place on the seabed and ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof beyond the
territorial waters ofany coastal State, this means that it will be taking place under
the waters of the high seas. The "right" thus granted appears to be more or less
meaningless as it would exist even without the treaty grant. In fact, in view of
the provision that the observation may not interfere with a State's activities on
the seabed, it may even be argued that the provision, rather than assisting in
verifying compliance, protects the State engaged in illegal activities from
observation as it may label any such observation as "interference". Similarly,
every State Party to the Treaty would have the right to have recourse to the
Security Council of the United Nations if it had evidence that another State
Party was violating the provisions ofthe Treaty even without a specific provision
granting that right. It can be seen that in drafting this article the draftsmen were
more concerned with ensuring that it could be said that the Treaty included a
verification provision than with drafting a meaningful provision on the subject.
The United States is a Party to this Treaty. It will be necessary at some point
to reach a decision as to whether it prohibits the use of nuclear warheads on
such weapons as the CAPTOR ofthe United States Navy, a weapon which lies
on the seabed and discharges a torpedo only when activated by the passage of a
submarine, a torpedo which is capable of carrying a nuclear warhead.
Bacteriological Convention
While we usually refer to the 1925 Geneva Protocol as the instrument
prohibiting the use of asphyxiating gases, actually it prohibited the use not only
of asphyxiating gases but also of "bacteriological methods of warfare". In 1972,
being unable at that time to reach agreement on a more comprehensive
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combined chemical-bacteriological weapons convention, a convention was
signed by which the States Parties to it agreed to prohibit the "development,
production and stockpiling" of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons,
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and further agreed to destroy all such weapons then in their arsenals. With
"use" already prohibited, this means that the States Parties have, in effect, agreed
that no such weapons could be or would be available in any future war.
Once again, Article VI of this Convention, dealing with verification, leaves
much to be desired. It provides for the lodging of a complaint with the Security
Council of the United Nations with respect to any alleged violation of the
provisions of the Convention and includes an undertaking by any State Party to
the Convention to cooperate in any investigation thereafter initiated by the
Security Council. Unfortunately, such an investigation can, of course, be
prevented by a veto in the Security Council; and a number of States have
heretofore found it expedient to disregard mandates ofthe Security Council and
undoubtedly will do so in the future when they believe that such action is in
their national interest—which, of course, it will be when they are the actual
violators of the Convention and are being investigated.
The United States is a Party to this Convention. Strange to relate, all of the
"non-law-abiding States", with the exception ofSyria, have found it appropriate
to became Parties to this Convention. To what extent they can be expected to
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comply with its provisions is debatable.
ENMOD Convention
By Article I of the 1976 ENMOD Convention a State Party thereto has
undertaken
not to engage in military or any other hostile use of environmental modification
techniques having widespread long-lasting or severe effects as the means of
destruction, damage or injury to any other State Party.
Article II defines environmental modification techniques as "any technique
for changing—through the deliberate manipulation of natural processes—the
dynamics, composition or structure of the Earth." Although Article III of the
Convention specifically provides that it does not apply to environmental
modifications techniques for peaceful purposes, a number of States have
apparently failed to ratify this Convention for fear that, despite that specific
provision, they will be accused of a violation of the Convention and of a hostile
act, if, for example, they seed a cloud in order to cause rain to fall over an arid
area of their territory, when, had that action not been taken, the cloud might
have provided much-needed rain on the territory of a neighboring State.
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Problems with respect to the objectives and application of the Convention
and with respect to charges ofviolations thereof are covered in Article V which
provides for the establishment of a Consultative Committee ofExperts to solve
the former and for resort to the Security Council of the United Nations to pass
on the latter. An Annex to the Convention sets out the functions and rules of
procedure of the Consultative Committee. The provisions with respect to the
Security Council are, with a few unimportant exceptions, identical with those
contained in the 1911 Bacteriological Convention, discussed above.
Because of the technical nature of this Convention, the draftsmen deemed it
appropriate to reach a number of "understandings" which are not a part of the
22
Convention itself. These understandings include definitions of the terms
"widespread", "long-lasting", and "severe" used in Article I; and an illustrative
list of examples of the phenomena referred to in Article II.
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The United States is a Party to this Convention.
1977 Additional Protocol I
After negotiations conducted during 1974, 1975, 1976, and 1977, a
Diplomatic Conference convened by the Swiss Government was finally
successful in completing the drafting ofthe 1971 Additional Protocol J, the primary
purpose of which was to provide protection from the hazards of war to the
persons not protected by the 1949 Geneva Conventions: the civilian populations
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in the unoccupied territory of the belligerent States. Unfortunately, primarily
because of a certain group ofprovisions of that Protocol, many States, including
France, Great Britain, and the United States, have not ratified it.
The Preamble to this Protocol contains a statement to which the United
States fully subscribes. After referring to the international agreements containing
the rules of the law of war, it states that these rules
must be applied in all circumstances to all persons who are protected by those
instruments, without any adverse distinction based on the nature or origin of the
armed conflict or on the causes espoused by or attributed to the Parties to the
conflict.
This is a complete rejection of the doctrine of the "just war", espoused by
some nations, under which the law ofwar is binding upon their enemy, always
the aggressor, while it is not binding upon the victim of aggression, always
oneself.
Article 1 of the Protocol is concerned with when it is applicable. Paragraph
4 of that Article states:
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4. The situations referred to in the preceding paragraph include armed conflicts
in which peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation
and against racist regimes. . . .
Prior to this provision the conflicts therein referred to had been considered
to be internal conflicts, civil wars to which the international law of war did not
apply. This provision, with its corollary provisions in Articles 43 and 44, is one
of the main objections of the United States, and other States, to this Protocol..25
Ever since the unratified 1814 Declaration of Brussels four requirements for




be commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates;
2. wear a fixed distinctive emblem recognizable at a distance;
3. carry his arms openly;
4. conduct military operations in accordance with the laws and customs ofwar.
Article 43(1) of the 1911 Additional Protocol I only partially follows the
historical precedent in that it requires the armed forces of a belligerent to have
a responsible commander (Item 1 above) and to enforce the law ofwar (Item 4
above). Then Article 44(3), after stating that there are occasions when an armed
combatant cannot distinguish himself from the non-combatant civilian
population, permits him to retain his status as a legal combatant with the sole
requirement that he carry his arms openly
1
.
during each military engagement; and
2. during such time as he is visible to his adversary while engaged in a
military deployment preceding an attack. (This is a very limited
application of Item 3 above).
There is no requirement that combatants wear "a fixed distinctive emblem
recognizable at a distance"—or any other kind of distinctive marking (Item 2
above). Obviously, these provisions of the Protocol put the civilian population
at risk in order to give additional protection to members of national liberation
movements. And Article 44(4) provides that if a combatant (read that as "a
member of a national liberation movement") fails to comply with the modest
requirements of the provision concerning the carrying ofarms openly, while he
will not be entitled to the status of a prisoner of war, he will be entitled to all
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the protection to which a prisoner ofwar is entitled. ' There is no explanation
of the difference between 1. having the status of a prisoner of war; and 2. not
having that status but, nevertheless, having all of the protection to which a
prisoner of war is entitled. In their demand for the protection of members of
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national liberation movements the Third World States gave these individuals,
even when illegal combatants, more protection than the legal, uniformed
combatant receives.
Once again, problems arose when the Conference attempted to draft a
verification provision. It ended with a very lengthy Article 90 entitled
"International Fact-Finding Commission, the Commission being tasked with
the chore ofinvestigating complaints ofgrave breaches or other serious violations
of the four 1949 Geneva Conventions and of the 1977 Protocol I. The main
objection here is that it is applicable only to those States which have filed a
statement accepting the jurisdiction of the commission.
There are a number of provisions of this Protocol which are either a
codification of the customary international law of war or are much-needed
additions to that law. For example, Articles 35 and 55 are attempts to protect
the natural environment from the effect of war. Article 51 prohibits attacks
on the civilian population; prohibits attacks which have as their primary purpose
the spreading of terror among the civilian population; prohibits target-area
bombing; and prohibits reprisal attacks against the civilian population. Article
52 prohibits attacks on civilian objects which are not military objectives, as well
as reprisals against such objects which are not military objectives, as well as
reprisals against such objects. Article 53 prohibits attacks on historic monuments,
works of art, and places ofworship, as well as reprisals against such places. Article
54 provides that "Starvation of civilians as a method of warfare is prohibited"
and then lists specific sources offood and water supplies indispensable to civilian
life which are not to be attacked, even by way of reprisal.
On a number of occasions officials of the United States Government at the
policy-making level have indicated that this country accepts many of the
provisions of the Protocol as binding law. However, neither the Reagan nor
the Bush Administrations sent the Protocol to the Senate for that body's advice
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and consent to ratification by the President. Whether the Clinton
Administration will do so remains to be seen—so far it has not done so but there
are rumors that it is engaged in another review of the Protocol in order to
determine whether it should be sent to the Senate for the latter' s advice and
consent to ratification and, if so, what understandings or reservations should be
included.
Conventional Weapons Convention
During the early 1970's a conference of government experts convened by
the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) drafted a list of
conventional weapons which were believed to require consideration because
they appeared to cause unnecessary suffering or to be indiscriminate in their
effect. There were:
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1. Small calibre projectiles;
2. Blast and fragmentation weapons;
3. Time-delay weapons (land mines and booby traps);
4. Incendiary weapons; and
5. Potential weapons development.
In 1977, near the conclusion of the Diplomatic Conference which ultimately
drafted the 1977 Additional Protocol J, that Conference adopted a resolution
recommending that another conference be held to draft "prohibitions and
restrictions on the use of specific conventional weapons". The General
Assembly of the United Nations thereafter convened such a Conference. It met
in 1979 and 1980 and drafted the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the
Use ofCertain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious
or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, to which three Protocols were attached.
The Convention itself is merely an "umbrella" convention containing
administrative provisions applicable to all three of the substantive Protocols.
Article 1 makes the Convention and the Protocols applicable in "any situation
described in paragraph 4 of Article 1 ofAdditional Protocol I"; and Article 7(4)
elaborates on that provision by providing how a State Party to this Convention
may become bound by it vis-a-vis a national liberation "authority". Paragraph 4
ofArticle 1 of the 1977 Additional Protocol is as we have already seen, one of the
major reasons why the United States has not ratified that Protocol. However,
with respect to the 1977 Additional Protocol la major objection was that it served
as the basis for Article 44(3) of that instrument which removed from members
of national liberation movements the historic requirements for legal combatants
and it was argued that this gave protection to terrorists. That problem does not
arise with respect to this Convention or its Protocols. When the United States
ratified this Convention, it made a reservation with respect to Article 7(4)(b).
(France made reservations to several of these provisions, including Article
7(4)(b)).
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Article 4 of this Convention, dealing with ratifications, is rather unique. It
requires that in ratifying the Convention a State must also ratify at least two of
the three attached Protocols. And, finally, Article 8 of the Convention provides
for the calling of a review conference by the Parties thereto ten years after the
effective date of the Convention ifnone has been called prior to that date. That
ten-year period has now expired and it is expected that the review conference
will meet in September 1995.
It is in the Protocols themselves that important provisions of the law of war
are contained. Protocol I is entided Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of
Non-Detectable Fragments. It prohibits the use of any weapon "the primary effect
of which is to injure by fragments which in the human body escape detection
by X-ray". It was directed primarily against weapons made of such materials as
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glass and plastic. It was completely non-controversial, probably because, as one
of the United States Delegates has said, "no one seems to have had any serious
military interest in such weapon". A Canadian Delegate has stated that this
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Protocol "bans a weapon which does not exist". It was the fear that States
would only ratify the Convention and its Protocol I that caused the adoption
of the provision in Article 4 of the Convention requiring the ratification oftwo
or more of the Protocols. Actually, that fear does not appear to have been
justified. As of 31 December 1992, thirty-five States had become Parties to the
Conventional Weapons Convention and all but Benin and France had ratified all
three Protocols. Benin approved Protocols I and III and France ratified Protocols
I and II.
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Protocol II is concerned with Prohibitions and Restrictions on the Use ofMines,
Booby Traps and Other Devices. It is to be noted that Article 1 makes it clear that
its subject matter is limited to land mines only. That article specifics that its
coverage includes "mines laid to interdict beaches, waterway crossings or river
crossings" but that it "does not apply to the use of anti-ship mines at sea or in
inland waterways".
Article 2 of this Protocol contains two very important definitions, among
others:
"mine" means any munition placed under, on or near the ground or other surface
area and designed to be detonated or exploded by the presence, proximity or
contact of a person or vehicle; "remotely delivered mine" means any mine
delivered by artillery, rocket, mortar or similar means or dropped form an aircraft.
Of course, the foregoing provision with respect to "remotely delivered
mines" would also apply to the weapons of warships.
The second definition of interest is that relating to booby traps. It states:
"Booby-traps" means any device or material which is designed, constructed or
adapted to kill or injure and which functions unexpectedly when a person disturbs
or approaches an apparently harmless object or performs an apparendy safe act.
Of particular interest is the fact that there is a list often categories of articles
the booby-trapping of which is prohibited. These categories include objects
specially designed for children, including toys, a type ofbooby trap widely used,
with grim results, in Afghanistan.
Another category worthy of note is
kitchen utensils, or appliances except in military establishments, military locations
or military supply depots.
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The unit cook is an important person. He must be warned of the possibility
of legal booby traps so that he will take care in adding enemy kitchen utensils
to his collection!
Other important provisions concerning mines are those requiring the
recording of information with respect to the location of minefields. Not only is
this subject covered in several articles of Protocol II, but there is a Technical
Annex containing guidelines for such recording.
There are special provisions in Article 8 of Protocol II for the protection of
United Nations forces and missions from minefields, mines, and booby traps.
When one reads ofthe relieftrucks which have been the victims ofburied mines
on much-traveled roads both in Somalia and in Bosnia, the need for such
provisions becomes obvious—but that they will be complied with appears to be
questionable.
One final provision which is of major importance is contained in Article 9.
It provides for various procedures, both national and international, to be
followed upon the cessation of hostilities in order to "remove or otherwise
render ineffective, minefields, mines and booby traps placed in position during
the conflict". After World War II there was an "International Agreement for the
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Clearance ofMines in European Waters", but there was no equivalent agreement
with respect to land mines. After those hostilities had ended the French kept
well over one hundred thousand German prisoners of war engaged in the task
of mine removal on French territory, with many casualties, as a result ofwhich
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the 1949 Geneva Third Convention specifically prohibits such action. For many
years after the end ofWorld War II there were civilian mine casualties in North
Africa. And even at this late date there are almost daily casualties caused by land
mines in Afghanistan.
It is clear that land mines have become one of the major problems of the
world as we approach the Twenty-First century. It is also clear that this Protocol
is entirely inadequate for the protection of mankind from a weapon that has
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assumed the role of the major hazard to the civilian population. There is
pressure for an international agreement for the complete prohibition of the use
of land mines and at least some strong limitations on their use appears to be just
over the horizon.
Let us now turn to Protocol III
—
Protocol on Prohibitions and Restrictions on the
Use of Incendiary Weapons. This was undoubtedly the most controversial of the
three Protocols. It contains only two articles, the first dealing with definitions
and the second with the protection of civilians and civilian objects. (It should
be emphasized that the primary objective of both Protocols II and III is
protection of civilians.) Incendiary weapons are defined as
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any weapons or munition which is primarily designed to set fire to objects or to
cause burn injury to persons through the action of flame, heat, or combinations
thereof, produced by chemical reaction of a substance delivered on the target.
The definition goes on to specifically exclude from its coverage weapons
which have incidental incendiary effects and combined effects munitions
(CEMs). Although the word "napalm" was heard frequendy during the
discussions, that word will not be found in the Protocol itself.
Article 2(1) states that
it is prohibited in all circumstances to make the civilian population as such,
individual civilians, or civilian objects the object of attack by incendiary weapons.
There can be no objection to this provision. Civilians, and civilian objects
not being used for rnilitary purposes, should not be the objects of any type of
attack, incendiary or non-incendiary.
Article 2(2) prohibits air-delivered incendiary attacks on military objectives
located within a concentration of civilians. This provision is, perhaps, overly
broad, as many important military objectives, such as national command and
communication centers, are frequendy located within a concentration of
civilians; and many types ofmajor rnilitary objectives, even when originally built
away from concentrations of civilians, are soon to be found surrounded by
concentrations of civilians. Decisions in this regard should be based on the
principle of proportionality. Of course, if, as a matter of military tactics,
another type of air-delivered weapon can be just as effective in destroying such
a rnilitary objective, for example, the so-called "smart-bomb", it should be the
weapon selected.
Article 2(3) prohibits attacks on military objectives within a concentration of
civilians by incendiary weapons, other than those which are air-delivered,
"except when such military objective is clearly separated from the concentration
of civilians and all feasible precautions are taken." As only a small number of
military installations are "clearly separated" from concentrations of civilians,
once again the doctrine of proportionality should be applied.
Article 2(4) is undoubtedly a throwback to Vietnam and the defoliation
program employed there by the United States. It provides:
It is prohibited to make forests or other kinds ofplant cover the object of attack
by incendiary weapons except when such natural elements are used to cover,
conceal or camouflage combatants or other military objectives, or are themselves
military objectives.
398 Levle on the Law of War
There does not appear to be anything contained in this Protocol which would
be so restrictive on military operations as to justify the refusal of the United
States to ratify it; and if there is any such provision, surely it could be taken care
ofby an understanding or, ifdeemed necessary, by a reservation. Nevertheless,
the President transmitted only the Convention and Protocols I and II to the
Senate for its advice and consent to ratification, accompanied by a statement to




It will be recalled that in 1925 the Geneva Protocol was drafted and that it
was subsequently widely accepted by States. It is important to emphasize that
this Protocol prohibited "use" only. As a result many States ratified it with what
was known as the "First-Use Reservation". What this meant was that most
nations engaged in the development, production, and stockpiling of chemical
and bacteriological weapons in order to be prepared to retaliate in kind should
a future enemy make first use of such weapons.
While, as we have seen, in 1972 it was found possible to draft a convention
prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological
weapons, the problem ofchemical weapons long continued unsolved, primarily
because of the difficult question ofverification. It was not until September 1992
that a Draft Convention on the Prohibition ofthe Development, Production, Stockpiling
and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction was finally submitted to the
General Assembly of the United Nations. In February 1993 that organization
approved the Convention and submitted it to the States for ratification or
accession. It is far lengthier and more complex than its bacteriological brother.
In fact, it is probably the most complex law-of-war convention ever drafted.
Let us study a few of its highlights.
Article I is the heart of the Convention. By it each State party undertakes
that it will never under any circumstances:
1. Develop, produce, or otherwise acquire or stockpile chemical weapons, or
transfer such weapons to "anyone";
2. Use chemical weapons; or
3. Engage in any military preparations to use chemical weapons.
That article contains these further undertakings by each Party:
1 . To destroy any chemical weapons that it owns or possesses or that are located
within its jurisdiction;
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2. To destroy any chemical weapons that it has abandoned on the territory of
another State Party; and
3
.
To destroy any chemical weapons production facilities that it owns or possesses
or that are located within its jurisdiction.
Finally, that Article provides that "Each State Party undertakes not to use riot
control agents as a method of warfare"—and therein lies the problem as far as
the United States is concerned. When the United States finally ratified the 1925
Geneva Protocol in 1915 there was an agreement between the President and the
Senate that an Executive Order would be issued covering the subject of riot
control agents. The Executive Order which was issued provides that the United
States renounced the first use of herbicides except for certain Hmited purposes;
and then lists four situations in which it will use riot control agents in war:
1
.
In riot conditions in areas under US military control including for the control
of rioting prisoners of war;
2. In situations in which civilians are used to mask or screen attacks;
3. In rescue missions in remotely isolated areas of downed airmen and escaping
prisoners of war; and
4. In rear echelon areas to protect convoys from civil disturbances, terrorists, and
paramilitary organizations.
It is to be assumed that in ratifying the Convention the United States will
continue to insist on the legality of the use of riot control agents in those four
situations despite the very adverse reception that such claim encountered during
the drafting process.
Article II contains a large number oflengthy definitions. Ofparticular interest
is the fact that research and development ofmethods ofprotection against toxic
chemicals and chemical weapons is not prohibited. Article III is a rather unusual
provision. Within thirty days ofratification or accession a State Party must make
a number of declarations concerning its ownership of chemical weapons, their
location, its program of destruction, etc. Articles IV and V are concerned with
the destruction ofchemical weapons and the closing and destruction ofchemical
weapons production facilities, respectively. Article VII establishes an elaborate
permanent organization to oversee and verify compliance with the Convention.
Article IX establishes the methods by which verification by an organ of the
Organization may be obtained. These methods include what is termed
"Challenge Inspections"—an on-site inspection by members of the Technical
Secretariat of the Organization requested by any State Party which believes that
there is non-compliance by another State Party. (There is also a 100-page
"Verification Annex" which fleshes out various parts ofthe Convention proper).
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Article XII is entitled "Measures to Redress a Situation and to Ensure
Compliance, Including Sanctions".
Apparently, while the United States is not enamored with all ofthe provisions
of the Convention or of the Verification Annex, and particularly with the
wording of some of them, it will accept the entire document as written with a
reservation with respect to riot control agents mentioned above. What action,
if any, with respect to this Convention will be taken by the "non-law-abiding
States" mentioned above remains to be seen—but it would probably be unwise
to expect them to become Parties to it, or to comply with it if they do become
d .• 49Parties.
Conclusion
It may safely be said that while law-of-war activity during the first half of the
Twentieth Century was notable for the numerous 1907 Hague Conventions, the
1925 Geneva Protocol, and the four 1949 Geneva Conventions, the second half of
that century was characterized by a melange of much-needed international
legislation relating to a variety of unrelated aspects of this field. It is perhaps
being overly optimistic to look forward during the balance of this century to
the widespread adoption of a Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,
Production, Stockpiling and Use of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass
Destruction and on Their Destruction. However, such an event is not as unlikely as
it once was. On 3 September 1993 the World Health Organization (WHO)
requested an advisory opinion from the International Court ofJustice on the
following question:
In view of the health and environmental effects, would the use of nuclear
weapons by a States in war or other armed conflict be a breach of its obligations
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under international law including the WHO Constitution?
Then on 15 December 1994 the General Assembly of the United Nations
adopted Resolution 49/75 entided "Request for an Advisory Opinion from the
International Court ofJustice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear
Weapons". The question posed by the General Assembly asks:
Is the threat or use of nuclear weapons in any circumstance permitted under
52
international law?
Both of those matters are presently pending before the Court. Should the
Court decide the former affirmatively, and the latter negatively, the possibility
of an international convention implementing those decisions and totally
prohibiting not only the threat or use of nuclear weapons, but their very
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existence, would be greatly enhanced and the law-of-war activities of the latter
half of the Twentieth Century would truly have a major place in history.
Unfortunately, it can be assumed with more than a reasonable degree ofcertainty
that were such a fortuitous event to occur, a number ofpresent-day, or potential,
possessors of nuclear weapons would fail to become Parties to such a
convention—or would become Parties with the preconceived idea of violating
their agreement and thereafter being in a position to hold the non-nuclear world
hostage.
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Prosecuting War Crimes
Before An International Tribunal
28 Akron Law Review 429 (1995)
It is probably appropriate to begin this discussion by stating that while the
author has acted as an official reviewer of records of war crimes trials, and
has read and analyzed innumerable records ofthose trials, he has never personally
prosecuted an individual accused of a war crime. Accordingly, this discussion
will necessarily be based upon what others have said and done with respect to
the problem of prosecuting war crimes cases before international tribunals.
Some people would label such a discussion as "academic", intending the word
to be interpreted pejoratively. If "academic" means knowledge gained from the
study of what the majority of actors in the arena have done when confronted
with the problems ofprosecuting charges ofthe commission ofwar crimes, then
this presentation will, indeed, be "academic." However, the author prefers to
consider that a discussion based on the experiences ofmany such prosecutors is
practical and instructive, rather than academic.
Generally speaking, except in a few specific areas, the functions of the
prosecutor in war crimes trials do not differ greatly from the functions of the
prosecutor in any other area of criminal law although they will, of course, differ
in detail and, frequendy, in magnitude. Thus, just as the first function of any
prosecutor, whatever name the locality gives to that position, is to get himself
appointed or elected to office, the first function of the war crimes prosecutor is
to get himselfappointed to that position. Such an appointment is, in the opinion
of this author, a dubious honor. War crimes prosecutions are far more tedious,
far more exhausting, than ordinary local prosecutions. In almost every instance
the prosecutor is dealing with accused persons and witnesses who speak a
language which he does not understand and with documents written in a
language which he cannot read. Not only must he rely entirely on his
translator-interpreter, which in and of itself can be a very frustrating business,
but every interrogation, both offand on the stand, consumes double the normal
time—or more. In other words, only seek the job of prosecuting war crimes if
the case is important enough to give you a place in history—as it did for Justice
Jackson, Benjamin Ferencz, Telford Taylor, and a few others.
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Article 14 of the 1945 London Charter ofthe International Military Tribunal
provided for four Chief Prosecutors of equal stature with their overall functions
specified in detail. Article 8 ofthe Charter ofthe International Military Tribunal
for the Far East provided for one Chief of Counsel responsible for the
investigation and prosecution with no other limitations on his activities, and
with the other ten nations which had been at war with Japan each having the
option of designating an Associate Counsel. This latter arrangement would
appear to be much more preferable inasmuch as an organizational pyramid
topped by a committee is not exactly recommended as a sound management
practice.
Now, having disregarded the advice given above, and having sought and
obtained the job ofprosecuting war crimes before an international tribunal—or,
being a military lawyer, having been told ofyour assignment to that job—your
next function, and your primary and most important task, is the collection of
the evidence that will identify and establish the guilt ofthe culprits, the evidence
that you will produce at the trial and which will, you hope, result in the
conviction and punishment of the accused.
You will find that a great mass of material will have already been collected
-11
by various governmental and non-governmental agencies. Unfortunately, it
will all too frequendy develop that many of the interrogations ofwitnesses were
inadequate; that witnesses who have been interrogated and from whom helpful
statements have been obtained have been released and have merged into the
population or, if they were not local residents, they will have returned to their
homes, probably halfway around the world; and that many of the documents
with which you are presented have either not yet been formally translated or,
if they have been, that the translations are not reliable. At some point along the
way you will ask yourselfwhy you ever sought and took the job ofprosecuting
war crimes. But, like any good lawyer, you will press ahead, seeking the
documents and the witnesses that you need to fill the lacunae which will
continuously make their appearance. Make no mistake—this will pose many
problems unknown to the hometown prosecutor. Many potential witnesses will
not have survived the hostilities; essential official documents will have been
destroyed during the course of hostilities, or, more recently, by their custodians;
others will be in the possession of uncooperative agents of the government of
the potential accused, perhaps even in the hands ofthe potential accused himself;
they will be in a foreign language and will be difficult to identify, even if you
know exacdy what you are seeking—and for the most part you will not have
that knowledge. Prevarication and stalling by unfriendly witnesses is a
phenomenon known to every prosecutor—but it is much easier to accomplish
and much harder to identify when it is being done in a foreign language, a
language with which the prosecutor is not familiar. Frequently, the interpreter
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will omit the hemming and hawing that has taken place during an interrogation
and, after what appears to have been a five-minute back-and-forth argument
with the witness, he will turn from the witness to you and state: "He says
'No'"—and all you can do is shrug it off and continue plodding along.
But all is not as bleak as might appear. You will have some good investigators
and interrogators and some good translators and interpreters and gradually you
will accumulate the evidence that you believe will establish beyond a reasonable
doubt the commission of war crimes by specific persons. Incidentally, the
searching out, collection, analysis, and indexing of documents by the U.S.
investigators in Germany during and after World War II probably contributed
more than any other single factor to the success of the prosecution before the
International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg and the Subsequent Proceedings
12
conducted there.
Now you are confronted with the next function of the prosecutor of war
crimes before an International Tribunal—the decision as to the identity of the
persons to be indicted and tried. In the international arena there is no grandjury
to make the final decisions on this question. Unlike the hometown prosecutor,
you may be selective and omit naming an individual as an accused even though
you believe that you have evidence that proves his guilt beyond any possible
doubt. Leave the small fry, no matter how guilty, to some national court,
military or civilian. You are going to prosecute before an International Tribunal
and you want only the top people, those who established policy, those who
were responsible for the decision to undertake an aggressive war, those who
gave the orders for massive atrocities against the civilian population, including
genocide, those who were responsible for the policies that resulted in the studied
maltreatment of prisoners of war. This selection is not an easy task, particularly
if it has to be done by group decision, as was the case for the International
Military Tribunal in Nuremberg. There the prosecutors included the name
of one individual, Gustav Krupp, who was senile and non compos mentis and
whose prosecution the Tribunal had no alternative but to defer indefinitely. As
he was in the U.S. Zone of Occupation, the American prosecutors should have
been aware of this and should not have named him in the indictment. Two
other names, those of Raeder and Fritsche, were added to the list at Soviet
insistence solely in order to include among the accused some prisoners who
were in Soviet custody. (Fritsche was acquitted and Raeder received a sentence
to life imprisonment.)
Of course, in determining the identity of the persons to be named in the
indictment charging the commission ofwar crimes, the most important element
that the prosecutor must bear in mind is the evidence available against each
individual. While acquittals are unquestionably evidence of the impartiality of
the Tribunal, they are anathema to the prosecutor, particularly when he can
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be so much more selective than the hometown prosecutor in naming the persons
whom he proposes to prosecute. The drafting of the indictment is, therefore,
of major importance. He must ensure that while the charges correspond to the
offenses listed in the Tribunal's constitutive document, they also correspond to
the evidence against each named accused which he is going to be able to present
at the trial.
The substantive law that will be the basis of your prosecution will not be
difficult to identify. Basically, it will undoubtedly be stated in your constitutive
document and will be supplemented by well-known and generally accepted laws
and customs ofwar. However, one problem that the prosecutor ofwar crimes
before an international tribunal will have to face, which is unknown to his
hometown counterpart, is the question of the procedure pursuant to which the
trial is to be conducted. While it may happen that the prosecution and the defense
in a war crimes trial have similar legal systems and trial procedures, the chances
are very great that they will not—and even if they do, inasmuch as your trial is
before an International Tribunal its rules of procedure will be tailored to that
Tribunal and will differ markedly from most national procedural systems,
probably being a composite of several systems; and if both the prosecution and
the members of the Tribunal are multinational in character, as occurred in the
International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg with four nations with different
legal systems represented in the prosecution and on the bench and in the
International Military Tribunal for the Far East in Tokyo with eleven such
nations represented in the prosecution and on the bench, the problem is
multiplied. For example, the continental civil law does not know many of the
traditional common law rules of evidence and such rules were generally not
followed in war crimes trials, even by American military commissions; and one
of the reasons for the dissent of the French judge in the Tokyo trial was that
there had been no examining magistrate, the procedure which initiates a criminal
trial under French law, and which he considered to be indispensable to a fair
trial. (Strange to relate, the Frenchjudge at Nuremberg had apparently not found
this to be a problem.)
The major procedural change included in the 1945 London Charter and in
the laws under which trials were conducted in the American and British Zones
of Occupation in Germany after World War II, the one that will undoubtedly
be included in any charter or law under which you will act as Prosecutor, and
the one which was found to be most repugnant by American lawyers bred on
the common law system, was the provision exempting the tribunals from
"technical rules of evidence." Three aspects of this matter do not appear to
be so widely known: first, that while the use of affidavits was and is contrary to
traditional common law rules of evidence, it was not and is not contrary to the
rules of evidence of many other legal systems; second, that where an affidavit
Prosecuting War Crimes 409
was introduced in evidence by either side, the other side had the right to demand
the production of the affiant on the witness stand, a right which was rather
infrequently exercised; and third, that the defense use of this affidavit privilege,
as compared to its use by the prosecution, was on the order of more than ten
20
to one.
Article 19 of the 1945 Charter of the International Military Tribunal stated
not only that it was not bound by technical rules of evidence, but that the
91
Tribunal should admit "any evidence which it deems to have probative value."'
Article 13(a) of the Charter of the International Tribunal for the Far East was
22
to the same effect. Article 14 of the Statute of the International Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia authorizes the judges of that Tribunal to adopt rules for
"the admission of evidence." Rule 85(C), adopted by the judges of that
Tribunal, provides that "A Chamber may admit any relevant evidence which it
deems to have probative value." Article 14 of the Statute of the International
Tribunal for Rwanda requires the judges of that Tribunal to adopt the rules of
procedure and evidence adopted by the International Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia "with such changes as they deem necessary."' It would appear
obvious that the international community does not intend that international
tribunals should be bound by technical rules of evidence such as those which
are typical of the common law system.
Finally, you have collected your evidence, you have reached a decision as to
whom you will charge, you have drafted your indictment, you have served it
on the persons accused, you have filed it with the Tribunal, and you are ready
to go to trial. There we will leave you. Apart from the different rules ofevidence
discussed above, and some comparatively minor variations in other aspects of
the trial procedure, the trial itself should present few novelties for any attorney
who has previously tried a criminal case in an American court.
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22. See supra note 8. Paragraph c of that article was quite detailed in enumerating items which would be
admissible in evidence, most of which violate the traditional common law rules of evidence.
23. See supra note 4.
24. International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, adopted 11
February 1994, 33 I.L.M. 484, 533 (1994).
25. See supra note 6.
26. Article 19(b) of the International Law Commission's 1994 Draft Statute of an International Criminal
Court (Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-sixth session, G.A.O.R., 49th
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The Statute of the International
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia:
A Comparison With The Past and a
Look at the Future
21 SyracuseJournal of International Law and Commerce 1 (1995)
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I. Introduction
ver the course of the twentieth century, many proposals have been made
for the creation ofan international criminal court. These proposals have
been met with decided apathy on the part of governments—perhaps because of
a feeling on the part ofthe government policy-makers ofmany nations that they
might be establishing an international criminal jurisdiction which would
thereafter be exercised with respect to their own actions. During the first
forty-five years ofthis century, the 1907 Hague Conference drafted a convention
establishing an International Prize Court; Article 227 of the 1919 Treaty of
Versailles provided for a special international tribunal for the trial of the
ex-Kaiser; the League of Nations created a Permanent Court of International
Justice ("PCIJ'); and the draftsmen of the Charter of the United Nations
included, as an annex thereto, a Statute of the International Court of Justice
("ICJ"). Of those courts, only the one to try the ex-Kaiser had any criminal
jurisdiction and it never came into being. Then, on 8 August 1945, the four
major victorious Allies of World War II reached agreement in London on a
Charter for an International Military Tribunal ("IMT"), empowered to try the
major German officials accused of having committed war crimes during the
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course of those hostilities. Subsequently, a similar type of tribunal, the
International Military Tribunal for the Far East ("IMTFE"), was established in
Tokyo for the trial of the major Japanese officials accused of having committed
war crimes during the course of the hostilities in that area.
Although sometimes maligned as "victors' courts," these were truly the first
international criminal courts to function in the modern era. Other international
war crimes tribunals, military government courts, military commissions, and
national courts tried war crimes cases alleged to have occurred during the course
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ofWorld War II. No war crimes trials, as such, have been conducted since that
time, although preparations for such trials have, on occasion, taken place.
The recent action of the Security Council of the United Nations in establishing
an "International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the
12
Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 " may be an indication that the
diplomatic logjam has finally been broken and that action with respect to a
13
general international criminal court will be taken in the not too distant future.
*
Accordingly, it appears appropriate to analyze the Statute of the new
International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and to compare it to the 1945
London Charter, which was the basic source for almost all of the documents
creating post-World War II international and national war crimes tribunals, as
well as to the latest Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court prepared
by the International Law Commission ("ILC"); and to determine to what
extent the new Statute contains novel provisions which would be suitable for
an international court with more general criminal jurisdiction over individuals,
provisions which should be considered by the International Law Commission
in its next draft of a Statute for an International Criminal Court.
II. Organization of the International Tribunal
Article 26 of the Statute of the International Court ofJustice provides that
the Court is to consist of fifteen judges, but that it may establish chambers of
three or more judges. Such chambers have been formed for the hearing of
specific cases. The Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia goes a step further, dividing the Tribunal, which is to consist of
eleven judges, into two permanent Trial Chambers of three judges each and a
17
permanent Appeals Chamber of five judges. In addition, there is a Prosecutor
18
and the usual Registry. The provision for an Appellate Chamber is unique in
international law. There was no review of, and no appeal from, the decision of... 19
the International Military Tribunal. General MacArthur reserved the right to
review the decision of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East but
this was executive review, not judicial appellate review. The Military Governor
of the U.S. Zone of Occupation of Germany reserved the right to review the
decisions of the international military tribunals established under Allied Control
Council Law No. 10 and he set aside some convictions and made many
reductions in sentences, but once again this was executive review and clemency,
not judicial appellate review. Article 60 ofthe Statute of the International Court
ofJustice provides that its judgment "is final and without appeal.'" However,
Article 48 of the ILC Draft Statute also provides for appeals and Article 9 thereof
would establish an Appeals Chamber consisting of the President and six other
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judges. By implication, none of them may have been members of the Trial
Chamber by which the accused was convicted.
III. Qualifications for Judges
The qualifications for the judges ofthe International Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia are substantially the same as those for judges of the International
Court ofjustice. The method ofselection ofthejudges is the usual complicated
system ofthe United Nations, with the Secretary-General, the member nations,
the Security Council, and the General Assembly all playing a part. One unusual
aspect of the method of selection ofjudges for the International Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia is that "non-member States maintaining permanent
observer missions at United Nations Headquarters" are included both in the
24
nominating and in the election process. It is believed that this is a practice
which should not be followed. Article 6 of the ILC Draft Statute provides for
the election ofjudges by a majority of the States parties to the Statute of the
Court. This is the general practice of multilateral international agreements and
is deemed appropriate for an international criminal court. An unusual aspect of
the qualifications forjudges set forth in the ILC Draft Statute is that, in addition
to being qualified for appointment to the highestjudicial office oftheir country,
ten ofthem must have "criminal trial experience" and eight ofthem must have
"recognized competence in international law."
IV. Competence of the International Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia
Article 227 of the 1919 Treaty of Versailles gave the special tribunal which it
created the power to try the ex-Kaiser "for a supreme offense against
international morality and the sanctity of treaties."' Article 6 of the 1945
London Charter was much more definite, listing numerous specific offenses
under the rubrics of"Crimes against Peace," "War Crimes," and "Crimes against
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Humanity." The jurisdiction of the International Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia is set forth even more broadly. Article 1, entitled Competence of the
International Tribunal, states:
The International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons responsible
for serious violations ofinternational humanitarian law committed in the territory
of the former Yugoslavia since 1991 in accordance with the provisions of the
28
present Statute.
This provision alone probably would have sufficed to grant jurisdiction to the
International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia to try all ofthe offenses which
might be charged in cases brought before it. However, it is followed by articles
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which elaborate on (or, perhaps, restrict) the foregoing provision by enumerating
four specific categories ofinternational humanitarian law intended to be included
29
within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. Article 2 lists as offenses within the
jurisdiction of the International Tribunal "grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva
Conventions;"* Article 3 lists conventional war crimes - violations of the laws
31 32
and customs ofwar; Article 4 lists acts ofgenocide; and Article 5 lists "crimes
,,33 .
against humanity."* Crimes against peace, perhaps the major criminal act of
our times, are notable for their absence. In view of the patendy aggressive acts
ordered by the leaders of the former Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), it is
regrettable that the Secretary-General did not see fit to include crimes against
35
peace as a fifth category ofjurisdiction for the International Tribunal.
Obviously, the foregoing provisions of the Statute of the International
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia with respect to subject-matter jurisdiction
would be far from adequate for an international criminal court of general
jurisdiction. Any such court must have jurisdiction which includes not only the
offenses constituting the violations of international humanitarian law listed in
the Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, but also
jurisdiction over such offenses as violations of the numerous other international
conventions concerned with aviation—hijacking, drugs, hostage taking, piracy,
slavery, terrorism, torture, etc. And, certainly, any such international criminal
court should be givenjurisdiction over acts constituting violations ofthe General
37
Assembly's Definition ofAggression. Article 20 of the Draft Statute prepared by
the International Law Commission is only partially successful in accomplishing
this overall objective. After listing the crimes of genocide, aggression, serious
violations ofthe laws and customs applicable in armed conflict, and crimes against
humanity, it adopts the procedure of referring to an Annex in which are listed
the nine conventions with respect to the violations of which the International
Criminal Court would have jurisdiction on the basis that they are "crimes
established" by those Conventions and that they "constitute exceptionally
serious crimes of international concern." The basic defect in this manner of
granting jurisdiction is obvious. The members of the International Law
Commission could not possibly be aware of every treaty or convention which
meets their criteria. For example, Article 1 of the 1888 Convention for the
Protection ofSubmarine Cables specifically provides that the "breaking or injury
of a submarine cable, done willfully or through culpable negligence . . . shall be
a punishable offense." This meets the criteria set forth above—but the
Submarine Cable Convention is not among those listed. Similar provisions will
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be found in the 1926 Slavery Convention, ' the 1929 Convention for the
Suppression of Counterfeiting, the 1950 White Slave Convention, etc. It is
inevitable that if the policy of enumeration is followed there will not only be
unintended omissions, but that, in omitting some conventions, the ILC may
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well have reached conclusions contrary to those which an international criminal
court might reach.
In the Commentary to the Annex in which the specific treaties are listed, the
statement is made that "[tjreaties which merely regulate conduct . . . are not
included in the Annex." This is followed by an explanation as to why certain
specific treaties have been omitted from the list. Thus, the regulations attached
42 43
to the 1 899 and 1 907 Hague Conventions on the Laws and Customs ofWar
on Land have been omitted because they "contain no provisions dealing with
individual criminal responsibility"—this despite the fact that at Nuremberg the
International Military Tribunal had determined that they constituted part of the
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customary international law of war and had found violations of specific
provisions thereof to be criminal offenses. Similarly, the 1954 Convention for
the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event ofArmed Conflict has been
omitted, although its Article 28 calls for the States Parties "to take all necessary
steps to prosecute and impose penal or disciplinary sanctions upon those persons
who commit or order to be committed a breach of the present Convention."
This would appear to meet the criteria set forth above—but the Cultural
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Property Convention is not among those listed. The conventions listed are
five law-of-war conventions (the four 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1977
Additional Protocol 1 ), two aircraft hijacking conventions (the 1970 Hague
and 1971 Montreal Conventions), the 1973 Apartheid Convention , the
1973 Convention on Internationally Protected Persons , the 1979 Convention
53 • 54
on the Taking ofHostages , the 1984 Convention on Torture , two maritime
conventions (the 1988 Convention for the Suppression ofUnlawful Acts against
the Safety of Maritime Navigation ~ and the 1988 Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on
the Continental Shelf ), and the 1988 Convention against Illicit Traffic in
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Narcotic Drugs. Article 22 of the ILC Draft Statute sets forth the extent to
which States ratifying the Convention containing the Draft Statute would be
bound by the foregoing list.
While it is possible that jurisdiction over violations of the unlisted treaties
mentioned above as examples, and the many other similar treaties, could be
based on the grant ofjurisdiction over "crimes under general international law,"
the fact that a treaty is not mentioned in the list would provide a strong argument
against jurisdiction, particularly where it meets the first criterion but still is not
listed.
Article 23 of the ILC Draft Statute would also give the international criminal
court jurisdiction over cases specified in Article 20 which are referred to it by
the Security Council. Paragraph 1 of the Commentary on Article 23 points out
that this provision does not extend the jurisdiction of the Court and that it was
included so that the Security Council would not be compelled to establish ad
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hoc tribunals. Paragraph 2 thereof indicates that the "cases" referred to would
not be complaints against individuals, but would be "a 'matter', that is to say, a
situation in which Chapter VII of the Charter applies," leaving it to the
Prosecutor to investigate and indict named individuals.
V. Individual Criminal Responsibility
The contention has, on occasion, been advanced that only international
entities (States and international organizations) are the subjects of international
law and that, therefore, individuals cannot be punished for violations of that law
except as their national laws may so provide and their national courts may so
decide. Concerning the claim that international law does not provide for the
punishment of individuals, the International Military Tribunal said:
Crimes against international law are committed by men, not by abstract entities,
and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of
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international law be enforced.
Article 6 of the Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia gives it jurisdiction over "natural persons." It is indisputable that,
like its immediate predecessors, it has been given jurisdiction to try individuals
charged with violations ofthe provisions ofinternational humanitarian law. The
ILC Draft Statute apparently did not consider such a provision necessary but
frequendy refers to a "person" or "persons" and to "the accused." The final
sentence of Article 6 of the 1945 London Charter provided that various
categories ofpersons "participating in the formulation or execution ofa common
plan or conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing crimes are responsible for all
acts performed by any person in execution of such plan." Article 7(1) of the
Statute ofthe International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, while somewhat
similar, is more specific. It provides for the individual responsibility ofany person
who "planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted
in the planning, preparation or execution" of one of the listed offenses.
In general, the 1945 London Charter and the other directives creating
tribunals for the trial of war crimes alleged to have been committed during the
course of the hostilities in World War II contained provisions denying to the
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accused the right to interpose the defenses ofact ofstate and ofsuperior orders.
Article 7(2) of the Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia adopts the rule of the 1945 London Charter with respect to the
defense of act of state. Article 7(4) thereof adopts the rule of the 1945 London
Charter with respect to the defense ofsuperior orders. The fact that the Statute
of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia adopts the "superior
orders" rule set forth in the 1945 London Charter is itself almost unique for an
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international document drafted after the post-Worid War II war crimes trials.
The Secretary-General of the United Nations included such a provision in the
draft convention on genocide which he prepared for the use of the Economic
and Social Council, but it did not survive the final drafting process; such a
provision was proposed by the International Committee of the Red Cross
("ICRC") in the Working Document for the Diplomatic Conference which
drafted the 1949 Geneva Conventions and it was rejected by that Conference;
and it was proposed by the ICRC in the Working Document for the Conference
which drafted the 1977 Additional Protocol I and it was rejected by that
Conference. Of course, for the delegates at those Conferences, there was fear
that to deny the defense of superior orders would have an adverse effect on
military discipline in the armed forces of the States participating in the
Conferences which might ratify or accede to the conventions drafted by the
conferences; here there was less concern with respect to the military discipline,
or the lack thereof, which the denial of this defense might have on the armed
forces of the several entities of the former Yugoslavia.
Finally, Article 7(3) ofthe Statute ofthe International Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia disregards the limitations placed on the responsibility ofcommanders
for acts of their subordinates contained in Article 86(2) of the 1977 Additional
Protocol i ("ifthey knew, or had information which should have enabled them
to conclude in the circumstances at the time") and adopts a test more closely
resembling the much-maligned rule ofthe Yamashita Case: "ifhe knew or had
reason to know."
VI. Territorial and Temporal Jurisdiction
Neither the 1945 London Charter ofthe IMT, nor the Charter ofthe IMTFE,
contained territorial or temporal limitations, providing as they did solely for the
"trial and punishment of the major war criminals of the European Axis" or to
"try and punish Far Eastern war criminals." As to territoriality, both in Europe
and in the Far East, the place of the commission of the offense was generally not
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considered relevant. However, as to temporal limitations, the International
Military Tribunal found that, for certain offenses its jurisdiction was limited to
those committed after 1 September 1939, the date of the commencement of
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World War II. So, too, did several of the later Nuremberg Tribunals.
The Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia contains
both territorial and temporal limitations: an offense must have been committed
in the territory of the former Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia (this would, of
course, include Bosnia, Croatia, Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia,
and Slovakia); and it must have been committed after 1 January 1991 . (However,
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there is no cut-off date) . Obviously, this type of provision would be out of
place in the constitutive document of a permanent international criminal court
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ofgeneral jurisdiction. However, applying the principle of nullum crimen sine lege,
Article 39 of the ILC Draft Statute properly provides that the offense charged
must have been a crime "at the time the act or omission occurred."
VII. Concurrent Jurisdiction and Double Jeopardy
There is no question but that national courts have jurisdiction to try their
own nationals for violations not only of their own law, civilian or military, but
also for violations of international law. When Lieber drafted his famous code in
1863, Article 59 thereof provided for the trial of a prisoner ofwar for an offense
committed before capture against the captor's army or people "for which he
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had not been punished by his own authorities." After both World War I and
World War II, attempts were made by defeated nations to exercise their national
jurisdiction in the hope, perhaps in the expectation, that such trials would
preclude trials by other tribunals, either by those of the victorious nations or by
international tribunals, by application ofthe doctrine of non bis in idem, or double
jeopardy. If this was their hope or expectation, it was not realized. After World
War I, the Germans tried two cases in their own courts and on their own
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initiative before undertaking the trials of individuals named by the Allies. An
attempt by Admiral Doenitz, Hitler's successor as German Head of State, to
adopt such a procedure after World War II was frustrated by General
Eisenhower. ' The several Japanese trials, which were conducted before this
procedure was halted by General MacArthur, were disregarded and the accused
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were retried by Allied military commissions. Despite these precedents, Article
9 of the Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia gives
concurrent jurisdiction to national courts and the Tribunal, with "primacy" in
the latter. However, Article 10(2) of the Statute places some restrictions on the
application of the doctrine of doubleJeopardy insofar as the jurisdiction of the
International Tribunal is concerned. It provides that an individual who has
been tried by a national court may still be tried by the International Tribunal if:
(a) the act for which he or she was tried was characterized as an ordinary crime;
or
(b) the national court proceedings were not impartial or independent, were
designed to shield the accused from international criminal responsibility, or the
case was not diligendy prosecuted.
Once again, the drafting leaves much to be desired. The Secretary-General has
explained that subparagraph (a) means that "the characterization of the act by
the national courts did not correspond to its characterization under the
statute." If the offense for which the individual was tried in the national court
was "theft" or "robbery," is that an "ordinary crime" to which the doctrine of
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double jeopardy is not applicable so that the individual may thereafter be tried
by the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia for "plunder ofprivate
property", an offense specifically set forth in Article 3(e) ofthe Tribunal's Statute?
And sub-paragraph (b), quoted above, means that the International Tribunal
will have no alternative but to conduct a hearing on its jurisdiction before it can
apply the provisions of that subparagraph. It would have been better to have
provided specifically that the doctrine of double jeopardy was inapplicable to
the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia where the prior trial was
in a national court. This would have constituted notice to the national
authorities that they would be unable to immunize an individual by any of the
types of trials referred to in sub-paragraph (b), while relieving the International
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia of the task of a preliminary hearing to
determine whether the national trial falls within the ambit ofthat sub-paragraph.
The Tribunal could then have taken into consideration the action ofthe national
court and authorities to the extent that it deemed such consideration appropriate
as partially provided in the third paragraph of Article 10 of its Statute.
The Rules adopted by the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,
in this respect, do not appear to be helpful in solving this problem. Rule 9
provides that where it appears to the Prosecutor that any national investigation
or criminal proceedings falls within the paraphrased provisions of Article 10(2)
ofthe Statute, or that "what is in issue is closely related to, or otherwise involves,
significant factual or legal questions which may have implications for
investigations or prosecutions before the Tribunal," he may propose to a Trial
Chamber of the Tribunal that a formal request be made that the national court
defer to the Tribunal. Rule 10 provides for the formal request to the State
concerned by the Trial Chamber ; and Rule 1 1 provides that in the event of
a State's failure to respond to the Trial Chamber's request within sixty days, the
latter may request the President of the Tribunal to report the matter to the
Security Council.
VIM. Rules of Procedure and Evidence
Article 13 of the 1945 London Charter provided that the International
Military Tribunal could draft rules of procedure, the only limitation being that
they could not be inconsistent with the provisions of the Charter itself. Article
15 of the Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
authorizes it to adopt rules of procedure and evidence. While it does not
include the limitation contained in the London Charter, it is unlikely that any
judicial body would adopt a rule which was in direct conflict with its basic
constitutive document. The members of the International Tribunal met at The
Hague and, on 11 February 1994, they adopted their Rules of Procedure and
Evidence.
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Article 19 of the 1945 London Charter was perhaps the most controversial
provision included in that instrument, particularly insofar as American attorneys
were concerned. It provided that the International Military Tribunal "shall not
be bound by technical rules of evidence" and that it "shall admit any evidence
which it deems to have probative value." Thus, the strict rules of evidence of
the common law system (the rule against hearsay, the best evidence rule, etc.)
were not followed. Article 15 of the Statute of the International Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia goes even further in that it authorizes the Tribunal to
adopt its own rules for "the admission of evidence," with no limitations
whatsoever on what those rules may include. Inasmuch as many of the strict
rules of evidence of the common law system do not exist in the continental law
system, and a majority of the judges are from non-common-law countries, it
was to be assumed that the rules with respect to evidence adopted by the eleven
Judges of the International Tribunal would most probably follow the example
of the 1945 London Charter. Accordingly, it is not surprising to find that, after
providing that national rules ofevidence are not binding on the Trial Chambers,
Rule 89 of the Tribunal's Rules of Procedure and Evidence continues with the
following:
(B) In cases not otherwise provided for in this Section, a Chamber shall apply
rules of evidence which will best favour a fair determination of the matter before
it and are consonant with the spirit of the Statute and the general principles of
law.
(C) A Chamber may admit any relevant evidence which it deems to have
probative value.
(D) A Chamber may exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the need to ensure a fair trial.
(E) A Chamber may request verification ofthe authenticity ofevidence obtained
out of court.
It is interesting to note that while Article 44 of the ILC Draft Statute is entided
"Evidence," that article does not contain any similar provisions relating to the
admissibility of evidence. However, the Commentary to that article indicates
that the matter should be dealt with by the Court in its Rules, calling attention
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to Rules 89-106 of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.
Strange to relate, while Rule 91 of that Tr ounal contains lengthy provisions on
the action to be taken in the event of the commission of perjury before it,
Paragraph 2 of the Commentary to Article 44 of the ILC Draft Statute points
out that prosecutions for perjury committed by witnesses before the
International Criminal Court would have to be brought before the appropriate
national court. This would put a premium on perjury before the International
Criminal Court.
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Of particular interest are the provisions for the protection of the accused
contained in both the Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia and in the Rules adopted by that Tribunal. Article 21 of the Statute
lists the "Rights of the Accused." While these rights are such as to provide an
accused with all of the various protections generally considered essential for a
fair trial, it would, perhaps, have been better to have borrowed the "fundamental
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guarantees" of Article 75 of the 1977 Additional Protocol 1.
One criticism that has been made ofthe Statute of the International Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia and ofthe Rules ofProcedure and Evidence adopted
by the Tribunal is that "they do not grant victims the right to plead and be
represented by counsel." However, as the critic of this alleged omission points
out, the Tribunal's Rule 74 authorizes a Chamber to "invite or grant leave to
a State, organization or person to appear before it and make submissions on any
issue specified by the Chamber." This would certainly include granting leave to
the victim to appear before the Chamber, either in person or by counsel, and
to make submissions on the issues ofthe horrendous nature ofthe offense charged
and of the guilt of the accused.
IX. The Prosecutor
One of the major mistakes made in the drafting of the 1945 London Charter
was contained in its Article 14, which provided that each of the four signatories
(France, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States) should appoint
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a "Chief Prosecutor." With no single "boss" to make final decisions, it was
only the adoption of a proposal made by the Soviet Chief Prosecutor for the
distribution of the prosecutorial functions that made possible the functioning of
the prosecution at Nuremberg. The problem of State equality does not arise
with respect to the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Article
16 of which provides for a single Prosecutor to be nominated by the
Secretary-General of the United Nations and to be appointed by the Security
Council, and a staff to be appointed by the Secretary-General on the
recommendation of the Prosecutor. Similarly, Article 12 of the ILC Draft
Statute provides for a "Procuracy," consisting of a Prosecutor and one or more
Deputy Prosecutors who, like the judges, are to be elected by the States Parties
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to the Convention establishing the Court.
X. The Registry
A judicial body cannot operate without an administrative branch, whatever
it may be called. While a number of articles of the Statute of the International
Court ofJustice refer to functions to be performed by a "Registrar," there is no
provision in that Statute actually establishing such an office. The 1945 London
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Charter, likewise, had no provision in this respect, but nevertheless a Secretariat
was established to perform the necessary administrative functions for the
International Military Tribunal. Article 3(b) of the Charter of the International
Military Tribunal for the Far East established a Secretariat to perform
administrative functions for that Tribunal. Article 17 of the Statute of the
International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia provides for a Registry
consisting of a Registrar and staff "for the administration and servicing of the
International Tribunal" to be appointed by the Secretary-General of the United
Nations. Article 13 of the ILC Draft Statute is quite similar except that the
Registrar and the Deputy Registrar, if any, are to be elected by the judges.
XI. Investigation and Preparation of Indictment
There are, of course, no true police, no grand juries, and no examining
magistrates or judges of instruction in the international arena. Accordingly,
official prosecutors have been called upon to initiate investigations; to collect
evidence; where deemed appropriate, to draft and file indictments; and to
conduct the prosecution at the trial. Articles 14 and 15 of the 1945 London
Charter so provided. Article 18 of the Statute of the International Tribunal for
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the Former Yugoslavia is quite complete in its coverage of these matters. Not
only may the Prosecutor institute investigations, he may draft and file
indictments on his own initiative. ' The ILC Draft Statute adopts a quite
different approach to this problem. Under its Article 25, complaints may only
be filed by certain categories ofStates and by the Security Council. It is believed
that the listing of the States which may file complaints is too restrictive; and no
valid reason is perceived for denying this right to the Prosecutor who may well
have come into the possession of evidence of a serious violation ofinternational
law with respect to which no State has filed, or is willing to file, a complaint.
Article 19 of the Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, entitled "Review of the Indictment," is rather unusual. When the
indictment is received by one of the Trial Chambers of the International
Tribunal "the judge of the Trial Chamber to whom the indictment has been
transmitted shall review it" and, as a result of this review, the indictment is either
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confirmed or dismissed. Normally, in the common law system, a preliminary
determination with respect to the validity of an indictment is only undertaken
when a challenge is initiated by the accused named therein. It would appear that
the procedure adopted more closely follows the continental law system, where
all of the prosecution's evidence is attached to the indictment and is reviewed
by a magistrate before being referred for trial.
Like Article 19 of the Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, the previous draft of the ILC Draft Statute provided that the Bureau
of the Court (consisting of its President and its two Vice Presidents) "acting as
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an Indictment Chamber, shall examine the indictment and determine whether
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or not a prima facie case exists." The present draft prepared by that body has
a convoluted procedure set forth in its Articles 26 and 27. When a complaint
is filed by a State, or results from action ofthe Security Council, the prehminary
investigation and review is by the Prosecutor. If he concludes that there is no
sufficient basis for the filing of an indictment and for a prosecution, he must so
inform the Presidency. At the request of the State which filed the complaint, or
of the Security Council if the complaint is based upon action of that body, the
Presidency may review the action of the Prosecutor and "may request" him to
reconsider his decision. Apparently, his subsequent decision not to file an
indictment is final. If his investigation of the complaint indicates that there is a
prima facie case, the Prosecutor drafts an indictment which he files with the
Registrar. The Presidency reviews the indictment and its supporting material.
If it determines that the case should be heard by the Court it confirms the
indictment and establishes a Trial Chamber to hear the case; ifit determines that
the case should not be heard by the Court, it so notifies the complainant State
or the Security Council, as the case may be.
XII. Cooperation and Judicial Assistance
Having determined that there is a valid indictment against an accused, he
must be brought before a Trial Chamber of the International Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia. Because of the situation existing at the end ofWorld War
II, with most of the individuals accused ofwar crimes being found in defeated
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States, little difficulty was encountered in this regard at that time. Unlike the
provisions with respect to cooperation and judicial assistance appearing in most
law-of-war treaties, which are frequently optional and dependent largely upon
the extradition treaties of the State in whose territory the accused is to be
found, Article 29 of the Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia is set forth in mandatory terms. "States shall cooperate with the
International Tribunal"; "States shall comply without delay." A State will be
unable to avail itself of the exclusionary provisions of its extradition treaties,
including particularly the "political offense" exception, when the International
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia issues an order for the arrest and surrender
of an individual within the State's territory who is charged with having
committed a violation of any of the provisions of Articles 1 through 5 of the
Statute of the Tribunal.
Of course, it undoubtedly will be found that many, if not most, of the
individuals whose surrender will be demanded by the International Tribunal
will be located in the former Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and in
Bosnia-Herzegovina. Both of these entities can be expected to be reluctant to
surrender any of their personnel to the International Tribunal for trial for
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violations of international humanitarian law. The individuals who negotiate the
final cease-fire on behalfofthose entities will, understandably, vigorously oppose
including any provision in that document calling for compliance with the
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provisions of the Statute, particularly for the surrender of personnel for trial.
While the Statute is contained in a Security Council resolution and is, therefore,
binding upon authorities in all of the entities which came into being upon the
dissolution of what was once the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, it
can be anticipated that considerable difficulty will be encountered by the
International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in securing the custody of
many ofthe individuals against whom valid indictments may be filed, particularly
if a provision in any cease-fire agreement setting forth the right to demand such
custody is seen as causing a prolongation of hostilities.
Part 7 (Articles 51-57) of the ILC Draft Statute deals with this subject. Article
51 is concerned with general matters and the Commission's Commentary to
that article states that it is "adapted from article 29 of the Statute of the
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International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia." It, too, provides that States
"shall respond without undue delay" to the requests ofthe International Criminal
Court; and Article 54 mandates that a "custodial State" shall either extradite the
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suspect or try him. Article 55 sets forth the well-established rule of
specialty—that an individual delivered to a court for trial may only be prosecuted
for the offense or offenses included in the request for his custody. For some
reason the Secretary-General did not consider it appropriate to include such a
provision in the Statute ofthe International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,
nor did the Judges of that Tribunal consider it appropriate to include such a
provision in their Rules.
XIII. The Trial
Articles 20, 21, and 22 of the Statute of the International Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia make it clear that the Trial Chamber is in control of the trial
proceedings and is responsible for ensuring not only that the accused receives a
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fair trial, but also that victims and witnesses receive proper protection. The
usual rights of the accused (the presumption of innocence, to be informed of
the charges against him in a language which he understands, to have counsel of
his own choice, to have a prompt trial but with adequate time to prepare the
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defense, to be present at the trial, to examine the witnesses against him and
to obtain the presence of witnesses on his behalf, to have an interpreter if that
is necessary, and not to be compelled to testify against himself or to confess guilt)
1 12
are set forth seriatim. Understandably, the Rules of Procedure and Evidence
adopted by the Judges of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
include a great many provisions necessary to ensure that the Judges of the Trial
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Chambers ofthat Tribunal will be able to control the proceedings and to enforce
the necessary decorum.
XIV. Penalties
A major difference between the relevant provisions of the 1945 London
Charter and the Statute ofthe International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
is that, unlike the former, where a death sentence was far from unusual, under
Article 24 of the Statute the penalties which may be imposed by the latter are
limited to imprisonment. This is understandable as many nations have now
abolished the death sentence in their domestic judicial systems.
The 1945 London Charter, as well as many of the other post-Worid War II
laws and regulations establishing various types of tribunals for the conduct of
war crimes trials, authorized the judicial body to impose financial forfeitures.
Except for the French, this power was rarely, if ever, used. No such provision
is included in the Statute ofthe International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
which does, however, include in its Article 24(3) a provision authorizing the
Trial Chamber to "order the return of any property and proceeds acquired by
criminal conduct, including by means of duress, to their rightful owners.
There are, of course, no international prisons. After World War II, the
Germans convicted ofwar crimes were normally incarcerated in German prisons
while the Japanese convicted of war crimes (except those convicted by Soviet
courts) were incarcerated in a Japanese prison. In those cases, however, the
prisons were located in occupied territory or the country involved had entered
into a contractual arrangement with respect to such prisoners. No such situations
exist with respect to any accused who may be convicted and sentenced to
imprisonment by the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.
Accordingly, another solution of the problem was required. Article 27 of the
Statute provides, in essence, that States may indicate to the Security Council
their willingness to accept for imprisonment in their penal institutions persons
convicted and sentenced to imprisonment by the Tribunal. The Tribunal then
designates a State from those which have so notified the Security Council.
Once in a prison of one of the volunteer States, the imprisonment is to be in
accordance with the laws of that State, "subject to the supervision of the
International Tribunal." Thus, Article 28 specifically provides that if, under the
laws of the State in which the individual is confined, "he or she is eligible for
pardon or commutation of sentence," the State concerned is to notify the
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International Tribunal which then decides the matter.
Article 59(1) of the ILC Draft Statute likewise provides for incarceration in
prisons maintained by States "which have indicated to the Court their willingness
to accept convicted persons." However, paragraph 2 of that article provides that
ifno State is designated, the convicted person is to serve the sentence "in a prison
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facility made available by the host State." Inasmuch as Article 3(1) of that Statute
designates the State of the seat of the Court as the "host State," this imposes on
that State an obligation which it may be unable or unwilling to accept.
XV. Appellate Proceedings
We have already seen that Article 12 of the Statute of the International
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia provides for a permanent Appeals Chamber
of five judges. ' Article 25 of the Statute sets forth the grounds for appeals to
that body, grounds which include both errors of law and errors of fact. An
unusual aspect of this provision is that either the convicted person or the
Prosecutor may appeal. Does this mean that the Prosecutor may appeal from an
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acquittal? It would appear that it does. Strangely, the Statute does not include
any time limit for the filing of such appeals. That omission has been rectified by
the Tribunal's Rule 108 which allows thirty days from the date on which the
judgment is pronounced.
In addition to the provisions for appeals, the Statute of the International
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia provides, in its Article 26, for review
proceedings when a fact is discovered which had not been previously known
1 22
and had not been made available to the Tribunal at the trial or on appeal. As
in the case of an appeal, the application for review may be made by either the
convicted person or by the Prosecutor. It would normally be assumed that the
Prosecutor might only make such an application in the interest ofjustice, if the
accused has been convicted and the new evidence might warrant upsetting that
conviction or reducing the severity of the punishment, and not if the accused
has been acquitted. However, in view ofthe provisions relating to appeals which
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have just been discussed, it is doubtful that such an assumption is warranted.
Article 48 of the ILC Draft Statute also provides for appeals by either the
Prosecutor or the convicted person and Article 49(2) (b) refers to an "appeal
brought by the Prosecutor against an acquittal." However, Article 50 ofthe ILC
Draft Statute makes it clear that applications for revision of the decision of a
Trial Chamber, or of the Appeals Chamber, on the basis of newly discovered
evidence may only be made where there has been a conviction. This means that,
unlike the Prosecutor of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,
the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court may not seek to reopen a
judgment of acquittal pronounced by a Chamber of that Court which has
become final.
XVI. Conclusion
While the Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia is
not a perfectly drafted instrument, it appears that it will accomplish the purpose
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for which it was intended—provided, of course, that the possibility that it may
function is not largely nullified by the provisions of any final cease-fire
agreement. On the other hand, the Draft Statute for an International Criminal
Court prepared by the International Law Commission, while an improvement
over the previous drafts, leaves something to be desired, particularly with respect
to the grant ofjurisdiction. It is to be hoped that before a final draft is approved
by the General Assembly for reference to the States in the form ofa Convention,
its provisions in this and other respects will be both clarified and enlarged.
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is a good solution because, in effect, the action of the Security Council would constitute the legislative
establishment of the substantive offense and the Court would then be required to perform only its natural
function—the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused before it of a legislatively-established
offense).
38. 24 Stat. 989; T.S. 380; 1 Treaties and Other International Agreements, supra note 3, at 92;
75 B.F.S.P. 356; 163 Consol. T.S. 391.
39. 60 U.N.T.S. 253.
40. 112L.N.T.S. 371.
41. 96 U.N.T.S. 271.
42. 32 Stat. 1803; 1 Treaties and Other International Agreements, supra note 3, at 247; 1 Am.
J. Intl L (Supp.) 129 (1907); The Laws of Armed Conflicts, supra note 2, at 63.
43. 36 Stat. 2227; T.S. 539; 1 Treaties and Other International Agreements, supra note 3, at
631; 2 Am. J. Intl L. (Supp.) 90 (1908); The Laws of Armed Conflicts, supra note 2, at 63.
44. Opinion and Judgment of the International Military Tribunal, Nazi Conspiracy and
Aggression 83 (1947) [hereinafter Nazi Conspiracy].
45. Id at 62, 68, 72. So, too, did dozens of other military tribunals and military commissions. Another
reason given by the Commission for not including the Hague Regulations in the Annex listing is that "aspects
of the Regulations fall within the notion of serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in armed
conflict and are thus covered by article 20(c) of the statute." But this is also true of the four 1949 Geneva
Conventions and the 1977 Protocol I, supra note 30, all ofwhich are, however, included in the Annex listing.
46. Government of the Netherlands, Records of the Conference Convened by the United
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization Held at The Hague from 21 April
to 14 May 1954 5; The Laws of Armed Conflicts, supra note 2, at 745.
47. The Commentary to the Annex states that this Convention is not included because "[i]t does not
create crimes as such (cf. art 8)." This completely disregards the quoted provision of the Convention.
48. See supra note 30.
49. 22 U.S.T. 1641; T.I.A.S. No. 7192.
50. 24 U.S.T. 564; T.I.A.S. No. 70.
51. 1015 U.N.T.S. 243.
52. 28 U.S.T. 1975; T.I.A.S. No. 8532; 1035 U.N.T.S. 167.
53. T.I.A.S. No. 11081; 1315 U.N.T.S. 205.
54. U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/46, (1984); 23 United Nations Resolutions (General Assembly) 395
(D. Djonovich ed.).
55. 27 I.L.M. 668 (1988).
56. Id. at 685.
57. Id.
58. Nazi Conspiracy, supra note 44, at 53.
59. S/G Report, supra note 12, at para. 53, which points out that in a number of resolutions the Security
Council has referred to "individual criminal responsibility."
60. "Conspiracy" was the nub of the offense set forth in the provision of the 1945 London Charter
quoted in the text. It caused considerable difficulty for the representatives of the civil law countries at
Nuremberg. While that word does not appear in the Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, anyone who "aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution" of a crime would,
from the common law point of view, be guilty of having participated in a criminal conspiracy.
61 . See generally 1945 London Charter, supra note 7, at arts. 7 &: 8; Charter of the International Military
Tribunal for the Far East, supra note 8, at art. 6; Allied Control Council Law No. 10, supra note 9, at art. 4.
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Nevertheless, the defense of superior orders was the defense most frequently interposed in post-World War
II war crimes trials and the defense of act of state was also asserted in a great many cases. Levie, supra note 7,
at 465-469 and 512-521.
62. The 1945 London Charter, supra note 7, and International Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, supra note 12, both provide that the order of a government or of a superior shall not relieve an
accused of criminal responsibility, "but may be considered in mitigation of punishment." Article 11 of the
ILC Draft Code, supra note 34, rejects that defense only "if, in the circumstances at the time, it was possible
for him not to comply with that order."
63. Howard S. Levie, The Rise and Fall ofan Internationally Codified Denial ofthe Defense ofSuperior Orders,
30 Mil. L. & L. War. Rev. 199 (1991).
64. Remarks and Proposals at 64, ICRC (1949); 2B Final Record ofthe Diplomatic Conference ofGeneva
of 1949, at 115, Swiss Fed. Pol. Dep't. (1949); Levie, supra note 63, at 199-200.
65. Draft Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions ofAugust 12, 1949, at 25, ICRC (1973); 9 Official
Records ofthe Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development ofInternational Humanitarian
Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts at 386-392, Swiss Fed. Pol. Dep't. (1978); Levie, supra note 63, at 200-203.
As indicated in note 62, supra, the International Law Commission has included in its Draft Code a provision
limiting, but not completely denying, the assertion of the defense of superior orders.
66. Paragraph 58 of the S/G Report, supra note 12, points out that the International Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia will be called upon to consider the merits of other defenses, "such as minimum age or
mental capacity, drawing upon general principles of law recognized by all nations."
67. See supra note 30.
68. 327 U.S. 1 (1947); Levie, supra note 7, at 156.
69. Concerning its basic law, Allied Control Council Law No. 10, supra note 9, the Military Tribunal
in the Einsatzgruppen Case said: "As this law is not limited to offenses committed during war, it is also not
restricted as to the nationality ofthe victim, or to the place where committed" (emphasis added) (4 Trials OF War
Criminals, supra note 9, at 499). A French law limited the jurisdiction of its Permanent Military Courts sitting
in France to offenses committed in France or against French nationals. There were no such limitations on
French military courts sitting in Germany.
70. The International Military Tribunal has so held with respect to crimes against humanity. See Nazi
Conspiracy, supra note 44, at 84. Allied Control Council Law No. 10, supra note 9, and the United States
Zone Military Government Ordinance No. 7, 18 October 1946 (1 Trials OF War Criminals, supra note
9, at xxi; Levie, supra note 7, at 563), are similarly lacking in temporal limitations and were similarly construed.
It should be noted, however, that the tribunals which sat in Europe all considered 1 September 1939 to be
the date of the beginning of the war, although the Soviet Union did not become a belligerent until June 1941
and the United States did not become a belligerent until December 1941.
71. The Military Tribunals in The Medical Case, 2 Trials of War Criminals, supra note 9, at 12 and
174; the Flick Case, 6 Trials of War Criminals, supra note 9, at 1213; and the Ministries Case, 13 Trials
OF War CRIMINALS, supra note 9, at 112, all so held. However, the Military Tribunals which heard theJustice
Case, 3 Trials of War Criminals, supra note 9, at 956, and the Einsatzgruppen Case, 4 Trials of War
Criminals, supra note 9, at 499, held otherwise.
72. For the territorial limitations placed on the International Tribunal for Rwanda, see supra note 15.
Article 7 of that Tribunal's Statute sets the temporal limits ofjurisdiction as the period beginning on 1 January
1994 and ending on 31 December 1994.
73. It should be noted that the Secretary-General did not consider it necessary to include in the Statute
of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia a provision concerning the applicability or
non-applicability of any statute oflimitations. However, a provision with respect to limitations of time would
be appropriate for an international criminal court of general jurisdiction. There is no such provision in the
ILC Draft Statute.
74. United States Army, General Orders No. 100, 24 April 1963; Levie, supra note 7, at 529, S32.
75. James F. Willis, Prologue to Nuremberg 130 (1982). After the Allies refused further
participation in the Leipsig Trials, the Germans continued to conduct hundreds of such trials, all of which
concluded with the acquittal of the accused. This did not stop the French from subsequently trying many of
these same individuals, usually in absentia.
76. Peter Padfield, Donitz: The Last Fuehrer 428 (1984).
77. Levie, supra note 7, at 141. In any event, there is considerable doubt that the doctrine of mom his in
idem precludes trials for the same offense by different sovereigns.
78. International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, supra note 12, at art. 10, para. 1,
specifically prohibits a trial by a national court for an offense for which the accused has previously been tried
by the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.
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79. See S/G Report, supra note 12, at para. 66(a).
80. Rule 12 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence adopted by the International Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia, supra note 18, provides that, "Subject to Article 10(2) of the Statute, determinations of
national courts are not binding on the Tribunal." This, however, adds nothing to the Statute.
81. Article 42 of the ILC Draft Statute, supra note 14, adopts the provisions of Article 10 of the Statute
of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia with some minor variation. It is, therefore, subject
to the same infirmities.
82. An oddity of this Rule is that where a Trial Chamber makes such a request, it is disqualified from
taking further proceedings in the matter.
83. Rule 13 is the reverse of the coin. Where an individual has been tried by the International Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia and proceedings are thereafter instituted against him in a national court, a Trial
Chamber, following the procedure set forth in Rule 10, mutatis mutandis, will request the national court to
discontinue its proceedings; and, if it fails to do so (presumably within sixty days), the President of the Tribunal
may so report to the Security Council.
84. Article 14 of the Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, supra note 15, provides that the
Tribunal shall adopt the rules of procedure and evidence already adopted by the International Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia "with such changes as they deem necessary."
85. See supra note 18. Article 19 of the ILC Draft Statute would also authorize the International Criminal
Court to draft rules for the functioning of that Court. However, the rules so drafted would be subject to the
approval of a conference of the States Parties to that Statute.
86. See Levie, supra note 7, at 52-53, 259-262. In this respect, it is worthy of note that the rules of
procedure proposed by the United States for the International Tribunal included the following provisions:
19.5(A) The Trial Chamber shall in general admit any relevant oral, written or physical evidence
having a bearing on the issues before it, and shall exclude any evidence which in its opinion is of no
value as proof ....
(B) The Trial Chamber shall in general require the best evidence available.
United States, Draft Rules of Procedure for the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons
Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Former Yugoslavia.
87. See supra note 18. Other, generally non-controversial, rules with respect to evidence will be found
in Rules 90-98. They include such subjects as "False Testimony," "Confessions," "Judicial Notice," etc. Rule
96 (Evidence in Cases of Sexual Assault) provides that no corroboration of the victim's testimony is required,
that consent shall not be allowed as a defense, and that prior conduct of the victim shall not be admitted as
evidence.
88. The ILC Commentary, supra note 14, erroneously refers to Rules 89-106 of the Rules of the
International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. The reference should have been to Rules 89-98. Rules
99-106 are concerned with sentencing procedures.
89. See supra note 30. Additional items for the protection ofan accused will be found in Rule 42 (Rights
of Suspects during Investigation), Rule 43 (Recording Questioning of Suspects), Rule 45 (Assignment of
Counsel), Rule 63 (Questioning ofAccused), Rule 66 (Disclosure [ofEvidence] by the Prosecutor), Rule 67
(Reciprocal Disclosure), Rule 68 (Disclosure of Exculpatory Evidence).
90. Bruce Zigaris, Introductory Note, 33 I.L.M. 484, 488 (1994).
91 . See supra note 7. Article 8 of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, supra
note 8, avoided this problem by providing for one Chiefof Counsel and an Associate Counsel to be appointed
by each nation which had been at war with Japan and which desired to appoint one.
92. Levie, supra note 7, at 54.
93. Article 16(2) of INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE Former Yugoslavia, supra note 12, properly
provides that the Prosecutor "shall not seek or receive instructions from any Government or from any other
source." An identical provision is in Article 13(4) of the ILC Draft Statute, supra note 14, and in Article 15(2)
of the Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, supra note 15. The latter Statute also provides that
the Prosecutor of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia shall serve as the Prosecutor for the
International Tribunal for Rwanda, with an additional Deputy Prosecutor and additional staff.
94. See supra note 14.
95. The provisions with respect to the Registry of the International Tribunal for Rwanda are the same
as provisions contained in the Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, but, there are
to be two separate Registries.
96. Article 18(1) of the Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia provides that
the Prosecutor may "initiate investigations ex officio or on the basis of information obtained from any source."
Article 18(1) then goes on to list possible sources. The Commission of Experts created by S.C. Res. 780
(1992), 6 October 1992, 31 I.L.M. 1476 (1992), for the purpose of receiving and analyzing the evidence of
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war crimes alleged to have been committed in Bosnia-Herzegovina, is not specifically mentioned. It may be
considered that its Final Report (S/ 1994/674, 27 May 1994) and its voluminous records are included under
the heading of "United Nations organs." They have already been made available to the Prosecutor.
97. On 8 November 1994, the prosecutor, Judge Richard J. Goldstone of South Africa, filed an
indictment against Bosnian Serb Dusan Tadic, alleging murder, torture, forced evacuations, and gang rape.
Judge Goldstone also requested a Chamber of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia to seek
the custody ofTadic from the German authorities who were keeping him in confinement in Munich and had
indicted him for genocide and murder. The Chamber did so, and the German authorities indicated an intention
to comply with the International Tribunal's request. Associated-Press Dispatch, Shrapnel, Snipers Killed in
Central Sarajevo; War Crimes Tribunal Seeks Serb Accused ofMurder, Torture, Chi. Trib., November 9, 1994, at
16. On 7 November 1994, the Prosecutor filed with the Tribunal an indictment against Dragan Nikolic who
is alleged to have been a concentration camp commander and who is believed to be in Bosnia. It will be
interesting to see the answer to a request for his custody made to the Serbian authorities in Bosnia. Roger
Cohen, Serb is First to Face Post-World War II War-Crimes Indictment, N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1994, at A5, col.
1.
98. A proposal to permit the Prosecutor to file a complaint was rejected. See paragraph 4 of the
International Law Commission's Commentary to Article 25, supra note 15.
99. Unfortunately, paragraph 95 of the Commentary, S/G Report supra note 12, does not give us a
reason for this provision as it merely paraphrases the Statute's provision.
100. Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence adopted by the International Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia, supra note 18, provides the method for the review of an indictment; Rule 28 provides
that in July of each year the President of the Tribunal shall assign for each month of the next calendar year a
Judge of a Trial Chamber to review the indictments.
101. See Report of the Working Group, arts. 10(3), 32, 33 I.L.M. 258, 260, 274 (1994).
102. ILC Draft Statute, supra note 14.
103. See Levie, supra note 7, at 238-250. While a number of individuals wanted for trial did manage to
reach sanctuary in several South American countries and even in the United States and Canada, in most such
cases their whereabouts were not known for many years so no requests for custody were made.
104. See, e.g., Article 88 of the 1977 Additional Protocol I, supra note 30, which contains such phrases as
"subject to the rights and obligations established in the Conventions," "when circumstances permit," "they
shall give due consideration," etc.
105. See the S/G Report, supra note 12, at paras. 23 & 125.
106. In paragraph 126 of the S/G Report, supra note 12, the Secretary-General takes the position that
such an order "shall be considered to be the application of an enforcement measure under Chapter VII of the
Charter of the United Nations."
107. When World War II in Europe was approaching its conclusion, the United States drafted a proposed
surrender agreement to be submitted to the Germans. Concerning this draft the Soviet representative said:
[T]he U.S. draft [is] acceptable except for paragraph VII which required the German authorities
and people to cooperate in apprehending war criminals and making them available for trial. The Soviet
government, he said, did not want a reference to war criminals in the document because the men who
came to sign might themselves fall into this category and might, therefore, refuse to do business at all.
Earl Ziemke, The United States Army in the Occupation of Germany 112 (1975). It is inevitable that
the officials negotiating the final cease fire in the former Yugoslavia will seek to include some type of amnesty
provision in that document. There are those who believe, with considerable justification, that including any
such provision will constitute a major setback for the future of the United Nations.
108. See supra note 14.
109. This article provides that extradition would be "to a requesting State" rather than to the International
Criminal Court. Paragraph 5 of the ILC's Commentary to its Article 21 and paragraphs 1 and 2 of the
Commentary to its Article 54, supra note 14, explain that this provision was intended to cover instances where
the custodial State has not accepted the jurisdiction ofthe International Criminal Court over the crime alleged.
110. While paragraph 108 of the Commentary contained in the S/G Report, supra note 12, attributes this
latter requirement "to the particular nature of the crimes committed," the protection of victims and witnesses
(and of the accused) has also been recognized as a requirement in Article 43 of the ILC Draft Statute, supra
note 14. Rules 69 and 75 ofthe Rules ofProcedure and Evidence ofthe International Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, supra note 18, contain additional provisions aimed at protecting victims and witnesses. All of these
Rules will also apply to the International Tribunal for Rwanda. See supra note 84.
111. The 1945 London Charter, supra note 7, at art. 12, authorized trials in the absence of the accused
and one accused, Martin Bormann, was so tried. There is no such provision in the Statute of the International
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the right of the accused "to be tried in his presence" would appear
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to negate the possibility of trials in absentia. See Commentaries of the S/G, supra note 12, at para. 101. Article
41(l)(d) of the ILC Draft Statute, supra note 14, gives the accused the right "to be present at the trial." Article
37(1) thereof states that "[a]s a general rule, the accused should be present during the trial." (See the lengthy
Commentary on this matter, supra note 14). However, Article 37(2) authorizes the Trial Chamber to proceed
with a trial in the absence of the accused where such absence is due to certain specified actions on his part.
112. These rights are not quite as well set forth as in Article 75(4) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I, supra
note 30. They arc extracted from Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999
U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967).
113. The International Law Commission apparently expects that the International Criminal Court will
likewise adopt rules on this subject as no provisions with regard thereto are included in its Draft Statute.
114. The Italian proposal for an International Tribunal would have required the International Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia to "apply the penalties provided for by the criminal law in force at the time of the
commission in the State in whose territory the crime was committed." S/25300, 17 February 1993, Annex I,
art. 7(1). While there is considerable merit to this proposal, in view of the fluid situation in the territory of
the former Yugoslavia its adoption might have caused some difficulties.
115. Rule 101 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence promulgated by the International Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia, supra note 18, lists the factors to be taken into consideration by the Tribunal in
determining the sentence to be imposed. Article 47 of the ILC Draft Statute, supra note 14, also authorizes
the imposition of imprisonment, up to life. Paragraph 1 of the Commentary to that article states flatly that
"[t]he Court is not authorized to impose the death penalty." Id at Commentary, art. 47, para. 1. As a member
of the Security Council for this year Rwanda voted against the creation of the International Tribunal for
Rwanda because that Tribunal would not be able to impose the death penalty while Rwandan courts, trying
lesser criminals, would be doing so. Julia Preston, Tribunal Set on Rwanda War Crimes; Kigali Votes No on U.N.
Resolution, Wash. POST, Nov. 9, 1994, at A44, col. 1.
116. Article 47 of the ILC Draft Statute, supra note 14, also authorizes the imposition of fines and provides
for the disposition of fines so imposed and collected.
117. Rule 105 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, supra note 18, elaborates on this provision of its Statute. The previous draft of the ILC Draft Statute
also provided for restitution orders but such a provision was omitted from the 1994 draft. Paragraph 3 of the
Commentary to Article 47 of the ILC Draft Statute, supra note 14, indicates that it was considered that such
a matter would be more appropriate for a separate civil proceeding.
118. If several States have notified the Security Council of their willingness to accept for imprisonment
persons convicted and sentenced by the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, the Tribunal is to
designate the State in the prison of which the convicted person will be confined. There is no indication in
the Statute as to how, and to what extent, reimbursement will be made to the imprisoning State for the
expenses incurred in the confinement of persons convicted and sentenced by the Tribunal. Presumably, this
will be negotiated by the Secretary-General and the State concerned.
119. Rule 125 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, supra note 18, sets forth the criteria to be employed by the Tribunal for granting pardon or
commutation ofsentence. (Inasmuch as "pardon" normally refers to executive clemency and is always available,
with no qualifying requirements, the term "parole" would have been more appropriate than the term
"pardon"—unless it is considered that the Tribunal will be acting in an executive, rather than a judicial,
capacity. Article 60 of the ILC Draft Statute, supra note 14, refers to "pardon, parole or commutation of
sentence").
120. See supra text accompanying note 17.
121. Paragraph 117 of the Commentary, S/G Report, supra note 12, states that "the Prosecutor should
also be entitled to initiate appeal proceedings on the same grounds." Again, there is no indication as to whether
this means that he may appeal an acquittal. Rule 99 of the Tribunal's Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra
note 18, appears to assume that he may do so. After providing for the immediate release of an accused who
has been acquited, that Rule states:
(B) If, at the time the judgment is pronounced, the Prosecutor advises the Trial Chamber in open
court of his intention to file notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 108, the Trial Chamber may, at the
request of the Prosecutor, issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused to take effect immediately.
Id. In addition, Rule 118 refers to the possible absence ofthe accused when the appellatejudgment is delivered,
he "having been acquitted on all charges."
122. Article 50 of the ILC Draft Statute, supra note 14, is to the same effect. Rule 115 of the International
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, supra note 18, covers the use ofnew evidence during the course of an appeal.
123. Rules 107 to 118 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia, supra note 18, amplify the provisions of the Statute with respect to appellate proceedings.
XXIII
Was the Assassination of Abraham Lincoln
a War Crime?
Dr. Mudd and the Lincoln Assassination: The Case Reopened 213
(John P.Jones ed., 1995)
There does not appear to be any dispute about the following facts
concerning the assassination of President Abraham Lincoln: that on 14
April 1865, while sitting in a box at Ford's Theater in Washington, D.C.,
watching a performance of"Our American Cousin," Lincoln was shot and killed
by John Wilkes Booth; that in jumping from the box to the stage (where he
delivered the sic semper tyrannis pronouncement) one ofBooth's spurs caught on
a flag decorating Lincoln's box with the result that he fell and broke his leg; that
despite this he was able to escape from the theater and from Washington; that
he was later joined in his flight by David E. Herold; that Dr. Samuel Mudd, a
Booth acquaintance living in Maryland, treated Booth's leg and provided him
with a makeshift crutch; and that all this occurred five days after Lee's surrender
to Grant at Appomattox.
From that point on there is litde agreement on the facts —and even less on
the applicable law. However, as to some of the facts which are disputed, there
is really no basis for argument. For example, it is sometime argued that with
Lee's surrender the Civil War (or the War Between the States) came to an end.
That is not so. Lee had merely surrendered the Army ofNorthern Virginia. The
Confederate States of America had other armies in the field, armies which
continued to fight, armies which did not surrender until well after the date of
the assassination. Moreover, because of the presence of thousands of
Confederate sympathizers in Washington, martial law had been declared for that
city, which was fortified and heavily guarded by Union troops, and that status
still existed on 14 April 1865, when the assassination took place.
The current manual on the law of war of the United States Army defines a
war crime as "a violation of the law of war by any person or persons, military
or civilian." Adopting this definition, the sole question that this article will
attempt to answer is: Was the assassination ofAbraham Lincoln by John Wilkes
Booth (and any co-conspirators) a violation of the law ofwar and, hence, a war
crime? To refine our discussion even further: Is the murder of an individual
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committed in wartime by one or more individuals of the same nationality as the
victim a war crime?
If the answer to these questions is in the affirmative, under the law of war a
military commission would unquestionably have jurisdiction to try the accused
persons, including Dr. Samuel Mudd, brought before it charged with such an
offense. If the answer to these questions is in the negative, the question of the
jurisdiction of a military commission becomes one of constitutional and national
law which is beyond the purview of this discussion.
For our purposes we will assume the worst case for the accused: 1) that the
evidence established that there was a conspiracy to assassinate President Lincoln;
2) that the eight individuals convicted by the military commission on 30 June
1865, including Dr. Samuel Mudd, as well as others who were not charged,
were parties to that conspiracy; 3) that all of the conspirators charged, being
residents of the District of Columbia or of the State ofMaryland, were nationals
ofthe Union; 4) that, nevertheless, all ofthe conspirators were strong supporters
of the Confederate cause; and 5) that the conspiracy to assassinate Lincoln was
motivated by a desire on their part to help that cause.
The charge with respect to which the military commission opened its hearings
on 9 May 1865, and to which the eight accused pleaded "Not Guilty" on the
following day, alleged that they "maliciously, unlawfully and traitorously"
combined, confederated, and conspired to kill and murder Abraham Lincoln
and others. There is no allegation that their acts were in violation of the law
of war. The wording of the charge itself demonstrates that the prosecution
considered the offense charged to be a conspiracy to commit treason by
murdering the President and his successors-to-be and that it did not consider
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this to be a war crime. As the present author has said elsewhere:
There are a number of actions which, while they are wartime criminal offenses
and are punishable by the injured belligerent, do not come within any definition
ofwar crimes. Thus, while there is a wide-spread beliefthat espionage and treason
are violations of the laws and customs ofwar and are, therefore, war crimes, this
is not so. International law does not forbid espionage and treason; national laws
do.
12
Presumably, the accused, Union citizens, assumed their acts of assassination
would in some manner benefit the Confederate cause, even at that late date in
the war. Their acts were, therefore, traitorous—but, as it has just been shown,
treason is not a violation of the law of war, and it is not a war crime.
The post-World War II trials in which Germans tried Germans, Austrians
tried Austrians, Hungarians tried Hungarians, etc., were not true war crimes
trials. For the most part they were collaborationist (treason) cases and, in many
cases, prosecuted misuse or abuse of power. Nor were the euthanasia cases or
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the concentration camp cases (involving actions which took place prior to, and
after, 1 September 1939, the official date of the beginning ofWorld War II in
Europe), which were tried by the Germans, true war crimes cases. They were
violations ofGerman criminal law, which had existed at the time ofthe offenses,
13
but which, for obvious reasons, had not been enforced by Nazi officials.
In the Nordhausen Concentration Camp case, the review ofthe case contains
the following statement:
For an illegal act to be a war crime certain elements must be present, viz., (1) the
act must be a crime in violation ofinternational law; (2) there must be a disparity
of nationality between the perpetrator and the victim; and (3) the criminal act
must have been committed as an incident of war.
These elements were not present in the trial ofthose alleged to have been parties
to the conspiracy to assassinate Abraham Lincoln. The act charged was not a
violation of international law; there was no disparity of nationality between the
persons charged as perpetrators and the victim; and it is extremely doubtful that
the assassination of Lincoln may be considered to have been an incident of the
war. Therefore, it was not a war crime.
Proponents of the argument that the law of war governed the assassination
of Abraham Lincoln, a Union citizen, by those who were likewise Union
• 15
citizens, will find support in the trial of Mariano Uyeki, a case for which the
present author can find no justification:
Mariano Uyeki was born in 1924 in Iloilo, Panay, the Philippines, ofJapanese
parents. When the war broke out in 1941 he apparendy suffered at the hands of
his Filipino schoolmates because he was pro-Japanese and it was alleged that on
10 May 1942, after theJapanese occupation ofPanay, and without anyjustification,
he shot and killed a fellow Filipino teenager. There was some evidence at that
period he was acting as an interpreter for the Japanese and that he was wearing at
least parts of a Japanese Army uniform. However, he was not conscripted into the
Japanese Army until October 1944. He became a prisoner ofwar on 1 September
1945. Early in 1946 he was tried for the murder by a United States Military
Commission. He was convicted and sentenced to death. That conviction was
vacated because "the validity of the proceedings is faulty." Unfortunately, there
is no explanation of the basis for that statement. He then made an application to
the Supreme Court of the Philippines for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that
he was a Filipino citizen and that the United States Military Commission had no
jurisdiction to try him. His application was denied on the ground that even if he
had originally been a national of the Philippines, he had forfeited that nationality
by rendering military service to the Japanese Government. This was not a decision
that the military commission had jurisdiction to try him, it was a decision that the
Supreme Court of the Philippines had no jurisdiction to rule on the jurisdiction
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of the United States court because he was not a citizen of the Philippines. He was
retried by another United States Military Commission in April 1946 and was again
convicted and sentenced to death.
Concerning this case the present author went on to say:
When the offense was committed in 1942, it was a matter of the murder of
one (pro-American) Filipino civilian by another (pro-Japanese) Filipino
civilian. It was a violation of the criminal law of the Commonwealth of the
Philippines. Surely, this was a case for the courts of the Philippines and not a
war crime for trial by a United States Military Commission. Even though the
accused may have lost his Filipino nationality in 1944, upon entering the
Japanese Army, and even though the Philippines were not yet fully
independent, it did have its own fully-developed criminal justice system. It is
difficult to find a basis for the jurisdiction of the United States military
commission for this offense committed in 1942. Regrettably, no application
for a writ of habeas corpus was made to the United States Courts.
In other words, it is not believed that motive alone can convert an offense
which is a violation of national law into one which is a violation ofinternational
law. Had Booth and his fellow conspirators been disappointed office seekers,
the assassination ofPresident Lincoln would certainly not have been a war crime,
and the fact that they acted as they did because of their political motivation,
because of their desire to support the Confederacy, does not convert a common
law national crime into an international crime.
The conclusion is reached that the assassination ofPresident Abraham Lincoln
byJohn Wilkes Booth and his fellow conspirators was not a violation of the law
of war and, therefore, was not a war crime, but was a politically motivated,
treasonous act committed by Union citizens in the hope that it would help the
Confederate cause. Accordingly, even ifwe assume that the evidence supported
Dr. Mudd's conviction of conspiracy to commit treason and murder under
national law, he was properly convicted only if a trial by military commission
at that time and place complied with the constitutional and statutory law of the
United States.
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War Crimes in the Persian Gulf
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I. Introduction
Events since the cessation of the hostilities during the Gulf Crisis have
demonstrated conclusively the mistake that was made in not allowing the
forces of the Coalition of Nations, operating in the Persian Gulfin 1990-1991, to
occupy Iraq in its entirety. The Iraqi Army was in full retreat with thousands of its
members surrendering. Saddam Hussein and his aides could have been made
1 i
prisoners ofwar and they could have been put on trial for violations ofinternational
law, and particularly ofthe law ofwar. Had this been done, there would have been
no need for embargoes and no difficulty in searching for, and destroying, nuclear,
chemical, and biological plants, weapons, and materials in Iraq.
This essay examines, in retrospect, whether a legal basis existed for the
establishment of an International Military Tribunal to try Saddam Hussein and
his aides for war crimes in the Persian Gulf. It argues that a legal basis for such
a Tribunal existed and still exists. It will do so by first establishing the legal
foundation for and jurisdiction of a war crimes tribunal in the Persian Gulf. It
will then describe the substantive law that the Tribunal would apply. Finally, it
will outline the substantive evidence ofwar crimes already available that could
be presented before the Tribunal, including, but not limited to, violations ofthe
rights of foreign and protected persons, other human rights violations, and
environmental destruction and use of chemical and biological weapons.
II. Legal Foundation For And Jurisdiction of a War Crimes Tribunal
in the Persian Gulf
The provisions of the 1945 London Charter which created the International
Military Tribunal (IMT) were the foundation for most of the war crimes
* An earlier, and necessarily much less detailed, version of this article was presented
at a Conference entided Crisis in the Gulf: Enforcing the Rule of Law, sponsored by
the Standing Committee on Law and National Security ofthe American Bar Association,
at the International Club, Washington, D.C., onJan. 30-31, 1991. The author also made
a presentation on the subject at a hearing on War Crimes: Hearing before the Subcommittee
on International Law, Immigration and Refugees of the Committee on theJudiciary of the House
of Representatives, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., (1991).
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directives promulgated in Europe after World War II, and they were repeated
almost verbatim in the corresponding activity in the Far East. There was,
therefore, adequate precedent for the members of the Coalition of Nations
involved in the Gulf War to draft and become Parties to an agreement such as
the London Charter. This agreement would contain provisions for the
establishment and procedure of an International Tribunal similar to, but not
necessarily identical with, those contained in the London Charter. Moreover,
we now have the additional precedents of the establishment, by the Security
Council of the United Nations, of an International Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, and an International Tribunal for the trial of persons accused of
having committed war crimes in Rwanda, or in neighboring States by
Rwandans, during the year 1994. Therefore, in its 1991 cease-fire Resolution,
the Security Council might well have declared its intention to establish an
International Tribunal for the trial of persons accused of having ordered or
committed war crimes in Kuwait and in Iraq on and after August 2, 1990.
There is one jurisdictional issue that would undoubtedly be raised by the
defense if Saddam Hussein and other members of the Iraqi military were to be
tried by an International Tribunal. Article 63 of the 1929 Geneva Convention
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War provided that any sentence
adjudged against a prisoner of war must be "by the same tribunals and in
accordance with the same procedure as in the case of persons belonging to the
,,11 .12
armed forces of the Detaining Power." In the famous Yamashita Case, the
United States Supreme Court held that this provision did not apply to trials for
pre-capture offenses (war crimes), but only to offenses committed while under
the status of a prisoner of war. This decision was almost uniformly adopted by
the courts ofother countries trying war crimes cases after World War II. When
the 1949 Geneva Diplomatic Conference drafted the new version of the 1929
14
Convention, its Article 102 included a provision similar to that contained in
Article 63 of the 1929 version but ending with the phrase "and if, furthermore,
15
the provisions of the present Chapter have been observed." In addition, the
Conference then drafted Article 85 of that Chapter which states, "[p]risoners of
war prosecuted under the laws of the Detaining Power for acts committed prior
to capture shall retain, even if convicted, the benefits of the present
Convention."
Undoubtedly, one purpose of this provision was to establish a rule contrary
to that of the Yamashita Case. That is, to make the provisions of Article 102
applicable to all trials of prisoners of war by a Detaining Power, whether the
offense charged was alleged to have been committed prior to, or after, the
accused became a prisoner of war. The question which then arises is: Does
this preclude the trial of a prisoner of war for war crimes by an internationally
constituted tribunal? The answer would appear to be in the negative as such a
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trial would not be "prosecuted under the laws of the Detaining Power," but
under international law. Furthermore, the accused would not be tried by a
Detaining Power but by an international entity. While the Commentary on the
1949 Geneva Prisoner of War Convention, prepared by the International
Committee of the Red Cross, advances a contrary interpretation of that phrase,
19
its reasoning is not particularly convincing. Further, the Commentary states
that Article 129 of the Convention, an article concerned specifically with the
punishment of "grave breaches" ofthe Convention, "does not exclude handing
over the accused to an international criminal court whose competence has been
,20
recognized by the Contracting Parties."
It appears that if a Detaining Power elects to try a prisoner of war pursuant
to its national law, for a war crime committed prior to capture, it must do so
"by the same courts according to the same procedure as in the case of a member
21
of the armed forces of the Detaining Power." However, if the trial is by an
International Tribunal whose members have been elected by the Security
Council and General Assembly ofthe United Nations, or have been selected by
the members of a Coalition or by the Parties to a convention on the subject,
such a Tribunal would havejurisdiction despite the above-mentioned provisions
of the 1949 Geneva Prisoner of War Convention. The applicable rules of
procedure and evidence could be included in the Charter of the Tribunal, as in
the case of the International Military Tribunal which sat in Nuremberg, or they
could be drafted and adopted by the members of the Tribunal, as in the case of
22
the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.
III. The Substantive Law of the Tribunal
Having established that our International Tribunal would have jurisdiction
to try individuals for war crimes alleged to have been committed during the
Persian Gulf Crisis of 1990-1991, and assuming that its substantive provisions,
like the Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, are
23
based on Article 6 ofthe London Charter, the provisions of that article would
be applicable to the actions of Saddam Hussein and his military commanders.
A. Article 6(a): Crimes Against Peace
Article 6(a) of the London Charter states:
Crimes against peace: namely, planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war
of aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or
assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the
accomplishment of any of the foregoing.
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A number of writers have urged that in the post World War II trials this
2S
provision constituted the creation of an offense ex postfacto. ' This was also the
contention of those accused at Nuremberg and Tokyo, as well as in other cases
where the accused were charged with waging aggressive war. Nevertheless, both
the International Military Tribunal (IMT) and its counterpart in the Far East,
the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE) ruled that such
a crime already existed in international law. Professor B. V. A. Roling, the Dutch
judge on the IMTFE, dissented from this ruling/
some years later he stated that the IMTFE had:
28
ing. However, in an article written
recognized the legal existence of the crime against peace as defined in the
Charter. In so doing it contributed to the recognition of this crime. Its decision,
combined with later actions taken within the United Nations, confirmed the crime
29
against peace as a crime under international law.
Thus, it appears that since at least 1945, if not before, the waging of aggressive
war, as well as the waging of war in violation of international treaties, has been a
violation of international law and a war crime. Recognizing the severity of this
offense the IMT said, "[t]o institute a war of aggression, therefore, is not only an
international crime; it is the supreme international crime differing only from other
30
war crimes in that it contains within itself the accumulated evil of the whole."*
B. Application ofArticle 6(a) and the Law ofAggression Against Saddam Hussein.
In examining whether Saddam Hussein's actions fall within the purview of
Article 6(a), it is necessary to refer to Article 5 of the 1945 Pact of the League
32
ofArab States. Both Iraq and Kuwait were original Parties to this treaty, Article
5 of which specifically prohibits the use of force for the resolution of disputes
between member states. Better known, of course, are the provisions of Article
2(4) of the United Nations Charter which require members (and both Iraq and
Kuwait are members) to refrain "from the threat or use of force against the
33
territorial integrity or political independence ofany state. " After many decades
of debate, that provision has been amplified by the General Assembly resolution
entitled Definition of Aggression. This Resolution provides in its Article 1
that "[ajggression is the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty,
3S
territorial integrity or political independence of another State . . ."' but also
specifies, in Article 3(a), that the following qualify as acts of aggression:
The invasion or attack by the armed forces ofa State ofthe territory ofanother
State, or any military occupation, however temporary, resulting from such
invasion or attack, or any annexation by the use offorce ofthe territory ofanother
State or part thereof.
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Moreover, Article 5(2) of the resolution states that "[a] war of aggression is
a crime against international peace. Aggression gives rise to international
responsibility." It seems indisputable that Saddam Hussein has been guilty of
this international crime and that he could have been indicted and tried therefor.
In addition, it is equally clear that he has been guilty not only of planning,
preparing, initiating, and waging a war of aggression against Kuwait, but also
that his actions have been in violation of international treaties and agreements
to which both Iraq and Kuwait were Parties.
Article 6(b) of the London Charter states:
War crimes: namely, violations ofthe laws or customs ofwar. Such violations shall
include, but not be limited to, murder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave labor
or for any other purpose of civilian population ofor in occupied territory, murder
or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing of hostages,
plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns or
38
villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity.
Both Article 147 ofthe 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection
39
of Civilian Persons in Time of War and Article 130 of the 1949 Geneva
40
Prisoner of War Convention, to which Iraq and Kuwait (as well as most
countries of the world) are Parties, list as "grave breaches" almost all of the acts
listed in Article 6(b) of the London Charter, as well as a number of additional
acts. Thus, a court trying war crimes cases today is even better supplied with
specifications of substantive international criminal law than were the courts
which tried those cases after World War II.
41
Iraqi troops invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990. United States milita
forces were ordered to the Persian Gulf five days later, on August 7, 1990.
43
Saddam Hussein announced the annexation of Kuwait on August 8, 1990.
After World War II the contention was frequently advanced that because an
invaded country had been incorporated into Germany, the law of war, and
specifically the law of military occupation, no longer offered protection to the
inhabitants of the occupied territory. Concerning this contention the IMT said:
In the view of the Tribunal it is unnecessary in this case to decide whether this
doctrine of subjugation, dependent as it is upon military conquest, has any
application where the subjugation is the result ofthe crime ofaggressive war. The
doctrine was never considered to be applicable so long as there was an army in
the field attempting to restore the occupied countries to their true owners. . .
The subjugation ofKuwait by Iraq was, without question, "the result of the
crime of aggressive war"—but was there an army in the field, opposing Iraq, on
August 8, 1990? The answer to that question must be in the negative. Kuwait
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had been overrun and its army had disintegrated. Undoubtedly, Saudi Arabia
had mobilized its armed forces prior to this date, and had an army in the field;
but that army was mobilized solely for self-defense against an Iraqi attack. It was
not to "restore [Kuwait] to its true owners." While it might be urged that the
United States forces (and those of the other nations which soon assembled in
Saudi Arabia, on the Iraqi border) were "an army in the field," at that time those
forces lacked both national and international authority to restore Kuwait to the
Kuwaitis. This raises the issue which the IMT felt it unnecessary to decide: Does
the doctrine ofsubjugation apply where the subjugation is the result ofa criminal
war of aggression? Or, as in the context of this particular problem, does the law
ofwar protect civilian inhabitants (and prisoners ofwar) of a country victimized
by a war of aggression and formally annexed by the aggressor?
The doctrine applied by the IMT, that there could be no annexation of
occupied territory while there was an opposing army in the field, was based
upon the principle that any annexation announced before the conflict had fully
terminated and peace had been restored was unlawful. Today, Article 5(3) of
the Definition of Aggression states that "[n]o territorial acquisition or special
advantage resulting from aggression is or shall be recognized as lawful." While
it is true that resolutions of the General Assembly of the United Nations are not
binding, it would certainly appear that the provision with respect to aggression
quoted above is an expression of present-day customary international law. In
other words, it is a principle ofcustomary international law that there can be no
lawful annexation resulting from an aggressive war; ergo Iraq's annexation of
Kuwait was unlawful. Moreover, Security Council Resolution 662, adopted on
August 9, 1990, stated that the Security Council, "[d\ecides that the annexation
of Kuwait by Iraq under any form and whatever pretext has no legal validity,
46
and is considered null and void." In this Resolution, the Security Council also
.47
decided "to continue its efforts to put an early end to the occupation.'"
If the annexation was unlawful, then the status of Kuwait continued to be
one of military occupation, a status which began on August 2, 1990, and which
continued thereafter despite Iraq's unlawful attempt to change it to one of
ownership by annexation on August 8, 1990. Moreover, Article 47 of the 1949
Geneva Civilians Convention provides," [protected persons who are in
occupied territory shall not be deprived, in any case or in any manner
whatsoever, of the benefits of the present Convention ... by any annexation '
by the latter [Occupying Power] of the whole or part of the occupied
, • ,,48
territory.
Accordingly, it must be concluded that the annexation ofKuwait by Iraq was
a nullity, and that subsequent to August 2, 1990, Iraq was bound by the law of
war and, specifically, by the law of military occupation.
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IV. Substantive Evidence of Iraqi Offenses
A. Violations of the Rights of Foreign Nationals and Protected Persons
49
The 1907 Hague Regulations and the two 1949 Geneva Conventions
referred to above, contain provisions which, as will be discussed later, were
violated by the Iraqi army in Kuwait and in Iraq. The violations occurred both
before and after the unlawful annexation. Convincing evidence ofthese offenses
was collected and evaluated by the appropriate authorities during the course of,
50
and after the hostilities. Moreover, information with respect to numerous
offenses against the law of war was available through the media, including the
51
official Iraqi television, and from a report prepared by Amnesty International.
When Iraq invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990, there were many Americans
and other foreign nationals in both Kuwait and Iraq. As these individuals were
not allowed to leave Iraq, they had the status of "protected persons" and were
entitled to all of the protections afforded by the 1949 Geneva Civilians
Convention. Articles 48 and 35 thereof provide that protected persons "who
are not nationals of the Power whose territory is occupied" have the right to
leave the occupied territory, "unless their departure is contrary to the national
interests of the State."" The exception was included primarily to enable a State
to prevent neutral persons, who were important to its economy, from leaving
the occupied territory. Its purpose was not to enable a belligerent to detain such
53
individuals as hostages. The United States nationals, among others, were not
only compelled to remain in Kuwait and in Iraq in violation of Article 48, but
they were held there as hostages. This was well publicized and verified by the
returnees, and constituted a violation of Article 134 of the Geneva Civilians
Convention. This Convention specifically prohibits the taking of hostages and
Article 1 47 makes such action a "grave breach" ofthat Convention. Moreover,
these hostages were frequendy forced to remain in military installations and
armament factories (including those producing chemical weapons), in an effort
to deter the Coalition armed forces from attacking these sites by air
bombardment. This violated Article 28 of that Convention which specifically
prohibits using protected persons "to render certain points or areas immune
from military operations."
There have been reports that thousands of persons, foreign, Kuwaiti, and
Iraqi, who were in Kuwait as refugees from Iraq, were deported from Kuwait
to Iraq. This was a violation of Article 49 of the 1949 Geneva Civilians
Convention which prohibits "[i]ndividual or mass forcible transfers, as well as
deportations ofprotected persons from occupied territory to the territory of the
Occupying Power ..." Furthermore, Article 147 provides that a violation of
this provision is a "grave breach" of the Convention—a war crime.
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B. Other Human Rights Violations
In referring to the massive violations of human rights which occurred in
Kuwait immediately after the Iraqi invasion and occupation of that country, the
Amnesty International Report contains the following statement, " [t]hese include
the arbitrary arrest and detention without trial of thousands of civilians and
[Kuwaiti] military personnel; the widespread torture ofsuch persons in custody;
the imposition of the death penalty and the extrajudicial execution of hundreds
of unarmed civilians, including children."
Murder and torture are specifically prohibited by Article 32 of the 1949
Geneva Civilians Convention and both are listed among the "grave breaches"
of Article 147. According to the Amnesty International Report, hundreds of
extrajudicial executions were carried out. ' Some of these were apparently
occasioned by the refusal of the Kuwaiti citizens involved to pledge allegiance
to Saddam Hussein. Civilians detained by the Iraqis were required to pledge
such allegiance in order to obtain their freedom. Article 45 of the 1907 Hague
Regulations forbids compelling the inhabitants of occupied territory to swear
allegiance to the hostile Power.
The Amnesty International Report also indicates that:
[Widespread destruction and looting of public and private property was carried
out. Most critical of these has been the looting of medicines, medical equipment
and food supplies. The massive scale of destruction and looting which has been
reported suggests that such incidents were neither arbitrary nor isolated, but rather
reflected a policy adopted by the government of Iraq.
These actions violated Article 23(g) of the 1907 Hague Regulations, which
prohibits wanton destruction of property; Articles 46 and 56 thereof which
protect private property and that of municipalities and institutions; and Article
47 ofthose Regulations, which prohibits pillage. Article 53 ofthe 1 949 Geneva
Civilians Convention likewise prohibits the destruction and appropriation of
real or personal property notjustified by military necessity and Article 147 makes
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such destruction or appropriation a "grave breach" of that Convention.
Iraqi television is reported to have shown two captured American airmen
being paraded through the streets of Baghdad. It also conducted on-screen
interviews of prisoners of war from the United States and other Coalition
nations. Both of these actions were violations of Article 13 of the 1949 Geneva
Prisoner of War Convention which specifically provides that prisoners of war
must be protected against "intimidation and against insults and public
curiosity." ' Similar actions during World War II resulted in a number of
convictions for violations of this aspect of the laws and customs of war.
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Moreover, in the first few interviews each ofthe prisoners ofwar looked battered
and bewildered and made a statement favorable to Iraq—which would seem to
indicate that at least some of the prisoners, ifnot all, had either been coerced by
force or drugged.
Iraq announced that it had placed prisoners ofwar in economic and scientific
centers. As in the 1949 Geneva Civilians Convention, the 1949 Geneva Prisoner
ofWar Convention, in its Article 23(1), specifically prohibits using the presence
of prisoners of war "to render certain points or areas immune from military
, 568
operations.
War crimes trials conducted after World War II demonstrated that where
there was a general pattern of violations of the law of war, it was the result of
orders emanating from the top echelons of leadership—in this case, Saddam
Hussein and his agents. It was on this basis that many ofthe higher-ranking Nazi
officials were convicted of conventional war crimes. This rule of customary
international law has now been incorporated into conventional international
law. Article 29 of the 1949 Geneva Civilians Convention states, "[t]he Party to
the conflict in whose hands protected persons may be, is responsible for the
treatment accorded to them by its agents, irrespective of any individual
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responsibility which may be incurred." Articles 12(1) and 131 of the 1949
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Geneva Prisoner ofWar Convention are to the same effect.
No attempt has been made to list and discuss every war crime that may have
been committed by Iraq. However, those that have been enumerated indicate
an almost total disregard for the provisions of the customary and conventional
law of war. When the Coalition captured its first Iraqi armed soldiers, the men
who composed the anti-aircraft crews on the oil platforms off the coast of
Kuwait, the United States informed the Iraqi Government that the Coalition
would comply with the 1949 Geneva Prisoner ofWar Convention and that it
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expected the same ofIraq. However, based upon the non-compliance by both
sides during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), it was undoubtedly realized that
this Convention, as well as other law ofwar conventions, would be the subject
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of similar widespread violations by the Iraqis in this conflict. Referring back
to Article 6(b) of the London Charter, it will be found that with one or two
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exceptions (for example, the murder of persons on the high seas ), Saddam
Hussein and his followers have substantially violated that provision.
C. Wanton Environmental Destruction
The Governments have been exceedingly slow in drafting law-of-war
74
agreements, or even provisions, for protecting the environment. Concerning
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Iraqi actions against the environment the following was found:
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The Gulf was fouled when between seven and nine million barrels of oil were
discharged into it by Iraq. In the desert, five hundred and ninety oil wellheads
were damaged or destroyed: five hundred and eight ofthem were set on fire, and
the remaining eighty-two were damaged in such a manner that twenty-five to
fifty million barrels of oil flowed freely from them onto the desert floor. The result
was total devastation of the fragile desert ecological system and the pollution of
water sources critical to survival. . . .
From 9 to 12 July 1991, the Government ofCanada, in concert with the Secretary
General of the United Nations, hosted a conference of international experts in
Ottawa, Ontario, to consider the law of war implications of the environmental
devastation caused by the Iraqis. There was general agreement that the actions
cited constitute violations of the law of war, specifically:
a. Article 23(g) of the Annex to the 1907 Hague Convention IV Respecting
the Customs of War on Land of 18 October 1907, forbids the destruction of
"enemy property unless imperatively demanded by the necessities of war;" and,
b. Article 147 of the GC [1949 Geneva Civilians Convention], makes the
"extensive destruction ... of property, not justified by military necessity and
carried out unlawfully and wantonly" a grave breach.
Clearly, the oil well destruction by Iraq served no military purpose, but was
designed to wreck Kuwait's future, carrying a scorched earth policy to the
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extreme.
D. Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons
The use of chemical and biological weapons is worthy of attention. In 1925
a Protocol was drafted in Geneva prohibiting the use in war of asphyxiating,
poisonous or other gases, and of all analogous liquids, materials, or devices. It
also prohibits "the use of bacteriological methods of warfare." Iraq is a Party
to this Protocol as are most of the nations represented in the multilateral force
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which opposed Iraq. Nevertheless, Iraq has used poison gas against Iran and
against Kurdish and Shiite rebels in its own territory. It was apparendy well
supplied with this type of weapon and had threatened that in the event of
hostilities by the Coalition forces it would use poison gas not only against the
armed forces facing it, but also against Israel, which had played no part in the
confrontation. While Iraq did fire a number of missiles against Israel, they had
conventional warheads.
There are some claims that it did use gas or biological weapons during the
hostilities. If proven that Iraq did so, this will be one more treaty Iraq will have
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violated, and one more war crime or a crime against humanity to be charged
against Saddam Hussein and his agents.
Article 6(c) ofthe London Charter contains the following definition ofcrimes
against humanity:
Crimes against humanity: Namely, murder, extermination, enslavement,
deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population,
before or during the war, or persecutions on political, racial, or religious grounds
in execution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the
Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where
perpetrated.
With respect to this category of offenses, the IMT said, "from the beginning
of the war in 1939 war crimes were committed on a vast scale, which were also
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crimes against humanity." If one substitutes 1990 for 1939 in that statement,
it apdy describes the situation in Kuwait and, perhaps, in Iraq.
V. Conclusion
This essay has demonstrated that if custody of Saddam Hussein and the
members of his Military Council could be obtained, they could be charged and
tried for having committed crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against
humanity during the Iraqi invasion ofKuwait. To do so would require some or
all ofthe States which actively supported the actions against Iraq (or the Security
Council of the United Nations) to reach an agreement under which a Tribunal
would be established, evidence collected, charges made, and a trial, or trials,
conducted.
In any event, it is to be hoped that in the light ofthe experience in the Persian
Gulf, and the problems that Saddam Hussein has caused in the implementation
of the cease-fire resolution, should he or another rnilitary despot disturb the
peace of the world at some future date, the international community will not
commit the same mistake of not making him pay for his crimes.
Notes
1. Unfortunately, as so often happens, to have included a provision concerning trials for war crimes in
the terms of the cease fire enunciated in U.N. Doc. S/RES/687 (1991), would undoubtedly have lengthened
the period of hostilities. Eventually, this would have resulted in Saddam Hussein and other high ranking Iraqis
seeking refuge in a country that would have granted them asylum and would have refused to try or extradite
them as required by international agreements to which all of the States involved are Parties.
2. One eminent student of this area of international law has made a case for Saddam Hussein's
assassination. Robert F. Turner, Killing Saddam: Would It Be a Crime?, Wash. Post, Oct. 7, 1990, at Dl.
Although the word "assassination" is inherently repulsive, this is not an idea that should be dismissed out of
hand. Saddam Hussein was a uniformed member of the Iraqi Army and was, therefore, a legitimate target.
Killing him during the course of hostilities would have been a legitimate act of war and not an assassination.
During World War II the British in Africa mounted an unsuccessful operation in North Africa the sole purpose
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of which was to kill German Field Marshal Rommel and his staff. In the Pacific, the United States mounted
a successful operation aimed specifically at killing Japanese Admiral Yamamoto. (If the attempt to assassinate
Hider by members of the German resistance had been successful, World War II would have probably ended
a year or so earlier and thousands of lives might have been saved at the cost of one life, which was already
forfeited.)
3. One of the most extensive, if somewhat biased, reviews of the Persian Gulf Crisis of 1990-1991 can
be found in Greenpeace, On Impact: Modern Warfare and the Environment, A Case Study of the
Gulf War (1991) [hereinafter On Impact]. For a broad, general view of the matter, see John N. Moore,
War Crimes and the Rule of Law in the Gulf Crisis, 31 Va. J. INT'L L. 403 (1991). Moore properly concludes
that, "[p]erhaps the most important reason for holding war crimes trials in the Gulf crisis is that we must bring
deterrence home to totalitarian elites if we are to be most effective in avoiding aggressive war and human
rights violations." See id. at 405. Perhaps, if there had been war crimes trials after the Gulf Crisis, the leaders
of the various parts of the former Yugoslavia would have given more thought to compliance with the law of
war in the conflict in Bosnia; see also Jordan J. Paust, Suing Saddam: Private Remedies for War Crimes and
Hostage-Taking, 31 Va. J. INTL L. 351 (1991).
4. Charter of the International Military Tribunal attached to the Agreement for the Prosecution and
Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 27
[hereinafter Charter of the International Military Tribunal]; Howard S. LEVIE, TERRORISM IN WAR: The
Law OF War Crimes 549 (1993) [hereinafter War Crimes]. The Charter was drafted by representatives of
France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The Agreement to which it was
attached was subsequently adhered to by nineteen other nations. See id. at 51.
5. See e.g., Allied Control Council Law No. 10, Dec. 20, 1945, 15 Trials of War Criminals Before
the Nuremberg Military Tribunals 23 (1947) (hereinafter Trials of War Criminals); see also War
Crimes, supra note 4, at 558.
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S/RES/827 (1993), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1203 (1993).
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Enforcing The Third Geneva Convention On
The Humanitarian Treatment Of
Prisoners Of War
7 United States Air Force AcademyJournal of Legal Studies 37 (1997)
During the period of early history, through the Biblical days, the Egyptian,
Greek, and Roman empires, and the Crusades, and well into the Middle
Ages, there was no protection for individuals taken prisoner in conflict and they
were either killed or enslaved. It was not until well into the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries that it began to be accepted that prisoners of war were
merely unfortunate human beings who were being held in custody solely to
1
prevent them from once again engaging in the hostilities. While this resulted
in some bilateral agreements touching on the subject, the first multilateral
attempt to legislate in this area was Chapter II of the Regulations Attached to
2
the 1899 Hague Convention No. II on the Laws and Customs ofWar on Land,
a document containing 17 articles with respect to prisoners of war. The 17
articles of Chapter II of the Regulations Attached to the 1907 Hague
Convention No. IV on the Laws and Customs ofWar on Land were, for all
practical purposes, identical to those of 1899. The provision of these two
instruments most relevant to our discussion is Article 4(2) which provides that:
"They [i.e., prisoners of war] must be humanely treated." Although these
Conventions had no penal provisions as such, after both World War I and World
War II individuals were tried and convicted for what amounted to violations of
their provisions.
During the course of World War I the provisions of the 1907 Hague IV
Convention relating to the protection of prisoners of war were found to be so
inadequate that a great number of bilateral and multilateral agreements on the
subject were drafted and entered into by the opposing belligerents. Then in
1929, as an aftermath ofWorld War I, the International Committee of the Red
Cross (the ICRC), which had previously been concerned solely with the sick
and wounded ofarmed forces in the field and at sea, entered the prisoner-of-war
arena by sponsoring the 1929 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment
of Prisoners of War ; and World War II was followed by four new
ICRC-sponsored conventions, the third of which was the 1949 Geneva
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Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners ofWar. It is with this 1949
Third Geneva Convention that we will be primarily concerned. In view of the
breadth of the subject-matters covered by the 1949 Geneva Convention
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, this discussion will be limited
to the provisions relevant to "deterring humanitarian law violations" and to
Q
those "strengthening enforcement" of those provisions.
First, some statistics: as of31 December 1995 there were 185 members of the
United Nations. At that same time, there were 186 States Parties to the 1949
Geneva Conventions. The only members of the United Nations, or Parties to
the Statute of the International Court ofJustice, who were not Parties to these
Conventions were Eritrea, Lithuania, Marshall Islands, and Nauru. The near
universality ofthese conventions is obvious and it is probably not an exaggeration
to say that they are now part ofthe customary law ofwar, binding on all nations,
whether or not they are Parties thereto.
There are a number of articles of the 1949 Third Geneva Convention which
are worthy of mention in the context of our study as they establish either the
coverage of the Convention or the substantive humanitarian rule which is to be
followed. Thus, Article 1 is short and to the point: "The High Contracting
Parties undertake to respect and to ensure respect for the present Convention
in all circumstances." Note that not only does a Party itselfundertake to respect
the provisions of the Convention, it is responsible for ensuring respect thereof
by its people, civilian and military, and by other Parties, including the belligerents
when it is a neutral and its allies when it is a co-belligerent. This latter is not
always an easy task, as the United States learned in Vietnam.
Article 2 specifies when the Convention is applicable. First, it is applicable
in all cases ofdeclared war or ofany other armed conflict which may arise between
two or more of the High Contracting Parties even if the state of war is not
recognized by one of them.
The latter part of this provision has increased in importance because of the
fact that although there have been more than a hundred international armed
conflicts since the end ofWorld War II, there have been no declarations ofwar
since that of the Soviet Union against Japan in August 1945 and there have,
therefore, been no formal acts recognizing the existence of a state of war.
Second, the Convention is applicable in the case of a military occupation,
even if that occupation is not resisted; and, third, the general participation (si
omnes) clause of the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions is specifically rejected
and the Convention is applicable as between States Parties thereto even if one
of the belligerents is not a Party to the Convention. In view of the wide
acceptance of this Convention, this provision, which was of major importance
Third Geneva Convention 461
when adopted, has lost that status. Its importance when drafted is evidenced by
the fact that in his 1948 dissent in the trial of the major Japanese war criminals
by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Justice Pal ofIndia found
that during World War II in the Pacific Japan was not bound by the rules set
forth in the 1907 Hague Convention No. IV and its annexed Regulations
12
because Bulgaria and Italy were not Parties to that Convention.
Article 4 of the 1949 Third Geneva Convention is an extremely lengthy
article which specifies the numerous classes of individuals who are entided to
prisoner-of-war status when they fall into the power of the enemy. For the
purposes of the present study it may be assumed that at the time of the alleged
violation of the humanitarian provisions of the Convention the victims were
prisoners ofwar and that at the time ofthe prosecution for that alleged violation
of the humanitarian provisions of the Convention, the accused were entitled to
13
the status of prisoners of war.
Article 5 has two very important provisions. Its first paragraph provides that
the Convention is applicable "from the time they [i.e., persons entitled to
prisoner-of-war status] fall into the power of the enemy until their final release
and repatriation." The North Koreans and the Chinese Communists in Korea
contended that a prisoner of war was not entitled to the benefits of the
Convention until he had "repented"—which meant that he had accepted
Communist indoctrination ; and the North Vietnamese contended that,
although no American prisoners of war had been tried, they were all war
criminals captured in flagrante delicto and, therefore, were not entitled to the
protection of the Convention. Neither of these contentions was legally valid.
Moreover, the second paragraph of that article specifically provides that if there
is a dispute as to the entidement to prisoner-of-war status, the individual is
entided to the protection of the provisions of the Convention until his status
has been determined by a competent tribunal. No such determinations were
made in either North Korea or North Vietnam, but prisoners of war held by
those entities were denied the protection ofthe provisions ofthe Convention.
Article 8 is concerned with the operations of the Protecting Power, the
neutral Power which represents a belligerent in the territory of its enemy and
which has the very important responsibility of ensuring that prisoners of war
receive the humane treatment and other protections to which they are entitled
under the provisions of the 1949 Third Geneva Convention. A Protecting
Power is selected by the belligerent which it is to represent and it must be
acceptable to the belligerent in whose territory it is to operate. While most
belligerents had Protecting Powers during World War II, the 1982 Falklands
War is the only real instance of the designation, acceptance, and functioning of
Protecting Powers during hostilities since 1949 despite the great number of
international wars which have occurred since that time. ' This is, indeed, a
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tragedy, as the mere existence of a Protecting Power is frequently sufficient to
ensure more humane treatment for prisoners of war.
Article 9 provides that nothing in the Convention is to be considered as
adversely affecting the humanitarian activities of the ICRC, or of any other
impartial humanitarian organization, which activities are, however, subject to
the consent of the belligerent concerned. In Korea the ICRC was allowed to
perform its normal functions of inspecting prisoner-of-war camps, consulting
individual prisoners ofwar, providing reliefsupplies, etc., by the United Nations
Command in South Korea, but it was not permitted to function in North Korea.
In Vietnam the ICRC was allowed to perform its normal functions in South
Vietnam, but it was not permitted to function in North Vietnam. During the
hostilities in Vietnam one well-known academic took the position that an
anti-war group ofwhich he was a member was such an "impartial humanitarian
organization." The present author strongly challenged that conclusion.
During the Iran-Iraq War there were not only no Protecting Powers, but both
countries frequendy denied the International Committee of the Red Cross
access to its prisoner-of-war camps. Eventually, the Secretary-General of the
United Nations sent a special mission to inspect the prisoner-of-war camps in
both countries and numerous violations of the provisions of the 1949 Third
20
Geneva Convention were found to have been committed by both sides.
The 1949 Third Geneva Convention contains a number of substantive
provisions which define certain inhumane conduct towards prisoners of war as
punishable. Thus, Article 13 provides:
Any unlawful act or omission by the Detaining Power causing death or seriously
endangering the health of a prisoner of war in its custody is prohibited and will
be regarded as a serious breach of the present Convention. In particular, no
prisoner ofwar may be subjected to physical mutilation or to medical or scientific
experiments ofany kind which are not justified by the medical, dental or hospital
22
treatment of the prisoner concerned and carried out in his interest.
Likewise, prisoners of war must at all times be protected, particularly against acts
23
of violence and against insults and public curiosity.
OA
Measures of reprisal against prisoners of war are prohibited.
And Article 130 states:
Grave breaches to which the preceding Article relates shall be those involving any
of the following acts, if committed against persons or property protected by the
Convention: wilful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including biological
experiments, wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health,
compelling a prisoner ofwar to serve in the forces ofthe hostile Power, or wilfully
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depriving a prisoner ofwar of the rights of fair and regular trial prescribed in this
Convention.
These two articles refer specifically to serious or grave breaches of the
provisions of the 1949 Third Geneva Convention. Article 129(1) of that
Convention requires States Party "to enact legislation necessary to provide
effective penal sanctions for persons committing, or ordering to be committed,
any of the grave breaches" defined in Article 130. Based upon the precedents
of post-Worid War II, this provision was unnecessary. A violation of a
prohibitive provision of a law-of-war convention is a war crime; a war crime is
punishable as a violation of international law; the punishment to be assessed for
27
the commission ofa war crime is within the discretion ofthe trial court. Article
129(3) requires each State Party to take measures for the punishment of all
violations ofthe 1949 Third Geneva Convention other than the grave breaches.
Thus, violations of other provisions of the Convention such as, for example,
those contained in Articles 14, 16, 17, 23, 26, 34, 52, etc., are likewise punishable
offenses, although the international community considers them to be on a lesser
28
level of importance than violations of the provisions of Articles 13 and 130.
There will be little difficulty in identifying the acts which constitute violations
of the substantive provisions of the 1949 Third Geneva Convention.
Unfortunately, the procedural provisions of that Convention, while easily
identified, may present some problems of application.
Articles 82-88 and 99-107 set forth rules which are intended to ensure that
any prisoner of war who is subjected to a judicial proceeding by the Detaining
Power, whether for a pre-capture or a post-capture offense, will receive a fair
29
trial. Most of those provisions should cause no difficulty of implementation.
However, there are two which will.
Article 63 of the 1929 Geneva Prisoner-of-War Convention provided:
A sentence shall only be pronounced on a prisoner ofwar by the same tribunals
and in accordance with the same procedure as in the case ofpersons belonging to
the armed forces of the detaining Power.
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In the Yamashita Case the United States Supreme Court held that this
provision was directed at post-capture offenses only and did not apply to trials
for pre-capture offenses (war crimes). This ruling was followed by all of the
courts before which the issue was raised in the war crimes cases tried after World
War II with the result that those cases were not tried by courts-martial, but by
military tribunals, military commissions, and other specially established courts,
each with its own rules concerning procedure and, particularly, the admission
of evidence.
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Apparently the participants in the Diplomatic Conference which drafted the
1949 Third Geneva Convention desired to make its provisions applicable to
pre-capture, as well as post-capture, offenses. To accomplish this end they
included in that Convention Article 102 which, for all practical purposes, is
identical with Article 63 ofthe 1929 Geneva Prisoner-of-War Convention; then
they drafted a new provision to be found in Article 85 ofthe 1949 Third Geneva
Convention, which states:
Prisoners of war prosecuted under the laws of the Detaining Power for acts
committed prior to capture shall retain, even if convicted, the benefits of the
32
present Convention.
It would appear that the draftsmen were attempting to provide that when
prisoners of war are tried for pre-capture offenses, that is, for war crimes, they
would, in accordance with the provisions of Article 102, be entitled to be tried
"by the same courts according to the same procedure as in the case ofmembers
of the armed forces of the Detaining Power"—which means that the draftsmen
of the Convention were adopting a rule contrary to that laid down in the
33
Yamashita Case. Of course, such trials could still be conducted by military
commissions or other specially created tribunals—but only if members of the
armed forces of the Detaining Power could be tried by such commissions or
tribunals.
There is one possible view of Article 85 of the 1949 Third Geneva
Convention which might result in its being interpreted differendy. As we have
seen, that article refers to prisoners of war "prosecuted under the laws of the
Detaining Power." When a prosecution is for a violation of a provision of the
1949 Third Geneva Convention, is it based on "the laws of the Detaining
Power" or is it based on international law? The International Committee of the
Red Cross urges very strongly that such a prosecution is based on national law,
particularly for a country like the United States where treaties are part of the
supreme law of the land. On the other hand, it is often argued: (1) that the
post-World War II war crimes trials established the precedent that war crimes
were and are violations ofinternational law; (2) that it would be difficult to find
a national statute which, for example, prohibited compelling a prisoner of war
to serve in the forces of the Capturing Power, or the denial of quarter, or the
use of prisoner-of-war labor in a munitions factory; and (3) that the fact that
Article 99 ofthe 1949 Third Geneva Convention prohibits the trial ofa prisoner
of war for an act not "forbidden by the law of the Detaining Power or by
International Law,"' while Article 85 of that Convention refers only to "the
laws of the Detaining Power," indicates that the draftsmen did not intend
prosecutions under international law to be covered by the provisions of Article
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85 and that, therefore, the decision in the Yamashita Case, and like cases,
continues to apply. This appears to be a problem of interpretation which will
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only be resolved when courts are actually presented with the problem.
It is apparent that in any future war crimes trials there will be little opportunity
to advance the contention that the offense charged is subject to the claim of
being ex post facto; and that, under the post-war situation which normally
prevails, prosecutions in common law countries will be much more difficult to
conduct if there must be compliance with the strict common law rules of
evidence. However, all in all, it may certainly be said that while some of the
provisions of the 1949 Third Geneva Convention are intended to protect the
helpless prisoner of war from unfair prosecutions, the specific aim of many of
those provisions is to "deter humanitarian law violations" and to "strengthen
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indiscriminate merchant ship sinkings as (Spanish Civil War), 313, 333nl21
merchantmen gun crews to be treated as (Germany, WW I), 301, 329n59, 330n73
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special arrangements between belligerents, 73, 86nn97-98
training/protective equipment, 70, 85n87
working conditions as disciplinary measure, 71, 85n90
working hours/holidays/vacations, 73-74, 86nnl01-103
permitted types of work
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Index 501
exchange of prisoners, 174, 175, 186n4-5, 187nl5
in Falklands Crisis, 209-211
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pre-World War I, 29-31, 138, 47nn(3-4, 8)
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1929 Geneva Convention, uneven application of, 32-34, 48nnl5-18
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prisoners of war, safeguarding
death or serious injury of, 42
ICRC draft Prisoner ofWar Convention (1921), 32
injury or disease from assigned work, 41
POW camps, inspection of(WW I), 47nn(10, 12)
POW money/rights/privileges, 40-42
prisoners' representative, approval/rejection of, 42
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316, 334nnl40
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in Yugoslavia International Tribunal, 422, 434nn86-88
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Russia. See Russia, Imperial; Soviet Union
Russia, Imperial
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See also Russo-Japanese War; Soviet Union
Russo-Japanese War
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Sabotage
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Terrorist and Sabotage Decree (Nazi Germany), 376
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Protecting Powers in, 30, 47n8
Shimonoseki, Armistice of, 19
Sino-Soviet War
Protecting Powers in, 30
Skorzeny, Otto
use of U.S. uniforms in Battle of the Bulge (WW II), 351n43
South Vietnam. See Prisoners of war, maltreatment of (Vietnam War); Vietnam War
Soviet Union
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German POWs, maltreatment of, 96-97, 376
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constraints on armed belligerent merchantmen, 301, 302, 328n29
submarine warfare ignored in, 296
warships in neutral waters, time allowed for, 301, 329n57
League of Nations
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London Naval Conferences
See London Naval Conference/Treaty (1930); London Naval Conference/Treaty
(1935-1936); Proces-Verbal
merchantmen, armed
and abolition of privateering, 304, 305, 330n73
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U.S. protests neutral flags as disguise, 299, 329n43
World War II (general)
failure of international law during (commentary), 321, 336nnl65
law of war and unrestricted submarine warfare, 162nl45
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Levie comment on, 386n54
See also Nuremberg International Military Tribunal (IMT); War crimes (various)
Sverdlovsk catastrophe (Soviet Union, 1980), 260, 267nn81
Target-area bombing, 110-111, 127nnl36-139
Terrorists
argument of bias toward (1977 Protocol I), 342-343, 350nn25-2
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